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D. SEYFORT RUEGG

AN INDIAN SOURCE FOR THE TIBETAN HERMENEUTICAL TERM *DGOṄS GŽI* ‘INTENTIONAL GROUND’

In a recent issue of this Journal the present writer published an article on the Tibetan term *dgoṅs gži*, a word used by the Tibetan hermeneuticians to designate the ultimately intended, but not immediately conveyed, purport or import of an utterance described as *ābhiprāyika* ‘intentional’ — or ‘allusive’ — and as involving the cancellation or neutralization of the utterance’s directly expressed surface meaning (*dṅos la gnod byed*: *mukhyārthabādha*), the one that is prima facie conveyed to the addressee. As such, the *dgoṅs gži* can be described as the ‘deep meaning’ of an *ābhiprāyika* utterance (and of one that is described as *neyārtha* = *draṅ* [*ba’i*] *don* or *bkri ba’i don*), inasmuch as the latter requires to be interpreted in a sense other than the obvious surface meaning in order to elicit its intended sense.[1] In that article it was suggested that, as a term designating one of the three criterial factors required for establishing that an utterance is *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha* in the frame of a given system of philosophical hermeneutics,[2] the compound word *dgoṅs gži* may have been a terminological development of the Tibetan hermeneuticians. Attention has nevertheless to be drawn to the source of this compound, the analytical expression *dgoṅs pa’i gži*.

In a passage of the *Prasphuṭapadā*, a commentary by Dharmamitra (*c.* 800) on Haribhadra’s *Vṛtti* on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*,[3] we read in Chapter vii (Peking edition of the bsTan ’gyur, mDo ’grel, volume ña, fol. 105b—106a; sDe dge edition, Šes phyin, volume ña, fol. 91a5—6):

rtag pa daṅ chad pa la sogs pa’i lta ba las (*b*)*zlog pa’i phyir bdag daṅ kun gži sogs pa ni/ chos kyi dbyiṅs dgoṅs pa’i gžir bžag las . . .*

‘In order to remove views (*dṛṣṭi*) such as the eternalist (*śāśvata*) and nihilist (*uccheda*) ones, [teachings given in the canon pertaining to an]

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ātman, ālaya[*vijñāna*], etc., took as [their] intentional ground the *dharmadhātu* . . .'

This passage from the *Prasphuṭapadā* provides a valuable parallel to explanations later given by the Tibetan hermeneuticians of the Madhyamaka school according to which canonical allusions both to an *ātman* and to the *ālayavijñāna* (and also sometimes even to the *tathāgatagarbha*) are *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha* utterances that are governed by specific — and legitimate — salvific motives (*prayojana* = *dgos pa*) of the Buddha and have as their *dgoṅs gži* 'intentional ground' non-substantiality (*nairātmya*), Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and ultimate reality (*bhūtakoṭi*), that is, equivalents of *dharmadhātu* in Dharmamitra's text.[4]

It is true that no reference has been explicitly made here by Dharmamitra to the cancellation of the directly expressed surface meaning in favour of a deep meaning conveyed by indirection, or to the *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha* character (within the frame of the Mādhyamika's systematic interpretation of the total canonical corpus of the Buddha's teaching) of those teachings that bear on an *ātman* (for example in the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* and in other doctrinally related Sūtras) or on the *ālayavijñāna* (in Sūtras linked with the Vijñānavāda). However, the notion of motive (*prayojana*) — which is, together with the *dgoṅs gži*, the second fundamental criterial condition that must be satisfied to establish that an utterance is *ābhiprāyika* and *neyārtha* — is very clearly represented in the *Prasphuṭapadā* by the words 'in order to remove views such as the eternalist and nihilist ones'.

Since the compound *dgoṅs gži* regularly employed by the Tibetan hermeneuticians is simply a convenient abbreviation of the analytical expression *dgoṅs pa'i gži*, this passage of the *Prasphuṭapadā* provides us with a ninth-century source both for the 'intentional ground' in the hermeneutical theory discussed earlier and for the term *dgoṅs gži* that designates it.

Because the Sanskrit original of the *Prasphuṭapadā* is not available, the exact Sanskrit equivalent of the expression *dgoṅs pa'i gži* unfortunately remains uncertain, and all that can be said at present on the basis of the materials available to this writer is that it presumably contained the word *abhiprāya* or a derivative of this word. It is to be hoped that the precise Sanskrit form can sooner or later be located in some text the Sanskrit original of which is extant. As the Sanskrit equivalent of *dgoṅs pa'i gži, abhipreta-vastu* might be tentatively suggested.

In closing, attention can be drawn to interesting parallels between Buddhist hermeneutical terminology in Sanskrit and Tibetan and some Greek terms. Thus, to *abhiprāya* = *dgoṅs pa* 'intention, purport' there correspond *νοῦς*, *διάνοια* and *βούλημα*. And *ὑπόνοια* corresponds not only to this term but also to *dgoṅs pa'i gži*.[5] These are parallels and it is being suggested neither that the Buddhist and Greek theories converge nor that one is derived from the other. (If ultimately the English word 'intentional' is felt to be inappropriate to render Sanskrit *ābhiprāyika* and Tibetan *dgoṅs pa can* because of its semantic overlap with the word 'deliberate', 'dianoetic' could be introduced to express what is denoted by these terms in their wider use. And when the reference is specifically to a covert 'intentional ground', i.e. to one not immediately conveyed to the addressee of an utterance, 'hyponoetic' could be introduced to express this meaning. It should however be noted that the Greek words *διανοητικός* and *ὑπονοητικός* do not appear to be attested as adjectives to the above-mentioned Greek hermeneutical terms. If we wish to avoid employing such neologisms, the word 'allusive' can be used to paraphrase *ābhiprāyika* = *dgoṅs pa can*.)

NOTES

[1] See D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'Purport, Implicature and Presupposition: Sanskrit *abhiprāya* and Tibetan *dgoṅs pa/dgoṅs gži* as Hermeneutical Concepts', *JIP* **13** (1985), 309—25.

[2] With the Tibetan hermeneuticians these criterial factors are, in addition to the *dgoṅs gži*, the motive (*dgos pa* = *prayojana*) governing the giving of an *ābhiprāyika* teaching and systematic incompatibility with the primary and directly expressed meaning of a text-passage (*dṅos la gnod byed*: *mukhyārthabādha*).

[3] On Dharmamitra and his *Abhisamayālaṃkārakārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā Prasphutapadā*, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, 'The *gotra, ekayāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā According to Dharmamitra and Abhayākaragupta', in L. Lancaster (ed.), *The Prajñāpāramitā and related systems* (Studies in honour of E. Conze, Berkeley, 1977), p. 283ff.

[4] This idea can be found already in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Chap. ii (ed. B. Nanjio, pp.

78—79), as well as in Candrakīrti's observations in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* (vi. 42, 85 and 95f). But the hermeneutical theory based on the three criterial conditions mentioned above was only fully elaborated later.

[5] See for example H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale*, i (Paris, 1959), especially p. 373ff, 382—3, 392 Note 3, and also ii/2 (Paris, 1964), p. 182ff (on the problem of the *integumentum* and *involucrum*, and *exegesis per integumentum*). See also recently M. Harl, *Origène: Philocalie 1—20* (Paris, 1983), pp. 47 (on the 'spirit' of a text as opposed to its literal meaning, the *lexis* (λέξις) or *historia* (ἱστορία), 122 (on *huponoia* (ὑπόνοια) as the hidden sense of a text).

RICHARD P. HAYES

PRINCIPLED ATHEISM IN THE BUDDHIST SCHOLASTIC TRADITION

0. INTRODUCTION

In their systematic presentations of religious philosophy, the Indian Buddhists consistently defended the position that belief in an eternal creator god who superintends his creation and looks after the concerns of his creatures is a distraction from the central task of the religious life. This was clearly the position taken in the early Pāli literature and in the Theravāda philosophy based on that literature, but even in the later Mahāyāna writings such as the Lotus Sūtra and the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, in which buddhahood is portrayed not as a feature of the isolated career of Siddhārtha Gautama but rather as a constant feature of the entire cosmos at all times, great care is taken to try to distinguish the concept of the cosmic Buddha-nature in the forms of Dharmakāya or Tathāgatagarbha from the concept of a creator god. The Buddhists were, for whatever reasons, eager to avoid falling into a theistic position. The motivation behind the present paper has been to discover what those reasons were.

Section 1 will outline how the issue of God's existence is treated in the early Buddhist literature, especially in the Suttapiṭaka, where systematic Buddhist philosophy begins. Section 2 will review the treatment of the question of divine creation as an issue in the systematic philosophy of such thinkers as Vasubandhu (400—480), Dharmakīrti (600—660), Śāntarakṣita (725—788) and Kamalaśīla (740—795). And section 3 will show how the arguments for atheism are isomorphic with the arguments for a variety of other positions to which the Buddhist philosophers were committed.

1.0. BUDDHIST ĀGAMAS ON THE QUESTION OF GOD

In the Nikāya literature, the question of the existence of God is treated primarily from either an epistemological point of view or a

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moral point of view. As a problem of epistemology, the question of God's existence amounts to a discussion of whether or not a religious seeker can be certain that there is a greatest good and that therefore his efforts to realize a greatest good will not be a pointless struggle towards an unrealistic goal. And as a problem in morality, the question amounts to a discussion of whether man himself is ultimately responsible for all the displeasure that he feels or whether there exists a superior being who inflicts displeasure upon man whether he deserves it or not.

An instance of the epistemological treatment of the question of the highest good occurs in the Tevijja Sutta, the thirteenth sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya. In this sutta there is an account of a dispute between two young brahmins, Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja, over the issue of which religious practices lead most directly to union with Brahmā. Brahmā is typically treated in the Nikāya literature as an object of brahmanical devotion who is believed by his devotees to be the master over whom no other being has mastery (abhibhū anabhibhūto), who sees everything (aññad-atthu-daso), the mighty one (vasavattī), who is lord, maker, designer, chief, creator, master and father of all beings that have been and of all beings that shall be (issaro kattā nimāttā seṭṭho sañjitā vasī pitā bhūtabhavyānam).[1] Moreover, companionship with Brahmā (Brahma-sahavyatā) is believed to be the state of salvation, and so whatever set of practices leads most directly to companionship with Brahmā may be considered the most direct path to salvation (añjasâyano niyyāniko).[2] But the brahmin students Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja have heard from their respective teachers differing accounts on which practices lead to the goal that they both desire. And so they decide to approach Gotama the Buddha to see whether he can decide which party is right in this very important dispute.

On being told the nature of the dispute between Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja, Gotama Buddha begins by asking the disputants a few questions of his own, and the answers to the questions show that the young brahmins believe that there are many alternative paths that lead to Brahmā, but the dispute is really over which path is most direct. On learning this much, Gotama Buddha then pursues the supposition that there are paths that lead men to meet Brahmā face to face. What, asks the Buddha, entitles us to believe that anyone meets Brahmā face to face? Prompted by Gotama's questions, the young brahmin's concede that no living brahmin teacher claims ever to have seen Brahmā face to face, nor has any living brahmin teacher's teacher, nor has any teacher in the lineage of teachers for the past seven generations. Moreover, not even the Ṛṣis, the ancient seers who made the Vedas available to man and whose words the brahmin priests learn and chant and transmit down through the generations, claim to have seen Brahmā face to face. What we have then, is the astonishing state of affairs in which the followers of the brahmanical religious tradition are striving towards a goal for the existence of which no one has any evidence. Their religious goal, says the Buddha, is laughable (hassaka), vain (rittaka) and empty (tucchaka).[3]

It is not only fellowship with God that is dismissed in this way. Very nearly the same treatment is given to a Jaina disciple and his teacher in the Cūḷa-Sakuladāyi-sutta and the Vekhanassa-sutta respectively, suttas seventy-nine and eighty in the Majjhima Nikāya. Here the Jainas are depicted as seeking after a "highest lustre," a lustre superior to which and more excellent than which there is nothing. On hearing of this unsurpassed lustre, the Buddha's response is exactly the same as his reaction to the idea of comradeship with the mighty lord and creator of all beings: he challenges the devotees to point to that to which they are devoted. When they cannot do so, Gotama spins out an analogy to illustrate to the devotees the nature of their search. They are, he says, like a young man who goes about saying "I love and cherish the loveliest woman in the land," but who cannot say whether she is of high birth or low, of pale complexion or dark, a city-dweller or a villager, and does not even know what her name is. In short, the poor fool does not know, directly or indirectly, the identity of the woman with whom he claims to be in love. We are entitled to wonder, then, whether he is really in love at all.

The Buddha's reaction to those who seek to meet the creator or who seek the unsurpassed lustre is not to deny that such things exist. Rather, it is to take the epistemologically cautious stand that even though the loveliest woman in the world may exist, one might very well see the person who uniquely answers to the description of the world's loveliest woman and yet not realize *that* she is the person who answers to that description. Furthermore, it is not clear how one could ever be certain that a given woman were the loveliest in the world, unless he could see every woman in the world and know that he had seen every woman. Similarly, it is not clear how a religious seeker could be sure that he had correctly identified the greatest lustre or the master over whom no other being has mastery. And, as we see in the Brahmajāla Sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya, the case can be made that people often misinterpret religious experiences and draw false conclusions from them, which should make one suspicious of even the very claims of direct experience of such things as unsurpassed masters. Until his identification of the supreme being is specific and certain, the religious seeker may be said to be pursuing such an ill-defined and nebulous goal that it becomes difficult to determine whether a given set of practices leads toward or away from the desired goal. In contrast, the goal of nirvāṇa towards which Gotama's disciples strive is sufficiently definite — the elimination of selfish desire and hostility — that a disciple can have a very clear idea of whether he has or has not reached it and whether he is or is not making progress toward it. It is a goal to be realized in this life, not in some future existence, says Gotama, and he makes no promises to anyone other than that nirvāṇa can be achieved by anyone who strives diligently to attain it. The definiteness of the goal of Buddhist striving is what makes that goal more worthy of pursuit than the goals of the Brāhmaṇas and the Jainas — this seems to be the message so tirelessly repeated in the Nikāyas. And so the Buddha Gotama is portrayed not as an atheist who claims to be able to prove God's nonexistence, but rather as a skeptic with respect to other teachers' claims to be able to lead their disciples to the highest good.

The above described reactions of the Buddha to the claims of other religious teachers are simply instances of his well-known aversion to speculative views concerning matters that are beyond man's ken. Speculation about such matters as whether the universe is beginningless or had a definite point at which it came into being was regarded as a distraction from pursuits closer at hand, and time spent thinking about such things was regarded as wasted time that could more profitably be spent on gradually ridding oneself of those counterproductive attitudes and beliefs that, when acted upon, bring further distress rather than the desired relief from the inconveniences of the human condition. That the attitude of the Buddha as portrayed in the Nikāyas is more anti-speculative than specifically atheistic is illustrated by a refrain that is frequently repeated in the Brahmajāla Sutta. Here Gotama the Buddha differentiates himself from other teachers on the grounds that he, unlike them, does not propound doctrines concerning the nature of the self after death. Furthermore, unlike other teachers, the Buddha realizes that "these dogmatic tenets thus taken up and thus embraced will lead to such and such consequences and will lead to such and such a destiny."[4] What the reader of this sutta is left to conclude is that if the consequences of embracing certain tenets about the existence of the self were healthy, then Gotama would certainly recommend that his followers embrace them; but, since he in fact repeatedly warns people to avoid embracing certain tenets, there must be something about them that he regards as unhealthy or counterproductive.

Some insight into why it is that Gotama regarded the belief in God as unhealthy, as an obstacle to spiritual progress, can be gained by looking at the Devadaha-sutta, the one hundred first discourse in the Majjhima Nikāya.[5] Here we find an enumeration of the types of reasons that people often give for why they experience pleasure and pain. Among the five reasons, one is that pleasure and pain are created by God (issara). This view is not refuted in the sutta in question, which is a polemical dialogue against the Jainas. All that is said is that *if* God creates pleasure and pain, then the Jainas are made by an evil creator who inflicts much suffering on them through their programme of austerities; the Buddha, on the other hand, feels only pleasant feelings in his dispassionate state, and so, if pleasure be created by God, then the Buddha's creator must be a kind one. The other theories, incidentally, as to why men experience pleasure and pain are that such experiences are (1) the result of actions done in the past, (2) the result of fate, (3) innate to certain species of beings, and (4) the outcome of efforts undertaken in the present life. A Buddhist monk, says this sutta, realizes that the source of all displeasure is self-centred craving (taṇhā), while the source of pleasure is nonattachment and dispassion. And so, while the reader is left to conclude that it is attachment rather than God, actions in past lives, fate, type of birth or efforts in this life that is responsible for our experiences of sorrow, no systematic argument is given in an attempt to disprove the existence of God.

Nor do we encounter actual arguments against the existence of a creator god in later Theravāda works such as Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga. Here it is explained that the Buddha's teaching that craving is the root cause of all distress is offered as a corrective to such false theories as that the world with all its woes is the creation of a god (issara), or that it is an evolution of primordial matter (padhāna) as in the Sāṁkhya system of philosophy, or that it is a product of time or fate or that it is an accidental by-product of material elements.[6] But how and why these theories are false is not explained.

2.0. VASUBANDHU'S DISCUSSION OF DIVINE CREATION

Like Buddhaghosa, the dogmatist Vasubandhu refers to alternative accounts of how the world and its attendant suffering began, and he too refers to the views that it began through divine creation, through an evolution of primordial matter, or on account of time, fate or pure chance. Unlike Buddhaghosa, however, Vasubandhu supplies arguments designed to show why these various theories are inadequate. Concerning the theory of divine creation of the world, Vasubandhu focuses his attention on three issues. First, he explores the question of how a single, undivided God, existing at all times, can create a complex universe the parts of which arise in temporal sequence. Second, he examines God's psychological motivation in creating the world. And third, he looks into the relationship between God as principal creator and auxiliary causal factors that go into making up the world. Vasubandhu treats these issues in about one page of Sanskrit prose. Later Buddhist philosophers wrote more extensively on each of these three issues than did Vasubandhu, but for the most part they did not explore other issues beyond these three. Let us look at the issues one by one, seeing first how Vasubandhu treated each one and then how later philosophers expanded on his treatment.

2.1. GOD'S UNITY

The position that Vasubandhu and most other Buddhist scholastics accepted is that the world is caused by a virtually infinite number of causes, namely, the intentional actions of the countless sentient beings who have lived through all beginningless time. The belief that there is a single entity responsible for the rich diversity of experiences is fundamentally wrong-headed. "The world," says Vasubandhu, "does not have a single cause. Although they generate their own actions in birth after birth, the poor wretches of unripened wisdom, who experience the consequences of their own actions, wrongly contrive a supreme God."[7] And so it should be noted at the outset that Vasubandhu's arguments are designed to demonstrate the untenability of *any* theory whereby the world's diversity is traced to a single source. In particular, Vasubandhu points out that all his arguments for the necessary plurality of causes does as much damage to the Sāṁkhya theory of primordial matter (pradhāna, or prakṛti) as to the theory of divine creation.[8]

Given that understanding of Vasubandhu's own position, let us see how he criticized the positions that were contradictory to it. He begins by saying:

> If the world had a single cause, whether that single cause be God or something else, the entire universe would have to arise all at once. But what we observe is that beings occur one after another. Now that fact could be a function of God's intending for each individual thing that it arise at a given time and disappear later. But in that case, since there are numerous intentions, it would turn out that the cause of the world is manifold. Moreover, that plurality of intentions would be simultaneous, for the reason that God, which is their source, putatively has no internal divisions.[9]

As will be discussed more fully below in section 3, this argument, or various modifications of it, was one to which Buddhist academics repeatedly resorted, not only in their arguments against theism but also in their arguments against any hypothetical entity that was supposed to retain its singularity while possessing a plurality of parts or characteristics. By the time of Vasubandhu a real thing (dravyasat vastu) is defined as any ultimate simple, that is, anything that cannot be reduced either physically or conceptually into smaller components.[10] Consistent with that understanding of what it means for something to be a real thing, Vasubandhu argues that if it is claimed that God is real and therefore simple, then it cannot consistently be said that he also have a plurality of separate intentions, one for each object in the universe. But if God's uniformity is taken seriously, then he must have only one intention that is applicable to everything at once. And if that single intention is "Let it be," then everything must be at once. A simple God can create, it would seem, only a perfectly static universe. But the universe that we experience is not static.

Vasubandhu anticipates one objection to the above line of reasoning: "Now one might argue that even if God's intentions occur all at once, the [created] universe need not do so, since it is created in accordance with divine will."[11] God's mind could have exactly the same set of intentions at each moment in history, and in that case it could not be said that he undergoes change. His unchanging set of intentions could be: "Let A be at t_a, B at t_b, C at t_c . . . X at t_x." Each event in history could then occur in the sequence that we observe and still the sequence could occur according to a constant set of volitions. Vasubandhu rejects this possibility, saying: "That is not so, because there is nothing that distinguishes those [intentions at one time] from [those that occur] later."[12] The point appears to be that if God's set of volitions is constantly in the form "Let all the events of history occur in a prescribed order," the problem still remains that in order for the intentions to be realized by being translated into action, some change must occur in something; some potentiality must be converted into an actuality. That change that must occur cannot occur in God himself, for he is changeless. It must, then, occur outside God. But if that which converts God's intentions into actions is something outside God, then we should say that it, rather than God, is the creator of the universe.

This question of how potentiality becomes actuality is taken up somewhat more fully in Dharmakīrti's arguments adduced to demonstrate the nonexistence of God. The first observation that Dharmakīrti makes is that a permanent, unchanging entity such as God would have to have exactly the same nature before the creation of the world as after; there would be no difference whatsoever between God as creator and God as a being that is not yet a creator.[13] To be a cause of something is to undergo some change, as when a seed and the earth in which it is planted undergo changes in nature as they evolve into a shoot.[14] But if God suffers no changes in nature, then he surely cannot be regarded as the cause of anything.[15] Even if there is no apparent change in nature within the cause itself, there must be some change in at least the cause's circumstances. For example, it must move from one place to another, or it must come into contact with an object with which it was not previously in contact. A weapon, for example, can be recognized as the cause of a wound in the body only if the body is not wounded before contact with the weapon, then contacts the weapon, and immediately upon such contact develops a wound. But if God is supposed to be omnipresent and therefore always in contact with everything, it cannot then be the case that God comes into contact with a thing with which he was not previously in contact, and so it is impossible that a change in some object be due solely to that object's change in relationship with God.[16]

Central to Dharmakīrti's argument is the claim that no action is possible without change, and so no unchanging thing can perform the action of creating the universe. In this connection he anticipates a possible counterexample that might be cited to disprove this central claim. A sense object such as a patch of colour apparently undergoes no change at all when it is perceived, and yet it is acknowledged as a cause of sight, as can be shown by pointing out that sight occurs when a patch of colour is present and fails to occur when no visible object is present. Is it not possible, therefore, that God can be an unchanging cause of the universe in the same way that a patch of colour is an unchanging cause of vision?[17] Dharmakīrti replies to this hypothetical counterargument by stating the principle that nothing can become an actuality without first being a potential. A visible object could never actually be seen unless it had the potential to be seen, and so a sense object must have an intrinsic potential to be sensed, and this potential must be in some way triggered into actuality. Similarly, if God is a creator of the universe, it must be admitted that he has a potential to create that exists prior to his actually creating anything. But if this is so, we must ask how that potential becomes realized. A visible object's potential to be seen, for example, is triggered into actuality by factors extrinsic to the visible object itself; there must be such factors as light, a sentient being with a functioning eye and an attentive mind and so forth, or else the potentially visible object cannot actually be seen. But is there a similar set of factors extrinsic to God that are required to trigger his potential to create? If so, then God is at least not a sufficient condition for creation of the universe — whether or not he is a necessary condition is a separate question, to which we shall return in section 2.3 below. But if there are no factors extrinsic to God that are required to trigger his potential to create, then the conversion of God's potentiality into actuality must be seen as an action that he himself performs. But if God performs an action, then he must undergo change and thus cannot be permanent.

Dharmakīrti could also have pointed out in this context that serious problems result from saying that a thing has an intrinsic potential to act. For following the parallel to an argument made in another context, we can see that if we claim that a certain object has an intrinsic potential to act, then we are forced to conclude that the object realizes that potential in every moment of its existence.[18] For otherwise we have no means of explaining why that which is a mere potential at one moment becomes an actuality in the next. Just as an object that has an intrinsic potential to perish must perish in every moment of its existence (and must, therefore, exist for only one moment), so also God, if he has a wholly intrinsic potential to create, must create in every moment of his existence. But this means that there is never a time when God exists and the created universe does not. If God is beginningless, then so is the universe. And if the universe is beginningless, there is no creation after all and therefore no need to answer the question of who brought the creation about.

Post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist academics, such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, provided a natural corollary to Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti 's conclusions that a changeless being cannot perform the action of creation. Not only can a changeless being not create the world of sequential events, says Śāntarakṣita, but he cannot even know about the world of change. Even if there were a simple, beginningless and endless being endowed with the faculty of intelligence, such a being could not know the events of the transitory world, for if such a being knew each event separately as it occurred, then he would have a plurality of cognitive acts and would lose his unity. But if he knew all events at once, then he would not know the essential characteristic of events, which is that they occur in sequence. Knowing all events in history at once would be like hearing every note in a melody played at once rather than in sequence. Just as the essence of a melody lies in the sequentiality of the notes rather than in the mere presence of the notes, the essence of history lies in the sequentiality of events. And so, concluded Śāntarakṣita, if God is indeed simple and eternally changeless, he cannot participate in or know about history, and so those of us who are caught in history can derive no benefit from God's existence at all.

As can be seen from the above discussions, Vasubandhu's claim that a complex world cannot have a simple and thus eternal cause was a very powerful and rich claim indeed, which thinkers were still exploring and expanding upon for several centuries.

2.2. GOD'S MOTIVATIONS

A second question that Vasubandhu raises about the theory of divine creation focuses on the issue of why a self-sufficient and supposedly perfect being would either need or wish to create anything at all. Vasubandhu asks:

> For what purpose would God expend so much effort in creating the world? Perhaps for pleasure? Well, if God cannot make an effort without pleasure, then he has no control over that, and thus he has no control over anything else either![19]

Even more alarming than the possibility that God's creation of the universe was a mere indulgence in hedonism is the possibility that it was an act of cruelty, as evidenced by God's apparent willingness to allow his creatures to err and to suffer for their errors:

> And if God allows his creatures to be afflicted in hells by many guardians and takes pleasure in that, then we should prostrate ourselves before such a God as that! For the verse composed about him is very apt that goes:
>
> Because he torments, because he is severe,
> because he is cruel and full of might,
> because he devours flesh, blood and marrow
> they call him the Dreadful (Rudra).[20]

In contrast to the argument concerning the impossibility of the creator's unity, which became the principal Buddhist argument against the existence of God, this issue of the creator's motivations was not stressed by Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla. In his Nyāyamañjarī, however, the Hindu theistic philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa devotes a section to arguments adduced by atheists before providing his own arguments in favour of God's existence. Among the arguments that Jayanta cites against God's existence is a version of Vasubandhu's question concerning motivations:

> Did the Lord of creation undertake the creation of the universe just as it is after he had pondered upon a purpose? If the undertaking were purposeless, then he would be like a madman, in that his actions would not be preceded by reflection.[21]

But, Jayanta reports his atheist opponent as saying, God is putatively endowed with every possible joy and is free of passionate desire, and so it is difficult to see what he would think he had to gain by creating a universe without which he is already quite content. The standard answer that the theist gives to this question is that God created the world out of compassion. But, says Jayanta's adversary, for whom are we to believe that God has compassion? Compassion is a response to beings who are in pain. But surely there can have been no beings in pain before the creation of the universe; indeed, it was precisely because of the creation that previously contented souls began to feel pain and anguish. Moreover, since God is supposedly omnipotent, he might have created a universe in which sentient beings felt only joy and happiness instead of this sorry world in which what little pleasure there is is fleeting and serves only to taunt us in our misery. Perhaps we can conclude only that the creation was a joke (krīḍā) that God played to amuse himself. But, Jayanta has the atheist say, if the creation was a joke, it is one the humour of which is too subtle for the sentient beings to appreciate: "Neither is the Magnanimous One's joke appropriate, which causes dread in all his creatures, nor is this great effort to play it."[22]

As effective as this investigation into divine psychology might be in casting doubt upon the purity of the creator's motivation in making the world such as ours, this line of attack was not as commonly used by Buddhist academics as the more fundamentally persuasive arguments based on metaphysical considerations such as the problem of God's unity and permanence. There is no need, then, for us to dwell any longer upon the teleological issue.

2.3. GOD AS ONE CAUSAL FACTOR AMONG OTHERS

We have already seen how Vasubandhu, who was followed in this by Dharmakīrti, argued that God cannot be regarded as a sufficient condition of creation, that is, as a wholly self-sufficient creator with an innate self-actualizing potential to enact the creation of the world. But the possibility still remains open that God might be one of several necessary conditions in the origin of the universe. Historically, in fact, this view of creation, whereby God is a sentient, noncorporeal agent whose volition puts coeternal atoms into motion to make up macroscopic corporeal forms and puts eternal souls into these created physical bodies, is the one adopted by most Indian theists, who generally condemned the theory of creātio ex nihilō as absurd. In dealing with the possibility that God requires factors outside himself in order to create the universe, Vasubandhu first considers the possibility that the creator's dependence upon other things is due to his being himself an effect of other causes. If anyone were to hold such a view, then he would have to answer what it was that caused the creator's causes and so on ad infinītum. In fact, says Vasubandhu, this theory amounts to admitting that the universe is beginningless, which is the view accepted by Buddhists; but if one accepts that the universe is beginningless, there is of course no need to posit a creator at all.[23]

The possibility that God's dependence upon other things is in the nature of his being the effect of those other things is not to be taken very seriously, since no one actually advocates such a view, and Vasubandhu's refutation of it must be seen as a result of a good philosopher's penchant for thoroughness. Far more serious, however, is the claim that the world made up of insentient matter requires some conscious force to put it into motion. The principal argument of the theistic philosophers in India, in fact, was that since all complex products require sentient makers and since the universe is a complex product, the universe must have a sentient maker.

The above argument was one that the Buddhist academics tended not to reject; the medieval Indian Buddhists, in other words, did not advocate a position anything like the view accepted by most modern thinkers to the effect that the universe is for the most part uninhabited and that sentient life is a development that has come about relatively recently in the history of an inconceivably vast expanse of lifeless matter. On the contrary, Buddhist mythology and systematic philosophy generally endorsed the view that the vast universe is everywhere populated by sentient beings and that the shape the universe takes is an accommodation to the force of the constant fruition of the multitudes of deeds performed by those sentient beings throughout the history of a beginningless universe. The medieval Buddhist view, in other words, is no more attuned to modern scientific views than is the theistic view of creation that the Buddhist academics sought to refute. What in particular Vasubandhu rejected in the theistic theory that the universe is sustained and influenced by noncorporeal sentience was the alleged *unity* of that sentience. If the material universe obeys the dictates of only one sentient force, namely God, then human beings and other sentient beings must be ultimately powerless, and their role in making all the manufactured items of ordinary life must ultimately be denied. As Vasubandhu puts the matter:

> He who accepts that there is but one cause of the universe must deny the obvious human effort in other matters. And he who fancies God as a creator along with [other] causal factors would merely be proclaiming his devotion, for we do not observe the operation of anything other than [the other] causal factors when something arises from them.[24]

Dharmakīrti did not develop this argument in his discussion of the theory of divine creation, but Śāntarakṣita expanded Vasubandhu's argument considerably. First, Śāntarakṣita recapitulates the theist's claim as follows: "Others regard God as the cause of all things that are produced. No insentient being, they say, produces its effects by itself."[25] But, he argues later, granting that an insentient universe cannot put itself into motion does not force us to conclude that there is but *one* sentient being who motivates insentient nature. On the contrary, in everything that we observe in the world around us we see that a multiplicity of effects is preceded by a multiplicity of creators. It takes many ants to make an anthill, and many men to construct a city and all the things in it; potters make pots, weavers make cloth, carpenters build houses and so forth, but we never observe that behind all these many manufacturers of things there is but a single sentient being at work with a single will.[26] If there were but a single purposive will driving all apparently independent sentient beings, there would be no conflicts among beings, but this is hardly what we in fact observe. And so, concludes Śāntarakṣita, "We have no dispute with what is claimed in general, namely, that [products] are preceded by something intelligent, for diversity is born of deliberate action. In the argument for [products'] being preceded by a single, eternal intelligence, the conclusion is frivolous and [the evidence is] inconclusive, because it is observed that palaces and so forth are built by many people."[27]

Closely related to the general issue of whether God is one factor among many in building and sustaining the universe is the contention held by some theists that God's function is an essentially administrative one in that he keeps an account of all the deeds of his creatures and dispenses retribution in accordance with merit. The crucial question to be asked in this connection, say the Buddhists, is whether or not God actually tampers in any way with anyone's stock of merit and demerit. If not, then it must be admitted that God is essentially doing nothing more than being aware of the natural process of the ripening of past deeds that would presumably take place whether or not he were conscious of it. God would then be much like us, a powerless bystander witnessing a series of virtually inevitable events. Positing such a god has no explanatory value, and paying respects to such an impotent figure would provide little comfort to the worshipper. And so, if God's administrative talents are to command our respect, it would appear to be more promising to assume that God can and does play a decisive role in the maturation of the seeds of past deeds into present realities. And to say that God plays a decisive role amounts to saying that he accomplishes something that the natural fruition process itself would not accomplish. But what can God accomplish that could not be accomplished by a natural process of individual karmic seeds maturing into new realities? The most likely answer to this question is that God must somehow be able to alter the karmic configurations of sentient beings, to give beings rewards and punishments that they do not rightly deserve on the basis of the moral momentum of their own actions. But if God has this power to give those beings under his care gratuitous benefits, then we are entitled to ask why he does not consistently exercise this power so that all beings might always be happy. That he does not do so would appear to indicate either God's insensitivity to our pain or his cruel willingness to see us undergo suffering that he could easily prevent. And so, the Buddhists conclude, whether God is unable to help us, unwilling to help us or unaware that we need help, he is of little value to man. We are better off conducting our affairs on our own powers and acting as if there is no divine power to help us in the task at hand, which is to transform our characters in such a way that we do only meritorious actions that naturally ripen into happy experiences in the present and future.

3.0. THE PROBLEM OF UNITY IN GOD, INDIVIDUALS AND UNIVERSALS

Of the issues concerning the existence of God that have been outlined above, the one that received the greatest attention from the Indian Buddhist academic tradition was that of the possibility of God's unity, simplicity and permanence.[28] In fact, this principal argument for the nonexistence of God may be seen as a special application of a form of argument that occurs repeatedly in Buddhist metaphysical treatises, it being but another instance of the general Buddhist preoccupation with the problem of unity in diversity. Generally speaking, the Buddhist philosophers denied the existence of anything that was supposed to retain its unity while occurring in or being related to a plurality of things, as this verse from the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra acknowledges:

> Personal identity, continuum, groups, causal conditions, atoms, primordial matter, and God the creator are regarded as mere ideas.[29]

Why each of these items is regarded as a purely conceptual fiction is that each is construed as a unity that is composed of a plurality of components. To give an exhaustive account of all occurrences of the Buddhist treatment of the one-many problem would be to tell nearly the whole story of Indian Buddhist philosophy, which is a bit like a symphony played on a one-stringed violin. Rather than attempting that monumental task here, let me simply outline four issues that at first glance might seem unrelated but which all turn out to be versions of the fundamental Buddhist claim that no whole exists over and above the existence of individual parts. Following this, I shall indicate briefly

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how this same fundamental claim was behind the Buddhist rejection of real universals and real relations.

3.1. WHOLES AND PARTS

Among the first Buddhist philosophical writings to become familiar to a relatively wide audience within the English-reading world was the celebrated Questions of King Milinda. In this text the monk Nāgasena is depicted as explaining to King Milinda that the personal identity that most people naively believe they possess is in fact no more than a mere designation, a convenient fiction. To demonstrate this principle, Nāgasena argues that the person is, like a chariot, really analyzable into discrete components, any one of which may be altered or replaced or deleted without impairing the supposed integrity of the collection of those parts.[30] Just as a chariot's wheel can be replaced without altering the chariot's "identity" — that is, without making it a different chariot — a person's body can undergo changes, and some habits can be replaced by others, and knowledge can be gained or lost, and all these changes can occur without changing the person's "identity." But when we inquire into where this so-called identity resides, we find that it cannot reside in its totality in any one component part, nor can it reside in the set of parts taken as a whole. For if, let us say, the entire identity of the chariot were to reside in, for example, the left wheel, then the chassis and the axle and the right wheel would not be parts of the chariot at all, for the chariot would be just the left wheel. And if the left wheel should break and be replaced, we should have to say that the entire chariot was broken and replaced by an entirely different chariot. On the other hand, if we assume that the identity of the chariot resides in the collection of parts taken as a whole, then, since the whole changes any time any part changes, to replace any part would be to change the identity of the whole; to replace a single screw in the chariot would be to create a wholly different chariot. But it goes against our intuitions of the chariot's identity to say either that the chassis is not part of the chariot or that the change of a tiny part creates an entirely different chariot. This intuition of identity, then, is no more than an intuition. It resides purely in the mind of the beholder and has no counterpart in the world outside the mind. What we take to be a person is in fact devoid of personal identity. Further arguments along this line are developed in Vasubandhu (pp. 461—479) and throughout the Buddhist academic tradition.

In Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika under Nyāya-sūtra 2.1.31—33 there is a discussion concerning whether or not it is justifiable to infer, when one sees the part of a tree that one is facing, that the tree has a backside as well. Uddyotakara represents the Buddhists as being unable to regard such an inference as justifiable. In order to use an observation of A to serve as a sign of B, say the Buddhists, one must have seen A and B together at some point and one must never have seen A without B. But it is impossible to see the face and back of a three-dimensional object simultaneously, and so one can never legitimately conclude that there is a backside to a tree or any other large object that one is facing. The Naiyāyika is spared from having to hold such a patently silly view, thinks Uddyotakara, because he believes it possible to see not only the parts of the tree but the tree itself as a whole object. To see the front of a tree is to see a tree, and to see a tree is to know immediately that it must have a backside as well, since having sides facing all directions is part of what it is to be a tree. But the Buddhists, says Uddyotakara, continue to dispute this Naiyāyika claim by availing themselves of the following line of argument. We cannot say that the tree-as-a-whole resides entirely in any one part, such as a single leaf, for if that part were destroyed we should then have to say that the whole tree was destroyed. On the other hand, we cannot say that the tree-as-a-whole exists only partially in the single leaf, since that would entail admitting that the tree-as-a-whole is partite, which runs counter to our intuition that a whole is a unit rather than a mere assemblage of smaller units. And so, say the Buddhists, the tree-as-a-unit resides only in our mind and is not something that can be seen or in any way sensed as a datum of the world external to awareness.

In Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti under kārikā 5.50, Diṅnāga argues that proper names (yadṛcchāśabda), usually regarded as words that apply only to given individuals, are in fact a type of class noun, since what we ordinarily think of as individuals are in fact complex objects. And so, just as the word "cow" applies to a plurality of objects that the intellect gathers together and treats as a unit called a class, a proper name like "Devadatta" applies to a plurality of traits that the intellect collects and treats as a unit called a person. But persons and classes are both convenient fictions for the supposed unity of which there is no justification in the facts of the world external to consciousness.

In the examples given so far, objects that are usually regarded naively as units have turned out on closer reflection to be complexes that because of their complexity in fact lack unity. Atoms, on the other hand, are defined as absolute simples in that they are divisions of matter than which nothing could be smaller. But the only unity than which nothing could be smaller must be without any dimension at all and so must not be a unit of matter at all, since unlike all other matter the atom cannot occupy space and be resistent to other units of matter occupying the same space. The same arguments are applied in some Buddhist works to the smallest possible unit of time, the moment (kṣaṇa).

Individuality, then, is merely an idea (cittamātra), say the Buddhist academics, for reason shows that things that are given in experience as existing, such phenomena as persons and chariots, have no real individuality, while things that theoretically have true individuality, such things as atoms and moments, cannot really exist.

3.2. UNIVERSALS AND RELATIONS

At Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.1—4, Diṅnāga argues that the intellect's act of gathering a plurality of individuals together under a single concept is done without any basis in a real unity binding the objects together in the world external to consciousness. There are, in other words, no real universals that retain their unity while residing in a plurality of individuals. At Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.17 Diṅnāga argues that if there were such a thing as a universal like cowness, then either it would have to reside in its entirety in a single individual cow or it would have to reside partially in each individual cow. In the former case there would then be only one cow, which is not what we in fact observe. In the latter case the universal cowhood would have internal divisions and so would not be a unity, which runs counter to the usual definition of a universal. Therefore universals do not reside in objects in any way at all, says Diṅnāga; rather, they are superimposed by the mind upon the objects of experience.

Using an argument that is parallel to the argument against the existence of real universals, Diṅnāga concludes that there are also no relations in the real world. For a relation is supposed to be a unity that binds a plurality of relata together. But if the relation is a real object in the world, then it must reside either wholly in a single relatum or partially in each, neither of which consequences is possible. Similarly, resemblance cannot be a real feature of objects in the world, for resemblance is a kind of relation. Resemblance, like any other relation and like universals, is something that the intellect superimposes upon the objects of experience rather than something that is a discovered feature of objects that they have outside our experience of them.

4.0. CONCLUSION

The doctrine that there is no permanent creator who superintends creation and takes care of his creatures accords quite well with each of the principles known as the four noble truths of Buddhism. The first truth, that distress is universal, is traditionally expounded in terms of the impermanence of all features of experience and in terms of the absence of genuine unity or personal identity in the multitude of physical and mental factors that constitute what we experience as a single person. As we saw above, the principal Buddhist arguments against the existence of God focus on the impossibility of permanence and unity in the causal structure of the universe. The second noble truth, that distress is the outcome of one's own unrealistic aspirations, is traditionally seen as ruling out the erroneous view that distress is something inflicted upon creatures by a cosmic superintendent or by other circumstances completely beyond their control. The third noble truth, that distress can be eliminated by divesting oneself of all unrealistic aspirations, rules out the view that sentient beings, as powerless victims of a divine will, have no alternative to a life of constant frustration. And the fourth noble truth, that the best means of removing unrealistic desires is to follow a methodical course of self-discipline, counters the view that the road to happiness lies in obedience to divine will or in trying to manipulate the sentiments of a cosmic intelligence through prayer or ritual.

Atheism, then, is a doctrine of fundamental importance within Buddhist religious philosophy rather than a mere accretion acquired through historical accident. As such it was a doctrine for which the Buddhist apologists during the academic period were strongly motivated to find good arguments. Although a variety of arguments were used, the most frequently used and the most powerful was a special application of the general Buddhist commitment to the principle that there can be no real unity binding together any plurality of things and that all notions of unity in plurality are therefore superimposed gratuitously upon experience by the experiencing mind. From this same principle the Buddhist scholastics in India also derived their commitment to nominalism or conceptualism in the realm of linguistic philosophy and to the theory of radical momentariness in the realm of metaphysics.

NOTES

[1] Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 18.

[2] Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 235.

[3] Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 240.

[4] "Tayidam, bhikkave, Tathāgato pajānāti: 'Ime diṭṭhiṭṭhānā evaṃ-gahitā evaṃ-parāmaṭṭhā evaṃ-gatikā bhavissanti evaṃ-abhisamparāyā ti.'" Davids and Carpenter (1890), p. 30.

[5] Chalmers (1898), pp. 214—228.

[6] "samudayañānam issarapadhānakālasabhāvādīhi loko pavattatī ti akāraṇe kāraṇābhimānapavattaṁ hetumhi vippaṭipattiṁ." (Knowledge of the origin [of distress] puts an end to misconception with respect to causes, which concerns the belief that something is a cause when it is not, such as that the world arises owing to God, primordial matter, time or the inherent properties [of the material elements].) Buddhaghosa, p. 1156.

[7] "tasmān na lokasyaikaṁ kāraṇam asti. svāny evaiṣāṃ karmāṇi tasyāṁ tasyāṁ jātau janayanti. akṛtabuddhayas tu varākāḥ svaṁ svaṁ vipākaphalaṁ cānubhavanta īśvaram aparaṁ mithyā parikalpayanti." Vasubandhu, p. 102, under Abhidharmakośa 2.64.

[8] "evaṁ pradhāne'pi yathāyogaṁ vācyam." Vasubandhu, p. 102.

[9] "yadi hy ekam eva kāraṇam īśvaraḥ syād anyad vā yugapat sarveṇa jagatā bhavitavyaṁ syāt. dṛśyate ca bhāvānāṁ kramasaṁbhavaḥ. sa tarhi cchandavaśād īśvarasya syād ayam idānīm utpadyatām nirudhyatām ayam pasćād iti. cchandabhedāt tarhi siddham anekaṁ kāraṇaṁ syāt. sa cāpi cchandabhedo yugapat syāt taddhetor īśvarasyābhinnatvāt." Vasubandhu, pp. 101—102.

[10] yatra bhinṅe na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat/
ghaṭārthavat saṁvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā//AK 6.4//
Vasubandhu, p. 334.

[11] "yaugapadye'pīśvaracchandānāṁ jagato na yaugapadyam. yathācchandam utpādanād iti cet." Vasubandhu, p. 102.

[12] "na. teṣāṁ paścād viśeṣābhāvāt." Vasubandhu, p. 102.

[13] yathā tat kāraṇam vastu tathaiva tad akāraṇam/
yadā tat kāraṇaṁ kena mataṁ neṣṭam akāraṇam//PV 1.23//
(That thing [which like God is permanent] is exactly the same way when it is not a cause as when it is a cause. When it is a cause, by what is it so recognized? Why is it not believed [to remain] a noncause?) Dharmakīrti, p. 16.

[14] svabhāvapariṇāmena hetur aṅkurajanmani/
bhūmyādis tasya saṁskāre tadviśeṣasya darśanāt//PV 1.27//
(Soil and so forth, owing to a transformation of nature, is a cause of a seedling's arising, since the seedling's attributes [such as growth] are observed in the soil's constitution.) Dharmakīrti, p. 17.

[15] svabhāvabhedena vinā vyāpāro'pi na yujyate/
nityasyāvyatirekatvāt sāmarthyaṁ ca duranvayam//PV 1.25//
(No activity is possible without a change in nature. Since a permanent thing is unchanging, its capacity to act is hard to believe.) Dharmakīrti, p. 17.

[16] śastrauṣadhābhisaṁbandhāc caitrasya vraṇarohaṇe/
asaṁbaddhasya kiṁ sthāṇoḥ kāraṇatvaṁ na kalpyate//PV 1.24//
(Owing to his contact with a weapon or with medicines, Caitra gets wounded or healed. But a permanent thing that is disassociated [from activity] is not considered to be a cause.) Dharmakīrti, pp. 16—17.

[17] yathā viśeṣeṇa vinā viṣayendriyasaṁhatiḥ/
buddher hetus tathedaṁ cet . . .//PV 1.28//
(But could this [creation of the world by God] be similar to a sense-faculty's contacting a sense-object, which without changing [serves as] a cause of awareness?) Dharmakīrti, p. 17.

[18] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (pp. 453 f.) reports a Buddhist argument for momentariness based on the principle that if a thing has an intrinsic, self-realizing potential, then that potential must be constantly actualized, for otherwise there is no accounting for how the potential becomes actualized just when it does and no sooner or later.

[19] "kaś ca tāvad īśvarasyeyatā sargaprayāsenārthaḥ. yadi prītis tāṁ tarhi nāntareṇopāyaṁ śaktaḥ karttum iti na tasyām īśvaraḥ syāt tathaiva cānyasmin." Vasubandhu, p. 102.

[20] "yadi ceśvaraḥ narakādiṣu prajāṁ bahubhiś cetibhir upasṛṣṭaṁ sṛṣṭvā tena prīyate namo'stu tasmai tādṛśāyeśvarāya. sugītaś cāyaṁ tam ārabhya śloko bhavati.

> yan nirdahati yat tīkṣṇo yad ugro yat pratāpavān/
> māṁsaśoṇitamajjādo yat tato rudra ucyate//

Vasubandhu, p. 102.

[21] "kiṁ kimapi prayojanam anusaṁdhāya jagatsarge pravarttate prajāpatir evam eva vā. niṣprayojanāyāṁ pravṛttāv aprekṣāpūrvakāritvād unmattatulyo'sau bhavet." Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, p. 192.

[22] na ca krīḍāpi niḥśeṣajanatātaṅkakāriṇī/
āyāsabahulā ceyaṁ kartum yuktā mahātmanaḥ//
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, p. 192.

[23] "kāraṇāntarabhedāpekṣaṇe vā neśvara eva kāraṇaṁ syāt. teṣām api ca kramotpattau kāraṇāntarabhedāpekṣaṇād anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ syād ity anantarabhedāyāḥ kāraṇa-paraṁparāyā anāditvābhyupagamād ayaṃ īśvarakāraṇādhimuktaḥ śākyapūrvīyam eva nyāyaṁ nātivṛttaḥ syāt." (On the other hand, if God is dependent on a variety of other causal factors to create the world, then he is not in fact the cause of the world. And if other causal factors arise one after another, then there would be an infinite regress, since each would require a variety of anterior causes. And so he who believes that God is the creator does not really reject the Buddhist position, since he too believes that the sequence of causal conditions, in which one comes immediately after the other, is beginningless.) Vasubandhu, p. 102.

[24] "ekaṁ khalv api jagataḥ kāraṇaṁ parigṛhṇatānyeṣām arthānāṁ pratyakṣaḥ puruṣakāro nihnutaḥ syāt. sahāpi ca kāraṇaiḥ kārakam īśvaraṁ kalpayatā kevalo bhaktibādaḥ syāt. kāraṇebhyo'nyasya tadutpattau vyāpārādarśanāt." Vasubandhu, p. 102.

[25] sarvotpattimatām īśam anye hetuṁ pracakṣate/
nācetanaṁ svakāryāṇi kila prārabhate svayam//TS 46//
Śāntarakṣita, p. 51.

[26] kintu nityaikasarvajñanityabuddhisamāśrayaḥ/
sādhyavaikalyato'vyāpter na siddhiṁ upagacchati//TS 72//
tathā hi saudhasopānagopurāṭṭālakādayaḥ/
anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvena niścitāḥ//TS 73//
(But [the world's] dependence upon that which is eternal, one, and of unchanging, omniscient mind is a conclusion that does not admit of proof. Because [the property that the theist cites as evidence for that conclusion, namely, the fact that the world is a complex product] is not pervaded [by the property of depending upon that which is eternal, etc.], for the property that is in need of proof does not extend [to all created things]. For example, such things as houses, staircases, gateways and towers are known to be preceded by many beings with changing mental states.) Śāntarakṣita, p. 63.

[27] buddhimatpūrvakatvaṁ ca sāmānyena yad iṣyate/
tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyaṁ hi karmajam//TS 80//
nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā/
vyabhicāraś ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇāt//TS 81//
Śāntarakṣita, p. 65.

[28] Another issue that came to be frequently discussed by the academics after Diṅnāga's time was that of God as a revealer of truths to which mankind would without revelation have no access. As this issue has been treated in Hayes (1984), I have not discussed it any further in the present writing.

[29] pudgalaḥ saṁtatiḥ skandhāḥ pratyayā aṇavas tathā/
pradhānam īśvaraḥ kartā cittamātraṁ vikalpyate//
Vaidya, p. 34.

[30] This discussion occurs in Śāstrī, pp. 19—20.

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MICHAEL M. BROIDO

VERIDICAL AND DELUSIVE COGNITION: TSONG-KHA-PA ON THE TWO SATYAS

1. INTRODUCTION

In many Buddhist countries, Madhyamaka is the main philosophical point of view (darśana). In Tibet, Tsong-kha-pa (1357—1419), the founder of the dGe-lugs school, was among those responsible for its pre-eminence, and through his influence it also came to be a subject of academic teaching and inquiry. In all four main schools the problems to which any writer on Madhyamaka must address himself if he expects to be taken seriously are, in the main, those discussed by him. He inherited many of them from Candrakīrti, and after him most Tibetan Mādhyamikas regarded themselves as Prāsaṅgikas[1] and as followers of Candrakīrti[2]; and if they criticized Tsong-kha-pa, it was for misinterpreting Candrakīrti. Now Candrakīrti treats the two satyas fairly simply, and so do earlier Tibetan Mādhyamikas such as rMa-bya-pa Byang-chub brTson-'grus. Tsong-kha-pa changed this: though he claimed merely to follow Candrakīrti, in his **rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho** (RG) on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā and his **dgongs-pa rab-gsal** (GR) on the Madhyamakāvatāra the treatment of the satyas is detailed and complex.

Possibly this detail and complexity reflect the influence of the Vajrayāna, which is a very central feature of Tibetan culture; Atīśa and Tsong-kha-pa were both experts on it, even though their reforms in Tibet were largely motivated by the view that the Vajrayāna had become undesirably prominent. While in Indian Buddhist thought Madhyamaka belongs primarily to the sūtra level or the pāramitā-vehicle (pāramitāyāna), in Tibet[3] it increasingly supplied the philosophical point of view for the Vajrayāna[4], as is plain even in such non-scholarly writers as Mi-la-ras-pa. Later on, Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Klong-chen-pa, Bu-ston, Tsong-kha-pa, Padma dKar-po and others attempted in various ways to construct large-scale systems of exegesis embracing both vehicles and organized round the **madhyamaka-**

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darśana, in a style not found in India. It seems, however, that nobody before Tsong-kha-pa wrote an account of Madhyamaka which can be directly applied in detail to the Vajrayāna. So in Tibet, Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna mutually influence each other; Padma dKar-po provides a good example of this mutual influence.

References to the two satyas and to their decisive importance for the Buddha's doctrines are found in the sūtras and tantras alike, and a theory of the two satyas is an essential feature of any system of exegesis of either. In the Vajrayāna, purified appearances such as the māyādeha ("illusory body") are called **saṃvṛti-satya**, while their quality of purity (very roughly) is called the radiant light or **paramārtha-satya**. There is a broad but convenient parallel between this doctrine and the familiar though unclear Madhyamaka relationship in which **vyavahāra-satya** is the basis or the means for the attainment of paramārtha-satya (MK XXIV.8, MMV VI.80 &c.)[5]. This vyavahāra-satya is usually identified with saṃvṛti-satya. This identification gives rise to many of the problems to be discussed in this paper, and it may help if we give a brief historical sketch.

The idea that ordinary everyday cognition is *really* (**paramārthatas**, **samyag-**) delusive, and that some quite different kind of cognition is *really satya* (paramārtha-satya) is an ancient one in India. The oldest sense of "vyavahāra-satya" is perhaps just that of ordinary everyday satya. The question arises as to how paramārtha-satya is possible; in a way this is the central problem of Indian thought, taken epistemically, just as the problem of how freedom is possible is the same central problem, taken soteriologically. One might imagine that there is some *other* kind of relatively everyday cognition, on the basis of which (by cultivating which, &c.) paramārtha-satya might be attained, might arise &c. Nāgārjuna went to some pains to deny such a possibility (MK XXIV.8): according to him, it is *only on the basis of ordinary everyday cognition* that paramārtha-satya is possible. Accordingly he refused to spell out any chain of causal steps connecting bondage and freedom (and this is why Karl Potter calls him a "leap philosopher"). His successors came under pressure (from Buddhist soteriology) to spell this connection out. Candrakīrti responded by making use of the notion of levels (**avasthā**) and stages (**krama**), distinguishing between saṃvṛti-satya for the ārya and for the pṛthagjana and between saṃvṛti-satya and *mere* saṃvṛti (**saṃvṛti-mātra**). In this way "saṃvṛti-satya" acquired a sense different from the normal one of "vyavahāra-satya". This fits in well with the Vajrayāna, where for instance the illusory body is not at all like an everyday (object of) cognition. Saṃvṛti-satya became the preserve of more advanced practitioners (bodhisattvas &c) and was seen not merely as a necessary condition for paramārtha-satya, but as its cause[6]. Treating the connection as causal (e.g. MMV VI.80), though helpful to this shift of perspective, introduces new problems; for instance it becomes difficult to understand what VI.23 could mean by saying that saṃvṛti-satya is delusive (**mṛṣa**). These problems were never properly resolved by Candrakīrti.

In Tibet, previous to Tsong-kha-pa, the shift of perspective just sketched became more marked; Tibetans came to see the causal connection between the satyas as very close, and the satyas themselves as tightly bound together in integration (**yuganaddha**). Some bKa-brgyud views of this development have been reviewed elsewhere[7]. The connection between the cognition of ordinary people and the saṃvṛti-satya of the āryas, which had been weakened by Candrakīrti, was now disrupted; the break in the chain of causal stages, which we already saw with Nāgārjuna, has reappeared[8]. This was unacceptable to Tsong-kha-pa. He set out to give a treatment of the two satyas within Madhyamaka (as developed by Candrakīrti) which would apply directly to these Vajrayāna notions, while also re-establishing the chain of causal stages from the level of an ordinary person to that of an ārya, set out by Atīśa in the **lam-rim** literature, as a central feature of Madhyamaka. He provided a more detailed description of the two satyas than Candrakīrti, and in particular a set of descriptive postulates for saṃvṛtisatya. Many of his critics such as Mi-bskyod rDo-rje (1508—54) and Padma dKar-po regarded this project as unintelligible; some of their criticisms have been discussed elsewhere and are further elaborated below.

Tsong-kha-pa held that it is implicit in Candrakīrti's theory of the two satyas that two different senses of **satya** have to be kept in mind and distinguished, in addition to the straightforward one connected with ordinary veridical cognition. According to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and Padma dKar-po, this disambiguation claim is little better than an admission that the interpretation is internally incoherent. The importance of this controversy for both sides can hardly be exaggerated. The dGe-lugs position is the basis of their claim to offer a solution of the ancient Indian problem of bondage and freedom, of their claim to resist, on behalf of the proper tradition of Indian Buddhism in Tibet, both old Chinese innovations and modern Tibetan ones, and of their reform of Tibetan Buddhism, and so even of their claims to geopolitical hegemony (insofar as these rested on anything other than naked force[9]). So the matters discussed in this paper belong to the history of ideology, as well as that of ideas.

This paper presents a selection of Tsong-kha-pa's own writings on the two satyas, as set out in RG and GR, in such a way that the controversy can be understood from his point of view. Our selection is not representative or complete in any other sense. Since Tsong-kha-pa's treatment in these works makes no use of Vajrayāna concepts, they will not be discussed here. Like Padma dKar-po and Mi-bskyod rDo-rje, we will not consider the interpretation of Tsong-kha-pa by his dGe-lugs followers. This procedure need not commit us to the correctness of any particular interpretation of Tsong-kha-pa or to the validity of any particular line of criticism of him. The basic method of this paper is the traditional philosophical one of paraphrase, in this case mainly from Tibetan into English[10].

Tsong-kha-pa had a distinctive historical sense of the Prāsaṅgika position, which he defined in part by contrast with that of the Svātantrikas[11]. In order to exhibit the contrast properly he was obliged to draw out and refine[12] much of what was implicit and rough not only in Candrakīrti, but also in the Svātantrikas. This approach is different from that of Padma dKar-po who, while following Candrakīrti on most points of importance, accepted certain Svātantrika views, or that of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje who, rejecting Tsong-kha-pa's innovations, claimed that he, and not Tsong-kha-pa, was the true heir of the old bKa-gdams-pas whose views he also refined. As so often, the ambiguities and tensions in a key writer, here Candrakīrti, are resolved differently by his different interpreters, and it is unreasonable to seek a single, canonical interpretation of Candrakīrti.

Our subject-matter overlaps with work of Paul Williams, especially his fine article *Tsong-kha-pa on kun-rdzob bden-pa* [W79], which is organized mainly around the Prāsaṅgika/Svātantrika contrast. As

Williams points out, according to Tsong-kha-pa part of this contrast is found in the Prāsaṅgika view that saṃvṛti-satya is connected with the viewing of appearances as illusion-like (sgyu-ma lta-bu, māyopāma) and with giving up attachment to **satya**. Most of Tsong-kha-pa's Tibetan critics accepted this description as a *necessary* condition for saṃvṛti-satya; the issue of its sufficiency, for which the grounds lie only partly within Madhyamaka, was more contentious.

It may help to illustrate the Sanskrit and Tibetan vocabulary which will be discussed *and the English vocabulary which will be used to discuss it* if we outline the standard Indian example of a delusive perceptual situation, the rope/snake illusion. This example is normally treated from the point of view of the cognition of the ordinary person (pṛthagjana, byis-pa) and in terms of normal linguistic and other conventions (vyavahāra, tha-snyad). In conditions of poor illumination, at night perhaps, a person sees what is in fact a rope, but mistakes it for a snake. The non-existent snake is sometimes said to be an **abhūtavastu**; seeing it, the person may become nervous, and generally on this basis (**ālambana**, BHS **ārambaṇa**) all sorts of mental activity (**abhūtavastunimittārambaṇamanasikāra**) may occur. This perceptual situation and/or the associated cognition and/or the object of knowledge (**jñeya**, shes-bya, here the non-existent snake) and/or the referent of the cognitive state (**jñeyārtha**, shes-bya'i don, here probably the imagined snake) may all be said to be *delusive* (moṣa, mṛṣa; slu-ba, brdzun-pa). The idea of these English, Sanskrit and Tibetan words is always that although there appears to be a snake, in fact there is none; although the situation seems to yield knowledge of a snake, in fact it does not. The opposite of these words is *veridical* (satya, bden-pa); *these* words apply to perceptual situations and their referents &c in those cases which do, in fact, yield the knowledge which they seem to yield. As I said, the normal use of the rope/snake example is in the context of ordinary cognition. But it is also used *as a simile* for the delusiveness (**moṣa** &c) of ordinary cognition from a "higher", transworldly (lokottara, 'jig-rten-las 'das-pa) point of view. Paramārtha-satya, then, as our texts will say, is what is *really* (paramārthatas, don-dam-par; samyag-, yag-dag-par) non-delusive (apramoṣa &c.) or veridical (satya); and as Tsong-kha-pa emphasized, there is the problem of saying coherently what this means. Here the rope/snake simile does not help much. For while we can make more explicit what it is for a cognition to be conventionally veridical (vyavahāra-satya, tha-snyad-kyi bden-pa), this explication is concerned with the relationships *among* ordinary everyday cognitions, and does not provide us with any basis for going outside the ordinary everyday realm to something else. This difficulty has made Nāgārjuna's assertion that vyavahāra-satya is the basis for paramārtha-satya into a puzzle for all later writers on Madhyamaka and has motivated the many attempts to introduce a notion of saṃvṛti-satya distinct, in some nontrivial sense, from ordinary everyday cognition or its referent.

2. THE *LOCUS CLASSICUS* FOR THE TWO SATYAS: MADHYAMAKĀVATĀRA VI.23

Candrakīrti's commentary, available only in Tibetan, is obscure and calls for detailed analysis such as is not always provided by Tsong-kha-pa's critics. Of Tsong-kha-pa's two comments on the verse, the one in the **dgongs-pa rab-gsal** follows Candrakīrti in its general structure, but adds much-needed explanations of Candrakīrti's terms. The one in the **rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho** is especially detailed, giving verses from the Madhyamakāvatāra and the Yuktiṣaṣṭika and considerable comment on them, both Candrakīrti's and Tsong-kha-pa's own[13].

Both authors make much use of the word **ngo-bo**, which in the verse translates **rūpa**. These words are ambiguous, standing both for things of some kind, such as the substrata of qualities (chos, dharma), and for aspects of a single thing, so that sometimes they even mean "point of view". **Rang-gi ngo-bo** (svarūpa) is similar. Tsong-kha-pa also uses **ngor** (probably without Sanskrit equivalent) which seems to mean "aspect" or "point of view" and is not used in the thing-like way. When **ngo-bo** is used in this way I will write "rūpa*", and when it is used in the aspect-like way I will just write "aspect", since the point of this use seems clear. Tsong-kha-pa undoubtedly conflated these two uses of **ngo-bo**[14], but the conflation does not seem to lead directly to errors.

Candrakīrti begins his commentary on VI.23 by saying that each external thing (dngos-po) such as a sprout and each internal thing such as a saṃskāra possesses two aspects, one being attained in saṃvṛti-satya and the other in paramārtha-satya. It is plain from this that here the satyas are not kinds of truth, they are features of cognition. Indeed, he says many times that **satya** is opposed to **mṛṣa** (delusive); thus it means "veridical". This is a crucial point; regardless of what "satya" means in other areas of Indian or Tibetan culture, here it cannot mean "truth" or "true"[15]. In the **dgongs-pa rab-gsal** on VI.23, Tsong-kha-pa begins with the following amplification of Candrakīrti's first few sentences[16]:

> So it is taught that the Buddhas see without error those two satya-aspects of all inner things such as **saṃskāras** and **cetana** and of all outer things such as sprouts. What are they? They are the **saṃvṛti-satya** aspect and the **paramārtha-satya** aspect. Here although for instance a sprout is a single rūpa* and a distinction is pointed out between its two aspects, one of which is saṃvṛti and the other paramārtha, it is not held that one single rūpa* of the sprout is demonstrated as two satyas as seen by the **pṛthagjana** and the **ārya**. Accordingly, since there is no quality (dharma) not based on some substrate (rūpa*), if the substrate (gzhi) (of the two satyas) could be established one could not distinguish (lit. "go beyond") identical or different **ngo-bos**; though **ngo-bos** are postulated, there is no contradiction with the absence of **ngo-bos** established by means of a self-essence.

The last of these points is taken up by Tsong-kha-pa later (see below), and the others are spelt out more in the **rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho**[17]:

> Each of these outer and inner things possesses a **paramārtha** and a **saṃvṛti** aspect, and though they are two they are both found in a single sprout, for instance. There is the aspect of a sprout which is attained by an analytic cognition (rigs-shes-kyis) which sees just the real object of knowledge, and there is the aspect of the sprout which is attained by conventional cognition which judges ('jal-ba) a delusive **artha**[18], a delusive object of knowledge . . . . According to MMV VI.23[19], in the single rūpa* (ngo-bo) of the sprout there exist the two satya-aspects (ngo-bo), of which paramārtha is attained by the first cognition and saṃvṛti by the second. However it is not said that the two satyas are one and the same sprout from the point of view of the two cognitions[20]. Candrakīrti's remark on this verse that each thing has a double aspect, paramārtha and saṃvṛti, means that the rūpa* of each thing is divided into two, the paramārtha being attained by a cognition which sees the real **artha**, and the saṃvṛti being attained by a cognition which sees a delusive [artha].

According to these two texts the satyas are not objective features of each sprout (say), waiting to be seen by two different kinds of cognition; the difference between them depends on the cognitive state of the observer. Yet elsewhere (e.g. RG 242a6, translated below) he seems to argue that (as in pramāṇa) it is *because* there are two heterogeneous objects of knowledge that there must be two different cognitions to cognize them. Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa are conflating two kinds of object of knowledge (things and intentional objects); this would be quite implausible without the previously noted equivocation in the use of "ngo-bo". Tsong-kha-pa continues:

> The dharmatā of a sprout is its nature (rang-bzhin, prakṛti) and this is said to be an aspect of it, [just as] the colour and shape of the sprout are what give it its identity (bdag-nyid) and are an aspect of it. The view repudiated by reasoned cognition and which, attached to a referent like a jar as **satya**, attempts to achieve certainty about a delusive **artha**, is supposed to attain that referent; for **satya** is not obscured by reasoning, and the delusive (mṛṣa) is not established by a **pramāṇa**[21]. Thus the establishing of a foundation by the mind for the sake of saṃvṛti-satya must certainly be regarded as an obscuration by the mind of whatever is really there (don-dam-par yod-pa, paramārtha-sat). Jar, cloth and so forth partake of saṃvṛti-satya, but if they were established by the mind [there would be a problem, since] the referent (artha) of saṃvṛti-satya ought not to be established by the mind, just as in their self-nature (prakṛti), jar, cloth &c. are like illusions which appear as though not existing, yet the mind which cognises them ought not to establish an illusory referent (artha)[22]. Because of this, it does not make sense to speak of the saṃvṛti-satya of jar, cloth and so forth as seen from the viewpoint of a pṛthagjana who does not have the "middle view" (madhyamakadarśana), and of [their] paramārtha-satya as seen by an ārya. This would contradict what Candrakīrti says in his commentary to MMV VI.23: "Thus whatever is paramārtha for pṛthagjanas is mere saṃvṛti for those āryas whose field of judgment contains appearances; for them, paramārtha is that whose nature (prakṛti) is voidness." Pṛthagjanas [Tsong-kha-pa continues] are attached to the satya-character of jars &c. and to their real existence[23]. From the viewpoint of their cognition, jars &c. are really established, but they are not the object (artha) of saṃvṛti[24]. Now the jars &c. which from that viewpoint are really established, from the viewpoint of the āryas who see an illusory object (artha) which appears before them, are saṃvṛti; it is said that from the viewpoint of [the āryas'] cognition, they are not explained as satya, but are mere saṃvṛti[25].
>
> But is it not said that their nature is paramārtha-satya? We must discuss the claimed distinction between jars &c. as saṃvṛti and their nature as the āryas' paramārtha. One should not say that for the āryas jars &c. are paramārtha; for it is said that jars &c. are not attained by the reasoned cognition which sees the real object, and that the mark of paramārtha-satya is the attainment of the real object by a reasoned cognition which does see the real object[26].

Candrakīrti's parallel remarks on paramārtha-satya (commenting on VI.23) are obscure[27], and Tsong-kha-pa provides a subcommentary on them, beginning with Candrakīrti's strange **yul-nyid-kyis**[28]:

> Candrakīrti means that attaining [the object] **by means of** a pure **awareness** which judges suchness is not establishing it by means of a self-nature[29]. He refutes those who say that it is really established by arising from a cause, being attained by a pure

> samāhita [jñāna]. "Awareness-particular"[30] means that it is not attained just by any **āryajñāna** but is the awareness-particular attained by ***yathābhūtadarśanajñāna**[31] and is demonstrated **paramārthatas**. The object attained is the object (artha) thus made known by this awareness[32] as in the previous case of saṃvṛti[33].

The **dgongs-pa rab-gsal** offers a similar discussion.[34] Roughly:

> Though the paramārtha-aspect of such things as a sprout is the aspect[35] attained by the viṣaya whose [object is the] awareness-particular[36], [viz.] the real object (artha) seen in **pratyakṣa**, it is not established by its own essence. This is one of the two aspects explained. 'Awareness-particular' (ye-shes-kyi khyad-par) means that it is one particular (bye-brag) not attained by just any āryajñāna, but by that awareness which assesses **yathābhūtaṃ**.[37]

In the **rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho** Tsong-kha-pa then continues by considering how that awareness attains its object. This discussion revolves around the often unhelpful (because unclear) simile of the person who has an eye-disease and sees hairs floating in front of his eyes, as in MMV VI.29:

> On this verse Candrakīrti says[38] "The buddhas who lack all ignorance see the skandhas &c. as though seeing [illusory] hairs yet with a vision not affected by disease; the prakṛti[39] by which they see this is their paramārtha-satya." However[40] the awareness which judges the suchness of the buddhas does not then see as though seeing, with unimpeded vision, a hair which is an appearance vitiated by the eye-disease of ignorance.

This clarification is important. Regardless of Candrakīrti's view, according to Tsong-kha-pa the buddhas do not see correctly something which is delusive because vitiated by karmic traces, &c.

3. TSONG-KHA-PA'S DISAMBIGUATION OF "SATYA"

Tsong-kha-pa stresses that the logical grammar[41] of "satya" is not straightforward; for him, saṃvṛti-satya is not just whatever is both saṃvṛti and satya[42]. Discussion of this logical grammar will be complex and repetitive, for it is not easy to separate the ambiguity of "satya" from that of "saṃvṛti". "Paramārtha" is not ambiguous, so we start with passages on paramārtha-satya and then give one on saṃvṛti-satya (RG 241a3ff):

> The Prasannapadā says[43]: "Since it is an **artha** and it is a superior one, it is

paramārtha, and since it is also **satya** it is paramārtha-satya." Though we do not hold, as others do, that **parama** stands for pure samāhitajñāna and paramārtha is its **visaya**[44], we do claim that what is both **artha** and superior is paramārtha-satya.

How is paramārtha-satya *satya*? Since what is non-delusive for the world is so by being different from how it appears, paramārtha-satya is only explained as existence in virtue of worldly convention[45].

The Yuktiṣaṣṭikavṛtti says that the Buddha said[46] "Bhikṣus, there is only one proper satya, it is the non-delusive dharmin, nirvāṇa." How is that? Just as saṃskṛtas appear wrongly and thus mislead fools, so there is no nirvāṇa, for it is always unborn by nature and just remains in this aspect. So for fools its aspect of arising like a saṃskṛta is nonexistent. Since, because of this, nirvāṇa stays continually in the nature of nirvāṇaness, it is only at the level of worldly convention that it is said to be proper satya. So, because the non-delusive is said to be **satya** in virtue of convention and because the sūtras say that the referent (artha) of **satya** is a non-delusive dharmin, it is said that all saṃskāras are delusive dharmins but that "satya" means "non-delusive"[47].

Now the sense of "satya" in "saṃvṛti-satya": from the viewpoint of attachment to satya this sense is not like the sense in "paramārtha-satya". Though the Yuktiṣaṣṭikavṛtti says that at the saṃvṛti level (kun-rdzob-tu) nirvāṇa is said to be satya, and though nirvāṇa is explained to exist as paramārtha-satya from the saṃvṛti point of view, conventionally (tha-snyad-du) it is not held to be satya[48].

The *locus classicus* for more refined analysis of saṃvṛti-satya and on the relation between the satyas for the ārya and the pṛthagjana is MMV VI.28. On this, the comment in the **dgongs-pa rab-gsal** takes in parts of two sections, one called "The sense in which saṃvṛti is satya and the sense in which it is non-satya" (114b1) and the other called "How there come to be paramārtha and saṃvṛti from the points of view of the ārya and the pṛthagjana" (121b1). The comment in the **rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho** is headed "Explanation of the words saṃvṛti and satya" and runs thus[49]:

> But what kind of saṃvṛti? what kind of satya? Regardless of the viewpoint from which satya is ascribed to the saṃvṛti of forms and other [dharmas], it is ignorance to impute existence to the non-existent svarūpa* established in dharmas by means of a self-essence. Since things cannot be established as satya[50], the satya-claim is from the viewpoint of the mind[51], since a mind not attached to satya does not claim they are satya. On this, MMV VI.28 runs "Since its nature is obscured by confusion, it is saṃvṛti, and of this what is contingent but appears as satya is said by the Muni to be saṃvṛti-satya; contingent things are saṃvṛti". And Candrakīrti's autocommentary says[52]: "Whatever is contained in the different parts of the world is called saṃvṛti-satya by the power of defilement-ridden ignorance. Śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have renounced defilement-ridden ignorance and who see saṃskāras existing similarly to a mirror-image &c. see their nature as contingent (bcos-ma) and not as satya, since they do not erroneously conceive it[53] as satya. These things deceive

fools, but for others they are like illusions and by their dependent origination they become mere saṃvṛti."

Accordingly [Tsong-kha-pa explains] it is taught neither that those who explain saṃvṛti-satya as existence do so out of ignorance, nor that from the viewpoint of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas who have renounced defilement-ridden ignorance it is not saṃvṛti-satya. The reason for the first of these points is that as explained previously defilement-ridden ignorance grasps onto satya but what is thus grasped does not exist [even] conventionally, since if it were saṃvṛti-satya it would be conventionally pervaded by existence. Thus if what exists conventionally had saṃvṛti as its basis, it would conventionally come into existence even for those with defilement-ridden ignorance; this must be wrong[54].

These passages mention matters which lie at the heart of the difference between Tsong-kha-pa and his opponents on saṃvṛti-satya. For Candrakīrti what is essential in the notion of saṃvṛti-satya is that it pertains to the āryas, and not to the pṛthagjanas, as we can see from the bhāṣya to MMV VI.27 and 28. It is about this connection that Candrakīrti lays down postulates (**khas-blangs-nas**, 27). For Candrakīrti it is then a contingent fact that on the whole it is the āryas who see the objects of everyday cognition as similar to illusions. This perspective is retained, and developed further, by Padma dKar-po. Tsong-kha-pa however, while sticking to the same facts, reverses Candrakīrti's logical perspective on them; for Tsong-kha-pa, what is essential about saṃvṛti-satya is that things are seen as like illusions, and this is what he *postulates*[55]; it is then a contingent fact that saṃvṛti-satya pertains mainly to the ārya.

Tsong-kha-pa perhaps developed this particular perspective because in the sampannakrama of the Guhyasamājatantra (cf. Appendix) the characteristic stage concerned with saṃvṛti-satya is the svādhiṣṭhāna-krama; at this stage the visualization is seen as like an illusion, and the corresponding samādhi is even called "like an illusion" (māyopāma, sgyu-ma lta-bu).

It may seem at first that this does not represent a great departure from Candrakīrti. *He* is committed to the idea that saṃvṛti-satya is a *means* to or towards paramārtha-satya; and moreover it is a necessary means[56]. On the other hand he points out that all ordinary objects of knowledge partake of it; saṃvṛti-satya, for him, is the manner in which ordinary objects of knowledge are taken by those who have achieved a certain detachment from the ordinary view of such objects, that is, mainly by the ārya. His account is general, letting our understanding of saṃvṛti-satya depend on our understanding of what it is to be an ārya (what saṃvṛti-satya is for others is not specified). Tsong-kha-pa (following Candrakīrti on VI.23 fairly closely) refines the general sense of "saṃvṛti-satya", but also postulates what it amounts to, not only for the ārya but also for the ordinary person. His critics attack him not because the specific account is mistaken on the facts, but because it is *postulated* to exclude the features which they consider vital (sahaja, &c).

A slogan-like summary of these ways of using the phrase "saṃvṛti-satya" is this: for Tsong-kha-pa, **vyavahāra-satya** is what is satya by convention, that is, conventionally (and not properly) called satya, and so it may *also*, by way of metaphor, be called "obscured satya" (**saṃvṛti-satya**)[57].

Since Tsong-kha-pa was well aware of the ambiguities in his use of "satya" and "saṃvṛti" and discussed them explicitly, it seems reasonable to speak of the logical grammar of these two words, as he used them, as including the ambiguities. So consider the following definitions:

paramārtha = samyagartha, the real or proper intentional object;
saṃvṛti* = obscured (cf. āvaraṇa, sgrib-pa; āvṛti, bsgribs-pa)
saṃvṛti # = vyavahāra, conventional
satya* = veridical (non-delusive, mi-slu-ba) in primary sense
satya # = neither veridical nor delusive in primary sense

Then Tsong-kha-pa's view is schematically:

The buddha-cognition is paramārtha-satya*
The āryas' cognition is typically saṃvṛti*-satya #
The pṛthagjana's cognition is typically mere saṃvṛti #, and Tsong-kha-pa rejects the Svātantrika view (as he would call it) that it is saṃvṛti #-satya*

By contrast, Padma dKar-po's view becomes, on this scheme:

The buddha and the ārya have both paramārtha-satya* and saṃvṛti*-satya*, they differ in the intensity and stability of these cognitions.
The pṛthagjana's cognition is mere saṃvṛti* (not saṃvṛti #).

Candrakīrti does not distinguish systematically between *either* of the pairs of saṃvṛti's and satyas, and his view is the corresponding conflation of Tsong-kha-pa's[58]:

> The buddha-cognition is paramārtha-satya
> The āryas' cognition is typically saṃvṛti-satya
> The pṛthagjana's cognition is typically mere saṃvṛti

Thus on Tsong-kha-pa's view, in saṃvṛti-satya there is no distinction as to appearances being veridical or delusive, over and above their status as illusion-like (sgyu-ma lta-bu, māyopāma); conventionally delusive appearances, such as the snake in the rope/snake illusion, can certainly partake of saṃvṛti-satya for one who sees them as illusion-like. At GR 115b1 he discusses a mirror-image as saṃvṛti-satya, and elaborately refutes the claim that mirror-images cannot be saṃvṛti-satya. This illustrates a general feature of Tsong-kha-pa's programme. The vyavahāra-satya which is the foundation of paramārtha-satya must be rooted in ordinary cognition; he achieves this by the demand, just discussed, that saṃvṛti-satya be related to ordinary cognition freed from attachment to the veridical. For this to work one must *distinguish* veridical cognitions without becoming attached to their being veridical; we return to this point later. We continue the account in the **rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho**:

> The reason behind the second point, viz. that from the viewpoint of those [śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas] who have renounced defilement-ridden ignorance, satya-claims derive from the absence of a saṃvṛti grasping onto satya, is that from their viewpoint, saṃskāras are established as non-satya but not established as non-saṃvṛti-satya[59]. So from their viewpoint saṃskāras are mere saṃvṛti since, though they fall under both saṃvṛti and satya, the word *mere* repudiates their ascription to satya but not their ascription to saṃvṛti-satya[60].
>
> So in what sense is saṃvṛti-satya ***satya***? Only in the sense of avidya-saṃvṛti. Candrakīrti says "It is called saṃvṛti-satya because conventionally it is satya." So it is [in fact] satya from the point of view of avidya-saṃvṛti, but conventionally it is not established as satya. If this were not so, firstly there would be a contradiction with the tradition that [satya] is not even conventionally established by means of a self-essence. Secondly, if those who refute real establishment and who establish delusiveness do so conventionally, it is wrong to say that conventionally there is real establishment, and if not, since it cannot be done absolutely, such analysis cannot be done at all.

The object of knowledge (**shes-bya**, jñeya) may be an ordinary object like a sprout or a less ordinary object like a mirror-image or a visualization. In all these cases, Tsong-kha-pa says, its cognition is saṃvṛti-satya (or not) according to how it is taken, viz. as like an illusion (**māyopāma**) (or not). Now, apart from the differences of logical perspective sketched above, this idea itself has been subject to various interpretations. Tsong-kha-pa's opponents took it as a kind of brute fact. They thought that in a properly functioning cognition, things would *naturally* appear as like illusions. This would not mean that cognition of them would be accompanied by any such thought as "this is like an illusion", &c. To do so would be to indulge in unnecessary **prapañca**; and they believed that Tsong-kha-pa's view encourages this. This criticism seems to be directed against passages such as RG 238a6—239a2 and 247b2—4 (see section 2 above). Here Tsong-kha-pa seems to waver between the two views just set out. Jar, cloth etc. do possess the required illusion-like character in virtue of their self-nature, and that is how they partake of saṃvṛti-satya (238b2, see note [22]). Now this self-nature is not the proper one connected with paramārtha-satya, viz. voidness. So where does it come from? *By the power of delusive cognition*[61]; there is no need to establish this as delusive, Tsong-kha-pa continues (GR 108b2), just as the spectator of a magic spectacle sees magical horses and elephants and this seeing is delusive, but there is no need to *establish* the appearances[62] as delusive. The ārya, of course, is not deluded, because he sees the appearances as like illusions. Evidently it is the nature of the *appearances* which (on Tsong-kha-pa's argument) gives them their capacity to be seen as phenomena in the sense that maybe there is nothing behind the appearance; jar, cloth &c. possess this capacity only in a secondary and derived sense[63]. As far as mere appearances are concerned, to see them as like illusions (as potentially delusive) is to see them as they really are[64], while for anything at all, seeing it as like an illusion entails seeing it as not having a self-essence, and this is logically equivalent to seeing it as empty. Thus Tsong-kha-pa has succeeded in removing some of the problems about ordinary objects to the level of appearances, while maintaining the general form of his distinction between the two satyas. And as far as I can tell, this is exactly what he needs in order to make his theory work in the Vajrayāna, on the level where it is admitted that saṃvṛti-satya is satya only by convention and that his theory cannot be used to give a really satisfactory account of **yuganaddha** which, strictly speaking, remains beyond description[65]. This brings us to the connection between the two satyas, which is the topic of our final section.

4. THE NUMBER AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE SATYAS

Tsong-kha-pa argues as follows that there are just two satyas[66]:

> The Prasannapadā says that the innumerable conventions of discourse and content, knowledge and knowable &c are all to be called **loka-saṃvṛti-satya**. This means that all conventional referents (artha) are subsumed in saṃvṛti-satya. So all knowables are contained in the two satyas. Now there is no point in setting up (yongs-su bcad-pa) a delusive referent since it would then be non-delusive and would have to be rejected (rnam-par-gcad-pa); for the notions of delusive and non-delusive are mutually dependent and should be given up, as incompatible with the way things are (gnas-pa'i 'gal-ba).
>
> This being so, all knowables whatever fall under one of these two mutually dependent notions which are to be given up; there is no third alternative. So the Madhyamakāvatāra says (VI.23) "All things are seen either properly or delusively, so all things are reached in two ways (rūpa, ngo-bo)". Thus the very mode of definition of the satyas fixes their number as two.

Though in the first part of this argument Tsong-kha-pa does not distinguish between a delusive referent and one experienced as delusive, it is surely sound: if something is properly set up (yongs-su bcad-pa) *as delusive*, its being delusive will be veridical and this veridical character must be rejected (rnam-par gcad-pa), according to Tsong-kha-pa's own principles. Not only is this absurd in itself, but it leads to a regress. The provisional solution, involving saṃvṛti-satya, is to bring about a cognition which is not delusive but merely illusion-like — potentially delusive but also potentially veridical. The ultimate solution, involving paramārtha-satya, is to drop all these notions of delusive and non-delusive as irrelevant to the actual situation at hand.

However the second part of the argument seems to yield interesting conclusions from rather few premises. It seems to show that the two satyas stand in a very simple logical relationship. Yet they apparently have two different functions: saṃvṛti-satya counteracts attachment to the veridical, while paramārtha-satya counteracts rejection of the delusive. Tsong-kha-pa has been severely criticized for ascribing these separate functions to the two satyas, and indeed we may wonder whether such slender premises can yield such strong conclusions, so let us review the argument in more detail.

In discussing appearances[67] Tsong-kha-pa distinguishes carefully between a delusive appearance and one seen as delusive, as we noted earlier with the example of the magical horses and elephants. Indeed, one and the same *appearance* can be both, depending on who sees it (compare a person who is taken in by the rope/snake, and one who is not). He compares saṃvṛti-satya with the cognition of one who sees the magical horses and elephants but sees them as delusive. As the passage just quoted makes clear, he thinks that seeing the magical horses and elephants as delusive entails associating them with the *word* "delusive", thinking "this is a delusion", &c. He claims to contrast this with paramārtha-satya, quoting MMV VI.23. But what is thus contrasted with saṃvṛti-satya is merely another verbal association of cognitions with the *word* "satya"; of course neither of these cognitive processes is veridical in the primary sense of yielding knowledge which will withstand critical investigation; as he says, both will have to be given up. The whole argument rests on a thinly-veiled confusion between the primary and secondary senses of "bden-pa" and "slu-ba" (say "veridical" and "delusive").

To Tsong-kha-pa, what matters is to counteract the general tendency to take ordinary cognition as veridical in the primary sense; this is what saṃvṛti-satya is *for*. This move gives rise to the idea of saṃvṛti-satya as veridical in the secondary sense: the perspective of the āryas in which any conventionally veridical (or delusive) cognition is just delusive in the primary sense[68]. Paramārtha-satya is not directly contrasted with this; it *is* veridical in the primary sense, and it achieves this by abandoning all **prapañcas**[69]. So in spite of what Tsong-kha-pa says in the passage just quoted, there is no simple logical connection between the two satyas (as he sees them). And this is as it should be, since the important connection between the two satyas is a causal one, as he makes clear in a later passage (RG 248a3) called "The purpose of teaching two satyas":

> [Objection:] If paramārtha had a nature lacking in **prapañca**, suchness could be

demonstrated [directly]. There would then be no need for the saṃvṛti of the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, of satya and of dependent origination. But this nature does not exist. If these things are to be renounced, why point them out?

[Reply:] Though it is true that one must renounce the erroneous saṃvṛti-appearances as though there were no suchness, still discourse and content, knowledge and the knowable &c. which are paramārtha for the world, from the viewpoint of the āryas are postulated[70] as conventional saṃvṛti-satya. Yet it is only on this basis that paramārtha can be pointed out, and if it is not pointed out it cannot be understood, and there will be no attainment of nirvāṇa. For this reason — because it is the means to obtain freedom, like a vessel which is necessary to hold water — it is always undoubtedly necessary to postulate a conventional [view] as to how things are.

The causal connection between the satyas here is not that saṃvṛti-satya is a form of cognition, the experience of which brings about paramārtha-satya if other conditions obtain. Rather, the causal nexus is a matter of understanding: on the basis of *postulating* (**khas-len-pa**) that worldly saṃvṛti-satya is such-and-such, paramārtha can be demonstrated and understood (rtogs-pa). Or (e.g. RG 247b6) the Buddha's teaching can be understood (rnam-par shes-pa) only as related to the two satyas; this understanding contains an essential discursive element, on Tsong-kha-pa's view. Again, this is a doctrine for which he has been vigorously attacked, and it is important to be clear how the doctrine fits into his general view of the two satyas.

According to the passages discussed here, considerations from **pramāṇa** play little role in Tsong-kha-pa's conception of the satyas[71]. In general, the appearance of pramāṇa terms in Tsong-kha-pa's discussions of the two satyas in the RG and GR just represents his development of Candrakīrti's use of such terms; and it is well-known that Candrakīrti disliked the use of Bauddha logic in Madhyamaka, preferring the realistic methods of the Naiyāyikas. This is a separate point from the use of formal inference for one's own purposes (svatantra) in Madhyamaka (which evoked Candrakīrti's disapproval) and from the use of the Apohavāda theory in connection with the two satyas (which goes back at least to Sa-skya Paṇḍita). The single appearance in GR of the apohavāda term **ngo-bo gcig-la ldog-pa tha-dad** (109a4) is of little importance; all Tsong-kha-pa is saying is that there is a broad analogy between the two satyas as two **ngo-bos** having a common substratum and the sense in which the properties (ldog-pa) of being created and of being impermanent are found in the same substratum[72]:

> The basis of the distinction is the division into saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya. Though there are many dissimilarities between the things thus distinguished, here both have a [common] basis. We have **ngo-bo gcig-la ldog-pa tha-dad-pa**, as with [the properties] created and impermanent, since there are both identical and different **rūpas** (ngo-bo gcig dang tha-dad) and since if substrata (chos-can, dharmin) other than empty of satya [possessed] different **rūpas** they would be established as satya.

This is clearly an analogy with the apohavāda theory, and not an application of that theory. (The passage occurs in a section dealing with miscellaneous alternatives to the theory of Candrakīrti, and not with his theory itself.)

In formulating his view of the two satyas one of Tsong-kha-pa's main objects of attack is the idea that *intrinsically* they are "born together" (sahaja, lhan-cig skyes-pa) or "integrated" (yuganaddha, zung-du 'jug-pa). Conversely, in criticizing him, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and Padma dKar-po make much use of these Vajrayāna terms. Candrakīrti does not use them, and I suspect that their use in Madhyamaka texts is a Tibetan innovation. It is found in Sa-skya Paṇḍita. Yet all these Tibetan authors regarded themselves as followers of Candrakīrti. How is this possible?

Candrakīrti inherited from the sūtras the idea that really there is only one kind of satya, viz. paramārtha-satya. His writing seems to contain, mixed up together, two different notions of how there comes to be a second satya. First, the idea of something which is not really satya at all, but is conventionally[73] known as satya; this is our saṃvṛti#-satya. Second, the idea of something taking its satya-character from paramārtha-satya, but obscured (saṃvṛta) by the defects of the visual apparatus; this is our saṃvṛti*-satya[74]. Now we can ask whether saṃvṛti-satya, seen as the conflation of *these* two notions, contains the idea of a second kind of satya. As I have made clear, I believe that Padma dKar-po and others never accepted that it does. Sticking with just one notion of satya, as Padma dKar-po did, there is no worthwhile application for the notion of saṃvṛti#, and this is how Padma dKar-po came to see Candrakīrti as speaking mainly of saṃvṛti*-satya*. Tsong-kha-pa's general programme meant keeping "saṃvṛti #"; but to keep it extensional[75] he is forced to bring in something like satya # as well. Thus his writings on saṃvṛti-satya mainly concern satya #, while those of Padma dKar-po mainly concern satya*.

In assessing the various criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa, we have to ask ourselves first of all whether he did treat the two satyas separately. I think on the whole he did; from his own point of view, little more justification would be required than a perusal of the bhāṣya to MMV VI.23. This is especially clear in his treatment of paramārtha-satya translated and discussed in section 2. The general structure of this treatment is that it is a brute fact that there are two kinds of object (artha): the ordinary one attained by a conventional cognition, and the "awareness-particular" (ye-shes-kyi khyad-par, *jñānaviśeṣa) which is attained in paramārtha-satya; and so, since there are two kinds of object, there must be two kinds of cognition which cognise them. A parallel argument is of course found in pramāṇa (though there seems to be no direct correlation between the pairs of objects and cognitions in the two cases). Another example of independent treatment is at RG 244b5. Yet elsewhere we find passages where they seem to be treated as arising together; the following is also of some interest for its (surely non-technical) use of the word **pramāṇa** (tshad-ma) (GR 108b2):

> So what is the point of analyzing saṃvṛti-satya as attained by a delusive cognition (MMV VI.23)? It is attained by a conventional means of knowledge[76] which assesses ('jal-ba) a delusive object (artha). Out of the previously explained two svabhāvas or svarūpas, paramārtha-satya is the one which assesses the real object (artha) by means of a reasoned cognition and so reaches it, and this is explained under the verse "rab-rib mthu-yis . . ."[77]. It is said that [of these two svarūpas] the one which is attained by a conventional means of knowledge which sees a delusive object (artha) is saṃvṛti-satya. Though the substrata attained in paramārtha and saṃvṛti-[satya] are spoken of separately, *they are attained as one and do not arise as two*[78].

However this does not quite meet the point made by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and Padma dKar-po. It is not enough that the substratum cognized should be one and the same and should not arise as two; their point concerns whether or not it is possible for the two *modes of cognition* to arise separately. And given the way Tsong-kha-pa insisted, as we saw above, that these two cognitions do have separate referents (artha) — even though they may be aspects of one and the same substratum (gzhi) — the balance of the evidence seems to be that he did regard the two cognitions as essentially separate.

Padma dKar-po has also criticized Tsong-kha-pa for separating the *functions* of the two satyas, as mentioned above. His argument, reviewed in [B85a], runs as follows. Tsong-kha-pa has claimed[79] that if one (wrongly) took the two satyas as having separate substrata, then paramārtha-satya would become non-existence like the barren woman's son, while at the saṃvṛti level existent things could never go out of existence. Thus appearance counteracts the extreme (mtha, koṭi) of existence, while voidness counteracts the extreme of non-existence. Padma dKar-po objects that if this argument is valid, then paramārtha-satya *has* become nihilism and saṃvṛti-satya *has* become eternalism. He does not give the details of his counter-argument, but it seems to amount to something like the following. Let us agree that that the two satyas have the same substrate, and consider them as functioning separately. If voidness functions purely by itself, there is nothing to distinguish it from nihilism; what is needed for this is precisely illusion-like appearances, i.e. (on Tsong-kha-pa's view) saṃvṛti-satya. Similarly, if appearances appear by themselves without voidness, they will *ipsissimo facto* possess (or be experienced as possessing) self-essences and so will be eternal; for as Nāgārjuna pointed out in the Vigrahavyāvarttānī, since voidness is the absence of self-essences, its absence logically implies their presence[80]. These arguments are of course well-known, and it may be doubted whether Tsong-kha-pa really laid himself open to them in the RG[81]; nevertheless they show clearly enough why Padma dKar-po so strongly objected to the separation of the two satyas.

This exemplifies a common state of affairs. On many disputed points the emphasis — the judgment of what is really important and what is merely incidental — of Tsong-kha-pa and of his Tibetan opponents differed fairly radically, and I do not believe that either side was normally able to defeat the other by some brisk little argument formulated in a couple of lines. The best chance of a decisive refutation of Tsong-kha-pa's views is perhaps in the Vajrayāna, for instance on the integration (yuganaddha, zung-'jug) of the two satyas. In Tibet it was widely agreed that this is a difficult area for him. The best chance of a refutation of his bKa-brgyud critics is probably in showing that their view of saṃvṛti-satya trivializes the connection between the satyas. It is probably not too difficult to show this from Tsong-kha-pa's own perspective, but it is extremely difficult from the perspective of those opponents. As so often, many of the mutual criticisms merely beat the air, because the opposing parties, though using the same words, are not using them to talk about quite the same things.

APPENDIX: THE TWO SATYAS AND VAJRAYĀNA

Given the importance of the Vajrayāna in Tibetan culture, a critical test of any theory of the two satyas is that it should provide an acceptable basis or foundation for the relevant Vajrayāna notions. In the Introduction we said that Tsong-kha-pa wanted to provide an account of the two satyas which would apply *in detail* to the Vajrayāna; he perhaps had four distinguishable, though related, projects in this area:

(a) To give a detailed account of the satyas compatible both with Candrakīrti and with the **lam-rim**.

(b) Within this framework, to provide an account of saṃvṛti-satya making it both intelligible and non-trivial that saṃvṛti-satya is the basis of paramārtha-satya.

(c) To apply these accounts to exegesis of the Guhyasamāja, showing how saṃvṛti-satya provides the basis for the the **māyādeha** (illusory body) and paramārtha-satya for the **prabhāsvara** (radiant light).

(d) More generally, to apply these accounts to the remainder of the tantras, especially the mother tantras.

Did he succeed in these projects? On (a), one may not like the result, but he met the challenge. It has been objected (e.g. by Mi-bskyod rDo-rje) that in doing so, he departed unacceptably from the views of Candrakīrti. To this it may be replied first that Candrakīrti's views absolutely require further development, especially if they are to be applied in detail to the Vajrayāna; and secondly, *ad hominem*, that Tsong-kha-pa's opponents departed from Candrakīrti as much, or even more, than he did. According to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and Padma dKar-po, (b) is unintelligible, but this view can itself be understood only on grounds lying outside Madhyamaka. Let us lay it on one side for the moment. Did Tsong-kha-pa succeed *on his own terms* in carrying out (b)? This depends partly on questions of fact; my own view, for what it is worth, is that if the facts are as Tsong-kha-pa says they are, then his account of (b) is worth taking seriously. In this appendix I want to review some of the general considerations which underlie any attempt to arrive at a view on (c) and (d), though the detailed work necessary for this lies outside the scope of this paper.

There are many different tantric cycles, and it is not easy to provide a general account of which they can all be seen as instances. Even if one does provide such an account, as Padma dKar-po did in his **gzhung-'grel**, it will have to be written from some point of view which will favour some tantras over others. So for any particular author a reasonable demand on his theory of the two satyas is that it provide an acceptable basis for the relevant applications in those tantras with which he is principally concerned. Tsong-kha-pa, whose main interest is in the father-tantras, may be required to provide an adequate account of saṃvṛti-satya as the basis for the illusory body and of paramārtha-satya as the basis for the radiant light; while Padma dKar-po, whose main interest is in the mother-tantras, may be required to provide an adequate account of saṃvṛti-satya as the basis for **sarvākāravaropeta-śūnyatā** and paramārtha-satya as the basis for **mahāsukha**. Additionally, those authors who regard one system of tantras as dependent on another, enter into corresponding commitments as regards the satyas. Padma dKar-po regarded the father-tantras as dependent on the mother-tantras in the sense that what is hidden or inexplicit in the father-tantras is made explicit in the mother-tantras; thus his theory of the two satyas may *additionally* be required to provide the basis for the illusory body and the radiant light in the father-tantras, *when these are regarded as explicated by means of the mother-tantras* in the appropriate sense. How Padma dKar-po set about this is spelt out a bit in my [B85a] and more in my papers on *Padma dKar-po on Ground, Path and Goal in the Tantras* and on *Yuganaddha* which will appear shortly in the *Journal of the Tibet Society.*

Tsong-kha-pa did not have the same commitments as Padma dKar-po. For him, the principal tantric cycle, for which the theory of the two satyas is above all to provide the relevant basis, is the

Guhyasamāja. (To see this, consider the structural connections between the **Lam-rim chen-mo**, the **sNgags-rim chen-mo**, and works specifically devoted to the Guhyasamāja such as the **gSang-ba 'dus-pa'i man-ngag rim-pa lnga rab-tu gsal-ba'i sgron-ma** [SG]). It seems that Tsong-kha-pa did not regard exegesis of the Guhyasamāja as dependent on that of any other cycle, in the way Padma dKar-po did. I cannot say whether or not there is any reverse commitment, that is, whether Tsong-kha-pa saw his exegesis of the Cakrasaṃvara or other cycles as dependent, in some such sense, on that of the Guhysamāja. Thus I can say a little about Tsong-kha-pa on (c), but not on (d).

So the first issue before us is: does Tsong-kha-pa's theory of the two satyas, as set out in the RG and the GR, provide an adequate basis for his account of the illusory body and the radiant light given e.g. in SG? Here "adequate" means "adequate for the purposes of the Guhyasamāja" (especially as set out in the Ārya tradition), seen as a tantric cycle not dependent on any other in the way just sketched. These two accounts *are* made for one another: his partly separate and independent treatment of the two satyas, to which attention was drawn in the body of this article, mirrors his treatment of the illusory body, the radiant light and **yuganaddha** as separate "stages" (krama) (as also in the Pañcakrama, Pradīpoddyotana &c). By treating them in this way as separate stages he can give a discursive account of saṃvṛti-satya and the illusory body without having to start off from the viewpoint of the radiant light. This is how they are treated also in the Ārya tradition and by Bu-ston. This style of treatment has its own difficulties, and in particular there is the danger that paramārtha-satya or the radiant light may become mere nihilism, but it seems reasonable to suppose that these authors were aware of these problems, as Bu-ston certainly was. In any case, the class of father-tantras (as Tsong-kha-pa and Padma dKar-po used this term), to which this treatment seems directly applicable, includes the Yāmantaka and Vajrabhairava and a number of other tantras important for the dGe-lugs.

Now apart from all this, we have (d), the question of how to deal with the mother-tantras. These include not only Hevajra, Cakrasaṃvara and Kālacakra, but also Catuṣpitha, Mahāmāya, Buddhakapala, Pañjara, Sampuṭa, Sarvabuddhasamayoga etc. For the Sa-skya-pas and bKa-brgyud-pas, the *critical* test of any account of the two satyas is that it should apply to these tantras; whether it also applies to the Guhyasamāja &c. is secondary. And according to Mi-bskyod rDo-rje and Padma dKar-po, any account of the two satyas which does not see them as intrinsically **sahaja** and **yuganaddha** is not going to be able to give an adequate account of these tantras; cf. also Sa-skya Paṇḍita in the **thub-dgongs rab-gsal**. Similar considerations apply to the rNying-ma-pas, although their classification of the tantras and their choice of individual tantras was of course completely different. Tsong-kha-pa's treatment of the two satyas does not seem to meet the requirement. This point has been made many times in Tibet, and no doubt the dGe-lugs-pas have a reply to it; no doubt too scholars who know about the dGe-lugs treatment of the tantras will tell us what it is. Meanwhile, in the present state of Western scholarship, it is essential to recognize that *prima facie* there is here a serious doctrinal difference between the dGe-lugs-pas and all the other Tibetan traditions, and not simply to pretend, as do Stein and others, that there is "no doctrinal schism".

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Over a period of years Paul Williams has disagreed with my views on Madhyamaka in the nicest possible way and in doing so has made me realise the importance of the technical issues raised (even if not settled) here.

NOTES

[1] The terms **Svātantrika** (rang-rgyud-pa) and **Prāsaṅgika** (thal-'gyur-pa) were coined in Tibet and used for the first time by Pa-tshab Lotsawa Nyi-ma-grags (1055–) [M81]. Pa-tshab was an important translator of Candrakīrti, being responsible for the standard translations of the PSP and the MMV.

[2] Cf. [M81], p. 161. Still, there were some notable exceptions, especially the Jo-nang-pas, whose *summa* is the **Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho** of Dol-po Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan. Their **gzhan-stong** position is seldom mentioned in **grub-mtha** (siddhānta) texts, and in spite of the fame of Dol-po-pa, for some reason many Tibetans treated it disrespectfully. Possibly there was a feeling that they were really Yogācāras masquerading as Mādhyamikas.

[3] Of course references to Madhyamaka notions, sometimes quite persistent and consistent, occur also in Indian and in earlier Tibetan Vajrayāna writings. So, on the other hand, do references to Yogācāra, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika notions. See also note [5].

[4] The **darśana** (lta-ba) plays a special part in the Vajrayāna, together with its cultivation (bhāvanā, sgom-pa), action (cārya, spyod-pa) and the goal or result (phala, 'bras-bu). For details and references, see [B85a].

[5] As far as the Indian Vajrayāna literature is concerned, the parallel is perhaps most highly developed in the Ārya school of commentary on the Guhyasamājatantra (Pañcakrama, Pradīpoddyotana &c.). No doubt this was one of the reasons why Tsong-kha-pa regarded the Ārya school so highly.

[6] Here "cause" must be taken in the sense of **pratītya-samutpāda**, and not in the Western sense. The idea of a cause being a *sufficient* condition for the occurrence of its effect was rejected by all Mādhyamikas.

[7] For Padma dKar-po see [B85a], which is concerned mainly with the general cultural and soteriological background to the role of the two satyas in his writings, especially those on Vajrayāna. Padma dKar-po was of course one of Tibet's most celebrated writers on Vajrayāna, but he did not write technical works on Madhyamaka. For technical details of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje's criticisms of Tsong-kha-pa (and others) see his **dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta**, *passim*.

[8] This does not mean that the problem of the break was ignored by the bKa-brgyud-pas. It is part of the subject-matter of what they called *rtogs-pa'i 'char-tshul* (see [B85a]). Like the rNying-ma-pas (and unlike the dGe-lugs-pas) they distinguished between a type who makes the transition from pṛthagjana to ārya in a moment (the *cig-car-ba*), the one who makes the transition in graded stages, similar to those of the *lam-rim* (the *rim-gyis-pa*), and an intermediate type for whom four main stages are distinguished (the *thod-rgal-ba*). Padma dKar-po's writings on Madhyamaka are addressed mainly to the *cig-car-ba*, not to the *rim-gyis-pa*; this marks an important difference of subject-matter between him and Tsong-kha-pa. The structural connections between Padma dKar-po's views on Madhyamaka and on mahāmudra, which underline these points, are spelled out in [B85a].

[9] Historians who claim e.g. that "The issue was one of political antagonisms. There was no schism over doctrine . . ." [St72, 83] are simply mistaken. A much more sensible view, placed in a relevant historical context, is that of Aris [A79, p. 150]: "The late 'reformed' school of the dGe-lugs-pa did contradict some of the doctrinal foundations of the older schools but it never held full sway in Bhutan." To work out the causal connections between the political antagonisms and the doctrinal schisms needs a properly developed history of ideology, such as we hardly possess in respect of any part of Asia save possibly the world of Islam.

[10] While I have mimicked, in English, the surface form of the Tibetan where this was possible without violence to the sense, nothing offered here should be taken as a *translation* in any more precise sense of this much-abused word. Given the oddities found in some work in Indian and Tibetan studies, it is not redundant to say firmly that this paper is written in English, and not, say, in Sanskritese. By this I mean that where English words are used, they mean exactly what they mean in English (and not in, er, Sanskritese). The resources of these languages will sometimes be enlarged by disambiguating, following native sources (e.g. satya#/satya* in section 3); such devices will be carefully defined on introduction.

[11] Tillemans points out [T82, pp. 106—7] that the dGe-lugs differed from some other Tibetan traditions on what the **prasaṅga/svatantra** distinction consists of. This difference is of considerable philosophical interest, but does not affect the questions discussed in this paper. On Madhyamaka method and what "theses" the Mādhyamika may hold, see also [W85].

[12] Compare the following remarks by Tillemans [T81, p. 312] on Tsong-kha-pa’s approach to the “neither one nor many” problem: “. . . I think it is fair to say that Tsong-kha-pa was less concerned with what Śāntarakṣita and others said, than with rationally reconstructing the logical situations they faced. We follow Imre Lakatos and make a distinction between internal and external history, the former being primarily logical deductions of what could have been said, given the key ideas of the philosopher in question, the latter being what was actually said, what actually took place. In this light there is no doubt that Tsong-kha-pa, the great debater, was a specialist in internal history; as such his stretching of terminology, his imposition of concepts which have no obvious textual justification, should not be judged by the severe criterion of the external historian. Bearing this distinction in mind, we deprive neither Tsong-kha-pa, nor for that matter, ourselves, of the possibility of using fertile but foreign concepts.” Tillemans here refers to Lakatos’ *History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions*, pp. 102—5, 118—21. While some of the same observations apply to Padma dKar-po and others too, Tsong-kha-pa perhaps had a more highly developed sense of the way the systems he interpreted might be expected to evolve.

[13] In the PSP Candrakīrti treats the two satyas quite briefly and refers his reader to the MMV for details; since his treatment in the MMV goes so far beyond anything written by Nāgārjuna, it is possible that he felt that to do justice to his own views in the PSP would constitute an **utsūtravyākhyā**. This point does not seem to have bothered Tsong-kha-pa who, though commenting (in the RG) on Nāgārjuna, explicates and develops the views of Candrakīrti.

[14] Candrakīrti may well have conflated two similar uses of “rūpa”.

[15] Truth is a property of sentences (relativized to contexts) or, philosophically, a property of propositions, but in any case not a property of cognitions or cognitive states or appearances or experiences or “things”. It is only with a great sense of strain that an English-speaker can say of a visual object or experience that it is true or false (cf. J. R. Searle, *Intentionality*, C.U.P. 1983, p. 43). For further examples see [B85a]. Given this strain and the resulting confusion it is not surprising that many Western accounts of the satyas are unintelligible.

[16] GR 107a6: ’di-na bden-gnyis-kyi rang-gi ngo-bo phyin-ci-ma-log-pa mkhyen-pa’i bcom-ldan-’das-rnams-kyis ’du-byed-sems-pa-sogs nang dang myu-gu-sogs phyi-rol-gyi dngos-po kun-te thams-cad-kyi rang-gi ngo-bo rnam-pa-gnyis ni ’dzin-par ’gyur-bar nye-bar-bstan-te / de gang zhe-na / kun-rdzob bden-pa’i ngo-bo dang don-dam bden-pa’i ngo-bo’o / / ’dis ni myu-gu lta-bu gcig-gi ngo-bo-la yang phye-na kun-rdzob yin-pa dang / don-dam yin-pa’i ngo-bo gnyis yod-par ston-gyi, myu-gu’i ngo-bo gcig-nyid so-skye dang ’phags-pa-la bltos-nas bden-pa gnyis-su bstan-pa gtan min-no / (b2) / de-ltar byas-na ngo-bo med-pa’i chos mi-srid-pas / gzhi grub-pa yin-na ngo-bo-gcig-dang-tha-dad-las mi-’da-la / ngo-bo yod-pa khas-len kyang rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa’i ngo-bo med-pa mi-’gal-lo /

[17] RG 238a1: phyi dang nang-gi dngos-po ’di-rnams re-re-la yang don-dam-pa dang kun-rdzob-pa’i ngo-bo gnyis gnyis[*sic*] yod-de de yang myu-gu lta-bu gcig-la mtshon-na / shes-bya yang-dag-pa de-kho-na’i don gzigs-pa’i rigs-shes-kyis rnyed-pa’i myu-gu’i ngo-bo dang / shes-bya brdzun-pa slu-ba’i don ’jal-ba’i tha-snyad-pa’i shes-pas rnyed-pa’i myu-gu’i ngo-bo’o /

[18] Cf. the last clause of note [17]. This use of **artha** (don) is very common in both Sanskrit and Tibetan and seems to have the dictionary sense of “that towards which something is directed”, that is, the object of an intentional state. The latter phrase is

probably best taken in the sense of Husserl, since the **artha** can be an ordinary physical object, a phenomenal object, or something about which the subject is thinking &c. independently of whether it exists; often there is ambiguity between these senses. A clarification of these related uses of **artha** is a pressing problem for our understanding of Indian epistemology and theories of perception. In these passages there is also a clutch of problems concerning the phrases **shes-bya** (jñeya), **shes-bya'i don** (jñeyārtha) &c. and their more complex variants (cf. note [21] &c), which would certainly repay more detailed study.

[19] RG 238a3 (Tsong-kha-pa's own remarks on the verse): / 'dis ni myu-gu'i ngo-bo-la bden-pa gnyis-kyi ngo-bo gnyis yod-pa'i don-dam-pa ni shes-pa snga-ma dang kun-rdzob ni shes-pa phyi-mas rnyed-par ston-gyi / myu-gu'i ngo-bo gcig-nyid shes-pa snga-phyi gnyis-la ltos-nas bden-pa gnyis-su ston-pa min-te / 'jug-'grel-las / dngos-po thams-cad-kyi rang-gi ngo-bo rnam-pa-gnyis nye-bar bstan-te / 'di-lta-ste kun-rdzob dang don-dam-pa'o / zhes dngos-po re-re'i ngo-bo-la gnyis gnyis-su phye-nas don-dam-pa ni yang-dag-pa'i don gzigs-pa'i shes-pa dang / kun-rdzob ni brdzun-pa mthong-ba'i shes-pas rnyed-par gsungs-so /

[20] The view here rejected by Tsong-kha-pa is very similar to that of Mi-bskyod rDo-rje [B85a].

[21] RG 238a6: / myu-gu'i chos-nyid ni de'i rang-bzhin yin-pas, de'i ngo-bo zhes-bya-ba-la myu-gu'i kha-dog dang dbyibs-la-sogs-pa yang myu-gu'i bdag-nyid yin-pas, de'i ngo-bo'o / mtshan-gzhi bum-pa-lta-bu zhig shes-bya brdzun-pa slu-ba'i don-du nges-pa-la gzhi de-la bden-par-'dzin-pa'i zhen-yul rigs-shes-kyis sun-phyung-ba'i lta-ba rnyed dgos-te / bden-pa rigs-pas ma-khegs-par brdzun-pa tshad-mas mi-'grub-pa'i phyir-ro / / des-na gzhi de kun-rdzob bden-pa'i don-du blos grub-pa ni don-dam-par yod-pa blos 'khegs-pa-la nges-pa ltos-so / This formulation of the argument relies on a well-known ambiguity in the use of the verb **'grub-pa** (sādh-, sidh-) in pramāṇa. Its basic meaning is "to make known"; but in relation to the two main epistemic varieties, (roughly) perception and inference, "making known" can mean respectively an act of perception or some kind of proof. In "bden-par 'dzin-pa'i zhen-yul" here, **yul** certainly refers to the subject in cognition (see note [27]).

[22] RG 238b2: / bum-snam-la-sogs-pa kun-rdzob bden-pa yin kyang de-dag blos grub-pa-na, kun-rdzob bden-pa'i don blos 'grub mi-dgos-te / bum-snam-sogs rang-bzhin-gyis med-bzhin-du snang-ba'i sgyu-ma-lta-bu yin kyang de-dag grub-pa'i blos sgyu-ma-lta-bu'i don 'grub-pa mi-dgos-pa bzhin-no / The claims about the nature of objects of perception are confusing; at the beginning of the paragraph this nature was said to be **dharmatā**, which is the object of paramārtha-satya, while in the quoted passage the nature is said to be their being illusion-like, which is the content (not object) of their saṃvṛti-satya. Apparently "nature" here is not to be taken in any very precise sense. See also note [30].

[23] don-dam-par yod-pa, paramārtha-sat (see also [21]).

[24] RG 238b3: / de'i phyir dbu-ma'i lta-ba-med-pa'i so-skye'i shes-ngo-la ltos-te bum-snam-sogs kun-rdzob bden-pa dang 'phags-pa-la ltos-te don-dam-bden-par smra-ba ni rigs-pa ma-yin-te / 'jug-'grel-las / de-la so-so skye-bo-rnams-kyi don-dam-pa gang yin-pa de-nyid 'phags-pa snang-ba-dang-bcas-pa'i spyod-yul-can-rnams-kyi kun-rdzob-tsam yin-la / de'i rang-bzhin stong-pa-nyid gang yin-pa de ni de-rnams-kyi don-dam-pa'o / zhes gsungs-pa-las bzlog-nas smra-ba yin-pa'i phyir-ro / / so-so'i skye-bo-rnams-kyis ni bum-pa-la-sogs-pa-la bden-par 'dzin-la de-nyid don-dam-par yod-par 'dzin-pa yang yin-pas / de-dag-gi shes-ngo de-la ltos-te bum-sogs-rnams don-dam-par

grub-pa yin-gyi kun-rdzob-pa’i don min-no / This last remark again exhibits the ambiguity of **artha** (don) and the confusion of objects with cognitive referents (also in [26]).

[25] RG 238b6: / de-dag-gi ngor don-dam-par grub-pa’i gzhi bum-pa-la-sogs-pa-rnams ’phags-pa’i rgyud-la snang-ba sgyu-ma-lta-bu’i don gzigs-pa-la ltos-nas kun-rdzob-pa yin-no / / shes-pa de-la ltos-na bden-par gzhag-tu med-pas kun-rdzob-tsam zhes-gsungs-so /

[26] RG 239a1 / de-lta-na’ang de-dag-gi rang-bzhin don-dam bden-par gsungs-pas, bum-sogs kun-rdzob dang de-dag-gi rang-bzhin ’phags-pa’i don-dam-mo, zhes-phye-nas brjod-par-bya’i / bum-sogs ’phags-pa-la don-dam-mo smra-bar mi bya ste / de’i yang-dag-pa’i don mthong-ba’i rigs-shes-kyis bum-sogs ma-rnyed-pa’i phyir dang / yang-dag-pa’i don mthong-ba’i rigs-shes-kyis rnyed-pa don-dam bden-pa’i mtshan-nyid-du gsungs-pa’i phyir-ro // Cf. [24].

[27] de-la don-dam-pa ni yang-dag-pa gzigs-pa-rnams-kyi **ye-shes-kyi khyad-par**-gyi **yul-nyid-kyis** bdag-gi rang-gi ngo-bo **rnyed-pa** yin-gyi / rang-gi bdag-nyid-kyis grub-pa ni ma-yin-te, ’di ni ngo-bo gcig yin-no / (extract from Candrakīrti on MMV VI.23).

Here (independently of anything which Tsong-kha-pa may have to say), **yul** (viṣaya) cannot mean “object”. It is governed by the instrumental particle **-kyis**, which is found in all editions of the MMV (as just quoted). But Tsong-kha-pa only confirms the point. He retains the instrumental both in his own paraphrases of Candrakīrti such as the one from GR quoted below [34], and in his glosses such as the one quoted in [28]. It is impossible for the object to be the instrument of cognition; these passages are not, of course, merely about the special case of a self-reflexive cognition [rang-rig]. For another related case, see [21].

[28] RG 242a5: . . . zhes de-kho-na-nyid ’jal-ba’i zag-med-kyi **ye-shes-kyis** rnyed-la rang-gi ngo-bos ma-grub-par gsung-pas / mnyam-gzhag zag-med-kyis rnyed rgyu cig byung-na bden-par grub-pa yin-no zhes smra-ba bkag-pa yin-no /. It is the “ye-shes-kyis” in the first of these clauses which is Tsong-kha-pa’s gloss on Candrakīrti’s “yul-nyid-kyis” (see note [27]).

[29] **rang-gi ngo-bo** (svarūpa), here apparently equivalent to **svabhāva**.

[30] **ye-shes-kyi khyad-par** (*jñānaviśeṣa) in Candrakīrti’s version [27]. RG 242a5: / **ye-shes-kyi khyad-par** zhes gsungs-pas ni ’phags-pa-rnams-kyi ye-shes gang-yin-gyis rnyed-pas mi-chog-gi ye-shes-kyi khyad-par ji-lta-ba mkhyen-pa’i ye-shes-kyis rnyed-pa cig don-dam bden-par ston-pa’o / Here Tsong-kha-pa for the second time glosses the **yul** (viṣaya) mentioned by Candrakīrti [27, 28] as **ye-shes** (Skt. **jñāna**). As is well-known and is plain in these passages of Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa, **jñāna** is usually translated into Tibetan by **shes-pa** when it is ordinary cognition, but by **ye-shes** when (as explicitly here) it is the purified cognition of an ārya or Tathāgata. The passage takes **ye-shes-kyi khyad-par** to stand for the object of this cognition, in apposition to **don-dam bden-pa** (paramārtha-satya). Given these facts, it is perverse to render such uses of “yul” (viṣaya) with “object”.

[31] **ji-lta-ba mkhyen-pa’i ye-shes** in the previous note. In Tsong-kha-pa, roughly, what samāhitajñāna is for a bodhisattva, yathābhūtajñāna is for a tathāgata: GR 123a6 ff., RG 243a1 ff. Similarly for **ji-snyed-pa mkhyen-pa’i ye-shes** and pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna. For the pair ji-ltar/ji-snyed (yathāvad or yathābhūtaṃ and yāvad) see references in [Ta66]. As a pair, these prefixes are known principally from the Sandhinirmocana and the Ratnagotravibhāga; however in the Ratna. both ji-lta and ji-snyed are related to

samāhitajñāna. According to Takasaki [Ta66 p. 173], the interpretation given here by Tsong-kha-pa is the one usual in Tibet.

[32] **shes-pa**, but here clearly standing for "ye-shes", as is shown by the next sentence: ye-shes-des ji-ltar rnyed-pa'i tshul ni / . . . ; perhaps an old editorial error. For "made known" for **grub-pa**, see note [21].

[33] rnyed-pa'i don ni shes-pa des de-ltar grub-pa'i don yin-te kun-rdzob-la'ang dra'o /.

[34] GR 107b3, continuation of the passage in note [16]: / de-la myu-gu-la-sogs-pa'i dngos-po'i ngo-bo don-dam-pa ni / yang-dag-pa'i don mngon-sum-du mthong-ba-rnams-kyis ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-gyi yul-nyid-kyis bdag-gi rang-gi ngo-bo rnyed-pa yin-gyi / rang-gi bdag-nyid-kyis grub-pa ni ma-yin te / 'di ni ngo-bo gnyis bshad-pa'i gcig yin-no / / ye shes-kyi khyad-par zhes-pa ni 'phags-pa'i ye-shes gang-yin-gyis rnyed-pa min-par ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-te bye-brag-gcig-la byed-de / de yang ji-lta-ba 'jal-ba'i ye-shes-kyis rnyed-pa'o / Here I have read **bye-brag-gcig-la** for what looks like **bye-brag-pa cig-la**, changing a **p** to a **g**, since a reference to the Vaiśeṣikas (bye-brag-pa) does not make sense. The corresponding passage of RG (242a5 ff, [28], [30]) is no help; "bye-brag" is not used there.

[35] rang-gi bdag-gi ngo-bo, perhaps better "subjective aspect".

[36] ye-shes-kyi khyad-par-gyi yul-nyid-kyis, lit. "by the viṣaya of the awareness-particular". Tsong-kha-pa quotes this phrase directly from Candrakīrti [27]. It is fatally easy to render it with "by the object of a special awareness", especially if one only has Candrakīrti's rather vague account [27]; but this English phrase is inconsistent with everything else which Tsong-kha-pa says. It also commits one to the useless grammatical blunder of muddling "khyad-par-gyi ye-shes" with "ye-shes-kyi khyad-par". See also notes [34], [37].

Since this matter was sketched in [B85a], some scholars have suggested that ***jñānaviśeṣa** can only stand for some kind of awareness (jñāna). If this were correct it would achieve nothing, since the point about Tibetan grammar just made would still stand. But *as a matter of Sanskrit grammar*, **jñānaviśeṣa** *can certainly stand for something else identified by an awareness* (jñāna). It is easy to find cases where **X-viśeṣa** stands for something identified by (an) X, and not for a kind of X. Even in Candrakīrti, we have "nus-pa'i khyad-par" many times (MMV VI.57—59); the Skt. is *śaktiviśeṣa or *śaktiviśeṣya (cf. MMV VI.57, quoted PSP following MK I.7). Here, "nus-pa'i khyad-par" stands for the vijñāna identified by a capacity (nus-pa, śakti), and not for a special kind of capacity. Again at NB II.13—14 **svabhāvaviśeṣa** stands for something distinguished by a svabhāva (svabhāvena viśiṣṭa) and not for a kind of svabhāva. Cf. Dharmottara on II.13: svabhāva eva viśiṣyate tadanyasmāditi viśeṣo viśiṣṭa ity arthaḥ I. On this Durveka Miśra remarks that in the qualification of "viśeṣa", semantic consistency (yogyatā) generates awareness that, in accordance with the sūtra "rājadantādiṣu param" (Pāṇ. II.2.31), "viśeṣa", the dependent term (nipāta, upasarjana) does not come first, as it would by II.2.30; thus the sense which sets up the action of the word "viśeṣa" is that of "viśiṣṭa". Cf. jñāna-janana-yogyatayā viśeṣaṇatve'pyasya rājadantādi-pāṭhād **viśeṣa**śabdasya pūrvanipātābhāvaḥ I karma-sādhanasyaiva **viśeṣa**śabdasyārthamāha — **viśiṣṭa** iti I. This analysis is not capricious; similar considerations are applied to the analysis of "svabhāva-pratibandha" as "svabhāvena pratibaddha" (NB II.20—21 and Dharmottara on them). So there is no question of deciding the matter by Sanskrit grammar, and one must look at what the texts are about.

[37] Thus for Tsong-kha-pa, as for our other authors, paramārtha-satya is concerned with the subject in cognition, contrary to what is often claimed in the literature. See also [B85a, pp. 20—23; notes 71, 83, 87].

[38] RG 242b4 (following quotation of MMV VI.29): . . . zhes gsungs-shing, de’i ’grel-pa-las kyang phung-po-la-sogs-pa de-dag-nyid ma-rig-pa’i bag-chags-dang-bral-ba sangs-rgyas bcom-ldan-’das-rnams-kyis / rab-rib-can ma-yin-pas skra-shad mthong-ba’i tshul-du rang-bzhin-gang-gis gzigs-pa de ni de-dag-gi don-dam-pa’i bden-pa’o /

[39] **rang-bzhin gang-gis** [38]. Thus for Candrakīrti paramārtha-satya is the nature of the cognizing mind (not that of the cognized object, which is śūnyatā). (“Mind” is broader than **mati** (blo), which does not include paramārtha-satya (BCA IX.2)). Yet Candrakīrti indicates another sense in which paramārtha-satya *is* an aspect of objects, viz. their capacity to be cognized in samāhitajñāna and yathābhūtadarśaṇajñāna (cf. note [31]).

[40] RG 242b5: . . . zhes, sangs-rgyas-kyi de-kho-na-nyid ’jal-ba’i ye-shes-kyis ma-rig-pa’i rab-rib-kyis bslad-pa-la snang-ba’i don rab-rib-med-pa’i mig-gis skra-shad ma-mthong-ba-ltar ma-gzigs-par gsungs-so /

[41] This phrase is due to Gilbert Ryle (see e.g. “The Concept of Mind”).

[42] E.g. RG 237b1, 242a1, GR 114b1, 115a5. See also note [76].

[43] PSP 494.1: paramaścāsāvarthaśceti paramārthaḥ | tadeva satyam paramāthasatyam | For this use of **artha**, cf. again note [18].

[44] **yul**. This is one of the exceptional cases discussed in note [27].

[45] RG 241a4: / don-dam bden-pa’i bden-tshul ni / mi-slu-ba yin-la, de yang gnas-tshul gzhan-du gnas-shing snang-tshul gzhan-du snang-nas ’jig-rten-la mi-slu-ba’i phyir / don-dam-pa’i bden-pa ’jig-rten-gyi tha-snyad-kyi dbang-gis yod-par bzhag-pa-tsam yin-te /

[46] Also quoted PSP 25.4.

[47] RG 241b6: . . . zhes, mi-slu-ba bden-par gsungs-pa’i don dang de yang tha-snyad-kyi dbang-gis yin-par gsungs-pa’i phyir dang / mdo-sde-nyid-las kyang mi-slu-ba’i chos-can zhes bden-pa’i don de-la gsungs-pa’i phyir dang / ’du-byed thams-cad ni brdzun-pa slu-ba’i chos-can zhes brdzun-pa’i don slu-ba-la gsungs-pas kyang bden-pa’i don mi-slu-ba yin-par shes-so /. The passage exhibits the opposition of **satya** and **moṣa/mṛṣa** (delusive) for Tsong-kha-pa (for Candrakīrti it is well-known). The pleonasm **slu-ba/brdzun-pa** (not present in Sanskrit) is difficult to reproduce in English. The referents (artha) of the satyas are here said to be cognitive states (**dharmin**, literally “that which owns a dharma”).

[48] RG 242a1: de-nas kun-rdzob bden-pa’i bden-pa ni bden-’dzin-gyi ngor bden-pa dang don-dam bden-pa gnyis sgra-don mi-’dra’o / Rigs-pa drug-cu-pa’i ’grel-pa-las / myang-’das kun-rzdob-tu bden-par gsungs-pa ni / myang-’das don-dam-pa’i bden-par yod-pa kun-rdzob-pa’i ngor ’jog-pa’i don yin-gyi, tha-snyad-du de bden-par bzhed-pa min-no / Tsong-kha-pa here distinguishes saṃvṛti-satya from vyavahāra-satya as sketched in sec. 2, but this does not receive the unqualified support of the YSV; such facts contribute to the problem mentioned at the end of note [75].

[49] RG 236b4: o-na kun-rdzob ni gang bden-pa ni gang zhe-na / de-la gzugs-la-sogs-pa-rnams kun-rdzob gang-gi ngor bden-par ’jog-pa’i kun-rdzob ni / chos-rnams-la rang-bzhin-gyis grub-pa’i rang-gi ngo-bo med-pa-la yod-par sgro-’dogs-pa’i ma-rig-pa yin-te / dngos-po-la bden-par grub-pa mi-srid-pas, bden-par ’jog-pa ni blo’i ngor yin-la / bden-’dzin min-pa’i blo’i ngor bden-par gzhag-tu med-pa’i phyir-ro /

[50] Here it is particularly important that satya means “veridical”: see the passages just translated from the YSV and Tsong-kha-pa on them [47—9].

[51] Cf. the remark on blo (mati) [39].

[52] MMV 107.17. Padma dKar-po quotes this without the remark on erroneous conception (mngon-par rlom-pa [53]); this omission reflects an important feature of his views.

[53] mngon-par rlom-pa (abhimāna), see MW and Poussin, ADK **4** 8 and **6** 133.

[54] RG 237a6: / des-na chos-rnams kun-rdzob-tu yod-par 'jog-pa'i 'jog-sa'i kun-rdzob yin-na ni / nyon-mongs-can-gyi ma-rig-pa-la kun-rdzob-tu byas-pa de ma-yin dgos-pa yin-no / This remark is obscure and my rendering uncertain, but surely Williams' "What is conventionally the case is not what appears to those with nescience possessed of defilement" [W79, p. 328] is not much like the Tibetan, nor is it what the argument demands.

[55] khas-len-pa [70]. Cf. also GR 107b3 (note [16], translated in section 2).

[56] MK XXIV.8, MMV VI.80 (though they say "vyavahāra" and not "saṃvṛti").

[57] Thus Tsong-kha-pa does sometimes conflate "tha-snyad-du" and "kun-rdzob-tu", but usually he is more careful than Candrakīrti e.g. RG 237b4, where he uses "tha-snyad-du" throughout, even for Candrakīrti's "kun-rdzob-tu", and the application is surely to what is *strictly* conventional. Cf. [48].

[58] The sense in which Padma dKar-po's view reduces to Candrakīrti's is quite different. The two satyas are two sides of the same coin, as it were; saṃvṛti-satya really is veridical, as far as it goes, and the phrase is not a metaphor, while "vyavahāra-satya" is metaphorical (just the opposite of Tsong-kha-pa). Padma dKar-po has no need of **satya #**; what is not the real thing (satya*) isn't satya at all. He can also do without **saṃvṛti #**.

[59] RG 237a6: / gnyis-pa'i rgyu-mtshan ni nyon-mongs-can-gyi ma-rig-pa'i kun-rdzob spangs-pa-rnams-la / gang-gi ngor bden-par 'jog-pa'i bden-zhen-gyi kun-rdzob med-pa'i rgyu-mtshan-gyis / 'du-byed-rnams de-dag-gi ngor mi-bden-par bsgrubs-kyi kun-rdzob bden-pa ma-yin-par ma-bsgrubs-pa'i phyir-ro / This supports the analysis of Tsong-kha-pa's first point given above and in note [54].

[60] RG 237b1: des-na de-dag-gi ngor 'du-byed-rnams kun-rdzob-tsam-du gsungs-pas ni / de'i ngor kun-rdzob dang bden-pa gnyis-kyi nang-nas bden-par-gzhag-tu-med-pas-tsam-gyi sgras ni bden-pa gcod-kyi, kun-rdzob bden-pa gcod-pa ga-la yin /.

[61] brdzun-pa mthong-ba'i stobs-las, GR 108b1 (cf. MMV on VI.23).

[62] Here and elsewhere I use "appearance" to denote the phenomenal content of a cognitive state, that is, independently of whether there is anything "behind" the appearance or not; in this sense of "appearance", its *percipi* is its *esse*. The noun "snang-ba" seems to be used both in this sense and in the sense of appearance contrasted with reality. See note [18] for related ambiguities of "don" (artha). The normal criteria for a cognition to be veridical are epistemic: it should be stable, be suitably connected with other cognitions, etc.; similarly for appearances. Such criteria are quite appropriate for **vyavahāra-satya**, as this term is normally used. This avoids embarassing talk of "ontological objects". (While Tsong-kha-pa's criteria for paramārtha-satya are somewhat different, they are still epistemic, e.g. that it should withstand critical analysis, &c.)

[63] The point is that it would not make sense to say that jar, cloth &c. are *themselves* appearances. That they are themselves like illusions is not a Prāsaṅgika view — Padma dKar-po and others even distinguish a school of Mādhyamikas called sgyu-ma-lta-bu-pa (Māyopāmika?), distinct from both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, on this basis (for references see Appendix C of [B85a]). Some authors regard this view as Svātantrika.

[64] Of course the notion of seeing something as it really is is fraught with ambiguity

and potential confusion. Similar ambiguities infect Sanskrit **samyag + dṛś-** and Tibetan **yang-dag mthong-ba** and **yang-dag gzigs-pa**.

[65] This is not necessarily a defect of Tsong-kha-pa’s theory, in spite of his critics’ claims. Virtually any theory which spells out the connection of saṃvṛti-satya with ordinary cognition will suffer from the same difficulty. Padma dKar-po escapes from it by dropping the idea, which does not fit very well into Candrakīrti’s scheme, that saṃvṛti-satya (for the ārya) is related to delusive cognition; his view is that saṃvṛti-satya is completely dependent on paramārtha-satya. The difficulty of describing **yuganaddha** then disappears; but the underlying problem reappears again in the difficulty of saying anything interesting about the connection of saṃvṛti-satya with ordinary cognition. See also note [8].

[66] RG 247b2: tshig-gsal-las kyang / brjod-bya dang rjod-byed dang shes-pa dang shes-bya-la-sogs-pa’i tha-snyad ma-lus-pa ’di-dag thams-cad ni ’jig-rten-gyi kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa zhes-bya’o / zhes tha-snyad-pa’i don thams-cad kun-rdzob bden-par gsungs-pas, bden-pa gnyis-su shes-bya thams-cad ’du-ba yin-no / / de yang gzhi gang-zhig brdzun-pa slu-ba’i don-du yongs-su bcad-na, mi-slu-ba’i don yin-pa rnam-par-gcad dgos-pas slu-mi-slu ni dngos-su phan-tshun spangs-te gnas-pa’i ’gal-ba’o /.

There is some equivocation here about the logic of **shes-bya** (jñeya): compare the passages in notes [17], [21] and the corresponding passages of Candrakīrti. The verb **yongs-su ’chad-pa** (pari + chid-) is used regularly, also in Vajrayāna, for positively setting up or establishing something; the usage is related to that recorded e.g. in MW “to define, determine, ascertain”. It is the opposite of **rnam-par ’chad-pa** (vi + chid-), the verb used when the Madhyamaka is regarded as essentially a *via negativa* in which erroneous notions are to be cut off.

[67] GR 108b2, see section 3. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, it seems to me that passages like this show that Tsong-kha-pa was frequently concerned with appearance in the phenomenological sense, in addition to his concern with things as they appear in contrast to things as they really are. Indeed, this last contrast is rather embarrassing for a Mādhyamika, for whom the phrase “things as they really are” simply does not have any application. It is not merely that there is nothing there — this statement has no higher or lower status than the statement that there is something there — but that interest is focused on the psychological attachment, or lack of it, to the ascriptions which are associated with appearances; and these have sometimes to be considered phenomenologically, as with the horses and elephants, if this programme is to get under way.

[68] Here Tsong-kha-pa’s theory makes contact with the old idea mentioned in the introduction, that all conventional cognition is really delusive.

[69] This word seems to mean not property-ascriptions generally, but those property-ascriptions to which there is some kind of psychological attachment (compare the phrase “abhūtavastunimittārambaṇamanasikāra”).

[70] RG 248a4: de-kho-na-nyid ma-yin bzhin-du der snang-ba’i kun-rdzob-pa’i ’khrul-pa-rnams spang-bar-bya-ba bden-mod-kyi / . . . brjod-bya . . . sogs . . . tha-snyad kun-rdzob-pa’i bden-pa **khas-blangs-pa-**la ma-brten-par / dam-pa’i don ni bstan-par mi-nus-la . . . . / . . . / . . . gdon-mi-za-bar kun-rdzob ji-ltar gnas-pa **khas-blang-bar** bya’o /; see also notes [16] and [55].

[71] Tsong-kha-pa did not think that paramārtha-satya is a form of **pratyakṣa** in the precise sense of Bauddha pramāṇa (RG 244b2—5; compare also [K85], p. 55).

However, he inherited from Candrakīrti the idea that it is pratyakṣa in a more general sense (RG 244a6).

[72] GR 109a4: / kun-rdzob-kyi bden-pa dang don-dam-pa'i bden-pa gnyis-su 'byed-pa ni dbye-ba'i ngo-bo'o / / phye-ba'i don-la yang mi-'dra-ba du-ma zhig 'dug kyang / 'dir ni gnyis-ka-la ngo-bo yod-la / de-la ngo-bo gcig dang tha-dad gang yang min-pa mi-srid-pa'i phyir dang / chos-can-rnams bden-stong-las ngo-bo tha-dad-na bden-grub-tu 'gyur-ba'i phyir / ngo-bo gcig-la ldog-pa tha-dad-pa byas-pa dang mi-rtag pa lta-bu ste / . . . These remarks are similar to ones found at GR 107b2 [16], which are even more clearly non-technical. See also note 90 of [B85a] and discussion there.

[73] Vyavahāratas; this word (as the English "conventionally") is itself ambiguous. Here it does not mean "by means of linguistic convention"; all utterance-types acquire their meanings by means of linguistic convention, and it is not this tautology which is at issue here.

[74] While the saṃvṛti # /saṃvṛti* distinction is relatively close to the surface in Candrakīrti, it needs to be dug out; he does conflate the two notions.

[75] See the references given in note [42], which would repay more analysis than is possible here. "Satya" strictly speaking, i.e. "satya*" stands for something really veridical, while "saṃvṛti # -satya*" (if it is to apply to Tsong-kha-pa's notion of saṃvṛti-satya) does not stand for something really veridical, for some kind of satya*. Thus the extension of "saṃvṛti # -satya*" is not contained in the extension of "satya*"; this situation is well-known in formal semantics, where it is illustrated by the contrast between e.g. "murderer" and "alleged murderer". Of course Tsong-kha-pa rejected the idea of saṃvṛti # -satya* as useless — for him it is what the pṛthagjanas quite *wrongly* take saṃvṛti-satya to be — but in order to do this convincingly one first has to have a good idea what the phrase means, as he undoubtedly did, and showed in the cited passages. His solution was to introduce a second notion of satya, the one I call satya #. I think it is pretty safe to assume that Candrakīrti did not attain this perspective, since Tsong-kha-pa is unable to find a convincing quotation (cf. RG 241a3 ff and notes [45—49]).

[76] tha-snyad-pa'i tshad-mas; according to Padma dKar-po, the whole topic of pramāṇa as developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti comes under this "conventional means of knowledge"; only paramārtha-satya (in the Madhyamaka sense) comes under *paramārthapramāṇa (don-dam tshad-ma). I do not know whether this view was shared by Tsong-kha-pa.

[77] MMV VI.29 (vikalpitaṃ yattimiraprabhavāt . . . , BCAP 176).

[78] gcig-la rnyed-tshul gnyis byung-ba min-no.

[79] This is related to the argument developed by Tsong-kha-pa in a section of the RG called "The damage which comes from taking the two satyas wrongly" (bden-pa gnyis log-par gzung-ba'i nyes-dmigs, 248b1—249b1). This line of argument is not found in the parallel section of TG (132b3—133b3).

[80] Both these arguments are used by Padma dKar-po in the **gan-mdzod**, from which the main argument is also taken [B85a].

[81] Thus on Padma dKar-po's premises the second argument is trivial, while on Tsong-kha-pa's premises it can probably be shown to rest on equivocations over what it is to experience something as possessing a self-essence; it is not easy to make capital out of this on behalf of Tsong-kha-pa, given his own equivocations. The first argument — that paramārtha-satya functioning by itself reduces to nihilism — does represent a

very serious challenge to Tsong-kha-pa, vigorously pressed by Padma dKar-po in the Vajrayāna context [B85a].

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Tsong-kha-pa, dbu-ma-la-'jug-pa'i rnam-bshad **dgongs-pa rab-gsal** zhes-bya-ba (GR).
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Magdalen College,
Oxford, England

DONALD S. LOPEZ, JR.

DO *ŚRĀVAKAS* UNDERSTAND EMPTINESS?

The Mādhyamika school of Indian Buddhism is traditionally regarded as having two branches, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, based on the manner in which reasoning is employed to establish the nature of reality. The Svātantrikas, notably Bhāvaviveka (c. 500—570), insisted on the use of the autonomous syllogism (*svatantra-prayoga*) against the opponent whereas the Prāsaṅgikas, in the persons of Buddhapālita (flourished c. 500) and Candrakīrti (c. 600—660),[1] employed consequences (*prasaṅga*). Although Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita for his use of consequences and Candrakīrti in turn defended Buddhapālita and attacked Bhāvaviveka for his use of autonomous syllogisms, it does not seem that the Indian masters of either school referred to themselves or each other as Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. These designations do not appear as the names of schools until the eleventh century, and not in India but in Tibet. It is only with the second propagation (*phyi dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet that the division of Mādhyamika that is considered standard today gained prevalence. It was during this period that Pa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags (died 1158) collaborated with the Kaśmīri *paṇḍita* Jayānanda in the translation of the major works of Candrakīrti from Sanskrit into Tibetan, including the *Prasannapadā*, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*. On the basis of their study of these translations, especially the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā*, it seems that Tibetan scholars coined the terms *rang rgyud pa* (*svātantrika*) to refer to Bhāvaviveka and his followers and *thal 'gyur pa* (*prāsaṅgika*) to refer to Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, and their followers.[2]

Although the form of logical statement to be employed in proofs of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) provides the basis for the etymologies of the two branches of Mādhyamika and carries broad implications for their respective conceptions of the nature of reality,[3] it is by no means the only significant issue upon which the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas part company. This paper will consider a constellation of issues

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revolving around the question of whether *śrāvakas*, followers of the Hīnayāna, understand emptiness. These issues include the meaning of selflessness (*anātman*), the nature of the afflictive obstructions (*kleśāvaraṇa*), the root of cyclic existence (*saṃsāra*), and the distinguishing features of the Mahāyāna. The *dramatis personae* and the plot are the same as that found in the controversy over the use of syllogisms and consequences: Bhāvaviveka attacks Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti comes to Buddhapālita's defense, rejecting Bhāvaviveka's argument. The controversy is played out in Buddhapālita's *Buddhapālitamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Tarkajvālā*, and Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* and *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

BUDDHAPĀLITA

Nāgārjuna's *Prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter *MMK*) says at VII.34:

Production, abiding, and disintegration
Are said to be like
A dream, an illusion,
And a city of Gandharvas.[4]

In commenting on this stanza, Buddhapālita writes:

> In this way, the *Bhagavan* set forth the categories of an illusion, an echo, a reflection, a mirage, a dream, a ball of foam, a water bubble, and a banana tree as examples of the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta*). There is nothing whatsoever that is real or non-mistaken in these. It is said that these are elaborations (*prapañca*), that these are falsities. In the statement, "All phenomena are selfless," selfless means entitynessless (*niḥsvabhāva*) because the term "self" is a word for entityness (*svabhāva*).[5]

Buddhapālita's position is that the Buddha used instances of worldly deceptions such as illusions, mirages, and dreams in order to indicate the deceptive nature of all phenomena, that they do not exist as they appear. These false appearances are elaborations or hypostatizations of mistaken conceptions (*vikalpa*).

Buddhapālita also implies that whenever the Buddha uses similes such as those employed by Nāgārjuna in VII:34, he is referring to the selflessness of phenomena (*dharmanairātmya*); Buddhapālita makes no qualification, as Bhāvaviveka will, as to whether the simile appears in a Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna *sūtra.*

Finally, Buddhapālita makes the important gloss, later reiterated by Candrakīrti, of *ātman* as *svabhāva.* The implications of this become clear when Bhāvaviveka's position is presented.

BHĀVAVIVEKA

In his commentary on the same stanza (*MMK* VII:34), Bhāvaviveka writes:

> I and mine do not inherently exist, but they are preceived in that way. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions (*kleśāvaraṇa*), the *Bhagavan* taught in the *śrāvakayāna*:
>
> The Seer of Reality said that
> Form is like a ball of foam,
> Feeling is like a bubble,
> Discrimination is like a mirage,
> Compositional factors are like a banana tree,
> Consciousness is like an illusion.[6]
>
> In the Mahāyāna, conditioned phenomena are just without inherent existence, although they are perceived in that way and appear in that way. Therefore, as an antidote to the afflictive obstructions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstructions to omniscience (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) it is said [in the *Vajracchedikā*]:
>
> Conditioned phenomena are to be viewed like
> Stars, cataracts, butter lamps,
> Illusions, dew, bubbles,
> Dreams, lightning, and clouds.
>
> Therefore, this is not something to be feared; the intelligent, having analyzed, should be forbearant.[7]

That is, the Buddha indicated the deceptive nature of the aggregates in order that followers of the Hīnayāna might overcome the misconception that the I and mine are real. This misconception serves as the root cause of the afflictive obstructions such as desire, anger, pride, and doubt. The realization that the self does not exist serves as an antidote to these afflictions and upon their destruction, liberation from birth and death is achieved. The Buddha teaches Bodhisattvas that all phenomena are selfless, empty of ultimate existence. By understanding this Bodhisattvas are able to overcome both the afflictive obstructions, which prevent liberation from rebirth, and the obstructions of omniscience, which prevent the attainment of Buddhahood.

It is Bhāvaviveka's view that statements in Hīnayāna sūtras that compare the aggregates to deceptive phenomena are intended to overcome the false conception of I and mine, the chief of the afflictive obstructions; a *śrāvaka* or *pratyekabuddha* needs only to abandon the conception of a self of persons (*pudgalātmagraha*) to be liberated from cyclic existence (*saṃsāra*).

The Bodhisattva however, must overcome both the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience in order for him to achieve his goal of Buddhahood. He must, therefore, abandon not only the conception of a self of persons but the conception of a self of phenomena (*dharmātmagraha*) as well. For the benefit of Bodhisattvas, the Buddha taught the selflessness of phenomena (*dharmanairātmya*) in the Mahāyāna sūtras in passages such as that cited from the *Vajracchedikā.*

Bhāvaviveka contends, then, that the two passages quoted teach different things although they are ostensibly very similar, with both using the images of bubbles and a mirage. In the first passage, the five aggregates are being described, in the second conditioned phenomena. Since the five aggregates and conditioned phenomena are coextensive categories,[8] the tenor of the two passages is the same. In both cases they are being likened to instances of worldly deception. Hence, at face value there is nothing that indicates that the passage from the Hīnayāna sūtra teaches strictly the selflessness of persons whereas the passage from the Māhāyana sūtra teaches the selflessness of phenomena. For Bhāvaviveka, the essential distinction is not to be found in what the passages say but in to whom they were spoken. This shall be explained below.

Bhāvaviveka goes on to quote Buddhapālita's commentary to *MMK* VII.34:

> Another [i.e., Buddhapālita] says, "The *Bhagavan* set forth the categories of illusions, echoes, reflections, mirages, dreams, balls of foam, water bubbles, and banana trees as examples of the selflessness of conditioned phenomena. There is nothing whatsoever

> real or non-mistaken in them. It is said that these are elaborations, these are falsities. In the statement, 'All phenomena are selfless,' selfless means entitynessless because the term 'self' is a word for entityness."[9]

Bhāvaviveka responds:

> Regarding that, one who is not the other [i.e., myself Bhāvaviveka] says that here [in the passage, "Form is like a ball of foam . . ."], since the appearance as self is a mistaken reality and since the term "self" is a word for self, and since a self that is a separate entity does not exist in those [aggregates], and they themselves are not a self just as they are not Īśvara, that [Hīnayāna] source cannot indicate that phenomena are selfless because of having the meaning of the term "selflessness of persons", which is to be specifically realized in the *śrāvakayāna*. If it could mean [the selflessness of phenomena], it would have been pointless [for the Buddha] to have taken up another vehicle [namely, the Mahāyāna].[10]

Bhāvaviveka argues that all references to selflessness in the Hīnayāna sūtras mean the selflessness of persons because, "the term 'self' is a word for self" of persons and does not mean entitynessless, as Buddhapālita claims. Passages that occur in the Hīnayāna sūtras, such as "Form is like a ball of foam . . ." cannot denote the selflessness of phenomena because *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* do not understand the selflessness of phenomena; the specific object of their realization is the selflessness of persons and therefore all allusions to selflessness in their sūtras must mean only that. The Buddha intended for followers of the Hīnayāna to understand the selflessness of persons and the followers of the Mahāyāna to understand the selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, nowhere in the Hīnayāna canon did he teach the selflessness of phenomena. If he had, "it would have been pointless to have taken up another vehicle." That is, if the object of the Bodhisattva's wisdom, the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena, were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, then the complete antidote for the removal of both obstructions would be available in the Hīnayāna *piṭaka* and the Buddha's teaching of the Mahāyāna would perforce be redundant. What sets the Mahāyāna sūtras apart for Bhāvaviveka is their teaching of the selflessness of phenomena.

Bhāvaviveka reiterates his assertion that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand one type of selflessness while

Bodhisattvas understand another, more subtle type in his commentary to *MMK* XVIII.4—5, which says:

> When the thought of the internal
> And external as I and mine
> Ceases, attachment stops and
> Through the extinguishment of that, birth ceases.
> When actions and afflictions cease, there is liberation.
> Actions and afflictions are from conceptions.
> Those [arise] from elaborations.
> Elaborations are stopped by emptiness.[11]

In the *Prajñāpradīpa* Bhāvaviveka contends that the first stanza describes the process of achieving the liberation of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*; through the realization of the selflessness of persons the afflictive obstructions are removed, resulting in the extinguishment of birth and the attainment of liberation. He argues that the second stanza describes the process of abandoning both obstructions whereby the Bodhisattva achieves Buddhahood. In response to a hypothetical Hīnayāna objection that it is unnecessary to realize the selflessness of phenomena since actions and afflictions cease through understanding the selflessness of persons, Bhāvaviveka replies that emptiness, the selflessness of phenomena, must be realized in order to destroy the afflictions and their latencies (*vāsanā*) completely.

> Objection: By only seeing the selflessness of persons the actions that arise from the conception of the beautiful and pleasant and the afflictions are completely pacified. Therefore, to see the selflessness of phenomena would be purposeless.
>
> Answer: That is not correct because we wish to pull out from the roots all of the afflictions and their predispositions and this cannot occur without seeing the selflessness of phenomena. The self-arisen wisdom is the antidote to the unafflicted ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*), which is abandoned by a non-mistaken realization whose object is all phenomena. [Hence,] it is not purposeless to see the selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, emptiness, which is the character of the complete pacification of all conceptual elaborations (*prapañca*) in that way, is liberation.[12]

Bhāvaviveka's position, then, is that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* only realize the selflessness of persons and hence do not fully destroy the nets of the afflictions. Their partial understanding is, nevertheless, sufficient to put an end to birth and suffering. Bodhisattvas realize the more subtle selflessness of phenomena, thereby destroying the elaborations of ultimate existence, which are the root cause of the afflictions, including the conception of a self of persons.

Bhāvaviveka delineates the two obstructions (*āvaraṇa*) most fully in the fourth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*, entitled "Introduction to the Reality of *Śrāvakas*" (*śrāvakatattvāviniscaya*). In commenting on *Madhyamakahṛdaya* IV.28, he writes:

> The path taught in the *śrāvakayāna* is not a cause of perfect, complete enlightenment (*samyaksambodhi*) because, since it lacks meditation [on emptiness], it is incapable of abandoning the obstructions to omniscience, as is the path taught in the *pratyekabuddhayāna*.[13]

He explains that there are two types of afflictive obstructions, the binding (*bandhana*) and the latent (*vāsanā*). The obstructions to omniscience only have a nature of binding. He goes on to say:

> With respect to this, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* merely abandon the binding afflictions, not the latent afflictions [nor] the obstructions to omniscience, which do not have a twofold nature. Therefore, it cannot be said that Arhats achieve nirvana because they [still] have obstructions [to be abandoned], like Stream Enterers (*śrotapanna*) and so forth. Thus, this proves the statement that even *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* become Buddhas upon purifying the stains of the predispositions and completing the collections of enlightenment (*bodhisambhara*).[14]

In addition to there being two kinds of afflictive obstructions, there are also two kinds of ignorance, the afflicted ignorance (*kliṣṭāvidyā*) and the non-afflicted ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*), with the former including such things as pride, obscuration, and attachment regarding the self. Non-afflicted ignorance is of the nature of the latencies. As in the case of the two types of afflictive obstructions, only the first type of ignorance is abandoned via the Hīnayāna path:

> Regarding that, *śrāvaka* superiors (*ārya*) entirely and thoroughly abandon the afflictive ignorance because they understand the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*). The non-afflicted [ignorance] does not obstruct [their] liberation, so that although [that type of ignorance] continues to exist, it is said that they gain knowledge of extinguishment (*kṣaya*) and non-production (*anutpāda*).[15]

Thus, for Bhāvaviveka, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* abandon the binding afflictive obstructions and the afflictive ignorance but do not abandon the latent afflictions of the non-afflicted ignorance, nor do they abandon the obstructions to omniscience. It cannot even be said, therefore, that Arhats have abandoned the afflictive obstructions; they have only abandoned one type of afflictive obstruction, that which binds them in the cycle of rebirth. It is only through meditating on emptiness and thereby destroying the misconception that is the root of desire that one is able to destroy the latent afflictions. Because *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* only understand the selflessness of persons and do not understand emptiness, they are incapable of destroying the latent afflictions.

> The *Bhagavan* is one who has thoroughly abandoned the stains of the afflictions together with their latencies through becoming accustomed to the view of emptiness over a long period of time. Therefore, this [Mahāyāna] is shown to be special due to [possessing] a method for abandoning the obstructions to omniscience.[16]

It is thus clear that, according to Bhāvaviveka, it is impossible to abandon the latent afflictions, the non-afflictive ignorance, or the obstructions to omniscience without understanding emptiness, and the exposition of emptiness is a special feature of the Mahāyāna.

> Abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience does not occur without special meditation [on emptiness]. Even the *Bhagavan* did not annihilate the obstructions to omniscience by means of this [Hīnayāna] path; he abandoned them by means of another, special meditation. If this path had the capacity to abandon the obstructions to omniscience, then even *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* would have annihilated the two obstructions and abandoned the intervening latencies. This is not the case. Therefore, the obstructions to omniscience are abandoned thoroughly only by the special cultivation of the path taught in the Mahāyāna.[17]

This statement provides further support for Bhāvaviveka's contention that the doctrine of emptiness is not set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras. He argues that if the Hīnayāna path possessed a method for abandoning the obstructions to omniscience, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* would have abandoned them. Because they have not, Bhāvaviveka concludes that the only way to abandon the obstructions to omniscience is by engaging in "a special meditation," meditation on emptiness, which is explicated exclusively in the Mahāyāna. Furthermore, the Hīnayāna path is incapable of abandoning even the afflictive obstructions in their entirety; it only abandons the binding afflictions but leaves intact the latencies of the afflictive obstructions. This contention leads Bhāvaviveka to a radical deprecation of the Hīnayāna path when he claims that, "It cannot be said that Arhats achieve nirvana because they [still] have obstructions [to be abandoned]." Later, however, he seems to contradict himself when he says that although *śrāvakas* do not abandon the non-afflictive ignorance, they nevertheless achieve liberation, "they achieve knowledge of extinguishment and non-production." In one place he says that *śrāvakas* do not achieve liberation and in another place he says that they do. It is necessary to attempt to determine whether he is referring to two different liberations, two distinct enlightenments.

Knowledge of extinguishment (*kṣayajñāna*) and knowledge of non-production (*anutpādajñāna*) are the ninth and tenth of the ten knowledges,[18] which are described at length in the seventh chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*. Vasubandhu says at VI.67a: "The knowledges of extinguishment and non-production are enlightenment."[19]

With the attainment of these two knowledges ignorance is abandoned completely; with the knowledge of extinguishment comes the knowledge that the task is completed and with knowledge of non-production comes the knowledge that there is nothing more to accomplish.[20] With the attainment of the knowledge of extinguishment one becomes an Arhat (*Kośa*, VI.44—45a) and with the attainment of the knowledge of non-production, one becomes an immovable (*akopya*) Arhat (*Kośa*, VI.50a). At *Kośa*, VII.7, Vasubandhu describes the knowledge of extinguishment as the certainty with regard to the truths that the sufferings have been identified, the origins have been abandoned, etc. He identifies the knowledge of non-production as the certainty that there is nothing further to be identified, abandoned, etc. In the autocommentary, he cites the *Mūlaśāstra*:

> What is the knowledge of extinguishment? When one knows, "I have identified suffering perfectly, I have abandoned origin, I have now actualized cessation, I have cultivated the path," the resulting understanding, the vision, the knowledge, the intelligence, the enlightenment, the wisdom, the illumination is called the knowledge of extinguishment.
>
> What is the knowledge of non-production? When one knows, "I have identified suffering completely and there is nothing more to identify, . . . there is no other path to cultivate," the knowledge is called the knowledge of non-production.[21]

Thus, for Vasubandhu these two bring knowledge that the afflictions (*kleśa*), the contaminants (*āsrava*), and the insidiosities (*anusaya*) have been extinguished and will not be produced in the future.

Bhāvaviveka presents his position on the two knowledges at *Madhyamakahṛdaya* IV.27:

> Furthermore, the knowledge of non-production and extinguishment
> Is not, in reality, the ultimate object
> Because it is conceptual and is as if erroneous.
> How could they think that that is reality?[22]

In the autocommentary, Bhāvaviveka says:

> The opponents assert that the knowledge of the non-production of the aggregates and the knowledge of the extinguishment of the afflictions that occur at the completion of the sixteen mental moments called the forbearance of doctrinal knowledge (*dharmajñānakṣānti*) regarding suffering, doctrinal knowledge regarding suffering, the forbearance of subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñānakṣānti*) regarding suffering, subsequent knowledge regarding suffering and, in the same way, the forbearance and knowledge of the doctrinal [knowledge] and subsequent knowledge for origins, cessations, and paths were indicated by the *Bhagavan* [when] he said, "The knowledges of extinguishment and non-production is enlightenment."[23] Because we do not agree with this, we refute it and say, "These are ultimately inaccurate. For what reason? Because they are conceptual, like mistaken consciousness." This indicates that since the knowledges of extinguishment and non-production are similar to mistaken consciousnesses and because they observe the unreal, they are [not] complete understandings and are [not] endowed with knowledge.[24]

It is at this point that Bhāvaviveka argues that the *śrāvakayāna* and *pratyekabuddhayāna* are not a cause of highest enlightenment because they lack the realization that eliminates the obstructions to omniscience. The Arhat is thus not truly liberated because he still has obstructions. The *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* abandon only the binding afflictive obstructions; the latent afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience remain. Furthermore, although they have destroyed the afflicted ignorance (*kliṣṭāvidyā*), which includes pride, desire, and so forth, they have not abandoned the unafflicted ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*), which has the nature of instinct (*vāsanā*).[25]

It is Bhāvaviveka's view, then, that Arhats are beset by three faults which Buddhas have abandoned: the latent afflictive obstructions or latencies of the afflictions (*kleśavāsanā*), the obstructions to omniscience (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), and the unafflicted ignorance (*kliṣṭāvidyā*).

Lamotte has studied the development of the idea of the latencies of the afflictions in Indian Buddhist thought.[26] It is in the Hīnayāna sects that the idea of the latencies of the afflictions (or impregnations of the passions, as Lamotte renders the term) first develops, apparently as a means of accounting for the strange behavior of some of the Buddha's most illustrious disciples. For example, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, the most advanced of the disciples in the use of magical powers, would begin to skip and jump about whenever he heard music; Nanda would stare at the women in the audience before preaching the dharma; Gavampati would spit out his food and then eat it.[27] Such behavior was understandably difficult to account for in those who had destroyed the afflictions. It was explained that these Arhats still had the latencies of the afflictions, predispositions to certain types of physical and verbal activity deriving from former births. Hence, Mahāmaudgalyāyana's "simian atavism" at the sound of music was due to the fact that he had been a monkey in previous lives. Nanda's ostensibly lustful stares were the residue of a past fondness for women and Gavampati's disgusting mealtime habit was the imprint of five hundred lifetimes as a cow.[28] Lamotte cites the *Mahāvibhāṣa* for a technical explanation:

> In every Śrāvaka who has already committed himself to a given passion, there is created by that passion a special potential, cause of a distortion in bodily and vocal behaviour: [this potential dwells] in the mind and is called impregnation. The impregnation is a special thought, [morally] undefined.[29]

Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sects held that the Buddha alone was free from such impregnations, due to his collection of merit over countless aeons.[30] The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* explains that the Bodhisattva abandons the afflictions over the first seven grounds (*bhūmi*) and the latencies of the afflictions over grounds eight, nine, and ten.[31]

Thus, it would seem that Bhāvaviveka's hypothetical Hīnayāna opponent would agree with him that the Arhat has not destroyed the latencies of the afflictions while the Buddha has. However, the Hīnayānist would argue that those latencies could be removed by traversing the Bodhisattva path as described by the Hīnayāna and would not require embarkation on the bogus Mahāyāna path. The same could be said of the unafflicted ignorance.

The unafflicted ignorance is said to involve an ignorance of the profound and subtle qualities of a Buddha; an ignorance of the very distant in place, as when Maudgalyāyana did not know that his mother had been reborn in the Mārīcī world; an ignorance of the distant in time, as when Śāriputra did not know that a certain householder possessed the roots of virtue necessary for liberation and thus did not allow him to join the order; and an ignorance due to the limitless divisions of the aspects of cause of effect, that is, not knowing the specific details of the realms, places of transmigration, circumstances of a lifetime, and so forth. Only a Buddha, for example, is said to know the karmic causes of the various colors in the feathers of a peacock's tail.[32] It would be the position of the Vaibhāṣikas, for example, that such ignorance is present in Arhats and absent in the Buddha and can be removed by the Bodhisattva path as set forth in the Hīnayāna canon.[33] However, Bhāvaviveka seems to have a different, more subtle, unafflicted ignorance in mind. He cites the *Sūryabuddhakṛtanirdeśasūtra*:

> This ignorance has two aspects:
> The mundane and the surpassing.
> The mundane creates discrimination;
> The surpassing extends far.
>
> When a disciple abides in the cessations,
> His mind becomes fixed,
> He is without appropriation [of the aggregates],
> He does not enter into birth.
>
> Abiding free from cessation,
> He is obscured by the surpassing ignorance.
> His consciousness lacks appropriation
> And he says he is liberated.
>
> How can this obscuration be liberation?
> In fact, it is complete obscuration.
> His consciousness is completely concealed
> In the depths of the source of phenomena.
>
> Although he does not take rebirth,
> This is not the final awakening.
> If it becomes the *dharmakāya* of a Buddha,
> It is called nirvana.
>
> This *dharmakāya* of the Buddha
> Is nirvana.
> It is fully known only by a Buddha.
> Therefore, abide in [their] blessings.[34]

This passage is cited by Bhāvaviveka as support for his position that *śrāvakas* abandon fully and utterly the afflictive ignorance through their understanding of the selflessness of persons. Although the unafflicted ignorance persists, it does not obstruct their liberation, and it can thus be said that they achieve knowledge of extinguishment and non-production.[35] Because Bhāvaviveka implies that it is necessary to meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in order to destroy the unafflicted ignorance, it is unclear how that ignorance differs from the obstructions to omniscience.

It would seem that his position can be summarized as follows:

1. Arhats abandon the binding afflictions and the afflicted ignorance.
2. Arhats do not abandon the latent afflictions, which are removed through the Bodhisattva's collection of merit.
3. Arhats do not abandon the obstructions to omniscience or the unafflicted ignorance, which can only be abandoned through meditation on emptiness as set forth in the Mahāyāna canon.

Thus, when Bhāvaviveka says in one place that *śrāvakas* do not achieve liberation and elsewhere says that they do, he is clearly referring to two distinct enlightenments. When he says that an Arhat does not achieve nirvana, he means that an Arhat does not achieve the perfect, complete enlightenment (*samyaksambodhi*) of a Buddha until he abandons the obstructions to omniscience, and this is accomplished only when the Arhat enters the Mahāyāna and completes the Bodhisattva path. When he says that *śrāvakas* achieve liberation, he means that they achieve the dual knowledge of extinguishment and non-production that is acquired at the completion of the sixteen moments of knowledge (*jñāna*) and forbearance (*kṣānti*) with respect to the four truths,[36] at which point the *śrāvaka* realizes that the afflictions have been extinguished and the aggregates will not be produced again in another lifetime. This indeed must be considered liberation in that the cycle of rebirth has been halted. But Bhāvaviveka disputes the Hīnayāna contention that the knowledge of extinguishment and non-production is enlightenment because such knowledge is accompanied by conception. He goes on to say that the knowledges of extinguishment and non-production are mistaken consciousnesses and observe the unreal (*viparīta*), presumably because they do not observe emptiness.[37]

Bhāvaviveka grudgingly concedes that freedom from rebirth is attainable via the Hīnayāna path while at the same time denigrating the attainment of the Arhat, whose enlightenment is far inferior to that of a Buddha. The Arhat, he says, is like a stream enterer when compared to a Buddha because he still has many obstacles to overcome. It is only when the Arhat enters the Mahāyāna path that true enlightenment comes within his grasp. So long as the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* remain satisfied with the provisional wisdom taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras, they can only seek the inferior attainment of mere freedom from rebirth and the binding afflictions. So long as they view the knowledge of impermanence, of production, and of cessation taught in their sūtras as supreme, they will remain bound by the webs of misconception because, for Bhāvaviveka, these knowledges are ultimately mistaken. The knowledge gained from the Hīnayāna sūtras is sufficient to destroy the binding afflictions but is not knowledge of the real. He says in the third chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*:

> In the *śrāvakayāna*, the *Bhagavan* thoroughly explained to *śrāvakas*, in order that they might abandon the afflictive obstructions:
>
> O, products are impermanent
> Having the nature of production and disintegration.
> Being produced they cease.
> They are peacefully blissful.[38]
>
> Why? As it is said [in sūtra]:
>
> The various worlds are not desire;
> Attachment to the imaginary is the desire of beings.
> For the steady [of mind] who abide like the various worlds
> [Desires] are tamed accordingly.
>
> In the Mahāyāna, [the Buddha taught] no arising, no phenomena, no production, no cessation, no composition, and no objects of knowledge in duality. If [that is the case], how can the afflictions arise? Thus, [the Buddha] explained [this] fully to the compassionate [Bodhisattvas] so that they might abandon the afflictions together with their latencies as well as the stains of the obstructions to omniscience.[39]

It is clear, then, that Bhāvaviveka sees a fundamental difference between the nature of reality described in the Hīnayāna sūtras and the nature of reality described by the Buddha in the Mahāyāna sūtras. In the Hīnayāna, the Buddha talked about impermanence, production, and disintegration, the transitory nature of phenomena. In the Mahāyāna, he talked about the emptiness of ultimate existence. The understanding of the former is not the understanding of the latter; they are two very different realizations. For Bhāvaviveka, only one is ultimately true, only one is knowledge of reality. The other is provisional, mistaken, and ultimately false. The realization of impermanence and of the selflessness of persons gained in the Hīnayāna has the capacity to tame and destroy the desire that binds beings in birth and death. Still, it is mistaken in the final analysis, it is "ultimately inaccurate," as Bhāvaviveka says. How, then, is it possible for a mistake, an untruth, to lead to freedom?

Bhāvaviveka answers this question in an intriguing manner through examining what is meant by the terms "true" and "false." At *Madhyamakahṛdaya* IV.30 he says:

> In fact, there is no path in the Mahāyāna
> For the realization of Buddhahood
> Because it would have conceptions and signs,
> As do worldly paths.[40]

Here, using the apophatic language so beloved by the Mādhyamikas, Bhāvaviveka denies the ultimate existence of the path to Buddhahood because, in reality, the Mahāyāna path is empty of ultimate existence as are all other paths and all other phenomena in the universe. In reality, there is only emptiness, the negation of ultimate existence. His commentary says:

> The path is not a cause of enlightenment because it possesses conceptions and signs, such as [the statement], "This world and the world beyond exist." It is like the path of performing actions that cause beings [to be reborn] in the realm of gods and humans [which is not a cause of enlightenment].[41]

Bhāvaviveka's point is that the special cause of Buddhahood is the non-conceptual, non-dual realization of the signless reality, emptiness; the details of the Mahāyāna path cannot, in themselves, serve as the cause of Buddhahood, just as ethical action alone can lead only to a favorable rebirth and never to the enlightenment of a Buddha.

It is important to note that Bhāvaviveka here expressed what might be termed a qualified apophasis concerning the path. When he says that there is no path in the verse above, he is making a specific statement about what does and does not effect enlightenment. To introduce that verse he says, "Furthermore, in this Mahāyāna system, the *Bhagavan* teaches the cultivation and clear realization of the path conventionally, not ultimately."[42] Hence, the path exists conventionally.

As a Mādhyamika, Bhāvaviveka would hold that the attainment of Buddhahood via the Mahāyāna path does not ultimately exist because the Mahāyāna path and Buddhahood and its attainment are all empty of ultimate existence. As a Mādhyamika, he would also uphold the compatibility of emptiness and dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*); the emptiness of a particular phenomenon does not cancel its conventional efficacy. Thus, that the Mahāyāna path does not ultimately exist is not a problem for Bhāvaviveka. It is a problem, however, for his hypothetical Hīnayāna opponent who sees the Mādhyamika view as nihilistic and who cannot conceive of an existence empty of ultimate existence. In the *Tarkajvālā*, such an opponent raises the following qualm:

> If it is the case that the cultivation of the path is for the purpose of destroying the afflictions, then what destroys the afflictions when [the path] itself is not true? By thinking that the stump of a tree is a human, one does not get rid of doubt.[43]

That is, an unreal path cannot destroy the afflictions. It is incorrect to hold that the afflictions can be overcome by cultivating a path that is not truly established. Something which is false can have no positive effect, says the opponent; nothing is gained by mistaking a tree stump in the distance for a human.

Bhāvaviveka, of course, does not agree because he does not equate non-true existence with non-existence; something can be empty of true existence, and in that sense be untrue, and still perform a positive function. But what of the opponent's example? Can anything ever be gained by a visual error? Bhāvaviveka, ever undaunted, provides a counterexample:

> Just as someone is frightened
> Through confusing a rope for a snake,
> [So] knowing that [it] is a coiled vine
> Is known to be a cure [for that fear].[44]

In his commentary, he explains:

> Due to being mistaken, someone initially [thinks] that a rope is a snake, not knowing that it is a rope. [Telling] that [person], "This is a coiled vine, it is neither a rope nor a snake," [creates] the apprehension of an unreal [in the sense of non-existent] coiled vine whereby the mistaking of [a rope] for a snake is cured. In the same way, adherence to wrong views and wrong thoughts arises through being initially mistaken about forms and so forth. By knowing that one is mistaken about these, a view is created that is a cure, such as the correct view (*samyak-dṛṣṭi*). [But] one should know that both of these [views, the wrong and the correct] are wrong due to being conceptions of true existence. The unseen is reality because there is nothing other than the nature which is non-true existence.[45]

To illustrate his point, he cites a passage from the *Tathāgatakośasūtra*:

> Kāśyapa, it is thus. Some beings are tormented by the unfounded suspicion [that they have taken] poison, and they beat their breasts and wail, saying, "I have eaten poison! I have eaten poison!" One skilled in the ways of medicine pretends to remove the unreal poison [by giving them a purgative[46]] thereby overcoming the belief [caused] by their suspicion of poison. As a consequence, they are relieved of their torment. What do you think, Kāśyapa? If the doctor had not pretended to remove the false weak poison, would those beings have lived?
>
> No, *Bhagavan*. Just as they were supposedly tormented by an unreal poison, so [that torment] was removed by another unreal poison.
>
> The *Bhagavan* said, "In the same way, Kāśyapa, do I teach the doctrine in an unreal manner to childish common beings who are beset by the afflictions."
>
> Does the *Bhagavan* not speak the truth? How could the Tathāgata not speak the truth?
>
> The *Bhagavan* said, "Kāśyapa, what do you think? Are you liberated by truth or untruth?
>
> I am liberated by untruth, not by the truth. *Bhagavan*, desire, hatred, and obscuration are said to be untrue. If desire were true, *Bhagavan*, one could not remove oneself from desire through [meditation on] ugliness. If hatred were real, *Bhagavan*, one could not remove oneself from hatred through [meditation on] love. If obscuration were real, *Bhagavan*, one could not remove oneself from obscuration through [meditation on] dependent arising. *Bhagavan*, it is because desire and hatred and ignorance are unreal that one can separate oneself from them by meditation on ugliness, love, and dependent arising. *Bhagavan*, since all afflictions are unreal, they are thoroughly abandoned by a realization that is unreal. *Bhagavan*, because both the afflictions and that by which they are abandoned are unreal and untrue, unreal knowledge removes one from unreal afflictions.[47]

Bhāvaviveka begins with the classic example of mistaking a coiled rope for a snake. He adds a further twist, however, by arguing that one can dispel the fear of the mistaken person by telling him that it is not a snake but a coiled vine. (He does not suggest the motivation for such prevarication.) This demonstrates that a mistake can be corrected (in the sense that the fear of the snake is dispelled) by an untruth. In the same way, wrong philosophical views, such as that forms are permanent, can be eradicated by learning correct views concerning impermanence. However, ultimately both wrong views and correct views are false because they are involved with the elaborations of true existence, "both of these are wrong due to being conceptions of true existence (*dngos por 'dzin pa*)." Emptiness, "the unseen," is reality "because there is nothing other than the nature of non-true existence (*dngos po med pa*)."

Thus, to the Hīnayāna opponent who objects that the path must be truly existent in order to be effective, Bhāvaviveka responds with an example of an effective lie, providing an instance of a worldly untruth to show that what is not truly existent can nonetheless be efficacious. He takes the discussion to another level, however, by going on to say that wrong views and correct views are ultimately false because they are based in the conception of true existence, that the only reality is emptiness, the very absence of true existence.

The play on "true" and "false", "real" and "unreal" continues in the example provided from sūtra, an example in which the motivation for the telling of a lie (or at least the withholding of the truth) is provided. The Buddha tells the story of a group of people who mistakenly believe they have been poisoned and are duly distressed. A skilled physician, knowing that his assurance that they have not been poisoned would be insufficient to allay their fears, administers something that they believe to be an antidote, thereby "curing" them. Comparing himself to that physician, the Buddha says, "In the same way, Kāśyapa, do I teach the doctrine in an unreal manner to childish common beings who are beset by the afflictions." That is, the Buddha teaches that which is not "true" to the more benighted of his followers.

To this point, Bhāvaviveka's example of the coiled vine and the example from sūtra are roughly parallel, showing the efficacy of untruth to dispel fear. The exegeses of the two examples are somewhat different. Bhāvaviveka explains that even though the correct view is not ultimately true, it can counteract wrong views. Kāśyapa focuses at first not on the truth or falsity of the antidote but on that of the malady, noting that it is because desire, hatred, and ignorance are untrue, that is, not truly existent, that they are susceptible to meditation on ugliness, love, and dependent arising. But he goes on to imply that this susceptibility is not because the unreal is overcome by the real but rather because the unreal is susceptible to the unreal: "*Bhagavan*, because both the afflictions and that by which they are abandoned are unreal and untrue, unreal knowledge separates one from unreal afflictions." There is no explicit identification made here, as there is by Bhāvaviveka, of this lack of truth with reality. However, when Kāśyapa says, "I am liberated by untruth, not by truth," he seems to imply that it is because phenomena are empty that liberation is possible, that if things were reified into some true existence, transformation would be impossible.

It is certainly fair to ask at this juncture what this discussion has to do with the question of whether *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. Bhāvaviveka is here attempting to prove the Mādhyamika point (made also by Nāgārjuna at *MMK*, XXIV, 14—24) that the viability of phenomena is possible within emptiness, that things need not be truly existent (indeed must not be) in order to be effective. Because Bhāvaviveka's *śrāvaka* opponent raises this qualm, it is clear at least that that *śrāvaka* does not understand emptiness. But what of the rest?

Bhāvaviveka's example of telling a frightened person that a coiled rope is a coiled vine is ascribed great significance by Tibetan doxographers of the dGe-lugs-pa order in their discussion of the question of whether, according to Svātantrika, *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. As will be seen in the next section, Candrakīrti criticizes an opponent for asserting on the one hand that the conception of true existence is the root cause of suffering and rebirth and asserting on the other that liberation from suffering and rebirth is possible without abandoning that conception. Bhāvaviveka does indeed appear to be caught in that contradiction. In an attempt to answer for him, 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (1648—1721) in his *Great Exposition of Tenets* (*Grub mtha' chen mo*) and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan (1797—?) in his *Annotations* (*mChan 'grel*) to the *Great Exposition of Tenets* argue that it was Bhāvaviveka's position that although emptiness is the final mode of being and true nature of reality and that the conception of true existence is the root cause of suffering, it is not necessary to understand emptiness in order to be liberated from rebirth, just as it is not necessary to know that what looks like a snake is actually a coiled rope; it is sufficient to think that it is a coiled vine for one's fears to be assuaged. In the same way, although emptiness, the selflessness of phenomena, is reality, it is sufficient to understand the selflessness of persons in order to gain the lesser liberation of the Arhat.[48] Whether it can be concluded that this is Bhāvaviveka's position will be considered when Candrakīrti's refutations are dealt with.

An examination of Bhāvaviveka's statements in the *Prajñāpradīpa* and the *Tarkajvālā* indicates that he rejected the view that the doctrine of emptiness appeared anywhere in the Hīnayāna sūtras, and that he held that the doctrine of emptiness was at least a, if not the, distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna canon, that followers of the Hīnayāna realize only the selflessness of persons and not that of phenomena, thereby becoming Arhats and abandoning the binding afflictive obstructions but not the latent afflictions, the unafflicted ignorance, or the obstructions to omniscience, which can only be abandoned through meditation on emptiness.

CANDRAKĪRTI

Bhāvaviveka's contention that the selflessness of phenomena is not taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras rests on three major points of disagreement with Buddhapālita: the meaning of self and selflessness, the nature of the two obstructions, and implicitly, the distinguishing feature of the Mahāyāna. Candrakīrti attacks Bhāvaviveka's position on each of these points.

He says in his commentary to Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*:

> Regarding this, "self" is the entity of things that does not depend on another (*aparapratibaddha*), [it is] inherent existence. The non-existence of that is selflessness. Through the division into phenomena (*dharma*) and persons (*pudgala*) it is understood as twofold, the selflessness of phenomena (*dharmanairātmya*) and the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*).

Candrakīrti makes two essential points here. First, he follows Buddhapālita's gloss of *ātman* as *svabhāva*; self does not refer to a falsely attributed quality of the person. Rather, it is the inherent existence, the intrinsic nature, the own-being falsely ascribed to all phenomena, including persons. It is an entity of independence and autonomy, an inner principle of objects that relies on nothing else for its existence. Secondly, Candrakīrti asserts that selflessness, the absence of this inherent existence, can be seen as twofold, as the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, a division based not on two qualities but on two qualificands. A person's lack of being an independent, inherently existing entity is the selflessness of persons. That same absence of inherent existence in a phenomenon other than the person is the selflessness of phenomena. For Candrakīrti, there is no difference in subtlety between the two selflessnesses. They are distinguished from the point of view of the bases that are selfless, that is, persons and phenomena. They are not distinguished from the point of view of that of which they are empty; the object of negation (*pratiśedhya*), inherent existence, is the same.

Candrakīrti's position stands in sharp contrast to that of Bhāvaviveka, who holds that the selflessness of phenomena is more subtle than the selflessness of persons. The two selflessnesses are not only distinguished in terms of what is selfless, as they are for Candrakīrti, but are also differentiated from the point of view of how they are selfless; the word "self" in the terms "selflessness of persons" and "selflessness of phenomena" has two distinct referents. When it is said that the person is selfless, it means that the aggregates are not a permanent, single, independent agent either individually or collectively, nor does such an entity exist apart from the aggregates. For Bhāvaviveka, the self is only imputedly existent (*prajñapti-sat*) as the mental consciousness.[49] When it is said that phenomena are selfless, it means that they lack ultimate existence (*paramārtha-sat*); they are incapable of withstanding analysis by a reasoning consciousness investigating their final mode of being.[50]

As Bhāvaviveka explains in his commentary to *MMK* XVIII.4–5, the selflessness of persons is the object of the wisdom of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* whereas the more subtle selflessness of phenomena is the object of the wisdom of Bodhisattvas. In his own commentary to *MMK* XVIII.4–5, Candrakīrti says:

> Therefore, in dependence on emptiness, which has the character of the complete pacification of all elaborations, one separates from elaborations and through separating from elaborations, thought is reversed. By overcoming thought, the afflictions are reversed and by overcoming the afflictions, birth is reversed. Therefore,

> since only emptiness has the character of the overcoming of all elaborations, it is called nirvana. As [Āryadeva's] *Catuḥśataka* says:
>
> Here, in brief, the Tathāgatas
> Speak of only these two:
> The doctrine is non-harming;
> Emptiness is nirvana.
>
> The master Bhāvaviveka does not understand that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have realization of emptiness as it is explained.[51]

Candrakīrti then paraphrases Bhāvaviveka's position that *śrāvakas* understand that there is no self of persons whereas the object of a Bodhisattva's non-conceptual wisdom is the view of the non-production of all products (*ajātasarvasaṃskāra*), that is, the selflessness of phenomena.[52]

To support his position that followers of the Hīnayāna realize emptiness, Candrakīrti cites the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*:

> Subhūti, one who wishes to attain the enlightenment of a *śrāvaka* should learn this perfection of wisdom. Subhūti, one who wishes to attain the enlightenment of a *pratyekabuddha* should learn this perfection of wisdom. Subhūti, one who wishes to attain unsurpassed, perfect, complete enlightenment should learn this perfection of wisdom.[53]

This is the extent of Candrakīrti's consideration in the *Prasannapadā* of the question of whether *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. He notes that he has already demonstrated that Bhāvaviveka does not follow Nāgārjuna on this point and refers the reader to the eighth verse of the first chapter of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.[54] Let us turn there.

Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* is divided into twelve chapters, the first ten devoted to delineations of the ten Bodhisattva grounds (*bhūmi*), the eleventh describing the qualities of the ten grounds, and the twelfth describing the qualities of Buddhahood. Candrakīrti's discussion of the object of the Hīnayāna wisdom and his attendant critique of Bhāvaviveka occur in two places in the text. In the first chapter, employing scripture, he presents quotations from sūtra and from the works of Nāgārjuna to show that *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. In the sixth chapter, employing reasoning, he argues that it is logically untenable to hold that liberation is possible without knowing emptiness.

At *Madhyamakāvatāra*, I.8, referring to Bodhisattvas on the first ground, Candrakīrti writes:

> Even those who abide in the first aspiration to full enlightenment
> Subdue those born from the speech of Munīndra
> As well as *pratyekabuddhas* through the increase of their merit.
> On the Gone Afar he surpasses them in awareness.[55]

Bodhisattvas on the first ground have greater merit than *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*. It is not until the seventh ground, however, the Gone Afar (*dūramgama*), that Bodhisattvas surpass those of the Hīnayāna with their wisdom. Candrakīrti cites the *Daśabhūmika* for support:

> Similarly, Children of the Conqueror, as soon as he creates the aspiration [to enlightenment], a Bodhisattva outshines *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* by the greatness of his special thought but not by the power of his analytical awareness. A Bodhisattva abiding on the seventh Bodhisattva ground greatly surpasses all the activities of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* through abiding in the great knowledge of his own sphere.[56]

Candrakīrti argues that it can be determined clearly from this passage that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* have the knowledge that all phenomena lack inherent existence. If they did not understand the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena, then Bodhisattvas on the first ground, who do have such understanding, would surpass them in intelligence on the first ground, not on the seventh as is indicated by the sūtra. If *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* observed forms as having their own entity, they would be mistaken and thus would not realize the selflessness of the person because they would misperceive the aggregates as self.[57] He goes on to cite an extended passage from Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* (stanzas I.35—37 and IV.57—66) to establish the relationship between the misconception of the aggregates and the misconception of the self. For example, *Ratnāvalī*, I.35 says:

> As long as there is a conception of the aggregates,
> There is a conception of the "I";
> When there is a conception of the "I" there is action;
> From action there is birth.[58]

The second long citation from the *Ratnāvalī* contains the stanza (IV.63):

> Because they lack entityness in that way,
> Attachment to finding pleasure and
> Attachment to separating from pain are abandoned.
> Therefore, those who see in this way are liberated.[59]

Candrakīrti argues that these extended passages from Nāgārjuna prove that it was his position that followers of the Hīnayāna understand emptiness because in his description of phenomena, such as the aggregates and physical elements (*mahābhūta*), as lacking inherent existence and how liberation is achieved through understanding that, there is no mention of Bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas are referred to only in the last stanza cited (*Ratnāvalī*, IV.66):

> Bodhisattvas, who also see in this way,
> Wish definitely for enlightenment.
> But they continue in existence until enlightenment
> Through their compassion.[60]

Candrakīrti attempts to demonstrate two points in the foregoing discussion. The first is that there is ample evidence in sūtra and in the statements of Nāgārjuna to indicate that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* understand the emptiness of inherent existence. His second point is that it is clear from the statements of Nāgārjuna that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* must realize emptiness, the lack of inherent existence of persons and phenomena, in order to be liberated from rebirth. Contrary to Bhāvaviveka's view, it is impossible to realize that the person is selfless without realizing that phenomena are selfless because, as Nāgārjuna says, as long as the aggregates are misconceived, so long is there the misconception of the "I". Hence, knowledge of the emptiness of inherent existence of persons and phenomena is essential for liberation from suffering. If *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* did not have such knowledge they would be like non-Buddhists who do not destroy the afflictions. The necessity of knowledge of emptiness for liberation is considered further by Candrakīrti in the sixth chapter.

Candrakīrti disputes two other positions of Bhāvaviveka in the first chapter of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the first being Bhāvaviveka's contention that emptiness is not set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras. Like Buddhapālita, he cites the "Form is like a ball of foam" stanza as evidence of the doctrine of the selflessness of phenomena in the *śrāvakapitaka*. He then cites two statements from Nāgārjuna, the first of which (*Ratnāvalī*, IV. 86) states that the teaching of non-production in the Mahāyāna and the teaching of extinguishment in the Hīnayāna refer to the same thing. In the second statement (*MMK*, XV.7), Nāgārjuna notes that the extremes of existence, non-existence, and both existence and non-existence are rejected by the Buddha in *Kātyāyanāvavāda*, a Hīnayāna sūtra.[61]

Finally, Candrakīrti disputes Bhāvaviveka's contention that if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the Hīnayāna scriptures, it would have been pointless for the Buddha to have taught the Mahāyāna.

It can be understood that the system of those who think that if the selflessness of phenomena were taught in the *śrāvakayāna*, then the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be pointless contradicts reasoning and scripture. The Mahāyāna teaching does not set forth simply the selflessness of phenomena. Why? [It sets forth] the grounds (*bhūmi*), perfections (*pāramitā*), prayers (*praṇidhāna*), great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), and so forth of Bodhisattvas as well as the dedications (*pariṇāma*), the two collections (*sambhara*), and the inconceivable reality (*acintyadharmatā*). As the *Ratnāvalī* [IV.90, IV.93] says:

The prayers, deeds, and dedications
Of Bodhisattvas were not explained
In the *śrāvakayāna*.
How could one become a Bodhisattva [by that path]?

The topics concerning the Bodhisattvas' deeds
Are not discussed in the sūtras;
They are discussed in the Mahāyāna.
Therefore, the wise should accept it [as the word of the Buddha].[62]

In order that the selflessness of phenomena be clarified, it is fitting that it be taught in the Mahāyāna because [the Buddha] wished to speak about the teaching at length; in the *śrāvakayāna* the selflessness of phenomena is limited merely to a brief characterization. As the master [Nāgārjuna] said [in the *Lokātītastava*, 27]:

You said that there is no liberation
Without understanding the signless.
Therefore, you taught it fully
In the Mahāyāna.[63]

Here, Candrakīrti counters Bhāvaviveka's contention about the pointlessness of the Mahāyāna on two fronts. First, he makes the rather obvious point that there are many topics set forth in the Mahāyāna sūtras that are not found in the Hīnayāna canon. Thus, the selflessness of phenomena is not the unique feature of the Mahāyāna, even if it were not taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras. Furthermore, in the passage from the *Ratnāvalī*, Nāgārjuna is attempting to prove that the Mahāyāna is indeed the word of the Buddha by listing those things essential for Buddhahood that are not to be found in the Hīnayāna sūtras. Notable by its absence is the selflessness of phenomena, which Nāgārjuna should have included were it unique to the Mahāyāna.[64]

Candrakīrti's second point is that the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena in the Mahāyāna is not redundant because the selflessness of phenomena is delineated at great length in the Mahāyāna sūtras whereas it is discussed only briefly in the Hīnayāna.

Hence, it is abundantly clear that Candrakīrti asserts that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the Hīnayāna sūtras and that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* must understand that selflessness in order to abandon the afflictive emotions and be liberated from rebirth. He says in his commentary to Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, "The abandonment of the afflictive emotions does not occur for those who wish to abandon the afflictive emotions but who apprehend the inherent existence of forms and so forth."[65] However, his statement in commenting on the stanza from the *Lokātītastava*, to the effect that the selflessness of phenomena is discussed only briefly in the Hīnayāna while it is set forth extensively in the Mahāyāna, suggests that Candrakīrti wishes to maintain the supremacy of the Mahāyāna even here, but with perhaps more deftness than Bhāvaviveka displayed. Despite his insistence that followers of the Hīnayāna must and do understand emptiness, Candrakīrti qualifies the nature of that understanding rather significantly later in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. This is evident in his commentary to VI.179ab, which says:

> For the liberation of transmigrators, this selflessness
> Was taught in two aspects, with the divisions of persons and phenomena.

Candrakīrti comments:

> This selflessness was set forth briefly in two aspects: the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons. Why was selflessness set forth in two aspects? As is explained, "For the liberation of transmigrators." The *Bhagavan* set forth these two aspects of selflessness for the sake of the liberation of transmigrators. Regarding that, the selflessness of persons was set forth so that *pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* would be liberated. Both [selflessnesses] were set forth so that Bodhisattvas would be liberated through attaining omniscience (*sarvākārajñāna*). *Śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* also see the mere conditionality (*idampratyayatva*) of dependent arising. However, they do not meditate on the selflessness of phenomena fully. It is shown that they have complete meditation on the selflessness of persons.[66]

Not only, then, is the selflessness of phenomena delineated in a partial way in the Hīnayāna sūtras, Candrakīrti also asserts that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* engage in meditation on the selflessness of phenomena in a partial manner. He concedes that they understand the "mere conditionality of dependent arising," which here can be taken to mean the emptiness of inherent existence of phenomena, but their contemplation of that emptiness is not as complete as that of Bodhisattvas. Candrakīrti here is able to maintain the superiority of the Mahāyāna while preserving his point that *śrāvakas* understand the selflessness of phenomena. He does so by qualifying the nature of that understanding.[67]

Candrakīrti's position rests on his fundamental conviction that the conception of inherent existence is the root cause of the afflictions and that it is therefore impossible to abandon any of the afflictions, much less achieve liberation, without realizing the emptiness of inherent existence. In the sixth chapter of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, he disputes the contention that liberation is achieved merely through understanding that the self is not permanent. He says at VI.131:

> [According to] you, yogis perceiving selflessness
> Do not realize the reality of forms and so forth.
> [Therefore,] due to seeing forms [as inherently existent]
> and relating to them [as such]
> Desire and so forth are produced because
> their nature has not been understood.[68]

This stanza seems to be addressed to those who do not acknowledge emptiness as the final nature of reality. Candrakīrti also attacks those, like Bhāvaviveka, who maintain that emptiness is the ultimate truth but who claim that liberation is possible without emptiness being understood. He says at VI.140—1:

> [You assert] that when selflessness is understood
> One abandons the permanent self, [but] it is not held
> To be the basis of the conception of self.
> Hence it is fantastic to propound
> That through knowing the lack of [a permanent]
> self, the view of self [i.e., inherent existence] is eradicated.
>
> That while looking for a snake that lives
> in a hole in the wall of your house,
> Your qualms can be dispelled and the fear
> of the snake abandoned
> By [someone's saying], "There is no elephant here,"
> Is, alas, laughable to others.[69]

The dGe-lugs-pa scholar Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan draws a connection between saying that there is no elephant in the wall and saying that a coiled rope is not a snake, but a coiled vine. He says in his *Annotations* (*mChan 'grel*):

> The Prāsaṅgikas say that it is not correct that by meditating on the selflessness of being a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency (*gang zag rang rkya thub pa'i rdzas yod kyi bdag med*) one abandons the afflictions and their seeds, because that [selflessness] is not the final mode of being of phenomena. To hold that transmigrators cycle in mundane existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena but that they can overcome cyclic existence not through meditating on the referent object of that [conception of a self of phenomena] but rather through meditating on the selflessness of a substantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency is senseless. This would be like saying that there is no elephant in the house in order to dispel the mistaken fear that there is a snake in the house.
>
> The Svātantrikas assert that it is true that transmigrators cycle in mundane existence through the force of the innate conception of a self of phenomena and that the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of being of phenomena. However, one does not have to meditate on the selflessness of phenomena in order to be liberated from cyclic existence because although a vine is not the mode of being of a rope, by saying, "This is a coiled vine," one can dispel the fear of one who thinks that a coiled rope is a snake. In the same way, although the selflessness of persons is not the final mode of being of phenomena, it is not contradictory that one can temporarily [that is, until entering the Mahāyāna] abandon cyclic existence and its causes.[70]

Bhāvaviveka provided the example of the coiled vine to demonstrate that the desired effect can be achieved by that which is not literally true. It will be recalled that he made that point to demonstrate to a Hīnayāna opponent that the Māhayāna path need not be ultimately existent to lead to the state of Buddhahood. Ngag-dbang-dbal-ldan recognizes Bhāvaviveka's point but sees a second significance in the metaphor, interpreting it as also illustrating Bhāvaviveka's position that one can be liberated from rebirth without understanding emptiness. Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan's juxtaposition of Bhāvaviveka's vine and Candrakīrti's elephant may not be historically accurate; we do not know whether Candrakīrti had Bhāvaviveka in mind as the opponent in this context. However, he has pointed up a major fissure between the two Mādhyamika masters. It seems that for Bhāvaviveka, despite his protestations, there is not such a great difference between the selflessness of persons understood by *śrāvakas* and the selflessness of phenomena understood by Bodhisattvas. The *śrāvakas* only make a small mistake, like confusing a rope for a vine, when they contemplate the nature of reality, and that mistake is not significant enough to prevent them from putting an end to the afflictions. For Candrakīrti, the error is of a different order; one cannot dispel the fear of there being a snake in the house by telling someone that there are no elephants in the parlor. The conception of a permanent self that the Hīnayāna schools refute is gross and obvious, like an elephant. It is unrelated to the more subtle and sinister serpent of the conception of inherent existence. Removing the elephant does not destroy the snake. Thus, Candrakīrti argues that understanding the coarse selflessness that is taught by the Hīnayāna schools will not bestow liberation. All who seek freedom from rebirth must destroy the conception of inherent existence. The *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* abandon the afflictions through their understanding of the two selflessnesses. However, they cannot abandon the latent afflictions (*kleśavāsanā*), which are only destroyed by Bodhisattvas.[71]

CONCLUSIONS

The present study has attempted to articulate a central issue of Mahāyāna soteriology through an examination of the writings of two Mādhyamika masters, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti. The purpose here has been to demonstrate a further criterion for the retrospective designation of their respective philosophies with the terms

"Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika." An exhaustive study of the nature of the Hīnayāna wisdom according to the Mādhyamika school would entail an analysis of the writings of many other masters, especially those who produced what has been called the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika synthesis. To attempt to determine the position of Maitreyanātha, for example, on this issue would entail an analysis of the famous "Five Treatises" (the *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga*, the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, the *Uttaratantra*, and the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*) as well as the myriad commentaries on these works. It is possible to speculate briefly here on what the position of Nāgārjuna may have been on this issue and then go on to discuss the implications and possible motivations of the views of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti.

When attempting to determine the position of Nāgārjuna, there is always the vexing question of deciding which of the many other works ascribed to him are indeed the products of the author of the *Madhyamakaśāstra*. Here, in order to provide a wide range of statements on the subject, I will accept the thirteen texts that Lindtner considers authentic.[72]

During the later propagation (*phyir tar*) of the Buddhist doctrine in Tibet (c. 11th century), Tibetan scholars called Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva "Mādhyamikas of the model texts" (*gzhung phyi mo'i dbu ma pa*) because their writings are ambiguous on a number of points upon which later Mādhyamikas, whom the Tibetans called "partisan Mādhyamikas" (*phyogs 'dzin pa'i dbu ma pa*), parted company.[73] It should be noted that in subsequent centuries, Tibetan scholars went to great length to demonstrate that Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva were not as ambivalent on these issues as earlier scholars had believed and that Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, in fact, represented the Prāsaṅgika view in their writings. When this could not be determined from their writings, it was argued that despite what the words may say, their "thought" (*dgongs pa*) was Prāsaṅgika.

On the question of whether *śrāvakas* must understand emptiness in order to be liberated from rebirth, Candrakīrti has already provided a prodigious number of citations from Nāgārjuna, drawn primarily from the *Ratnāvalī*. Other passages not cited by Candrakīrti but which support his position that all who wish to achieve liberation must know emptiness include *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 72:

> Those who do not know emptiness
> Are not bases of liberation.
> The obscured wander in the six realms
> In the prison of *saṃsāra*.[74]

MMK, XXIV.10 says:

> Without relying on conventions
> The ultimate cannot be taught.
> Without understanding the ultimate
> Nirvana is not attained.[75]

There is also the statement at *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (4):

> One is not liberated by existence;
> One is not liberated by non-existence;
> Great beings are liberated
> Through the thorough understanding of existence and non-existence.[76]

The term "great being" (*mahātman*) may be seen as referring to Bodhisattvas, who are often referred to with the epithet *mahāsattva*. But Candrakīrti says in his commentary that the *mahātman* is one who abides in the wisdom of the unobservable (*anupalabdhatā*), thereby greatly surpassing childish beings; *mahātman* is a term for *ārya*.[77] It is thus applicable to *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and Bodhisattvas. In the *Acintyastava*, Nāgārjuna says that the Buddha, out of his compassion, taught the selflessness of phenomena to "the intelligent" (*viditam*).[78] It is not clear from the context whether this refers explicitly to Bodhisattvas.

Another statement from Nāgārjuna, and in many ways the most interesting, comes from the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 11–13. Here, Nāgārjuna says that the Buddhas spoke of the five aggregates to *śrāvakas*, but continually taught Bodhisattvas that form is like a ball of foam, feeling is like a bubble, etc.[79] This passage can be read in two ways. Bhāvaviveka may find some initial support here in Nāgārjuna's contention that the Buddha described the aggregates for *śrāvakas* but declared the unreality of those aggregates to Bodhisattvas. Hence, the doctrine of the selflessness of phenomena, in this case the aggregates, was not intended for, nor taught to, followers of the Hīnayāna. However, as has already been discussed, the exposition of the unreality of the aggregates cited by Nāgārjuna derives from a Hīnayāna sūtra, the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*. This supports Candrakīrti's position that the selflessness of phenomena is taught in the *śrāvakapiṭaka*. In the end, Nāgārjuna's statement seems to provide further evidence for Candrakīrti's case, showing that the Buddha taught the selflessness of phenomena using language that he had employed in teaching *śrāvakas*. It appears to be an instance of the Buddha making a brief reference to the selflessness of phenomena in the Hīnayāna canon, as alluded to by Candrakīrti. Nāgārjuna's statement that the Buddha set forth the aggregates to *śrāvakas* is explained by Tsong-kha-pa to mean that he taught the reality of the aggregates not to all *śrāvakas* but to those temporarily unable to understand emptiness.[80] Nāgārjuna himself says that the Buddha did not teach the doctrine of emptiness to everyone. This point is made explicitly at *Ratnāvalī* IV.94—96 and at I.79, which says:

> This profundity that brings liberation
> And is beyond vice and virtue
> Has not been tasted by those who fear the baseless:
> The others, the *tīrthikas*, and even by us [Buddhists].[81]

It seems reasonable to conclude that from the evidence available to us, Candrakīrti seems to represent the position of Nāgārjuna when he says that the doctrine of emptiness is set forth in the Hīnayāna canon and that *śrāvakas* understand emptiness. Candrakīrti provides several citations from Nāgārjuna to support his claim and his interpretation of them is neither forced, far-fetched, or manipulative. There are other supporting statements from Nāgārjuna that Candrakīrti does not cite. Furthermore, Bhāvaviveka, who displays no reluctance to cite Nāgārjuna for support on other points of doctrine, provides no quotations from the master here.

What may have motivated Bhāvaviveka to argue so stridently that emptiness is not set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras? Bhāvaviveka clearly indulges in a hermeneutics of control when he claims that a statement in a Hīnayāna sūtra that says that feelings are like bubbles teaches the selflessness of persons to *śrāvakas* while a statement from a Mahāyāna sūtra that says that the conditioned is like bubbles teaches the selflessness of phenomena to Bodhisattvas. Bhāvaviveka lived in a period of sometimes bitter polemics among the various Buddhist schools: between the Hīnayāna schools and the Mahāyāna schools with the Hīnayāna denying the veracity of the Mahāyāna sūtras as the word of the Buddha (*buddhavacana*) and labelling the Mādhyamikas nihilists, and between Yogācāra and Mādhyamika. Bhāvaviveka seems to have conceived of himself as the defender of the Mādhyamika against such challengers, whom he attacked with zeal. Hence, he reacted bitterly to Hīnayāna charges of bogus scriptures and nihilistic views. In the *Tarkajvālā* he deals with his opponents in turn, setting out to demonstrate how the Mahāyāna is in all ways the superior vehicle, Mādhyamika in all ways the superior view. Thus, what distinguishes the Mahāyāna from the lesser vehicle is not merely its path or the nature of its enlightenment, not merely its method (*upāya*) but also its wisdom (*prajñā*). His statement that if the selflessness of phenomena were set forth in the Hīnayāna sūtras, the teaching of the Mahāyāna would be purposeless is clearly hyperbolic; it is obvious from the first three chapters of the *Tarkajvālā* that Bhāvaviveka did not believe the doctrine of emptiness to be the only contribution of the Mahāyāna sūtras to Buddhist thought.

In order to uphold the supremacy of the Mahāyāna, Bhāvaviveka forced himself into the philosophical difficulty of, in effect, positing two causes of *saṃsāra*. The binding afflictions are caused, at least immediately, by the conception of a self of persons. Understanding the selflessness of persons is, therefore, sufficient to put an end to birth and suffering and serves as the object of the *śrāvakas*, wisdom. Bodhisattvas realize the more subtle selflessness of phenomena, thereby destroying the elaborations of ultimate existence, which are the root causes of the afflictions, including the conception of a self of persons.

Bhāvaviveka distinguishes disciples of the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by the object of their wisdom. Although the difference in motivation is clearly important, with Hīnayānists seeking mere liberation for themselves and Bodhisattvas seeking Buddhahood for the welfare of others, motivation alone does not distinguish the two vehicles for Bhāvaviveka; he seems to imply that if the teaching of the selflessness of phenomena were available to *śrāvakas*, they would be capable of achieving Buddhahood. In order to defend the efficacy and purpose of the Mahāyāna scriptures, Bhāvaviveka is therefore willing to disregard or explain away any and all references to the selflessness of phenomena that appear in the Hīnayāna sūtras. It is instructive to note that in the fifth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* he similarly rejects all statements that appear to teach mind-only.

Candrakīrti is less polemical in approach, he is philosophically more consistent, and he is, at least ostensibly, more accommodating to the Hīnayāna. For him, the conception of self, of both persons and phenomena, is the chief obstruction to liberation. Thus, everyone who achieves liberation must realize the subtle selflessness of persons and phenomena, whether that liberation is sought with the Hīnayāna motivation or the Mahāyāna motivation. There is no difference between the objects of the wisdom of *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* on the one hand and Bodhisattvas on the other. All who are liberated understand emptiness. Therefore, emptiness must be taught in both the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sūtras. Candrakīrti is able to maintain the superiority of the Bodhisattva, however, by explaining that the Bodhisattva's meditation on the selflessness of phenomena is complete. Candrakīrti's position, then, is internally consistent: the conception of inherent existence is the root cause of suffering and its antidote is the wisdom of emptiness. This implies that there can be Mādhyamikas who are also *śrāvakas*, a point made by Tsong-kha-pa. Those Hīnayānists who have understood the selflessness of persons and phenomena are Mādhyamikas because they have abandoned the two extremes of permanence and annihilation.[82] Indeed, according to Candrakīrti, all of the great Arhats of the past must have been Mādhyamikas! He thus accommodates the followers of the Hīnayāna in his system but with a magnanimity tempered by a certain exclusiveness. Bhāvaviveka is willing to allow the *śrāvakas* the liberation from suffering that is the result of the paths delineated by the Hīnayāna sects. Candrakīrti holds that without understanding the profound emptiness, which is taught only briefly in the Hīnayāna sūtras, liberation is impossible.

NOTES

[1] The dates of these figures are taken from D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Towards a Chronology of the Madhyamaka School," in L. A. Hercus, et al., ed., *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Canberra, Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 505—530.

[2] The Tibetan origin of the designations Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is attested to by Tsong-kha-pa in his *Lhag mthong chen mo*, "During the latter propagation [of the dharma] in the Snowy Range [Tibet], scholars created the designations Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika. I do not think that they are fabrications because they accord with the *Prasannapadā*." See *rJe tsong kha pa'i gsung dbu ma'i lta ba'i skor*, Vol. 1 (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press), 1975, p. 16. Among the followers of Bhāvaviveka the Tibetan doxographers 'Jam-dbyang-bzhad-pa and lCang-skya-rol-pa'i-rdo-rje list Avalokitavrata, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla. Other well-known Prāsaṅgikas are Śāntideva and Atīśa.

[3] This question has been dealt with extensively by others. For two recent considerations of the implications of the debate over the use of syllogisms and consequences see David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, pp. 64—66, 76—80) and Jeffrey Hopkins, *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publication, 1983), pp. 441—530.

[4] The Sanskrit is: *yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaraṃ yathā| tathotpādastathā sthānam tathā bhaṅga udāhṛtaṃ||* See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās* (*Mādhyamikasūtras*) *de Nāgārjuna avec la Commentaire Prasannapadā de Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), p. 177. This edition will be referred to in subsequent notes as *Prasannapadā*.

[5] P 5254, Vol. 95 91.3.6—4.1. In their translation of Mādhyamika texts from Sanskrit, Tibetan translators rendered the term *śvabhāva* in two ways, as *rang bzhin* and as *ngo bo nyid*. The former I translate as "inherent existence" and the latter as "entityness". The formation of the latter neologism is influenced in part by Heidegger's discussion of "the thingness of a thing" in his essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art", where he writes:

"This block of granite, for example, is a mere thing. It is hard, heavy, extended, bulky, shapeless, rough, colored, partly dull, partly shiny. We can take note of all these features in the stone. Thus we acknowledge its characteristics. But still, the traits signify something proper to the stone itself. They are its properties. The thing has them. The thing? What are we thinking of when we now have the thing in mind? Obviously a thing is not merely an aggregate of traits, nor an accumulation of properties by which that aggregate arises. A thing, as everyone thinks he knows, is that around which the properties have assembled. We speak in this connection of the core of things. The Greeks are supposed to have called it *to hupokeimenon*. For them, this core of the thing was something always already there. The characteristics, however, are called *ta sumbebekota*, that which has always turned up already along with the given core and occurs along with it." See Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 22—3.

[6] With the slight modification of referring to the Buddha as the "Seer of Reality" (*de nyid gzigs pa*) rather than as the "Sun-friend" (*ādityabandhu*), this is a quotation that indeed appears in the *śrāvakayāna*, namely in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya III*. See *Saṃyutta*

Nikāya III, edited by M. Leon Feer (London: Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, 1960), pp. 141–2. An English translation by F. L. Woodward is available in *The Book of Kindred Sayings III*, Pali Text Society 13 (London: Luzac and Company, 1954), pp. 120–1. The Sanskrit, as quoted by Candrakīrti is: *phenapiṇḍopamaṃ rūpaṃ vedanā budbudopamā| marīcisadṛśī saṃjñā saṃskārāḥ kadalīnibhāḥ| māyopamaṃ ca vijñānam uktamādityabandhunā||* See *Prasannapadā*, p. 41. The verse is also quoted in the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* (12–13), traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna, an attribution accepted by some (e.g. Lindtner) and disputed by others (e.g. Ruegg).

[7] P 5253, Vol. 95 187.4.4–8.

[8] Vasubandhu says at *Abhidharmakośa*, I.7a, "Conditioned phenomena are the five aggregates, beginning with form." (*te punaḥ saṃskṛtā dharmā rūpādiskandhapañcakam*). See P. Pradhan, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu* (Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), p. 4.

[9] P 5253, Vol. 95, 187.4.8–5.3.

[10] P 5253, Vol. 95, 187.5.3–6.

[11] The Sanskrit is: *mametyahamiti kṣīṇe bahirdhādhyātmameva ca| nirudhyata upādānaṃ tatkṣayājjanmanaḥ kṣayaḥ|| karmakleśakṣayānmokṣa karmakleśā vikalpataḥ| te prapañcātprapañcastu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate||* See *Prasannapadā*, pp. 349–50.

[12] P 5253, Vol. 95, 224.2.5–4.8. Avalokitavrata's subcommentary occurs at P 5259, Vol. 97, 199.3.3ff.

[13] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.4.2–3.

[14] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.4.5–7.

[15] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.4–6.

[16] P 5256, Vol. 96, 66.1.7–8.

[17] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.3.2–5.

[18] The first eight are knowledge of conventionalities (*saṃvṛtijñāna*), doctrinal knowledge (*dharmajñāna*), subsequent knowledge (*anvayajñāna*), knowledge of suffering (*duḥkhajñāna*), knowledge of origin (*samudayajñāna*), knowledge of cessation (*nirodhajñāna*), knowledge of path (*mārgajñāna*), and knowledge of other minds (*paracittajñāna*).

[19] The Sanskrit is: *anutpādakṣayajñāne bodhiḥ*. See P. Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu* (Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), p. 382. Translating from Hsuan-tsang's Chinese translation, Louis de la Vallée Poussin renders the line, "Le *kṣayajñāna* avec l'*anutpādajñāna*, c'est la Bodhi" and reconstructs the Sanskrit as *kṣayanutpādayor jñānam bodhi*. Hsuan-tsang's version reverses the order of the two knowledges but reflects the sequence of the ten knowledges found elsewhere in the *Kośa* where *kṣayajñāna* is the ninth and *anutpādajñāna* is the tenth. See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, trans., *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Tome IV (Bruxelles: Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1971), p. 282.

[20] Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*, p. 383.

[21] See Pradhan, ed., p. 394.

[22] The Sanskrit is: *nānutpādakṣayajñāne yathārthe paramārthataḥ| bhrāntivāt savikalpatvāt tatbodhaḥ kasya tattvataḥ||*. The Sanskrit is provided from V. V. Gokhale and Robert A. F. Thurman's unpublished edition of the Sanskrit of the fourth chapter of the *Madhyamakahṛdaya*, which also includes an edition of the Tibetan of the fourth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* and an English translation of the chapter. Although the

translations from the fourth chapters of the *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and the *Tarkajvālā* provided in this article are my own, I have consulted the translation of Gokhale and Thurman from time to time. I am grateful to Professor Thurman for providing me with a copy of the manuscript. It is scheduled to be published by Tokyo University Press in *The Madhyamakahṛdaya of Bhāvaviveka*, edited by J. Takasaki.

[23] Cited also by Vasubandhu at *Abhidharmakośa* VI.67a.

[24] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.3.5—4.2. 72.4.2 mistakenly reads, "phyin ci log la dmigs pa'i phyir yongs su shes pa gang zhig rig pa dang ldan pa *yin* zhes bstan to." It should read *min* or *ma yin*.

[25] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.4.2—8.

[26] See Étienne Lamotte, "Passions and Impregnations of the Passions in Buddhism," in L. Cousins, A. Kunst, K. R. Norman, ed., *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1974), pp. 91—104.

[27] Lamotte, pp. 92—3.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] Lamotte, p. 94.

[30] Lamotte, pp. 94—8.

[31] Lamotte, p. 100.

[32] This explication of the four types of unafflicted ignorance is provided by the first Dalai Lama in his commentary to the expression of worship at the opening of the *Abhidharmakośa*. See dGe-'dun-grub, *mDsod tik thar lam gsal byed* (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), pp. 5—6.

[33] See lCang-skya-rol-pa'i rdo rje, *Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan* (Sarnath, India; Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970), p. 95.

[34] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.1—4.

[35] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.4—6.

[36] This is discussed at length in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* commenting on VI.25ff.

[37] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.3.6—4.2.

[38] The Sanskrit as quoted by Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā* (p. 39) is: *anityāśca te saṃskārā utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ| utpadya hi nirudhyante teṣām vyupaṣamah sukhaḥ||*.

[39] P 5256, Vol. 96, 27.1.8—27.2.4. This is the autocommentary to *Madhyamakahṛdaya*, III.24.

[40] The Sanskrit is: *na tattvato mahāyāne mārgo sambuddhabodhaye| savikalpani-mi[tta]tvāt saksāl laukikamārgavat||*. The Tibetan translation at P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.1—2 reads: *yang dag tu na theg chen gyi| lam gyis sangs rgyas jang chub dag| sgrub min rtog bcas mtshan bcas min| 'jig rten pa yi lam bzhin no||*, which can be translated as:

> In fact, the enlightenments of Buddhas
> Are not achieved by the Mahāyāna path;
> It does not have conceptions and signs,
> As do worldly paths.

Even if the *min* at the end of the third line is a scribal error for *yin*, as is suggested by the commentary, the two versions are sufficiently different to suggest that the translators of the text from the Sanskrit (the illustrious Atīśa and Tshul-khrims-rgyal-ba) may have worked from another edition than that provided by Gokhale and Thurman.

[41] P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.2—3.

[42] P 5256, Vol. 96, 72.5.8—73.1.1.

[43] P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.3—5.

[44] This is *Madhyamakahṛdaya*, IV.32. The Sanskrit is: *rajvāṃ sarpa iti bhrānter yathā trastasya kasyacit* | *laṭākularajjujñānaṃ pratipakṣo 'pi jāyate* ||. For the Tibetan, see P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.5—6.

[45] P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.1.6—2.1.

[46] This gloss is provided by Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan in his *Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor* (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Saying Press, 1964), *dbu ma* 33b2.

[47] P 5256, Vol. 96, 73.2.1—3.4.

[48] 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *Grub mtha'i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha' kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skong* (Musoorie, India: Dalama, 1962), ca 68a3—7 and Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, dbu 33a5—b2.

[49] *Tarkajvālā*, P 5256, Vol. 96, 34.4.5—6.

[50] P 5256, Vol. 96, 27.3.1—5.7. See also 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, *ca*, 71b3—4.

[51] *Prasannapadā*, p. 351.

[52] *Prasannapadā*, pp. 351—2.

[53] *Prasannapadā*, p. 353.

[54] *Prasannapadā*, pp. 352—53.

[55] Louis de la Vallée Poussin, ed., *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti*, Bibliotheca Buddhica IX (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), pp. 17, 19. This edition will be referred to in subsequent references as *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

[56] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 18.

[57] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, pp. 19—20.

[58] Cited at *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 20. The Sanskrit is: *skandhagrāho yāvadasti tāvadevāhamityapi* | *ahaṃkāre sati punaḥ karma janma tataḥ punaḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Madhayamakaśāstra of Nāgārjuna* (Darbhanga, India: Mithila Institute, 1960), p. 298.

[59] Cited at *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 21. The Sanskrit is: *sukhe saṃyogatṛṣṇaivaṃ naiḥsvābhāvyātprahīyate* | *duḥkhe viyogatṛṣṇā ca paśyataṃ muktirityataḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., p. 308.

[60] Cited at *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 21. The Sanskrit is: *bodhisattvo 'pi dṛṣṭvaivaṃ saṃbodhau niyato mataḥ* | *kevalaṃ tvasya kāruṇyādā bodherbhavasaṃtatiḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., p. 308.

[61] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 22.

[62] Cited at *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 23. The Sanskrit is: *na bodhisattvapraṇidhirna caryāpariṇāmanā* | *utkāḥ śrāvakayāne 'smādbodhisattvaḥ kutastataḥ* || *bodhicaryāpratiṣṭhārthaṃ na sūtre bhāṣitaṃ vacaḥ* | *bhāṣitaṃ ca mahāyāne grāhyamarumādivacakṣaṇaiḥ* ||. See P. L. Vaidya, ed., p. 310.

[63] The Sanskrit of the stanza from the *Lokātītastava* is: *animittam anāgamya mokṣo nāsti tvam uktavān* | *atas tvayā mahāyāne tat sākalyena deśitam* || For Sanskrit and Tibetan editions of the text as well as an English translation, see Christian Lindtner, *Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982), pp. 128—139. The entire passage translated is found at *Madhyamakāvatāra*, pp. 22—3.

[64] This point is made by Tsong-kha-pa in his commentary to the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. See his *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Saying Press, 1973),

pp. 65—67. Tsong-kha-pa also takes up the question of whether *śrāvakas* understand emptiness in his *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), pp. 152—55. Tsong-kha-pa's commentary on the first five chapters of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* has been translated by Jeffrey Hopkins in *Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism* (Valois, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1980), pp. 93—230. Tsong-kha-pa's *Legs bshad snying po* has been translated by Robert A. F. Thurman in *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the "Essence of True Eloquence"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[65] P 5265, Vol. 98, 182.4.3.

[66] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, pp. 301—2.

[67] Tsong-kha-pa provides an explanation of what it means for *śrāvakas* to have a complete understanding of the selflessness of phenomena while not meditating on that selflessness completely at *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, pp. 67—8.

[68] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 253.

[69] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 264.

[70] Ngag-dbang-dpal-ldan, *dbu*, 33a3—8.

[71] *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 393. Candrakīrti does not explicitly equate the latent afflictions with the obstructions to omniscience as 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa suggests. The latent afflictions that Candrakīrti discusses here seem quite close to those described by Lamotte. Candrakīrti even mentions the Arhat, formerly a monkey, who jumps about in trees.

[72] See Lindtner, p. 11. The most controversial among his list is probably the *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*, which Ruegg (*The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, pp. 104—5) ascribes to Nāgārjuna II.

[73] lCang-skya-rol-pa'i rdo-rje, p. 285.

[74] See Lindtner, p. 206. Also cited by Tsong-kha-pa, *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, pp. 62—3. Whether ascribable to Nâgârjuna or not, the same point is made in the *Dharmadhâtustava* (1) which says:

> Obeisance to the *dharmadhātu*
> That abides definitely in all beings;
> When it is not thoroughly known
> One revolves in the three existences.

See P 2010, Vol. 46, 31.3.7—8. For a study of this text, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Le *Dharmadhâtustava* de Nâgârjuna," *Études Tibétaines dédiées à la Mémoire de Marcelle Lalou* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneueve, 1971), pp. 448—471.

[75] The Sanskrit is: *vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate| paramārthamanāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate||*. See *Prasannapadā*, p. 494.

[76] See Lindtner, p. 102.

[77] P 5265, Vol. 98, 173.1.1—3.

[78] See Lindtner, p. 140.

[79] See Lindtner, p. 188.

[80] *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, p. 62.

[81] Tsong-kha-pa identifies the "us" as Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas and says that it does not refer to all followers of the Hīnayāna. See his *rTsa shes tik chen / dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bshad rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), p. 323.

[82] Tsong-kha-pa, *rTsa shes tik chen*, p. 323.

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Middlebury College,
Middlebury, VT 05753, U.S.A.

BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

ŚĀBDABODHA AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE-REPRESENTATION IN SANSKRIT

I

Śābdabodha has been accepted by the Naiyāyikas as a separate type of *pramā* (= Knowledge). Accordingly, the most efficient causal factor (*sādhakatama*) that generates such a pramā (the heard sentence in this case) is a *pramāṇa*. In this regard *śābdabodha* in Nyāya is on a par with perception and inference although it must also be distinguished from them. The idea is that the knowledge episode that is arrived at through speech, i.e., *śabda*, has a unique status distinct from a perceptual episode or an episode of knowledge through inference based on evidence.

What is presupposed here is a 'causal' mechanism ('causal' in an extended sense, for we are talking about a mental episode of a subject as its end-product). *Śabda* stands for human speech and hence for linguistic utterances. Such utterances are usually made by a speaker, a person who is a participant in a linguistic community. The mechanism can be understood on the basis of the following considerations. 1. The speaker emits sounds which are identifiable as a linguistic utterance. 2. This is done to communicate some knowledge or information to a hearer. 3. The hearer is a participant in the same linguistic community (i.e., he has linguistic competence). 4. The utterance must be that of a sentence which consists of words, sometimes a word and a suffix. (It can consist of a single word in English but that word would be a one-word sentence). 5. The hearer has auditory perception of each word in the utterance. 6. The hearer, as a consequence of 3 and 5, is reminded of the meanings/objects/things associated with each word. 7. The hearer then acquires knowledge of the connected meaning communicated by the utterance. (The hearer thus comes to know what the speaker wants him to be informed of by the utterance.) 8. Several auxiliary factors or episodes of knowledge are worth mentioning to explain how the final knowledge is reached as the end-product.

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8a. The words must be mutually related (syntactically) to constitute a linguistic sentence. Call it syntactic expectancy, for one word or one element 'expects' another word to form together an independent linguistic utterance. This ensures indirectly the grammatical acceptability of the sentence uttered. Words are *expected* to be grammatically tied; an analytic list of necessary words and suffixes will not do. 8b. The meanings of the word-elements must fit, or be compatible with, each other and the hearer must have some awareness of such compatibility or at least, he must not be aware of any incompatibility or lack of fitness. Call this the 'fitness' condition. 'Fire' and 'dampness' are not compatible, neither are 'pigs' and 'fly'. Another way of putting the same point is to say that if the hearer knows that pigs (the meaning of 'pigs') and fly (the meaning of 'fly') do not fit he would not have any *śābdabodha*, any language-generated knowledge from the utterance 'pigs fly'. 8c. Word elements must be spatio-temporarily proximate to each other so that the hearer will be able to discern the togetherness of the two or more word-elements. Call this *āsatti*, physical proximity. 8d. If some word in the sentence is ambiguous (usually has two or more meanings) the hearer should be able to make an intelligent guess about the speaker's intention from the context, the situation of utterance, etc. Thus, ambiguities can sometimes be resolved as in 'Please, bring me *saindhava*' uttered during a meal by a speaker. 'Saindhava' can either mean 'a horse' or 'some salt'. Obviously the latter meaning is intended by the speaker, as the context no doubt indicates.[1]

II

In the above analysis of the 'causal' mechanism, the utterance triggers off the process. The knowledge of the word in the hearer (derived from hearing) is the efficient causal factor ('instrument') for the final (hearer's) knowledge of the meaning of the uttered sentence. The final piece of knowledge (called a *pramā*, also a *śābdabodha*) is produced through another intermediate factor called *vyāpāra* 'function' or 'operation', which is in this case the resulting remembrance of the meaning of the individual words from the auditory perception of the words. The theory is that an efficient causal factor (an 'instrument' =

karaṇa) needs an intermediate factor (called *vyāpāra*) to produce the end-product (*phala*, in this case a pramā).[2]

The following *skeletal* causal model is pre-supposed. We write with a pen. The pen is an 'instrument' (the most efficient causal factor) for the end-product, writing on the paper. But besides the agent (the writer, who is not considered in this skeletal account), the pen needs to be in physical contact with the paper to produce writing. Such contact with the paper is its *vyāpāra* 'operation' or 'function' or 'intermediate causal factor'. This intermediate causal factor owes its origin to (is *caused* by) the pen and at the same time causes the writing (the final result) to come about.

Hence here is the skeletal causal model:

$$(I + V) \rightarrow R,$$

where 'I' stands for the 'instrumental cause', 'V' for the intermediate *vyāpāra*, and 'R' for the end-product.

The above model is applied to explain the origin of any mental event, especially the cognitive events we call knowledge-episodes. In the case of perception, the sensory faculty is the 'instrument'. What is *instrumental* to generate an episode of knowledge (a *pramā*) is called an epistemic means (*pramāṇa*). Thus the sense-faculty is called *pramāṇa* in the case of perception and the sense-object connection is the intermediate *vyāpāra*. The end product (R) is the perceptual knowledge. In the case of inference, the knowledge of concomitance or pervasion between the evidence or reason and the inferable feature (*sādhya*) is called the *pramāṇa* (I), and the combined knowledge (technically called a *parāmarśa*, a judgement having a special structure) that the particular evidence in question is such an evidence as is pervaded by the inferable feature is called the intermediate factor or *vyāpāra* (V). The knowledge of concomitance is usually derived from memory. It is usually a knowledge of the connection between universal features or sortals. But the final premise which gives, i.e., produces, the inferential conclusion — the final episode of knowledge derived from an immediately preceding knowledge-episode — must be of the form: The particular case (P) contains this particular evidence, i.e., instantiation of the same evidence which is pervaded by (concomitant with) the feature we intend to infer. Thus the instantiation of 'the model' 'I + V → R' in the case of perception is

(The sense-organ + the sense-object connection)
→ Perceptual Knowledge

and in the case of inference

(Knowledge of concomitance + *Parāmarśa*) → inference.

The same applied to *śābdabodha* is given as follows:

(Knowledge of the word-elements + Knowledge of their meanings)
→ (hearer's) knowledge-episode from *Śabda*.

The above account is based mainly on Gaṅgeśa and Mathurānātha. To avoid unnecessary complications, I have omitted references to many minor details as well as the difference of opinion among the Naiyāyikas regarding such details. For example, some would argue that the most immediate factor (e.g. the sense-object contact in the case of perception) should be called the most efficient factor, i.e., the 'instrument' (and hence the *pramāṇa*). We need not go into such details here.

III

In the case of the production of the hearer's knowledge from the hearing of the utterance (i.e., *śābdabodha*) several other factors demand attention. The hearer's knowledge of the word-meanings from the utterances of the words is generated according to the following psychological rule of association and memory. The hearer is a competent language user, and he is acquainted with the connection between word and meaning. This acquaintance or cognition may be called *šakti-jñāna* or *vṛtti-jñāna*. The said connection is called *vṛtti*, and an awareness of it would be called *vṛtti-jñāna*. The general nomological rule is that whenever such cognition of the connection between the two items is present, a cognition of one will generate remembrance of the other. Hence if words are cognized, meanings are presented to the hearer. This is therefore noted as an auxiliary factor.

It is easy to see why this factor is necessary. If the hearer hears a word, say 'a pot' and comprehends its meaning, and then remembers through association, another item, say the space (since he recalls that the pot is always in that space), he may then have an awareness where the two items are computed as 'a pot in a space'. But this would not be a knowledge derived from any linguistic expression or *śabda*, for the second item, the space, was presented in a different way, and not as the meaning of the word '(the) space' by the utterance of the word(s) '(the) space'. The above factor is noted so as to ensure that the resulting knowledge is solely generated from linguistic expressions through our cognition of their meanings.

Some further considerations enter in the account of the origin of speech-generated knowledge. Naiyāyikas note four further auxiliaries, which are also necessary. Even if the bits of knowledge of the word-meanings are presented by the knowledge of the words in the relevant manner, there must exist syntactic expectancy between the words uttered in sequence. In other words, words must be related to each other in the way they are made to relate in a given linguistic practice. There is syntactic expectancy between Word A and Word B, if the utterance of A cannot contribute to the knowledge of the sentence-meaning without being in combination with Word B. It follows that the utterances of words must follow an established linguistic practice, i.e., the grammar and syntax of a particular language. Some have said that syntactic expectancy is in fact the sequential order in which words and suffixes are arranged in a particular language following its rules of grammar and syntax (ānupūrvī = *ākāṅkṣā*). A sequence of word utterances that violates these established rules will not be potent enough to set the mechanism in action and produce the relevant hearer's knowledge. With such input, there is no output such as an episode of word-generated knowledge.

The words and inflections may be juxtaposed following the rules of grammar and syntax, but if they are juxtaposed at random in this way, the result may still be at times a nonsensical utterance such as 'Pigs fly' or 'Drink bananas'. These utterances lack semantic fitness or compatibility (*yogyatā*). Again, such utterances cannot be proper inputs for the *śābdabodha* mechanism. Thus the hearer's awareness of fitness, or more generally, his lack of awareness that the items do not fit, is a necessary factor, another auxiliary for language-generated knowledge *śābdabodha*.

The hearer should also have clear indication as to the spatio-temporal togetherness of the relevant words. This is ensured by the physical proximity of such words. If the two words, 'drink' and 'milk', are set apart spatio-temporally, or such words as 'eat' and 'rice' intervene, as in 'Drink Eat Milk Rice', the hearer will fail to get the message. The hearer's awareness of the meaning of this uninterrupted sequence of words is another auxiliary. This seeks to avoid to some extent the structural or constructional ambiguities of sentences.

Sometimes in a natural language, we have words with double or multiple meaning, the homonyms or homphones. In such cases, the context of utterances helps the hearer to resolve ambiguities and get at the meaning intended by the original speaker. An awareness of this is necessary. This is called *tātparya-jñāna*, awareness of the speaker's intention. If somebody asks for a pen while writing, it may be assumed that he intends (to get) a writing pen, not a play-pen or oxpen. Although it is not often obvious, an awareness of the speaker's intention can be a very general condition for *śābdabodha*, a key to interpreting any utterance made. Otherwise, a parrot's utterance may prompt us to action. Recorded messages do prompt us to action but that is because we hear them as *spoken* by the original speaker, not by the tape-recorder.

IV

So far, I have delineated the maintstream view in the Navya-Nyāya tradition ignoring any difference of opinion and controversies within the Nyāya tradition or even between the Nyāya schools and others. My concern here has been to give a causal account of the origin of the mental episode called *śābdabodha*, i.e., the hearer's knowledge from the linguistic utterance, underlining the usual nomological connection between mental events. "*Śābdabodha*" is also used, by extension, to refer to the description of the content of the hearer's relevant knowledge. Given a sentence-utterance, one may ask: What is its *śābdabodha*? The answer is presumably given by describing the knowledge-episode which is produced in the hearer by the utterance. In this way, an instance of *śābdabodha* is given by the description of exactly the message contained in and communicated through the utterance of the sentence. This description corresponds very roughly to what we sometimes call a 'paraphrase', provided such paraphrasing is done following a definite set of 'translational' rules. The idea is to represent the meaning of each word along with its semantic connection with others in the cluster. Implicit relations are thereby made explicit and the meaning intended by the speaker of the original sentences is supposed to be rendered unambiguous. This process is variously called *śābdabodha, anvayabodha* or *vākyārtha-bodha* (knowledge of the 'meaning' of the sentence).[3]

I have used the word 'meaning' here with some trepidation. It is clear from the above that the Naiyāyikas along with many others in India were trying to articulate the hearer's meaning. Meaning, as the modern adage goes, is not in the 'heads of the speakers', nor is it in the 'heads of the hearers'. In actuality the hearers at times may hear but not fully comprehend what is said. What goes on in the 'inner world' of the individual hearer is not presumably accessible to us. We therefore conceive here an 'ideal hearer' who is also a competent language-user. The idea is that the structured awareness or knowledge-episode that is supposed to arise (being caused in the above manner) in the 'ideal hearer' is what is shared by all language-users and hence inter-subjectively available. The knowledge-episodes arising in all individual hearers are distinct events, but on this theory all such events share the same structured content, provided the original causal mechanism is triggered off by the utterance of the same sentence in the same or similar situations (by the same speaker). In fact, the ideal hearer is like a computing machine, where the input would be the utterance and the output would be a corresponding uniquely structured knowledge-episode. In conceiving such an 'ideal hearer' we have to exclude obviously a number of other variable factors that may inhibit the functioning of the said machine. The Naiyāyikas have claimed in this way that an account or analysis (or structural description) of the object-complex grasped by the knowledge-episode would be an account of the 'meaning' of the sentence. Hence the equation: *śābdabodha* = *vākyārthabodha*. The 'meaning' is the object-complex related in a given manner that has been grasped by the knowledge of the hearer when he heard the sentence uttered.

The said knowledge-episode is qualificative in character. Its structure is assumed to be attributive-substantive in form (that is, it is in 'qualifier-qualificand' model), and hence the structural description seeks to identify what qualifies what. If x is qualified by y then x can be called the qualificand, the substantive, and y the qualifier, the attribute. The lexical items along with the grammatico-syntactic elements of the uttered sentence are mapped onto the object-complex of the said knowledge-episode following some conventional rules of mapping. There is however difference of opinion among philosophers as to which word in the sentence would contribute its meaning-element as the chief qualificand, the chief substantive. The chief qualificand is the nucleus around which the other elements would gather as qualifier, qualifier of the qualifier, the bonding agent between a qualifier and a qualificand and so on.

The Grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas believe that the principal element in a sentence is the verb itself and hence the part of the meaning-complex of the verbal expression should be the chief qualificand. In Sanskrit, the verbal expression has two main parts, the verbal stem and the verbal suffix. E.g. *pacati* (cooks) = (*a*)*ti*. According to the Vaiyākaraṇas (Grammarians), the meaning of the verbal stem (e.g. *pac*) is dominant, and therefore this should be selected as the principal qualificand while a structural description of the *śābdabodha* is in order.[4]

"Rāmaḥ annaṃ pacati (= Rāma cooks rice)."

It should first be analysed into the constituent lexical and grammatical elements (altogether six such elements here) as

"Rāma + s/anna + am/pac + (a)ti"/

Here 'ti' which is technically called *ākhyāta* here, means *agency* which qualifies the meaning of the verbal stem 'pac', i.e., the cooking or the action conducive to cooking. In fact the verbal stem is said to have both meanings, the result (*phala* = cooking) and the activity conducive to such result. The meaning of the second inflection, '*am*', in the nominal stem, '*anna*', is *karma*, the accusative, i.e., the *substratum* of accusativeness, and this is connected with the meaning of the stem itself by the relation of identity. I.e., the *substratum* denoted by 'am' is identical with rice (the meaning of 'anna'). This complex is then connected (being the accusative) with the meaning of the verbal stem, cooking = softening of the rice grain as well as the operation or activity conducive to such softening. The *ākhyāta*, i.e., '*ti*', has three meanings apart from meaning agency: a substratum, a number (singular), and a particular time (present time). The one with the first inflection, Rāma, is connected with the substratum of agency by the relation of identity, the number also goes along with it, and the present time qualifies the operation or activity, one of the meanings of the verbal stem. Besides, I have already noted that the meaning of 'ti' qualifies the meaning of '*pac*'. Hence the description of the content of the Śābdabodha, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa, is as follows:

I. It is the activity, which is presently taking place, which is tied to the substratum which is identical with one (single) Rāma, and which is conducive to the softening located in the substratum which is identical with rice.[5]

In the above presentation, I have followed the old Vaiyākaraṇas. The New Vaiyākaraṇas would have a slightly different structural description. Roughly the New School would say:

Ia. The activity of cooking occurring in present time has an agent (qualified by Rāma as its agent) which is identical with Rāma and qualified by rice which is connected with it by way of being its object.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the meaning of the verbal suffix or ākhyāta, not of the stem, should be the principal qualificand. This meaning is identified by the Mīmāṃsakas as *bhāvanā* 'making something to be, to become or to happen'. Āpadeva has defined *bhāvanā* as "*bhāvitur bhāvanānukūlo bhāvaka-vyāpāraviśeṣaḥ*".[6] It is argued that in each sentence there is a verb, and in each verb there is an implicit verb *bhū*, to be, to become. When something becomes, that which happens or becomes is called *bhavitṛ* "become-er" and it presupposes something else that makes it become, and the second item is called *bhāvaka* or *bhāvayitṛ* "maker of becoming". *Bhāvanā* is the operation or function of the maker conducive to his making whatever he makes. Bhāvanā is therefore the making function. This is expressed by the ākhyāta, '*ti*' in '*pacati*', and according to the Mīmāṃsakas, this meaning is the chief qualificand which the action of cooking qualifies as a qualifier. In fact, the action of cooking becomes the object (*karma*) or the instrument (*karaṇa*) of the making function (bhāvanā). 'Pacati' (cooks) is paraphrased as '*pākaṃ karoti*' ('makes cooking'), and "*annaṃ pacati*" (cooks rice) is paraphrased as '*pākena annaṃ karoti*' (makes rice by cooking'). Here the meaning of the verbal stem takes the role of a *kāraka*, a 'maker', an auxiliary to making, just as the meanings of the nominal stems are (and hence they take *kāraka* inflections explicitly).

Consider the sentence:

> "Rāmaḥ kāṣṭhena annaṃ pacati"
> (Rāma cooks rice with fire-wood)

The *initial* paraphrase on this view would be:

> "Rāmaḥ kāṣṭhena pākena annaṃ karoti"
> (Rāma makes rice by cooking by firewood).

The final structural description of the knowledge would be

II. It is a making function, which is happening at present, which is done through the instrumentality of cooking (i.e. qualified by cooking), which (cooking) has rice as its object-goal (*karma*) and is done through the instrumentality of firewood, and it is the making function qualified by Rāma as its agent.[7]

To avoid complications I have omitted the mention of singularity or singleness (expressed by the singular suffixes) in such items as the *karma* (rice), and the agent (Rāma). I have also avoided complications in the English presentation by not giving the detailed analysis of the connection between such items as making function and cooking, cooking and rice, cooking and firewood.

The Naiyāyikas however give a different analysis, for they believe that the word with the first ending (*prathamā vibhakti*) should be given primacy in a sentence and hence its meaning should be selected as the chief qualificand. All the other meaning elements including that of the verbal stem or verbal suffix should be connected with this element as its qualifiers. To use an imagery, according to the Vaiyākaraṇas, the meaning of the verbal stem, and according to the Mimāṃsakas, the meaning of the final verb suffix, should be at the centre around which all the other meaning-elements should cluster. According to the Naiyāyikas, the meaning of the word with the first ending, (usually the nominative or the subject) should be at the centre around which other elements should rotate.

The meaning of '*ti*' in *pacati* on this view is the effort, a property, which can be located in the agent who cooks. Udayana in *Nyāyakusumāñjali* gives the initial paraphrase of '*pacati*' ('cook') as *pākānukūla-vartamāna-yatna-vān*' ('possesses effort at present conducive to cook').[8] The Naiyāyikas in this regard have sometimes been followed by the Ālaṃkārikas and Vedāntins.

Consider the sentence:

"Rāmaḥ mahānase kāṣṭhana annaṃ pacati"
(In the kitchen Rāma cooks rice with firewood.)

The structural description of the relevant hearer's knowledge (generated in the above manner by the utterance) would be:

III. It is Rāma who is qualified by the effort that is conducive to cooking, which cooking has rice as its object-goal (i.e. qualified by the 'object-hood' in rice), which is qualified by instrumentality in firewood, and it is the same Rāma who is qualified by being located in the kitchen.

The last clause can also be written as

IIIa. ... which cooking is qualified by being located in the kitchen.[9]

In fact IIIa. would be more in accordance with the grammatical convention according to which the locative is a *kāraka* which provides the location of the action. (See definition of the location in Pāṇini.)[10]

The above way of representing the knowledge-content is admittedly very cumbersome and tenuous especially in its English version. In Sanskrit however, part of the complexity is resolved by natural nominalizations, compound-formation, etc., which are very common features of the Sanskrit language. To represent clearly the structure or formation of this rather artificial description of the knowledge-content, we may use a device which I had suggested in 1968 (*The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation*).[11] Use 'Q' for qualification-connector and read '$Q(ab)$' as 'a (is) qualified by b'. Allow the following formulas:

(i) $Q\,(ab)\;Q\,(ac) = Q\,(a(bc))$.
(ii) $Q\,(ab)\;\mathrm{Q}\,(bc) = Q\,(a\;\mathrm{Q}\,(bc))$.

Read (i) as 'a (is) qualified by both b and c' and (ii) as 'a (is) qualified by b which is qualified by c'. Using this convention we may represent IIIa. as

IIIa. $Q\ (a\ Q\ (e\ Q\ (e(rfk))$

Where 'a = Rāma', 'e = effort', 'c = cooking', 'r = rice', 'f = firewood' and 'k = kitchen'. The above structural representation both reveals and conceals. We have used a simple connector-function, a two-place predicate 'Q'. But in each case the specific nature of this connector is different and hence it needs to be spelled out in each case to reveal the structure in full. In the fully explicit Sanskrit representation, each connector is articulated in language. For example, the connector between cooking and rice is the objecthood that is resident (*nisṭha*) in rice and conditioned (*nirūpita*) by cooking. When a deeper analysis is required, it would be represented by saying that cooking is connected with objecthood and objecthood is connected with rice. Writing 'o' for 'objecthood' we can write:

"$Q\ (c\ r,\ Ro)$.

and read it as "Rice qualifies cooking through objecthood connector."

These 'connectors' or 'mixers' between the meaning-elements are usually of two types: non-identity and identity. Non-identity has various sub-categories, owner-owned (represented usually by the genitive), location-locatable (represented by locative suffixes), objecthood, goalhood, contenthood (all represented by the accusative suffix in connection with various verbs, 'cooking', 'going' and 'knowing'), etc. In fact the connectors are regarded as the semantic counterpart of various syntactic-grammatical elements represented in the surface structure of the sentence. Identity is usually the connector between the meaning-elements where two or more words are appositional (same endings or *vibhakti*).

In the above analysis, the following correlation between the linguistic elements and the corresponding components of the knowledge-content of the hearer has been made;

Linguistic elements	*Components of knowledge*
The word "Rāma(+s)"	Rāma

The verbal suffix *ti*	The Effort (= kṛti)
The stem "pac +"	The action of cooking
"Mahānasa +"	kitchen
The affix (locative) "-e"	location or occurrenthood
"*kāṣṭha* +"	firewood
The instrumental suffix "-ena"	instrumentality
"Anna +"	rice
The accusative "am"	objecthood
The affix "s" in "Rāmaḥ"	The meaning of the stem itself (*Prātipadikārtha*).

V

Both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaraṇas (also the Mīmāṃsakas) have given arguments to support their respective positions. The details of these arguments I shall omit here. Only one argument may be mentioned. This is based upon the supposed relationship between a sentence with a sub-sentence.

Consider: "Look, the deer runs = Paśya mṛgo dhāvati"

The Vaiyākaranas argue that since this is to be treated as a single sentence with one principal qualificand in the content of the verbal knowledge, their own analysis with the meaning of the verbal stem as the principal element provides a better structural description.

A. It is the seeing (by you) which is the object of command, and which has the running as its object, which running belongs to the deer as its agent.[12]

Here since the object (*karman*) is expressed by a verbal stem (*dhāvana* = run), and not by a nominal stem, one would not expect a second ending "*am*" (those endings are specifically meant for nominal stems). The proto-analysis of the Naiyāyikas would have been

A.* The deer is qualified by the effort conducive to running, and your being the location of seeing is the object of command.

Here clearly we have two sentences joined by 'and', and the two components are independent of each other. But this is counter-intuitive. For intuitively this sentence is to be treated as a single sentence with a subordinate clause or subsentence. If however the first part is made dependent upon the latter part, the deer would undoubtedly be the object (of seeing) and hence and word for deer would have to be inflected with the second (accusative) ending.

The Naiyāyikas do not think this to be a serious argument. For the above sentence can also be explained on their theory as one single sentence with one subordinate clause.

B. You are the locus of a commanded seeing, which seeing has such deer as its object, as is qualified by the effort conducive to running.[13]

Here the entire sentence (sub-sentence) "the deer runs" conveys the object of seeing, not simply the expression for the deer, and therefore there is no scope for the second (accusative) ending to appear as an inflection for the sub-sentence. Such inflection to be sure appears in the case of nominal stems only.

VI

I shall conclude by noting a few arguments of the Naiyāyikas in support of language-generated knowledge as a separate knowledge, distinct from perception or inference. In other words, a question generally arises: Why should the hearer's relevant knowledge from the utterance not be a special case of inference or even a case of perception? Why should it be regarded as another category of knowledge-episodes, called 'verbal knowledge'? Both the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists have settled for inference. That is, for them this so-called 'verbal knowledge' or speech-generated knowledge is only a special case of inference. But the Naiyāyikas find it important to distinguish verbal knowledge from both perception and inference. I shall note only two arguments here which will be based on Jagadīśa.[14]

Jagadīśa says that the 'verbal' knowledge or *śābdabodha* or the knowledge-episode arising in the hearer from the utterance of a sentence has always a *determinate* structure that constitutes it (*niyantritārtha*). This determination is a causal determination, the structure of the object-complex being uniquely determined by the particular sentence that is uttered. In the case of perceptual knowledge such unique determination is absent. For example, consider a perceptual situation where a cat is sitting on the mat. The object-complex which produces the perceptual awareness has a 'neutral' structure, a cat, a mat and a connection. The resulting perceptual knowledge may have either of the two forms: "The cat is ON the mat" or "The mat is UNDER the cat". The verbal expressions of the perceptual knowledge reveal different structures. But the utterance of "The cat is ON the mat" would produce in the hearer a knowledge-episode with a determinate structure. It is the cat qualified by the occurrence-in-the-mat. From the utterance of "The mat is UNDER the cat" there will be a different knowledge-episode in the hearer.

The same feature, that of having a structure uniquely determined by the particular utterance, distinguishes language-generated knowledge from inference also. In inference, the final knowledge-episode is produced by what is called a *parāmarśa*, a combined judgement based upon an awareness of the presence of evidence or *liṅga* or *hetu*, and another awareness (knowledge) of its concomitance with the inferable feature, the *sādhya*. The combined judgement may take either of the two forms (revealing two different structures of the object-complexes of the knowledge):

> "The hill has smoke which is concomitant with fire"

or

> "There is such smoke on the hill as is concomitant with fire."

These judgements lead to knowledge-episodes having two different structures (hence they are distinguishable).

> "The hill has fire"

or

> "There is fire on the hill".

Although the verbal expressions of these two knowledge-episodes imply each other, the knowledge-episodes themselves are different as episodes. Hence the structural content of the inferential knowledge-episode is not uniquely determined by the evidence or the inferential mark, *liṅga*. From the evidence adduced, we may infer either "The hill has fire" or "There is fire on the hill." But from the uttered sentence "The hill has fire" there will arise a verbal knowledge-episode with a uniquely determined structure. Thus, arguably, a śābdabodha, the hearer's knowledge, has a distinct feature and it is distinguished from perception and inference. But of course, if we wish to put little importance on this feature of having a uniquely determined structural content, the distinction between inference and *śābdabodha* may be eliminated.

NOTES

* This was presented at a Conference in Bangalore, December 1986. I wish to thank Dr. A. Chakrabarti, who read an earlier draft, for criticisms and suggestions.

[1] All these terms have been explained by modern writers in various ways. See B. K. Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, Delhi, 1985, chapter 5.

[2] This was first discussed in Matilal's 'The Doctrine of Karaṇa in Grammar and Logic', *Ganganath Jha Research Journal*, 1961; the main points are incorporated in Matilal, 1985.

[3] Gaṅgeśa, *Tattvacintamaṇi*, *Śabda-khaṇḍa*, Calcutta.

[4] See also Matilal, 'The Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (*vākya*)', *Foundations of Language*, 1967.

[5] Vartamānakālīna-Rāmābhinnakaṛtrniṣṭha-annābhinna-karma-niṣṭha-viklttyanukūla-vyāpāraḥ.

[6] Āpadeva, *Mimāṃsā-nyāyaprakāśa*, ed. F. Edgerton.

[7] Rāma-niṣṭha-vartamāna-kālīna-kāṣṭha-karaṇaka-anna-karmaka-pākānukūla-bhāvanā.

[8] Udayana, *Nyāyakusumañjali*, Chapter 3.

[9] Mahānasādhikaraṇaka-anna-karmaka-kāṣṭhniṣṭha-karaṇatāka-pākānukūla-kṛti-mān Rāmaḥ.

[10] "adhāro' dhikaraṇam" — is explained as "katṛ-karma-vyavahitaḥ kriyāyāḥ ādhāraḥ".

[11] B. K. Matilal, *The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Cambridge (Mass), 1968, Part 1.

[12] Vartamāna-kālīna-mṛga-niṣṭha-dhāvana-karmaka-darśanānukūla-vyāpāraḥ (tvan-niṣṭha).

[13] dhāvanānukūla-vyāpāra-van-mṛga-karmaka-anujñā-viṣayibhūta-darśanānukūla-vyāpāra-vān tvam.

[14] Jagadīsá, *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* (ed. M. Nyayacharya, Calcutta, 1984).

PIERRE BASSO

LANGUAGE FOR A CAUSAL CONDITIONAL LOGIC FOUNDATIONS AND OBJECTIVES

Is it Possible to Formalize Dependent Origination?

MAHĀYĀNIST FOUNDATIONS OF CCL

An important problem involved in the axiomatisation of logical systems is that of the notion of existence. All formal logics known today are based on the notion of predicate or of predicative relation to a given substance.

Formal language is therefore based on the notion of *a priori* being, the formal always expresses a semantic process. Consequently, it is not surprising that upon that score, the mathematical basis of these languages should be set theory.

According to Tarski,[1] the proposition "snow is white" is true because it designates an existing state of things. Predicate logic rests entirely on the more or less implicit supposition that objects and their predicates are real: "snow" is a once-and-for-all-objectively-determined substance to which is linked the quality of "whiteness".

In other words, any predicate logic proceeds from the more or less implicit *a priori* reality of existing essences.

The fact that we treat, in some axiomatic systems,[2] existence as a predicate applying, or not, to objects according to their nature, makes no difference, for the predicate "existence" which is referred to here, is used only to distinguish between real and fictitious things, i.e. with or without empirical reference, while no mention is made as to why and how the notion of reality is elaborated.

The main purpose of what I will call Conditional Causal Logic (CCL) will precisely consist in including this problem in its language. The doctrinal foundations of such a non-predicate logic — this title will be justified later on — are grounded in the so-called theory of Dependent Origination[3] which constitutes the framework of all Buddhist philosophical speculation in India and the Far East.

This CCL will be based essentially on the tenets of the branch of

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Buddhism called, for historical reasons, "Great Vehicle" (*Mahāyāna*) and more particularly on the following two schools: the Madhyamaka represented by its founder Nāgārjuna (IInd or IIIrd century A.D.) and by Candrakīrti (VIIth century A.D.) one of the most famous inheritors of the master's thought, and secondly the school of Vijñānavādin logicians whose greatest representatives were Dignāga (VIth century A.D.), Dharmakīrti (VIIth century A.D.), Dharmottara (IXth century A.D.), and later Ratnakīrti (XIth century A.D.).

It is impossible here to give an exhaustive account of the Mahāyānist schools' multiple tenets. The best I can do is to invite the reader to refer to the works of such eminent contemporary specialists on Buddhism as L. de La Vallée-Poussin, Th. Stcherbatsky, E. Lamotte, J. May, D. S. Ruegg, and G. Bugault.

Briefly speaking, according to Dependent Origination, a thing does not exist *per se*, it depends on something else to exist: "this being, that appears".[4] Mahāyānist causality has no ontological character whatsoever, it is not a relation of substances but a purely structural law of existence.

As the famous saying of the Indian master Nāgārjuna goes, "emptiness is Dependent Origination". It is worth noting by the way that the modern, philosophical or scientific, meanings of such words as "empty" and "emptiness" would certainly not have been accepted by the Indian masters of the Mahāyāna. The Sanskrit word *śūnya* can hardly be translated by the word "emptiness" commonly used in European languages, "insubstantial" or "non-substantial"[5] appear to be more appropriate words to convey this idea of a purely relational existence, if by substance one refers to something endowed with aseity,[6] i.e., an autonomous type of existence which would not depend on any efficient cause.

The discourse of the Madhyamaka, and more particularly the Prāsangika branch which best represents its original thought,[7] does not proceed from any postulate. It does not claim to be a particular philosophy, and never has made such a claim. It is — and it only means to be — a critical method applied to philosophical systems. Rather than proposing a corrosive nihilism,[8] this method offers to examine, or better, to "X-ray" any given thesis according to a de-substantializing dialectic.

We will see below what is meant by this expression. Let us simply say that this criticism aims, first and foremost, to question what has been called, following Stcherbatsky, the "ontological consistency" of the thesis. Without going into details, this term must be interpreted analogically rather than identically to the "consistency" of a formal system: the latter focuses on the truth-value of propositions, whereas the former is related to quite general systems and is concerned with the notion of existence of their fundamental concepts.[9]

To conclude, and this is the essential point at this stage, the dialectic of the Madhyamaka is its whole philosophy.

The other school in which we are interested, that of the Vijñānavāda, often called the idealist school, postulates the primary reality of "self-knowing clear Mindedness".[10] Even if its protagonists used the dialectic as brilliantly as the masters of the Madhyamaka, it was only a tool demonstrative of their primary thesis, i.e., the ontological preeminence of Knowledge-in-itself.

There can be no question here, of course, of looking into the effective content of this notion of "self-knowing clear Mindedness", especially as it is an idealistic monism postulating *a priori* the originally synthetic non-differentiated unity of the apperception from which stem, *a posteriori*, the subject and the object, rather than a tenet establishing the thinking subject as the primary datum.

Consequently, as regards this Vijñānavāda school, I will take into account its methodology of logical construction of the world, to use the Carnapean formula, conceived by the masters of a more specific branch of the school, that of the logicians.[11] According to them, any universal is an *a posteriori*, given that the primary datum is the particular, by which one should not understand "a particular object" but rather the instantaneous, the borderline a-conceptual point, the very basis from which can be elaborated the notion of thing.

I will come back in more detail to the methodologies of the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavādin logicians. Suffice it to say now that these two tenets can perfectly well be understood as formal methodologies although an essentialist terminology was used to put them into words.

The truth of this is confirmed concerning the Madhyamaka: when Candrakīrti deals with conditioned things as being defined by the triplet origination-duration-cessation: the origination in question is not an essence-origination, the cessation is not an essence-destruction, not the duration an essence-existentiation.[12]

Concerning Vijñānavādin logicians, none of the criticism levelled at their theory by the realists holds, if it is interpreted from a formal point of view: to consider mundane objects as stemming from causal series of event-points, is not an ontological thesis opposed to other theses of the same sort. The point-instant used as a reference falls short of any substantial concretion, it is purely formal, a pure insubstantiality from which the world of empirical experience organizes itself. Nothing is asserted as to the nature of reality-in-itself because, from the Mahāyānist point of view, any notion of substantiality is produced by mental activity.[13]

A MATHEMATICAL METAPHOR OF THE DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

To actually formalize their thought, the dialecticians of the Mahāyāna were lacking a conceptual tool of the type constituted by contemporary mathematical thought since the end of the XIXth century.

The idea of expressing the theory of non-substantiality by means of a mathematical terminology has stimulated several attempts by contemporary authors, the first of whom was H. Nakamura, a Japanese specialist in Indian philosophy, who became rightly aware that the Mahāyānist dialectic could be rendered in an axiomatic formulation.[14]

This article, which aroused a great deal of interest when it was published, opened a new line of research which inspired numerous subsequent works, and this study in particular, of course. Moreover, it is especially interesting, in a negative way perhaps, yet worth lingering on for a while, since it clearly reveals the inaptitude of the well-known logical patterns to put into correct axiomatic form the foundations of Mahāyānist thought.

Indeed, it is one thing to deal with mathematics, it is quite another to use metaphorical mathematics. Now, H. Nakamura's attempt, however worthy it may be, appears to be a metaphorical transcription of the Mahāyānist discourse rather than a true attempt to express mathematically Dependent Origination. To demonstrate this, it will be enough to take a typical example, such as that of the formal representation of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. According to Nakamura, it could be formulated as follows:[15]

$$(x, y) \wedge \mathscr{R}(x, y) \Rightarrow \sim(x \neq y) \wedge \sim(x = y)$$

This statement is supposed to express Nāgārjuna's famous formula: if between two objects called x and y there exists a relation of any sort, then x and y are neither equal nor unequal. This is purely and simply a misleading use of the conceptual content of the symbols.

If we confine ourselves to the pure formalism of predicate logic with equality, $(x \neq y)$ is an abbreviation for $\neg(x = y)$, i.e., not-$(x = y)$.

Two negation symbols have there been brought to the fore, the first "$\sim$" appearing in the formula of Dependent Origination, the second "$\neg$" meaning the negation of equality.

In a classical predicate calculus — and H. Nakamura's reasoning is situated in that perspective — only one negation operator is defined, so that "$\sim$" and "$\neg$" would have the same meaning. Furthermore, if it is a question of a bi-valued logic, then $(x = y)$ is true necessarily implies $(x \neq y)$ is false, and vice versa. In such a language equal "$=$" and unequal "$\neq$" have a strict meaning which cannot be altered with impunity.

From the perspective of a multi-valued logic, one could argue that $\sim(x \neq y)$ is not $(x = y)$, that between the truth of one and the falseness of the other can be found all the nuances of the probable. Very well, but such is not the problem of the Madhyamaka which, to my knowledge, never aimed at developing a theory of probable truth.

However, could the formula of Dependent Origination, given by Nakamura, be interpreted thus: if there exists a relation $\mathscr{R}$ between x and y one cannot demonstrate either the equality or the inequality of those two terms? But then, this formula should be considered according two levels each with a defined negator.

The first level is that of logical statements, symbolized by such letters as F, G, H for example, At that level, we have a negator "$\neg$" so that F true implies $\neg F$ false; e.g.: if $(x = y)$ is a true statement then $(x \neq y)$ is a false statement, and inversely.

The second level is that of the formal provability of a formula: one considers that to each F statement corresponds an $[F]$[16] formula and the provability of the $[F]$ formula will be written $Prov([F])$. The second operation negator "$\sim$" will only apply to that provability. In which case the formula of Dependent Origination as given by Nakamura, would be written:

$$\forall x \forall y \mathscr{R}(x, y) \Rightarrow \sim Prov([x = y]) \wedge \sim Prov([x \neq y])$$

It would also be necessary to demonstrate that, given some random statements, considering F, G, H, we have the following theorems:

- $Prov([F])$ if F is an axiom,
- $Prov([G]) \wedge Prov([G \rightarrow H]) \Rightarrow Prov([H])$.

This new expression of Dependent Origination would mean that if we consider x and y and any given relation $\mathscr{R}(x, y)$ then, in the given system, $(x = y)$ is not decidable,[17] i.e., there exists no possible demonstration of this equality.

However, one needs only to read the chapters of the Prasannapadā[18] where those notions of identity and difference are developed, to be convinced that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti were not concerned with whether the equality formula in such or such a formal system was decidable or not, but with the fact that the identity and difference considered are other operators taken from a logic different from predicate logic. It is a question of a relation of identity or difference between phenomenal natures rather than of formal identity or formal difference between formal variables, and consequently of the negation of all substantial realization of that identity or difference.

In conclusion, to return to the formula of Dependent Origination previously expressed, it has got to be one thing or the other: either "$=$" and "$\neq$" have their usual formal meaning and the above mentioned formula of the *pratītyasamutpāda* is absurd, or the use of those operators is only metaphorical and this mathematical expression is just an image without any efficient meaning since its significant value stands on a radically different field from that of its expression.

More recently, A. C. S. MacDermott[19] has tried to give a formal appearance to the notion of momentariness of existence which, in Buddhist scholasticism, is another way of expressing Dependent Origination. By writing the thing/predicate relation as a localisation of predicate f into object A, i.e., $0(f, A)$, this author really meant to point to the very specific way in which Mahāyānist logic deals with the notion of relation. But, from there onward, writing the momentariness of any entity A using the $0(\textit{momentariness}, A)$ formula[20] is only a metaphorical way of expressing the idea in question: the author deals with momentariness as if it was a predicate attributable, or not, to things whereas, according to all Buddhist schools and specially Mahāyānist ones, far from being a mere quality of existing things, it constitutes, in fact, the very foundation of their existence!

There lies, finally, the crux of the matter: all the attempts previously mentioned[21] constitute mere transcriptions of a discourse on non-substantiality into concepts arising from predicate logic.

Now such a process boils down to forgetting that, while the Mādhyamika dialectic uses a discourse whose structure remains within the framework of pure Aristotelician logic, this discourse is established in ordinary language as a meta-language, in order to describe a conceptual world which totally escapes the logic of meanings.

Nothing prevents, to a certain extent, the use of 0 to symbolize emptiness and 1 to symbolize existence, provided that one sees here only symbols indicating a world whose mathematics escape Boole's algebra through the definition of operators totally foreign to the latter. In particular we find a negation operator quite different from the one used in any propositional calculus and which is always used in the method of critical argumentation known as the tetralemma that we will examine in the following section.

LET US INTRODUCE SOME CONCEPTS OF CCL

However, before going any further in the explanation of this negator and its application to what is known as the tetralemma, we must define certain terms specific to CCL, which have often been given so far as mere indicators. For the purpose of notations, each word used as a specific term of CCL will be written in italics.

Substantiality — Considering a thing, or the concept of a thing, we call *substantialisation*[22] the fact of attributing to that thing a stable identity[23] surviving all the experiences which have been had in relation with that thing.

We could express this differently: one cannot say what Reality is, to say what it is amounts to saying something about Reality, stating Reality as a thing, attributing Being to that thing. In the language of CCL we call *substantialisation* this act of attributing self-existence to a thing or to the concept of a thing, of which one will then say that it is endowed with *substantiality*.

We could say, by adopting a Thomist terminology, that *substantialisation* is the mental act which confers inseity to a given essence, or in some cases aseity.[24] It also corresponds to the sanskrit term *kalpayati*, "hypostatizing function of the mind", previously mentioned.

Non-substantiality — The *non-substantiality* of *A* is the true nature of *A* (*paramārtha*) which by definition, if one may say, is beyond definition.

This *non-substantiality* will be included in CCL as that which is missing in any determination of a thing such as *A*. It is, in a way, the metaphysical dimension of *A*, which only realizes itself through the non-realization of its empirical dimension.[25]

As such, *non-substantiality* could then be considered as an operation of de-*substantialisation*.

In this way, CCL will use *non-substantiality* as an inaccessible limit of which nothing can ever be said other than what it is not. This "is not" having, in addition, no value of being, it constitutes a state of definition of existence as being *causal* and *conditional*,[26] neither determined by an identity nor non-determined. That is to say that the *non-substantiality* of a thing lies in all relations established with this thing, acknowledging that its reity has meaning only in relation to this *causal* and *conditional* context.

It is worth noting that *non-substantiality* must not be confused with the pure non-being; to establish an equivalence between *non-substantiality* and this non-being has only a mystical sense in some Mahāyānist texts which attempt to express this *śūnyatā* as non-existence or non-being. To say that *non-substantiality* is non-determined does not provide us with the meaning of the negation implied in such verbal statements: the "no" of that non-determination still remains this same negator specific to the doctrine of *non-substantiality*, so that the problem remains unsolved.

Ontological non-consistency[27] — Let T be a thesis, i.e., a system made up of a set of meaningful propositions[28] founded on a set of postulates defining the existence of a set of things or realities.

Any postulate asserts, in fact, a metaphysical origin, i.e., an absolute feature of existence or non-existence.

We call *ontological non-consistency* of T, noted $Ncons[T]$, the fact of bringing to the fore the non-realization of the object of T, through revelation of the *causal* and *conditional* character of any metaphysical content postulated by T or deduced from T.

To any thesis T corresponds an "instant" of *ontological non-consistency*, during which the existential content of T is constituted: the state in which this content validates itself in the revelation of its invalidation.

Fundamental negator — We call thus an operator whose application causes a departure from the field of identitary meanings without however consisting of a simple onto mapping of that field on the non-determined alone.

In CCL, this operator expresses the *prasajyapratiṣedha*[29] negator and will be noted *Nfond*.

Applying the *fundamental negator* to a thesis T amounts to bringing T back to its *ontological non-consistency* which I will denote mathematically:[30]

$$T \xrightarrow{Nfond} Ncons[T]$$

Let us consider any given proposition defining the existence of a subject by the attribution of a quality. In predicate calculus, the negation of this proposition would apply to the syntactic structure of the relation and the result of this application would be endowed with a truth value: the fact that "A is x" is true implies the falseness of its negation according to the demands of logical consistency. The *fundamental negator* does not apply to the syntactic structure of attribution but to the very fact of that application without implying any counterpart.[31] The nonsense of the attributive proposition picked out by the *fundamental negator* is only such from the point of view of what the Mahāyāna calls *paramārtha*; if the application of this negator remained in the field of significant identities, then the negator itself would be total nonsense.

It is possible to say that the *fundamental negator* applies to a proposition — or more generally to a thesis — so as to bring back the significant values which make it up, to a state of subsistence which is no longer identitary but *causal* and *conditional*.[32]

Refutation — Demonstration by means of classical inferences of the *ontological non-consistency* of any given thesis, which may be called *Ncons*[*T*].

The process involves a *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*) of the validity of the given thesis. It must be well understood that it is no matter here of questioning the formal consistency of this thesis as a set of meaningful propositions, but its claim to give an exhaustive definition of Reality, or more precisely, the *substantialisation* of significant values brought into play by the thesis in question. This is accomplished by bringing to the fore a state of fact revealing the absurd consequences which the intrinsic existence of the being it defines would imply, both from the point of view of reason and experience.

This dialectic uses only the arguments of the theory to be refuted without introducing any of its own arguments, particularly among the Mādhyamika of the Prāsaṅgika branch. The *refutation* of a thesis does not amount to maintaining a thesis opposed to that of the opponent, but rather to emptying its ontological validity on account of its self-relativization. In a way, *refutation* attacks the opposing thesis from the inside, without intervention of external elements, the only basis of this *refutation* being, finally, the critical function of Reason, its capacity to judge its own conceptual productions.

This would be expressed here by attributing to *Nfond* the property of not being able to apply to itself: *Ncons*[*Ncons*[*T*]], has no meaning because *ontological non-consistency* is not a thesis. This could be expressed in another way: *Ncons*[*Ncons*] is formally identical to *Ncons*.

Let us consider an identity A and a quality x, any predicative relation from x to A defines an ontology of the existing A. The existence of A is indeed always determined by its relation to a quality designating it, i.e.: affirmatively "snow is white" or negatively "snow is not white". Indeed what does one do in ordinary conversation but designate an entity by specifying it?

It must be clear that the *refutation* of such a predicative relation does not mean that the *non-substantiality* of A is any negative attribute which is expected to qualify A: the *non-substantiality* of A is its own nature!

In fact, it will not even be possible to say that the *non-substantiality* of A can be demonstrated, since no discursive process will permit us to reach the metaphysical foundation of something which exists. In fact, it is not so much a demonstration as an aim at *non-substantiality* from a de-stabilization of any *substantialisation* of A determined by its situation in relation to identity x.

In Mādhyamika logic this process of *refutation* unfolds according to a pattern of four alternative positions called tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) which I shall now explain before showing why the four steps are necessary.

(1) $T :=:$ "A **is** x" — The first thesis considered asserts that A is determined by x. The result of the application of the *fundamental negator* on "A is x" will not be some conclusion on this proposition, a true value, but a de-stabilization of its existential significance: the ontological content of T no longer has any intrinsic meaning, it represents instead a relational state in which are interwoven numerous items which constitute the *causal* and *conditional* context of the order of the world defined by this statement. $Ncons[T]$ has therefore been demonstrated.

(2) $\bar{T} :=:$ "A **is** $\bar{x}$" — But this *refutation* of T does not bring a final answer as to the intrinsic existence of A, for there exists another possibility, another order of the world determined as "A is not x". However, Mahāyānist dialectic does not generally express itself in this way; it will express the possibility of A being determined by an antithetic quality of x, i.e., $\bar{x}$.[33] It is not a question, then, of

the negation of T which, in this dialectic, will take on another meaning. Here again, the process of *refutation* will consist in applying this *fundamental negator* according to the previously defined process, i.e., the de-stabilization of $\overline{T}$ bringing its content back to the *causal* and *conditional* context which constitutes its supporting basis. $\mathit{Ncons}[\overline{T}]$ has therefore been demonstrated.

(3) $T \wedge \overline{T} :=:$ "A **is** x **and** $\bar{x}$" — What possibility is then left to realize the identity A? Perhaps a synthesis in which A would appear as an identity determined as a coincidence of antithetic predicates. This synthesis is made possible because, according to Bhattacharyya, $\overline{T}$ does not express the logical contrary of T but its epistemic contrary.[34] According to Candrakīrti, T is *true according to* that which does not imply that T is false and can be true simultaneously with the truth of $\overline{T}$. Applying the *fundamental negator* will bring to the fore, once more, the *ontological non-consistency* of this identity, i.e., A determined as a *coincidentia oppositorum*; for, unlike Hegel, the Madhyamaka will consider any synthesis as an acceptable solution, perhaps, on the plane of relative truth, but as non-consistent in its absoluteness. This is so because this synthesis, as a specific determination, will appear as a new entity. Now the Madhyamaka is not so much interested in the significant, relative justification of an entity, as in its ontological, absolute justification. $\mathit{Ncons}[T \wedge \overline{T}]$ has therefore been demonstrated.

(4) $\sim T \wedge \sim \overline{T} :=:$ "**neither** A **is** x, **nor** A **is** $\bar{x}$" — The dismissal (symbolized by "$\sim$") of T means that A is not determined according to the organization of the world defined by T, which does not imply in any way the determination of A according to the model defined by antithesis $\overline{T}$ and vice-versa. There remains a fourth possibility: A is a pure non-determination represented by a contradictory synthesis, or a synthesis of the negations, which will have to be refuted in its turn. If the de-substantialising dialectic had stopped at the third step, one might have thought indeed that identity A remains as pure non-determination, which is understood in most mystical texts when they refer to ultimate Reality. But giving up the *refutation* process at that stage, would amount to

granting A a status of purely negative identity endowed with the significant value of "that which is not determined". The accusation of nihilism, brought against the upholders of the Madhyamaka, would have been perfectly justified for this reason. It would not have been true to the ontological scepticism of the Madhyamaka according to which *non-substantiality* is a lack of *substantiality* rather than empty *substantiality*. Basically, in this fourth stage, it is a question of demonstrating the *ontological non-consistency* of an insubstantiality which would be understood as a pure void, pure indetermination. $Ncons[\sim T \wedge \sim \overline{T}]$ has therefore been demonstrated.

Concerning the writing of these formulae, only the content of Dependent Origination is of interest to CCL; as to the question of knowing whether the most appropriate connector in the third and fourth propositions is the *conjunction* "$\wedge$" or the *disjunction* "$\vee$", it concerns only the logical form of the account of Dependent Origination. There are also many uncertainties as to whether the terms of the four propositions are of a contrary or a contradictory nature.[35]

In fact, from the point of view of CCL, *stricto sensu*, such a question is not relevant, in so far as such logical connectors are not included in its language. Connector "$\wedge$" adopted for the circumstance, and with the aim only of presenting CCL, is a choice open to criticism.

One could rightfully question the necessity of those four steps. As a matter of fact, if refuting the first thesis results in a non-valuation of A,[36] what can then be the object of the following steps?

To this objection, it is possible to answer that, with each step, a proposition concerning reality of A is refuted, and that the *ontological non-consistency* of this thesis gives way to a different thesis, in so far as applying the *fundamental negator* corresponds to no value judgement whatever, precisely because its result is not to be found in the field of determined values.

If I claim that it is not true that A is x, then it is the end as concerns the point of view of the logical consistency of the system in which this proposition is included. But from the point of view of *ontological non-consistency*, invalidation of the proposition "A is x", as an identitary determination, having no truth value, does not imply taking a stand on the existence of that object A.

It is necessary to empty A of all *substantiality* instead of arguing about the truth or falseness of such determination, or about the indetermination of A. In order to do that, one examines all the *substantialisations* that can be given to A within the conceptual structures elaborated by the various theses concerning its determination by x, or its antithetic $\bar{x}$.

But this *non-substantiality* of A is not something to demonstrate, it can be aimed at through the invalidation of any possible *substantialisation* of A.

Now it is important to see clearly that each proposition put forward about A enjoys a sort of existential isolation: that which is refuted each time is the substantial charge loaded in the proposition, and that proposition alone, but not A itself since this identity only emerges from indetermination through its relation to x or $\bar{x}$. For from the point of view of Dependent Origination, what is A if not that which is indicated as A according to a quality called x, or otherwise?

To say that refuting the first proposition could suffice to show the *non-substantiality* of A, would implicitly amount to postulating that this A has a definition *sui generis*.

Finally, this *non-substantiality* of A will express itself as the *conjunction* of the refutations of the four theses brought into play by the tetralemma:

$$Ncons[T] \wedge Ncons[\overline{T}] \wedge Ncons[T \wedge \overline{T}] \wedge Ncons[\sim T \wedge \sim \overline{T}]$$

It is necessary to insist on the fact that this formula indicates, but does not demonstrate the *non-substantiality* which appears to be in CCl an inducement for the inner dynamism of this axiomatic system without being able ever to reach it. I will come back to this important question in more detail later in this publication.

One could object that it is possible to designate an entity without using a predicate and simply say: "A". This attitude implies that existence is the predicate, for to say "A" amounts to saying "A is" or "A is existing". We are then back in a logic including existence as a predicate[37] and thus the designation of an entity *A* as existing or non-existing, and so on, can be refuted just like any other designation.[38]

The demonstration of *ontological non-consistency* is a relativization of the whole idea of *evident eventual truth of premises* in such a way that this relativising process does not appear itself as an absolute truth, similarly to the demonstration of Parmenides' hypotheses in Plato's famous dialogue where, likewise, judgement is eventually suspended concerning the One and the Multiple.

ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF A FORMALISATION OF CCL

It thus appears quite difficult to reduce the doctrine of Dependent Origination to predicate logic; any attempt to formalize this doctrine must, in fact, be able to account for what it implies.

(1) THE LAW OF NON-SUBSTANTIALITY. Dependent Origination does not postulate any primary hypostasis nor any law of existence, even implicit, which is to be found at the root of all logic. This *non-substantiality* is not a negative quality which can be attributed to things, it is their very nature. There is no question then of writing an axiomatic system of *non-substantiality* in terms of a predicate logic because, basically, no value or relation is given.

(2) THE LAW OF UNIVERSAL RELATIVITY. This *non-substantiality* does not refer to a logical or epistemological void, but to a void of ontological truth-value. A thing is only reified by its determination as a significant value. But this particular value, which may be called *A*, has for its only foundation its existence in relation to other determinations, which are also determined by all their relations to other significant values, among which is *A* itself. This principle of determination expresses the thought of the Chinese Mādhyamika master Seng-Chao[39] (IVth A.D.): "As a thing is a thing because it becomes so in relation to other things, what is thus made may be called a thing". In other words, there exists no first term defining all the others, but rather a matrix, infinite in all its dimensions, where each term supports all the others and all support each one, without preeminence of the whole on the part, or of the part on the whole, because whole and part are only,

according to that view, interdependent notions subsisting one by the other.

(3) THE LAW OF PERPETUAL FLOW. To speak of a thing is to determine it; to determine it is to define it in relation to a fixed indicator. An existence will therefore be defined in relation to a context, a situation in universal interdependence. But it results from that law of universal relativity that there does not exist one unique situation of interdependence, which would imply an absolute basis, in other words an ontological postulate. Hence, universal relativity will resolve itself into an infinity of series, without first or last terms, of interdependent situations, resulting in a notion of order, of sequentiality. A thing will then appear as a structure organizing itself throughout a progressive evolution which will also bring to the fore the relations of that thing with other things, determined by a similar process. It is thus possible to speak of a dynamism, not in the sense of a power which could be attributed to a set of entities but which precedes these entities to constitute them. It is worth noting, by the way, what differentiates this logic of Dependent Origination from the Productive Logic of F. Spisani whose subject is the evolution of an entity in its own universe of discourse. From the point of view of Dependent Origination, this evolution is not that of an entity, because the evolutive process itself generates the notion of entity. To take an example, in the language of Productive Logic[40] to say that $p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots, p_n$, are the logical values of the variable p, would have no meaning in CCL, since these p_ι are precisely states of elaboration of an entity, determined states related to the determinative context — in CCL the word *conditionality* would be used. The way in which Dependent Origination on the one hand and Productive Logic on the other hand, deal with the notion of evolutive process is quite characteristic of their respective philosophical bases.[41]

(4) FUNDAMENTAL NEGATION. According to what has just been said, this term should be understood as a pure and simple refutation without positive counterpart, and that is the way in which we will understand it, each time it will be used in this text, and later, in the formalism of CCL. The fundamental negation of A is not $\sim A$, that of

$\sim A$ is not A or a significant intermediary value between A and $\sim A$, because applying the *fundamental negator* brings any *substantiality* back to its state of *ontological non-consistency*. Consequently, this operator cannot be compared to the negation operator of a tri- or pluri-valued logic.

Having insisted on the few basic ideas of CCL, we can now perceive more easily the meaning of the term used above of non-predicate logic, qualifying the doctrine of Dependent Origination.

Indeed, a predicate is not so much a term belonging to a conceptual category, as a place in a verbal structure giving another term, the subject of the predication, a function of significant designation, i.e., of definition of reality.

Any word can just as well be in the position of a predicate or of a subject. If the quality "white" draws the subject "snow" out of the pure field of abstraction to endow it with an empirical function, this last word could in its turn, in other significant structures, appear instead of the predicate. Inversely, we could find significant structures where "whiteness" appears as the subject.

It is thus possible to speak of non-predicate logic, insofar as that operator, the *fundamental negator*, acts as a de-stabilizer of the predicative relation which it undermines in its very foundation, i.e., the structuring function of Reality which is implied in its statement.

All logic operates on existential identities. CCL will present itself as a non-logic of identity, not because it leans on some void of identity, or void of existence, but because its basic postulate is the recognition that Reality can only reveal itself through identities which, paradoxically, only veil it!

As I said before: *non-substantiality* is not simply a hypostasis or a new principle, but the relativization of the notion of *substantiality*.

THE REALISTIC PRESUPPOSITION

To stress why it would be interesting to put the doctrine of Dependent Origination into an axiomatic system, it seems necessary, before anything else, to ward off the objections of realism by situating the perspective of the latter. This approach corresponds perfectly, by the way, to that of the theory of *non-substantiality*: *śūnyatā* does not present itself as an independant perspective, it is the relativization of all perspective!

According to the ordinary point of view, that is real which has its own experimental content, which offers a hold, which opposes a resistence to the intelligence and will power of the subject. That reality is thus defined by its "distance" in relation to an acting and knowing center.

This perspective which perfectly suits practical life is also that of experimental science which must maintain this fundamental dualism to be able to exert an action on the objects of its study.

Indeed, theoretical science has gone from the study of objects in the strictly empirical sense, to the study of conceptual objects. Thus, quantum physics, cosmology, plunge us into a universe which is totally foreign to practical realism without being able, nevertheless, to escape realism of conceptual hypostases such as matter, energy, space-time, and so on.

Generally speaking, it is possible to call realism any perspective which considers reality as the aseity conferred on one or several essences. This idea can be extended to the philosophical field: there exists a philosophical realism which can be either explicit, that is recognized as such by its authors, i.e.: materialism or, at the other extreme, theism; or an implicit realism such as any idealism founded on an Absolute, whose hypostasis is more or less openly admitted.

In other words, basically, there is always an act of foundation, an ontological act. It is finally the act that the methodology of Dependent Origination aims to analyze: it does not claim to say what things are, but will replace the ontological statement on things by methodical doubt. On this account, any follower of the Mahāyāna can very well put up with a practical or scientific realism, inasmuch as they correspond to a necessary dimension of human behaviour, whereas at the same time, he will question their claim to ontological truth.

Tarski's sentence, previously quoted, concerning the truth of this proposition "snow is white", accurately expresses the relation between the propositional calculus[42] and its realistic presupposition. Formal logic deals with propositions as if they were pure symbols, void of any semantic content. The result of that propositional calculus is a truth value, but to the question of the foundation of that logical value the realist replies: empirical truth.[43]

In other words, predicate calculus is developed, implicitly or not, from a realistic ontology. The fact that some axiomatic systems deny the notion of implicit existence,[44] and consider existence as a predicate, makes no difference, since these logics without existence assumptions aim at formally distinguishing between the notions of empirical existence and imaginary or conceptual existence, without tackling the actual problem of the nature of this *existence*.

The space-time of quantum physics is quite different from that of practical empiricism or even of classical physics. The objects of its semantic field are no longer those of sensory perception, but are constituted according to a sequence of measurable positions. The essential criterion of their logic is no more the notion of truth, but that of physical identity. Productive Logic formalizes the way of thinking inherent to that new vision of the world. It is founded on identity and difference, the genesis of difference from identity.[45] Its object is the evolution of an entity in the universe of discourse, without questioning the very idea of entity. Its ontological foundations are space, time, motion.

Any philosophical system has an intrinsic basis of realism, as soon as it legitimately claims to account for the existence of things. Thus it is possible to say, from a general point of view, that any philosophical problem is a problem of existence or perhaps of the nature of existence. Philosophical reflection, when applied in its critical function, cannot pay too much attention to that point of view, precisely because the latter appears as a mere point of view whose foundation must be looked for. Such is the vocation of philosophy. The realist will perhaps have a tendency to consider such an approach futile! He will see it as an irrelevant criticism, aimed at a field of thought to which ideological realism, by its *de facto* dogmatism, has denied all access.

Thus philosophical practice exerts itself in a field foreign to scientific thought, let alone practical thought. The philosophical mode is inherent to the human mind, no criticism against the necessity of philosophy has ever consisted in anything but philosophizing to deny philosophy!

The problems tackled by the philosophical mode fall beyond the scope of science, its demonstrative rules do not answer the same necessity. In short, it is hardly possible to deal with ontological problems using a logic which admits an empirical datum, or a hypostatic datum, as an implicit reference.

That is the ontological problem that the masters of Madhyamaka have analysed, their field of experience consisting in the corpus of Brahmanic, Buddhist, and Jainist metaphysics and cosmologies. Their method of refutation consists in isolating, within the system which is submitted to it, the moment of the existential act on which is based the ontological problem specific to that system. We will see later what meaning should be given to this time-related terminology.

An example, taken among many others, in the category of existential problems dealt with by the Madhyamaka, will permit the reader to better understand this process of refutation, and thus to situate the role and vocation of CCL, an axiomatisation of Dependent Origination.

REFUTATION OF "AGENT AND ACT" ACCORDING TO THE LANGUAGE OF CCL

To illustrate this method of refutation adopted by the Madhyamaka, I have chosen to treat the problem of the link between agent and act.

The importance of this discussion cannot be understood without a reminder of the various philosophies of existence which were current in India at the time of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti.

The construction of the world, according to some Indian schools born of the Brahmanic trend, was founded on the idea of a substantial entity. On this common basis appear, of course, numerous differences concerning the unicity, or the multiplicity, the nature, and so on, of this (these) substance(s). This also gives rise to other differences concerning the link between substance and attribute.

Thus for the Sāṁkhya, reality was bipolar: Consciousness (*Puruṣa*) and Matter (*Prakṛti*). From the latter proceeded phenomena without any distinction of nature from their immanent substance.

The ontology of the Mīmāṃsaka rested on the eternity of Sound: the elements of the discourse were, in fact, *sui generis* substances. Without going into details, that school considered there was no relation between substance and attribute.

Conversely, for the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there was a biunivocal correspondence between the objects of the external world and the categories of our language: things are real substances, their qualities are likewise real, as well as their inherence to corresponding substances.

Opposed to these various substantialist attitudes, there were also a series of phenomenological positions within the various schools of canonical Buddhism, called schools of the Small Vehicle (*Hīnayāna*). For the latter, the famous doctrine of Dependent Origination was to be understood as a law of ontological causality: reality belonged to phenomena (*dharma*), not to substances, these being merely abstractions. Yet, these *dharma*, although produced by the law of causality, were nevertheless endowed with a certain substantiality.[46]

As for Jains, they opted for a disjunctive synthesis between those two antithetic positions: i.e., a being both permanent and endowed with change; i.e., to each object are inherent both existence and non-existence; i.e., any predication is at the same time true and false. Likewise, they did not admit the reality of inherence of an attribute to its substance.

We cannot elaborate any longer on these various trends of thought, our purpose was to recall briefly the philosophical context in which the Mādhyamika dialectic was developed.

After these brief preliminary considerations, let us go on to the initial purpose of this section, i.e., to analyze, from the point of view of CCL, the problem of the act and the agent which constitutes the subject of the whole eighth chapter of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā.[47] To this end, I will define a very basic formal language intended to be an introduction both to the language of CCL and to the possible applications of that axiomatic system in the elaboration of a general methodology of systems of thought.

- **Determination** — Everything endowed with a significant identity, as previously defined, and with a semantic content.
- s(A) :=: *aaaa* — The semantic content of *determination A* is *aaaa*; in other words: "*A* means *aaaa*".
- $A \Rightarrow B$ — *Determination A* implies *determination B*. To imply is used in the sense of Lewis' strict implication: if *A* then necessarily *B*.

- **Efficiency** — The originality of CCL consists in its integrating the metaphysical realm in the axiomatic field, not as an end result of that axiomatic system, but as a tendency, an aim. The "definition" of *efficiency*[48] is to possess no definition at all, since defining it would amount to classifying it among the *determinations*, whereas the *determinations* are constituted on the basis of that *efficiency*. CCL is founded on the impossibility to say what existence *per se* is, except that it is neither determined nor non-determined, without even this double negation having a value of definition (see what has been said concerning the tetralemma). *Efficiency* is another word for *non-substantiality*; it is at the same time a lack in *determination* and a permanent possibility of *determination*, without this possibility being itself a *determination*; it is the internal mechanism constituting CCL. We call *efficiency state* the mediatic state between the determined and the non-determined from which stems a determined identity. It is the neither determined nor non-determined state of non-identitary subsistence, pure factuality, inexpressible actual experience, not identical with non-existence, since this subsistence is at the heart of the relational knot of its own *causes* and *conditions*.
- **Causal Connection** — We call *causal ε-connection* or more simply *ε-connection* the above mentioned relational "knot" constitutive of a *determination*; the word relation having here a wider meaning than the one habitually used in predicate logic, it would mean here a sort of factual concomitance applying to terms semantically implied by each other, the *causes*. The "instant" of convergence of the *causes* is called a *punctor*. This *punctor* is an existence totally depending on the *ε-connection*, and at the same time, the reason of being of that very *ε-connection*. It is important to insist on the fact that these elements of the *ε-connection*, the *causes*, are not determined identities, but transition states between the determined and the non-determined, the notion of *punctor* finally putting this transition in concrete form. In fact, all the elements of the *ε-connection* exist within an interdependent relation which constitutes their potentiality for interdetermination. This is the specific sense in which the term *cause* should be understood, rather than as a theory of causality. For any theory of this kind, the notion of being precedes the notion of existent causes since to produce there must be being, whereas for

CCL *cause* precedes existence; but in this context, *cause* loses all character of causal identity. An *efficiency state* is organized like an *ε-connection* but, as will be seen throughout the development of the language of CCL, it can include an infinity of *ε-connections*.

- **Conditionality** – For an identity to be determined, a set of specifications must differentiate it from other identities. It is the *ε-connection of causes*, constitutive of the *determination* in question, which will bear this differentiating specification. However, another parameter is necessary, otherwise any *determination* would apply to one and only one *efficiency state*, which would lead us back to a universe founded on an element impossible to formalize, *efficiency*, not contained in the theory, analogous as such to an axiomatic set theory. We call *conditionality* this discriminating factor of the *states of efficiency*; it represents the present state of the universe, or the determined/non-determined state of interdependence conditioning the emergence of this *determination* rather than that one.
- **Consequent Determination** – From a state of *efficiency*, there results a *determination* expressing the *punctor* and its *causes* as concepts of things. But this leads to a re-balancing of determined/non-determined interdependence. In other words, this *determination* from an *efficiency state* involves a re-organization of the universe of *determinations*. We call *consequent determinations* the *determinations* stemming from an *efficiency state* as consequences.

Concerning notations:

- a *determination* is designated by any given term, in italics, with a capital first letter, followed by one or more qualification(s) linked to the *determination* by a symbol "_", e.g.: *real_Agent*;
- a *cause* is designated by a *determination* symbol prefixed by "ε-";
- a *punctor* is designated by a *determination* symbol followed by "*-ity*";
- an *ε-connection* between *causes* $\varepsilon\text{-}A$ and $\varepsilon\text{-}B$ and *punctor* $C\text{-}ity$ is designated by the expression $\varepsilon\text{-}C[\varepsilon\text{-}A,\ \varepsilon\text{-}B \rightleftharpoons C\text{-}ity]$; this writing symbolizes the role of the *punctor, C-ity*, as the convergence of *causes* $\varepsilon\text{-}A$ and $\varepsilon\text{-}B$ and the reason of being of their *causal* interaction. $\varepsilon\text{-}C$ put before the left bracket means that $\varepsilon\text{-}C$ is

an *ε-connection* which, even if it is defined by *ε-A* and *ε-B*, is not however a *determination*, but its real lack in *determination* makes it a potential *cause* open to an infinity of *punctu*-al *determinations*, so to speak.

I shall state, without being able to demonstrate it within the scope of this article, the following principle:

PRINCIPLE OF UNICITY OF EFFICIENCY — In a given *efficiency state*, a term cannot be both the *punctor* of an *ε-connection* and the *cause* of any *ε-connection*.[49]

Let us return to refutation of act and agent. The chapter starts with the formulation of the problem: the opponent of the Mādhyamika upholder objects to the necessity of maintaining the reality of the collection of composite elements (*dharma*) in function of the reality of action and agent of action. In answer Candrakīrti demonstrates the *ontological non-consistency* of the notions of act and agent. It seems important to remember, despite possible repetition, that for the Madhyamaka it was not a matter of setting up a theory of action distinct from current theories, but rather of proceeding to a critical examination of the possible hypotheses concerning an ontology of action.

The method of refutation will then consist in isolating the notions of agent and act in their ontological "moment", i.e., the state during which act and agent have an experimental content: a state in which these notions have a factual correspondence.

The factual content of these notions of agent and act is given by the activity:

s(*Agent*) :=: principle of activity[50]
s(*Act*) :=: object of the agent's activity[51]

Here is a formal *ε-connection* whose *ε-Agent* and *ε-Act* are the *causes* and *Activ-ity* is the *punctor* i.e.: *ε-Activ*[*ε-Agent*, *ε-Act* ⇌ *Activ-ity*].

What does this notion of *ε-connection* express? What appears interesting here is not so much an ontology of action, as the semantic interweaving of the notions of agent, act and activity, in other words the "moment" in which these notions have a factual content, a "moment" which precedes any thetical consideration regarding them.

That is what is formally described by the ε-*connection*: the interdependence of these notions in the factual experience of activity, the fact that agent and act are indissociable in realization of activity.

At this point arises the formulation of the problem. According to the doctrinal points of view previously mentioned, there existed only three possible natures for any one entity: it is either real, or unreal, or real-unreal. We must nevertheless make it clear that these distinctions were only meaningful in relation to the above mentioned controversy opposing substantialists and phenomenologists.

What then was the meaning of these three possible natures: real, unreal, real-unreal? How can we convey these notions in formalized language?

s(*real*) :=: that which exists *per se*,[52] which is endowed with a permanent factuality. In the previously defined language a real being is expressed by a *punctor* whatever the *efficiency state*[53] may be.

s(*unreal*) :=: that which does not exist *per se*,[54] i.e., any *determination* which is not directly caused by *efficiency*, in other words a *consequent determination*. Such is the case of any abstract, conceptual, imaginative[55] element whose *determination* is not *connected* to an *efficiency* but deduced from the *efficiency* of a *cause* whose significant value would be, for example, "thinking subject".

s(*real-unreal*) :=: that which at the same time exists and does not exist *per se*.[56] A way of being which is specific to "essences" (*bhāva*) according to various schools of the Small Vehicle, and accepted by the Madhyamaka for the definition of conventional reality,

> appearing as conceptual constructions although endowed with their own identity.[57]

Let us consider the fact that it is possible to attribute each of these three natures to the act and the agent. The problem of the agent and the act will amount to the following combinatorial problem: must the action be attributed to a real, unreal, real-unreal agent in *ε-connection* with the object of its activity which may also be real, unreal or real-unreal? This exemple is also interesting insofar as it permits us to consider a wider application of the strategy of the tetralemma, than the one previously schematized. Indeed, to each hypothesis about the nature of the agent corresponds the triplet thesis, antithesis, synthesis concerning the act.

After these preliminary considerations, we will go on with the refutation of the nine hypotheses.

First Hypothesis

Real Agent Real Act

s(*real_Agent*) :=: *ε-Agent* is a *cause* regardless of any other *cause*, or *ε-connection.*

s(*real_Act*) :=: *ε-Act* is a *cause* regardless of any other *cause*, or *ε-connection.*

Therefore:

real_Agent $\rightleftharpoons$ *ε-Agent* is a *cause* non-*connected* to the *cause ε-Act*[58]

real_Act $\rightleftharpoons$ *ε-Act* is a *cause* non-*connected* to the *cause ε-Agent*[59]

However:

$$s(Agent) \wedge s(Act) \Rightarrow \varepsilon\text{-}Activ[\varepsilon\text{-}Agent,\ \varepsilon\text{-}Act \rightleftharpoons Activ\text{-}ity]$$

Moreover the text of the Prasannapadā adds: ". . . a real agent does not accomplish any act (has no activity) . . . In short, the real act has no activity . . .".[60] This can be formalized as follows:

$$\mathrm{s}(\mathit{real\_Agent}) \Rightarrow \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Agent}[\ldots \rightleftharpoons \mathit{Agent\text{-}ity}]$$
$$\mathrm{s}(\mathit{real\_Act}) \Rightarrow \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Act}[\ldots \rightleftharpoons \mathit{Act\text{-}ity}]$$

$$\mathrm{s}(\mathit{Agent\_accomplishing\_activity}) \Rightarrow \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Activ}[\varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Agent}, \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Act} \rightleftharpoons \mathit{Activ\text{-}ity}]$$
$$\mathrm{s}(\mathit{Act\_endowed\_activity}) \Rightarrow \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Activ}[\varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Act}, \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Agent} \rightleftharpoons \mathit{Activ\text{-}ity}].$$

These relations are opposed to the principle of unicity of *efficiency*, *ε-Act* and *ε-Agent* appear incompatibly in two different *ε-connections.*

Therefore the hypothesis is put at fault, since the ontological status *real* implies a dissociation of these two concepts, whereas their respective factual contents are related in, and by, the *efficiency state* of *Activ-ity.*

The substantialist thesis of the reality of an agent and an act in activity results in maintaining the *determinations* of *Act* and *Agent* out of their ontological "moment". The conclusion of this refutation, stated by Candrakīrti: "a real agent does not accomplish a real act"[61] must be understood as meaning that there exists no *efficiency state* in which *ε-Agent* and *ε-Act* would be distinct *causes* of the *efficiency* of the *punctor Activ-ity.*

Second Hypothesis

Unreal Agent Unreal Act

s(*unreal_Agent*) :=: *Agent* is a *consequent determination* following an *efficiency state* in which *Agent* is neither a *cause* nor *connected* to a *punctor.*

s(*unreal_Act*) :=: *Act* is a *consequent determination* following an *efficiency state* in which *Act* is neither a *cause* nor *connected* to a *punctor.*

However:

$$\mathit{Activ\text{-}ity} \Rightarrow \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Activ}[\varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Agent}, \varepsilon\text{-}\mathit{Act} \rightleftharpoons \mathit{Activ\text{-}ity}]$$

Therefore the thesis postulating, in an ontology of activity, that act and agent are merely abstractions in relation to the one and only reality of activity is refuted by the demonstration that the notions of act and agent coexist with the notion of activity in its *efficiency state*[62].

Third Hypothesis

Real-unreal Agent Real-unreal Act

The present thesis is that of an *efficiency state* in which the notions of agent and act appear at the same time as *causes* and *consequent determinations*. The problem, thus brought back to its ontological "moment", reveals its inner contradiction: either the opponent postulates the autonomous *efficiency* of *ε-Agent* (and *ε-Act*) because of their reality, and we are back to thesis 1; or *Agent* (and *Act*) are only *consequent determinations*, but then, the ontological "moment" is that of another *determination* — e.g. "thinking subject". The hypothesis is refuted in accordance with the principle of unicity of *efficiency*.[63]

Then follows the thesis pointing to the disparity in nature between agent and act, i.e.:

real_Agent	*unreal_Act*
real_Agent	(*real_unreal*)*_Act*
unreal_Agent	*real_Act*
unreal_Agent	(*real-unreal*)*_Act*
(*real-unreal*)*_Agent*	*real_Act*
(*real-unreal*)*_Agent*	*unreal_Act*

I will not dwell at length on the statement of these refutations which are all based on the incompatibility existing between the *ε-connection* of the *causes ε-Agent* and *ε-Act*, and the disparity of their respective ontological status; it would not add anything more to the comprehension of this dialectic. It seems more interesting to go onto the statement of its conclusion, according to which there exists nothing endowed with an autonomous ontological status, determined in an absolute way. This ontological status is, in fact, a significant value, a *determination* expressing, conceptually, a state of experience which we have called *efficiency state*. In other words, the reality of the thing has a meaning in that state only, nothing garantees its subsistence as such in another state.[64]

Moreover, naming the thing is only possible in relation to other things, as Seng-Chao says, and all things together determine the state in question. As a matter of fact, there does not even exist an ontological status *per se* of a thing, because this ontological status stems from an *ε-connection* of *causes*. Incidentally, this constitutes the radical criticism of the Madhyamaka which consists in pointing out the inconsistency of claiming the ontological truth of any given system. This is achieved by isolating, so to speak, by situating this (these) "moments(s)" of truth,[65] thus demonstrating that the ontological truth of a concept cannot extend beyond its field of consistency, i.e., its *efficiency state*.

The agent and the act are thus closely related, their semantic content designates a certain state of experience, a state of activity, the causal *ε-connection* of *ε-Agent* and *ε-Act*.

This result leads us to state the principle of Mutually Relative Reality,[66] one of the mainsprings of the Mādhyamika dialectic.

Basically, to exist is to be *determined* by *efficiency*. Now, what is an *efficiency state* if not an *ε-connection*? Indeed, is it possible to speak of existence without speaking of the existence of an essence, and is not all existence a significant value *determined* within an *ε-connection*?

Sartre wrote that conscience means *conscience of*, an idea to which the various schools of the Mahāyāna would subscribe adding, out of concern for insubstantiality, that existence means *existence of*.

However, *existence of* is nothing but a significant value endowed with a vital, experimental, content — an *efficiency* in our formalized language — and a significant value implies a significant structure of which it is a part. But since this significant value is existence, should is not then be autonomous and determine all the others? What is the meaning then of the existence of the others, of the Other? What happens, in the case of the existence of this Other, of the existence of this initial significant value?

All these questions will find their answer in the doctrine of the momentariness of things. This doctrine has sometimes taken on various meanings, not mutually exclusive by the way, in Buddhism. It is possible, indeed, to note the impermanence of things and life and draw all its ethical or religious conclusions, but in its deepest sense, this momentariness means that existence has meaning only in an *efficiency state*, an ontological "moment". This existence is not permanent, i.e., it does not extend beyond the context of a state in which it is *existence of*. The existence of the thing thus depends on this context, and the latter is only constituted from and around the existence in question.

However, Mutually Relative Reality does not constitute a vicious circle, since this interdependence is not of an analytical but of a factual order, and it is as such that *ε-connection* was distinguished from relation in the usual relational calculus meaning.

In fact, this Mutually Relative Reality follows, as we will see throughout the development of CCL, both from the impossibility to express the non-determined, and also, from the impossibility to determine without being determined by the act of *determination*.

Having introduced this principle of Mutually Relative Reality thanks to the criticism of act and agent, Candrakīrti will then generalize its application to all the dualities of concomitant terms, following the example of the act and agent, particularly the duality substance/attribute.[67]

One may wonder, however, at the absence of the fourth term of the tetralemma, i.e., "neither thesis, nor antithesis", which would result in bringing up to sixteen the number of hypotheses.

In fact, it is often the case that this analysis of consistency stops with the refutation of the first three terms of the tetralemma, or often even of the first two, which must not be interpreted as a flaw of the logic of the tetralemma or as the coexistence of another method of refutation. One must simply bear in mind that the Indian or even Oriental mind is apt to be elliptical. It appears that the teacher often left his demonstration in abeyance: some sentences remained implicit, leaving it up to the student to understand by himself what had been kept silent.

To that can also be added a practical reason: if the thesis corresponding to one of the terms of the tetralemma was not explicitly formulated by some school, the Mādhyamika dialecticians did not consider it useful to argue on an empty spot! Indeed this criticism was not simply a speculative game, it was used as an intellectual *praxis* after the fashion of Socrates' maieutics.

Lastly the proposition "neither thesis, nor antithesis" was submitted to a global criticism by the doctrine of the "voidness of the voidness" (*śūnyatāśūnyatā*), i.e., the insubstantiality of the insubstantial. In other words, if the Mādhyamika discourse happened to be endowed with an ontological content based on a purely negative Absolute, it would then be refutable too.[68] These last precisions clearly underline the extent to which, although they could not express it explicitly, the Mādhyamika upholders were aware of the formal value of their terminology.

OBJECTIVES OF CCL

One could almost say that although the methodology of the Vijñānavādin logicians is also entirely based on the idea of universal insubstantiality, it is diametrically opposed to that of the Madhyamaka, which we have just examined. Whereas the latter emptied the world by means of a de-constructive process, the former conversely brought to the fore logical processes of construction of the world stemming from the notion of point-instant of efficiency, another term for insubstantiality.

The point of view of the Vijñānavāda is psychological and epistemological. According to that school, the world results from a cognitive elaboration whose steps are described in minute detail in various texts.[69] The real is the point of efficiency, an ultimate, inexpresssible, neither determined nor non-determined element.

From a psychological angle, this point-instant of efficiency is that of pure perception[70] from which, through inference,[71] the objective world is elaborated.

According to Carnap, the fundamental relation permitting us to construct the world from "elementary experiences" (*Erlebnis*), is the relation of similarity.[72] According to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and other Vijñānavādin masters, it is the *apoha, determination* through negativity: a tree is only determined as "tree" from the *determination* "non-tree" and vice-versa.[73] In the *apoha*, we meet again the principle of Mutually Relative Reality dear to the Madhyamaka.

These few lines cannot claim, of course, to present exhaustively the tenets of the Vijñānavādin trend. For the benefit of CCL, I will retain a few essential ideas of their teaching:

- the notion of causal efficiency of the logicians' school; this term should not be interpreted as relating to a physical or philosophical theory of causality, but in the sense of the previously described *efficiency*.

- their tenet of the logical construction of the world based on that very causal efficiency; a doctrine which we will claim to convey through the notion of *determinations* constituted in the series of *efficiency states*.

The Madhyamaka also considered this efficiency as the basis of the relative world (*saṃvṛti*); briefly speaking, they refused to identify ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), in other words to consider efficiency as a *determination*.

On the other hand, if one goes beyond the framework of the psychological theory that this doctrine of efficiency may have originated, if one focuses on the idea of insubstantiality, inherent in this notion, if one centers on the literally mathematical character of the theory of causality, in accordance with the Vijñānavādin logicians,[74] then the points of view of these two schools appear to be the heads and tails of one and the same coin.

This doctrine of Dependent Origination is finally extremely rich and it seems obvious that such or such an aspect received particular emphasis according to the school.

Thus, the Mādhyamika school insisted above all on the notion of insubstantiality: the masters of that school essentially used with unequalled brilliance the formidable weapon of refutation.

For its part, the Vijñānavāda school stressed more particularly the idea of "logical construction of the world".

CCL cannot, and could not, be a mere formal transcription of the logic of the discourse of such or such Mahāyānist school. That would be pointless.

Indeed, similarly to that of the Vijñānavāda, the discourse of the Madhyamaka uses significant values linked to one another according to the classical syllogistic mode. As such, it is possible to say that these logics are classical bi-[75] or tri-[76] valued logics.

There is no point in formalizing a discourse about Dependent Origination since its demonstrative process is syllogistic after the fashion of any other logical process. This is so because, according to the language of CCL, such a discourse cannot be held outside the field of *determinations*.

If one insists on following such a process, the result is bound to be what we have previously called a metaphorical transcription of the doctrine of Dependent Origination, for this formalization will not apply to the very content of the idea of insubstantiality, with the concomitant notions, but to the truth values concerning propositions on Dependent Origination.

CCL seeks to express the doctrine of Dependent Origination directly in a mathematical terminology, or rather to convey this Dependent Origination through a mathematical language. It will not translate the discourse of this or that school, but will use the discourse of the various Mahāyānist schools as an inspiring framework.

Nevertheless, considering the character of synthesizing totalization that the Chinese school of Hua-Yen gave to its teaching, CCL could be considered as an attempt to formalize this doctrine.

Following the example of that school, CCL will be lead us to stress concepts which are specific to various Buddhist schools. Furthermore, the "positive" approach of the nature of things through the six characteristics of their intercausality[77] permits the use of an axiomatic system much more obviously than in the case of the apophatic approach of the Madhyamaka. This will not prevent us, for that matter, from coming back through the development of the axiomatic system to the Nāgārjunian negations.

The insubstantiality of a thing is not an attribute, but expresses its true nature. Now, according to Nāgārjuna, this insubstantiality is conveyed by Dependent Origination. In other words, to express formally Dependent Origination amounts to expressing the way in which the notion of thing comes to cognitive existence.

How will it be possible to express formally the fundamental ideas of Dependent Origination? This is what I will try to show now, by answering three questions which may arise concerning the means and objectives of such an axiomatic system.

FIRST QUESTION: HOW WILL CCL APPLY?

(1) Firstly, by splitting up a philosophical problem into a series of states

or ontological situations. To repeat J. Ladrière: if any philosophical system, particularly the one including the problem under consideration, is made up of sequences of propositions, it is not however of an essentially deductive, computable type. In fact, according to the same author, the conception of a system explaining existence would be an operation of desimplication, the different moments of this operation expressing themselves in speculative categories and concepts whose mutual relations will constitute the organizing structures of reality or of existence itself. Then the system is split up into so-called *efficiency states* which are nothing else than those moments. In these states, the notion of reality expresses itself through that very *efficiency*. This notion conveys, in fact, that the *determinations* are such because they are those organizing structures of an existential content. Thus, as we have seen in the refutation of the act and the agent, this *efficiency state* of the *ε-Agent* and *ε-Act causes* is the direct expression of the structuring of a content of experience into these concomitant concepts.

(2) Through what could be a called a "spectral analysis" of the problem in question, a system will be brought back to a series of states, its ontological moments, as it were. But this word "series" should not delude the reader any more than the use of the temporal terminology of "moment". The order which will then be deduced is nothing like a temporal sequence, it is a mathematical order; CCL is not a physical theory of causality. However, this notion of order will imply the existence of characters, obviously formal, permitting us to distinguish these states. Hence the existence of definitions, of demonstratives sequences or, in brief, of theorems. Thus we can see the possibility of a methodology of systems, going beyond the simple hypothetical and deductive systems,[78] taking shape. It is worth noting however, that it is not a question of wanting to formalize existential contents which, by definition, are impossible to formalize, but rules of relating situations endowed with an existential content.

SECOND QUESTION: WHAT WILL THE LANGUAGE OF CCL BE?

(1) CCL cannot be constructed on the semantics of a set theory.[79] Indeed the notion of *individual* is the necessary foundation of any universe of sets.[80] Such a universe is made up of well-founded sets

arranged in layers; the *individuals*, basis of the theory, constitute layer 0.[81] In other words, the notion of set is elaborated from something which is not a set, which is, in comparison with this theory, an existential element impossible to formalize. If the ZF-theory is founded on the empty set, the latter is nevertheless defined as the set containing no *individualities* at the level of the first layer of the construction.[82] At any rate, and at the moment this is our main concern, a universe of sets is founded on a notion of existence, even if its foundation is the absence of existing things. It is worth noting by the way the set-theoretical character of the Carnapean construction. From elements which are impossible to analyze (*Erlebnis*), whatever their nature may be since he admits the possibility of various foundations, the world is elaborated by means of the relation of similarity. By this relation are determined, at the first degree of the construction, classes of elements together with their relations. Then, at the second level, the classes resulting from the possible combinations between the first elements, their relations, and the objects constructed at the first level;[83] and so forth. This process constitutes, so to speak, a constructible set theory: the *individuals* being the famous elementary experiences, similarity will define layers of well-founded sets, each of which being a set of sets excluding the paradox of being an element of itself.

(2) CCL will have to integrate existence not as a concept, but as an act, otherwise CCL would merely express an idea of existence. If *efficiency* is an element of its language, it will appear by expressing a transcendantal relation towards the objects which it defines. To do that, CCL will use a language consisting of a set of identities making syntactical elements which do not refer to identities themselves. It will be called *ε-language*. This language is the mathematical theory of an *efficiency state*: it constitutes an axiomatic system of the Mahāyānist principle of Mutually Relative Reality, which expresses this inalienable interdependence of the Knower and the Known specific to each instant of factual experience. Among the terms of this *ε-language*, there can be found: *efficiency, ε-connection, causality, conditionality*, called Γ*-ity*, the *punctor*. Please note that *efficiency* does not perform the part of the individual, specific to the foundation of a set theory; it is not located outside the theory and furthermore it is not the first link of a deductive chain. If *efficiency* is considered as a concept, thus as a

determination, then it is a matter of the *efficiency* concerning the former state: any *determination* of *efficiency* constitutes a new *efficiency state*. In other words, the *ε-language* does not have the transcendantal character of a language in relation to the objects of its semantic field, because it is implied in the very act of efficiency. The universe of CCL is perpetually unstable: any item of the *efficiency state* is in a transient state between the non-determined and the determined. The *ε-language* plays the part of a transition between the metaphysical and the logical.

(3) A *determination* expresses conceptually how the factual experience of the *efficiency state* is organized: the elements of the *ε-connections* of efficiency resolve into a set of significant values called *σ-ities*, united by relations. One calls *σ-language* the mathematics of this universe of *σ-ities* referred to as Σ. This universe is perpetually changing: to each *efficiency state* corresponds a new state of Σ, showing itself as a conceptual mark of *efficiency*. We will show that this *σ-language* can be interpreted in the mathematical theory of *topos*, i.e.: a set of formal objects, in this case the *σ-ities*, plus a set of arrows linking them to make up diagrams. A diagram in a given state of Σ represents a set of significant values within a given context. The notions of existence or non-existence of a thing will appear as an ordered set of isomorphic diagrams of *σ-ities* within a sequence of successive states of that Σ universe.

(4) These *determinations* cannot be those of a situation of interdependence. As we have seen, a *determination* expresses an *ε-connection*; indeed, it expresses, conceptually, how reality is organized in accordance with the system contemplated. But this *determination* is only such because of its insertion in a significant structure. Thus, according to CCL, that structure determines the notion of reality. Each of its items is endowed with the same reality value towards the others. In other words, no item of the *ε-connection* will assume a more predominent role than another, none will define the others because CCL does not conceive a linear sequence from an original item: reality is "moment" in the organization of the system. In CCL, the notion of reality is elaborated from a point of *efficiency*. This point, which corresponds to *efficiency* as a notion, constitutes a centre, a starting point for deduction. The notion of deductive inference is not

unknown to CCL, it develops from this ontological moment marked by *efficiency*.

LAST QUESTION: WHAT WILL BE THE FIELD OF APPLICATION OF CCL?

(1) CCL seeks to constitute a general methodology of systems. Already, the language of CCL could permit an accurate distinction between purely deductive systems and so-called natural systems. A formal system, a mathematical theory, for example, could be a set of structures, entirely determined in a single *efficiency state*; conversely, a natural system could be defined within a series of states, each of them representing a local formalization of the system. From there onwards, one can consider the demonstration of theorems concerning the validity of those situations, one can hope for a generalization of notions established from deductive systems such as *consistency*. One can even consider a generalization of Gödel's theorem. Let it be noted, by the way, that the semantic notion of truth lies on a founder act, the instant of *efficiency*. That is why the truth of a formal system, entirely determined in a state of the eidetic field, will never form the subject of a proposition which can be demonstrated within the system itself.

(2) The difference between purely formal demonstration, and reasoning as an act of thought, appears in the distinction between these two dimensions of CCL: horizontally, the dynamism of reasoning, vertically, the static character of formal demonstration. One can consider applications of CCL to the epistemology of scientific discovery, one can attempt to formulate laws governing it.

(3) One can consider an application of CCL to the problems of defining the existence of a thing. Indeed, in any evolutive or transformist system, there always arises, from the ontological point of view, the problem of the origin of beings. Without being able here to expound the famous chapters of the Prasannapadā the *Critique du Mouvement* or the *Critique des Notions d'Extrémité*, because of their length and complexity, it is possible to say that this problem of the logical and ontological instant from which a thing is said to exist, or not exist any more, is, so to speak, one of the purple passages of the

Mādhyamika dialectic. One has thus every right to expect CCL not to betray its sources of inspiration!

(4) The notion of *ε-connection* expresses, so to speak, a notion of factual concomitance of items permitting us to state reality. The notion of factual equivalence will result from this *ε-connection*. According to CCL, *determinations* are factual *a priori* and analytical *a posteriori*. One could perhaps consider a formal treatment of the notion of semantic content in relation to its context of statement.

CCL WILL NOT BE A UNIVERSAL SYSTEM

This text constitutes only a brief presentation of CCL whose concepts and language will be expounded in further publications.

In conclusion, there remains the following objection: since CCL has the constitutive elements of a formal system, a language, demonstrative rules, would it claim to be a universal system? This would be the case if CCL presented itself as the primary determinant of any system. We will see, however, on expounding its formalism, that the very terms of CCL are themselves rendered relative as significant values by *efficiency*. The latter, when considered as the internal dynamism of CCL, not being a *determination*, absorbs all the *determinations*.

CCL does not start from any statement of existence; in other words from an expression, always specific, of that which, by essence, eludes all determination, because it is the lack inherent in all *determination*.

CCL integrates, in a certain way, the metaphysical dimension of existence, by taking as a foundation the helplessness of the *said* to fully express the nature of the act of *saying*.

The fundamental nature of the stater is not to be found at the end of the statement, and any attempt to explicate Reality will imply this very Reality at the basis of the act of stating. Consequently, stating what Reality is, appears as a never ending process, every system only veiling by its determination what it reveals by its lack in determination.

Faithful in that to the axiom of the *śūnyatāśūnyatā*, CCL is a way of saying that there is no such thing as a universal system.

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NOTES

[1] See [27].

[2] Various solutions have been proposed to deal with these fictitious objects and the means to distinguish them from current objects by the following authors: Hailperin-Leblanc, Lejewski, Leonard, Rescher, Schock. I shall not, here, expound in detail, these logics so-called "without existence assumptions". The reader may consult the book of R. Schock [20].

[3] *pratītyasamutpāda* in Sanskrit.

[4] *asmin sati idam bhavati.*

[5] This is S. Yamaguchi's translation of the Sanskrit term *śūnya*. See [28].

[6] According to medieval scholasticism, substance would be endowed with *inseity* but without *aseity*.

[7] Without going into minute detail, let us say that, historically, the Mādhyamika trend divided itself in two branches, starting in the VIth century: *Prāsaṅgika* and *Svātantrika*. The first represent the most radical tendency: they do not present any thesis of their own, using only the arguments of their opponent to lead them to a *reductio ad absurdum*. According to the Svātantrika point of view, an independant argument can be admitted in a refutation of the opposing thesis. To which the Prāsaṅgika reply by insisting that to propose an independent argument amounts to giving the opponent new weapons. This controversy between Prāsaṅgika, represented by Candrakīrti, and Svātantrika, represented by Bhāvaviveka, fills the whole first chapter of the Prasannapadā translated by Stcherbatsky in *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* [23].

[8] The upholders of the Madhyamaka had constantly to fight the accusation of nihilism. As we will see later, it is absolutely necessary to reason according to a logic void of all realism in order to understand that the Mādhyamika dialectic is much more than a mere game for sophists.

[9] In his translation of the first chapter of the Prasannapadā ([23], p. 110), Stcherbatsky attributed the term of logical consistency to Candrakīrti which, in my opinion, leads to dangerous confusions, some examples of which will be seen below.

[10] *rang ri rang sal* in Tibetan.

[11] For Vijñānavadin, as for Carnap, things are elaborated by the mind, the law of logical construction being "causality" for the first, "similarity" for the second. For a comparison of these two methods, please consult [24] and [5].

[12] The demonstration of the purely formal meaning of these three components defining conditioned entities is the subject of the whole seventh chapter of the Prasannapadā. See [17], pp. 106—142.

[13] *Kalpayati* or hypostatising function of the mind. See [17], note 64.

[14] Consult ref. [18].

[15] See [18], p. 388.

[16] See [10], pp. 76—77.

[17] See [14], pp. 86—88, and [9], pp. 223—273.

[18] See [17], Chap. II, *Critique du Mouvement*, pp. 70—71, and Chap. VI, *Critique de la Concupiscence et de son Sujet*, pp. 100—101.

[19] Consult ref. [15].

[20] In Sanskrit terminology 0(*kṣaṇikatva, A*): momentariness occurs in locus *A*. See [15], p. 9.

[21] Some of these attempts are mentioned by D. S. Ruegg in [19].

[22] *ngeu por djin pa* in Tibetan: realistic apprehension.

[23] In this text, the word identity will not be used in the sense of mathematical equality; its meaning here will be rather that of an objective entity endowed with permanent features which permit us to designate it.

[24] See [7], vol. I, pp. 101—102.

[25] ". . . La réalité absolute coïncide avec la réalité de surface en tant qu'elle l'annule; et tout son être consiste dans cette annulation." See [17], p. 19.

[26] The meaning of these terms will be clarified later on.

[27] This term is specific to CCL, strictly speaking, it is not the translation of a sanskrit term; it rather explains one of the nuances of the terms *na yujyate* and the like.

[28] See Tarski [25].

[29] "The negation may be expressed either in a single grammatical word — namely a descriptive (*karmadhāraya*) or possessive (*bahuvrīhi*) compound made up of a term preceded by the negative member *a* — or in a sentence predicate containing a verbally bound negative particle — i.e. *na* +verb in Sanskrit. The negation is therefore formally either term-negation or predicate-negation. While the first syntactic form corresponds to relational negation (*paryudāsapratiṣedha*) as defined by the Indian grammarians, the second syntactic form answers to the definition of absolute negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)". The drawback of the denomination "absolute negation" adopted by D. S. Ruegg is that it is somewhat ambigous, hence it will not appear in the language of CCL.

[30] This writing, and similarly those which will follow throughout the statement of the refutation of the tetralemma, have only a metaphorical sense, meant to schematize the statement; on no account can they be considered as representative of the language of CCL.

[31] "In philosophical usage *prasajyapratiṣedha* is pure negation in which no opposed (contradictory) thing is posited even by implication." See [19], note 10.

[32] "It is noteworthy also that Bhāvaviveka regards the Mādhyamika propositions (*pratijñā*) consisting in the negation of the four positions as belonging despite their verbalized form and consequent discursivity (*prapañca*), not to the level of surface convention (*saṃvṛti*) to which the *prapañca* is normally assigned, but rather to a special form of *paramārtha* that entails construction (*abhisaṃskāra*). This level is termed pure worldly knowledge in order to distinguish it from the supramundane nature of the supreme *paramārtha*, which is quite free from *prapañca* and cannot therefore be verbalized." See [19], pp. 20—21.

[33] The Madhyamaka will rather use the predicate negation than the negation of the copula. See [18], pp. 3—22, and [3], pp. 11—13.

[34] "The problem arises because Indian logic is basically an epistemic logic which, therefore, cannot be extensional like truth-functional logic." See [3], p. 10.

[35] See [19], App. II.

[36] “. . . the Mādhyamika commentators of both the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, have taken the negation of the four positions to be of the *prasajya* or absolute kind. This means that the negation of the first position does not commit the person who maintains it to the affirmation of the opposite statement, corresponding to the second position. And the same principle holds for the negation of the other positions.” See [19], p. 20.

[37] See R. Schock [20].

[38] “All is just so, or not just so, both just so and not just so, neither just so nor not just so.” Mūlamadhyamakakārikā of Nāgārjuna quoted by D. S. Ruegg [19], p. 6.

[39] See [6], Chap. 21, p. 352.

[40] See [21], number 6, p. 171.

[41] In this context of comparison with the Indian doctrines, it would be quite interesting to consider the possible analogies between Productive Logic and that of the Indian school of the Sāṁkhya.

[42] The above mentioned proposition is a matter for predicate calculus; it is nevertheless possible to consider it here within the framework of propositional calculus.

[43] “. . . La vérité d'une proposition consiste en son accord (ou sa correspondance) avec la réalité.” See [27], p. 270.

[44] See R. Schock's book mentioned above, [20].

[45] In Productive Logic a specific meaning is given to identity and difference: identity is not simple equality ($=$) and difference simple ($\neq$). According to F. Spisani: “. . . The “identic” one is not equal to itself in order to state a simple stasis ($p = p$). The identity produces the difference ($p \supset \sim p$), where $\sim p$ does not signify the total and dogmatic denial of p but a simple difference from p.” In *Principles of Productive Logic* [21], number 1, p. 18.

[46] “. . . dans le Hīnayāna les *dharma* . . . jouissent d'une existence séparée, sont eux-même “autres” bien que liés par le jeu des lois causales.” See [17], note 243.

[47] The Prasannapadā is a book of 27 chapters which have never been translated all in one piece. The most important part (12 chapters), to which I will constantly refer especially because of its abundant and interesting annotations, was translated by Pr. J. May, of the University of Lausanne. See [17].

[48] Efficiency in CCL expresses the notion of causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) of the Vijñānavādin logicians. See [24], Vol. I, part. II, chap. 2, §4.

[49] According to the *kāraṇa-hetu* all elements of the universe are the causes of a given phenomen with the exception of its own self, because nothing can be its own cause, but every thing else can. See [24], vol. II, p. 379, note 5.

[50] “l'agent tire son nom de ce qu'il agit”. See [17], p. 144.

[51] “l'acte, objet direct de l'agent, tire son nom de ce qu'il est objet d'activité”; *ibid.*, p. 144.

[52] *Ibid.*, note 412.

[53] *Ibid.*, notes 33 and 354.

[54] *Ibid.*, note 412.

[55] *Ibid.*, notes 46, 64, 150.

[56] *Ibid.*, note 412.

[57] *Ibid.*, note 319.

[58] “. . . l'agent d'un tel acte ne serait qu'un agent sans acte. . . .” *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[59] “. . . On aurait un acte indépendant de l'agent . . .”. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[61] ". . . un agent réel n'accomplit pas un acte réel". *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[62] "L'agent irréel est celui qui est dépourvu d'activité. Or, l'activité étant cause de la dénomination d'agent, un agent dépourvu d'activité se trouverait sans cause. L'acte irréel est également sans cause.", *ibid.*, p. 146. And also: "un agent irréel serait dépourvu de cause", *ibid.*, p. 152. Please note, however, that the word cause is used in this text in the general sense of "reason of being of" rather than in the specific sense defined by our formalised language.

[63] "Un agent réel-irréel n'accomplit pas d'acte réel-irréel, doué and non doué d'activité". *Ibid.*, p. 150.

[64] It may be useful to insist once more on this point: it is not a question of physical or psychological states, but only ontological states linked by a logical sequence.

[65] "Cause, efficiency or moment are but different names for the same thing.". See [24], vol. I, p. 129.

[66] *parasparāpekṣikī siddhi*, see [23], p. 240.

[67] ". . . l'existence en dépendance mutuelle de toutes les essences sans exception qui se distinguent de l'acte et de l'acte et de l'agent telles que: . . . le tout et la partie, la substance et la qualité, . . .". See [17], p. 155.

[68] See [23], p. 201—203, including the part of the translation of chapter XXV of the Prasannapadā where is refuted the conception of a *Nirvāṇa* which would be "neither Being nor non-Being". See also [17], chap. XXIV, p. 223 and pp. 229—232, on the error of hypostatizing emptiness.

[69] Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti, see [24], vol. II, pp. 1—47. Also translated in the same book the two treatises of Vācaspatimiśra: *On the Buddhist Theory of Perception* (Append. I) as well as *On the Buddhist Theory of a Radical Distinction between Sensation and Conception* (Append. II).

[70] "On the contrary the thing (really) perceived is the particular which is alone the ultimate reality. . . . Therefore it (alone) is the efficient cause of sensation." See [24], vol. I, p. 264.

[71] Although the term inference cannot be used without reservation: "our terminology is so much influenced by Aristotle that we cannot free ourselves enough to find terms corresponding to Indian conceptions. Every synthetic operation of thought, . . . , as opposed to the non-synthetic ideal sense-perception, is inference." See [24], vol. II, p. 47, note 2.

[72] See [5], §75—83 and §108—111.

[73] "Because these (tree and not-tree) are not perceived separately . . . (they are united dialectically the one being simultaneously the affirmation of trees and the negation of non-trees)." Excerpt from Jinendrabuddhi *On the Theory of the Negative Meaning of Names*, translated in [24], vol. I, p. 470.

[74] "Causality is Necessary Dependence of one thing upon others". See [24], vol. I, p. 273. See also in the same book part. II, chap. II: *Causation*.

[75] "But at the same time it has to be recalled that the logical method used by Nāgārjuna is firmly based on a classical two-valued logic founded on the dichotomously structured binary nature of discursive thinking in terms of alternatives." See [19], p. 51.

[76] "Thus well before Russell . . . the Buddha had already put forth a three-valued logic. Besides true and false this logic would admit a third possibility: nonsense, absurdity or incongruity". See [4], p. 28.

[77] See [8] and also [6], chap. 25.

[78] CCL would lead to a generalization of Tarski's work on purely deductive systems. See [25].

[79] "Voidness (*śūnyatā*) is not an existential category, . . . Or to return to the notion of set, it does not correspond to null-set". See [4], p. 60.

[80] "An individual is needed in order to serve as the *foundation* of the universe". See [1], p. 24.

[81] "All sets are well-founded", *ibid.*, p. 94.

[82] "The bottom layer consists of all individuals", *ibid.*, p. 87.

[83] ". . . (in ZF which does not admit individuals the bottom layer is empty) . . . Whether there are individuals or not, in the second layer we get the null-set 0", *ibid.*, p. 87.

[84] See [5], §68.

[85] See [17], chap. II.

[86] *Ibid.*, chap. XI.

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ANINDITA NIYOGI BALSLEV

AN APPRAISAL OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONTROVERSIES CENTERING AROUND THE NO-SELF DOCTRINE OF BUDDHISM

The History of Ideas in India and the West witnesses a perplexing variety of views concerning the phenomenon of I-consciousness. Nobody doubts its central place in our mental life,[1] nobody questions the indispensability of the word 'I' as an essential component of our conventional language yet the phenomenon remains "the most puzzling puzzle."[2] In other words, that there is such an awareness (*pratīti*) or that there is such a word (*śabda*) are not matters of any controversy. Philosophical disagreements arise only when one attempts to account for the phenomenon and investigates what forms the basis for this awareness or what the word 'I' really does point to. It is in this process that the many inherent difficulties become explicit, different views gradually emerge.

A survey of Indian thought leaves no doubt that the ancient Indian thinkers were fully aware of the subtleties and complexities of the issue in question. Rich in alternative conceptual models, the schools of Indian philosophy put forward their views along distinctly different lines.

Before we proceed to take an over-all view of the Buddhist understanding of the phenomenon of I-consciousness, it is important to make the following observation. It is often said that soteriology is the ultimate concern of Indian thought — Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina alike. It is indeed essential to keep in mind that this by no means has hindered an intense search in the conceptual exploration in the Indian philosophical context. The variety of views concerning I-consciousness, amongst other issues, that are present in the Indian history of ideas, bears witness to this remarkable characteristic. This is to be noted especially while reviewing the Buddhist position in the light of the controversies centering around the no-self view (*anātmavāda*) as such. The issue of I-consciousness, being central to any soteriological scheme, has received due attention in both the *Ātma-* and *Anātmavāda* traditions. The analytical approach in the different

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systems gives rise to distinct models. The rival theories work out differently the psychological, epistemological, ethical and metaphysical aspects of the question.

A consideration of the Buddhist philosophical analyses of I-consciousness points to characteristics which distinguish the positions from the traditional Brahmanical formulations. It is precisely this essential difference that plays a crucial role in designating Buddhism as *Anātmavāda* — the negative particle 'an' being added to a term which is the other name of Brahmanism.

It is therefore useful to be familiar with at least the basic philosophical traits of the Brahmanical theories on the subject which set a contrasting pattern and thereby put in relief the Buddhist conceptual models that emerged in course of history. Since it is not possible at this point to go into the details of the conceptual models that Brahmanical preoccupation with the question has given rise to, let us make only a few brief observations. This is essential in order to form an opinion about the controversial issue of self or no-self in the Buddhist context.

Brahmanism is inspired by the central philosophical insights contained in the exegetical texts of the Upanisads. The tradition has, however, worked out gradually distinct philosophical positions with regard to the phenomenon of I-consciousness. The disagreements amongst the Brahmanical schools concerning the notion of I, its status and its cognition are related to their respective understanding of the idea of ātman. However, despite the variations in their views it is never to be lost sight of that there is no exception to the general conceptual pattern, viz. the ātman is ever-identical, unchanging, knows of no beginning or end. Ātman is ontological and can never be reduced to the changing states of consciousness. The pattern of argument remains, generally speaking, as the famous Bhamati puts it: Yeṣu vyāvartamāneṣu yad anuvartate tat tebhya bhinnam — 'that which is constant in whatever is variable is different from the latter.'[3]

Another important feature to take note of in this connection is the relevance of the Brahmanical treatment of time for the notion of the immutable ātman, which is the prime concern of the tradition.

Time is a vast subject and a matter of separate study.[4] However, its impact on major issues of a given system can hardly be underplayed. Despite the pronounced differences in their views, it may be observed, that in all Brahmanical systems the ātman remains outside the influence of time (*kālaprabhāvamukta*). In other words, whether a specific Brahmanical school advocates the reality of absolute time or considers it to be merely phenomenal, whether it maintains time to be discrete or denies altogether the notion of an empty time, the different conceptual structures without any exception make room for a category which is not encompassed by time. Ātman is unsublatable by time, no matter whether the conceptual scheme is committed to non-dualism, dualism or pluralism.

This idea of the abiding self — in and through all its variations — received a severe challenge with the advent of Buddhism. Buddhism as a tradition decried the notion as an unwarrantable assumption, which is logically absurd, psychologically superfluous, ethically and soteriologically even a hindrance. *Anātmavāda* becomes the distinguishing mark, nay the other name of Buddhism.

Now, let us note that Buddhism, like Brahmanism, is not just one but a matrix of systems. It has been mentioned that there is no uniform view of '*ātman*', or of '*aham*' for that matter, in the Brahmanical tradition and yet there is adherence to a common conceptual pattern. Similarly it seems that various interpretations and understandings of *anātmavāda* and consequently of I-consciousness can be found in the different phases of the development of the Buddhist tradition, which saw the rise of specific schools. But before examining these different views it is necessary to add that whether a theory supports or rejects the notion of an identical, abiding self, it has to account for the phenomenon of I-consciousness which no one can doubt or deny. In this paper references will be made to texts and views belonging to different phases of Buddhism in order to obtain an overall view of the problem. The emphasis is on discerning a conceptual pattern which the theories share while delving into the technicalities of the question.

We all know that it is not to any revealed text but to the sermons of Gautama Buddha that *Anātmavāda* owes its origin.

It is especially the second sermon — the *Anāttālakkhaṇa Sutta* which is considered to be providing the key idea. An analysis is undertaken — of which we omit the details — which suggests that there is nothing perdurable in the psychophysical complex (*nāma-rūpa*) that the individual is identical with. It shows the vain and illusory character of the idea of a permanent self, having no basis in reality.

The idea *sarve dharmāh anātmanah*, i.e. all is without self, is said to be one of the three characteristics (*trilakṣana*) of all existence. This idea is intimately related to the other two characteristics, viz, all is impermanent (*sarvam anityam*) and all is suffering (*sarvam duhkham*). One could also refer to a number of sutras which carry out the analysis in this manner.

The following is only a brief outline of some of the key ideas for the purpose of showing how the question of I-consciousness acquires a novel dimension in the Buddhist context. Note that in this conceptual frame, no ātman could be pointed to as the basis of such an awareness like in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account. It can be seen that the idea of the individual as nothing but an aggregate of momentary elements gradually becomes commonplace. The doctrine of *pança-skandha* exerts a profound influence on Buddhist thought. The Buddhists took the bold step to interpret mental life purely in terms of a process, where the chain of conscious moments adheres to the law of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). The well-known formula is 'that being this is' (*asmin sati idam bhavati*). In other words, no event is a haphazard, arbitrary occurrence but is necessarily dependent on some other factor. The Buddhist philosophers have repeatedly kept on arguing that it is needless — logically or psychologically — to postulate a permanent self as a substratum or as a unifying principle. The identical self that I-consciousness is believed to point to is explained as an erroneous belief due to the recurrence of similar conscious moments (*ati-sadṛśa tādātmya bhrama*). There are many interesting details which are to be omitted in this short sketch. What is significant from the perspective of philosophy of language is the gradual emergence of the idea that the term 'self'/'soul' is a mere word and has no referent in reality.

The ethical implications of the idea of '*anātman*' is evident from the early as well as later texts. It is taken as a very effective moral tool in order to cultivate detachment from all sense of I-ness and my-ness (*ahamkāra, mamakāra*) — the chief obstacles for spiritual pursuit. The 'I' is a conceptual construction (*vikalpa pratyaya*). It is either one or a combination of skandhas that is referred to as 'I'. This philosophical insight is worked out with power and skill in the well-known dialogue between the monk Nāgasena and the king Milinda.[5] As a matter of fact, it is scattered through many texts in Samyutta Nikāya. Dhammapāda could also be cited.

In other words, the rejection of the idea of a non-temporal self, as standing apart from the conscious states, induces the setting up of alternative theories concerning I-consciousness. The impact of this philosophical event on such areas as epistemology and psychology alone makes it an important subject of study. Especially interesting are the later Buddhist philosophical works which demonstrate that phenomena like consciousness of consciousness, memory, recognition, as well as ethical and soteriological ventures can be accounted for on the Buddhist premise, which demands a thorough rejection of the idea of a permanent self. There are many documents of the refutation of this idea throughout the different phases of the development of Buddhism.

Mention must be made of the Sautrāntika school which rendered an invaluable service to the cause of no-self theory. It provided a logical device for rejecting any claim to the reality of the permanent. Employing the idea of causal efficiency as the criterion of reality, the so-called permanent entity is shown to be fictitious. The idea of the permanent self meets with the same fate. It is also interesting to note the novel way time as instant and being as instantaneous are made to coincide ontologically, in which case their so-called separation is attributed only to an arbitrary linguistic convention. This idea at one stroke annuls any idea of a static or a substance-view of reality.

The Brahmanical philosophers were fully conscious that no conception of ātman, of which there are several versions in the Brahmanical systems, was compatible with this Buddhist theory of *kṣanabhangavāda*. The attempts to repudiate the idea are well-known.

On the other hand, the Buddhist philosophers were no less conscious of the challenges that the idea offered to its opponents. In this connection attention may be drawn to the comment made by the respected Buddhist philosopher Kamalaśīla. In his Tattva-saṃgraha pañjikā, he pointedly remarks that the Buddhists did not need to reject the metaphysical entities posited by their opponents one by one; the idea that they disappear immediately after their appearance without leaving any trace (*ahetuka-niranvaya-vināśa*) alone could demolish those views.

Nevertheless, that the rejection of the idea of an abiding self is no easy and simple intellectual enterprise can be seen documented within the frame of the Buddhist tradition itself. A review of the Pudgalavada and Sunyavada discussions is especially significant.

In the Abhidharmakośa and Kathāvastu we find reference to the Vātsiputrīyas.[5] Their theory — *pudgalavāda* — merits attention as it represents a view which sought a compromising stand. They thought that without a unifying principle our mental life will be reduced into a plurality of psychical factors and therefore to a chaos. *Pudgalavāda* was the result of an attempt to do without the postulation of a permanent subject outside the aggregates and was based on an awareness conscious of the difficulties inherent in a position which accepted the reality of the *skandhas* alone. The idea never got assimilated in the mainstream of Buddhism. Various objections were raised by the different Buddhist schools. Some even considered them as pseudo-Buddhists.[7] The idea of *pudgala* was mainly opposed, because it could not be categorically taken to be momentary in so far as it is considered to be distinct from the aggregates.

Again, the Mādhyamika dialectical analysis represents an awareness of the limitations not only of *Ātmavāda* but also of the *Ābhidhārmika* understanding of the teachings of the Buddha, viz, the radical no-self view. The *Pudgalavāda* compromise is also criticized. A thorough scrutiny of the views of self as well as of the views of time are undertaken only to demonstrate their untenability.[8] The emphasis is to focus on the idea that the Real as *Śūnya* is free from conceptual construction.

Special mention must be made of the remarkable attempt to bridge the conceptual opposition of the *Ātma-* and *Anātmavāda* by Candrakīrti. The teachings concerning the self and the no-self are unravelled as nothing but conceptual devices (*upāya-kauśalya*)[9] with a definite spiritual aim. To those who are inclined towards nihilism the Buddha taught the existence of self in order to point out that Karma continues. On the other hand, the no-self view is taught to those who are dogmatically attached to the self.

The idealistic phase of Indian Buddhism saw the rise of the school of Yogācāra—Vijñānavāda. An elaborate study of consciousness was attempted which brought deep insights into various aspects of the problem. The question of I-consciousness obtains a new significance in the context of the notions of *manovijñāna, pravṛtti-vijñāna* and *ālaya-vijñāna.*[10] Omitting the details, let us note that the operation of *manas* is invariably connected with the imposition of an ego. This itself is *satkāya* or *ātma-dṛsti* which projects a '*pudgala*' on the *upādāna-skandha* and genders thereby *ātma-moha, ātma-māna* and *ātma-prema.*

All these ideas with which the principal schools were concerned when worked out fully will amply disclose the important contribution of Indian Buddhism to the issue of I-consciousness. The controversies amongst the Buddhist philosophers themselves is a fascinating study.

In this connection, a few words may be added to another genre of controversy concerning *Anātmavāda.* A few scholars have raised objections against the traditional understanding. They maintain that either it is a misunderstanding or a later interpolation by Buddhist scholars who cherished hostility against the Brahmanical tradition.[11]

Again, there are others who attempted to read directly some form of *ātmavāda* into the Nikāya literature[12] and came to the conclusion that the early *sūtras* were intended to mean what the self, is not and *not* that there is no self.

We are however inclined to believe that such a reading is unwarranted. If *Anātmavāda* were not already ingrained in the very beginning of Buddhist thought its subsequent development would remain unaccounted for. The Sarvāstivāda formulation of the idea and its more conscious Sautrāntika version cannot be passed only to be a later development, as not being really justified by the early texts, the basic sources of Buddhism.

It is noteworthy that the difficulties, of which the subsequent Buddhist philosophers were aware, were never sought to be resolved on the premise of Ātmavāda. For example, the dissension of the Vātsiputrīyas is not made in the line of any form of eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*). It is not *Ātmavāda* but *Pudgalavāda* that they advanced as a theory. The Vātsiputrīya and the Mādhyamika reviews of the Ābhidhārmika analysis of the individual are full of significance. These bear witness not only to the sharp and critical observations of these Buddhist philosophers on the issue in question but also demonstrate that they were equally aware of the philosophical implications and consequences of *Ātmavāda*. Buddhist soteriology at no stage sought a reassertion of this model. It is undoubtedly a distinct tradition – *Anātmavāda* is no arbitrary designation. The later phases of Buddhist thought can be seen interpreting and re-interpreting the early Buddhist documents, drawing support from various teachings of the Buddha himself. Their respective versions of Buddhist philosophy vary considerably but none of them has endorsed the idea of a static self (*sthira-ātmavāda*). The variations in the interpretations of *Anātmavāda* within the frame of Buddhist tradition speak for the analytical skill and the vigorous intellectual effort of the Buddhist thinkers. They show the important steps in the development of the theoretical approach to the question of I-consciousness.

It is tempting to observe that the designations of *Ātma-* and *Anātmavāda* can be seen as providing the hollow forms into which ideas are cast to bring out a variety of views, which know of no monotony. The world of Indian philosophy is not monolithic. These labels, so to speak, help us to identify the fundamental philosophical paradigms which operate in a set of conceptual models. The designation of *Anātmavāda* indicates precisely the departure from a substance-oriented view. The expression almost has a polemical vehemence which asserts its distinction from *Ātmavāda*. It does not seem justified to imply that the term is merely a linguistic trick to camouflage one form or other of *Ātmavāda*. It can be seen, on the contrary, as overthrowing a paradigm in an attempt to understand, analyze and reconceptualize diverse aspects of the problem afresh. It provides an alternative perspective to the question by challenging the conventional theories of self. Any attempt to read *Ātmavāda* in any phase of Buddhism fails to appreciate that soteriology can be worked out on a philosophical premise which does not make use of the *Ātma-*paradigm.

The point that this paper seeks to make is not an assertion of any eventual triumph or defeat of one paradigm alone but to stress that there is no reason to underplay the *anātma*-model. It is evident that the no-self view has been a source of several conceptual systems, providing inspiration not only to its advocates but also to its adversaries to rethink and reformulate their stands. A consideration of the variety of views concerning the crucial issue of I-consciousness in

Indian thought makes one aware of the usefulness of the nomenclatures of *Ātmavāda* and *Anātmavāda* for schematizations of philosophical strategies.

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Department of Philosophy
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A.

ANDREW O. FORT

BEYOND PLEASURE: ŚAṄKARA ON BLISS

The advaitin understanding of bliss (ānanda) does not suggest conventional notions of pleasure or ecstasy. According to Śaṅkara, advaita's progenitor, bliss is obtained only by those who become desireless after following the path of renunciation. Further, the nearest analogue for bliss is not love or sexual union, but deep, dreamless sleep. Given Śaṅkara's assumption that non-dual, utterly unconditioned brahman, the ultimate reality, is itself bliss, this conception of ānanda is quite understandable — if, perhaps, disappointing to duality-bound mortals.

Śaṅkara's comments on bliss are generally brief; he rarely mentions bliss beyond references made necessary by specific Upaniṣadic quotations.[1] He attempts to make even these references conform to his own understanding of bliss. He seems reluctant to accept bliss as a central property of brahman, equivalent to being (sat) and consciousness (cit).[2]

For Śaṅkara, the bliss of brahman is not "enjoyed" or "experienced" as are our temporary, body-bound pleasures. These pleasures, tied to body and sense conditioning, are inherently limited, part of the lower, dualistic world of everyday experience (vyavahāra). Conditioned joys bring with them their opposite — suffering and sorrow; brahman bliss, on the other hand, is perpetual. Put another way, momentary good feelings are not eternally pure non-duality. Ultimately, Śaṅkara holds that one (even when liberated) cannot "experience" the highest bliss, for such bliss is not an aspect (or "sheath") of brahman which a subject could experience as object. Bliss is brahman, and brahman is bliss.

As mentioned above, deep sleep (suṣupta/i) is considered the closest analogy for bliss in advaita.[3] Both are effortless, restful, and "natural". The nightly sense-unification and cessation of otherness in sleep intimate the bliss arising from liberation; both sleep and bliss are also free from desire and fear.[4] On the other hand, although the sleeper "becomes one" as if attaining brahman bliss, he remains

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ignorant and must return to waking, unlike after attaining brahman bliss.[5] Possibly for this reason, Śaṅkara does not emphasize the connection of sleep and bliss; even sleep is too dualistic and ignorant.[6]

Unlike some other strands of Indian thought, Śaṅkara and his followers ignore or reject any imagery of love and/or sexual union in the context of bliss. This might seem slightly surprising, if one considers lovers' ecstatic union an attempt to overcome duality or separation. However, since there is never any real separation from brahman, no re-union is necessary or even possible. Śaṅkara either ignores or condemns the so-called "bliss" of sexual pleasure (rati, etc.).[7] This apparently attractive conditioned bliss reinforces the individual's desires and 'I' notion, thus must be soundly rejected. Renunciation and freedom from worldly pleasures are the only route to realizing the bliss of non-dual brahman.

With these remarks in mind, let us turn to Śaṅkara's Upaniṣad commentaries in more detail, beginning with the Taittirīya Upaniṣad. As is well-known, the Taittirīya Upaniṣad introduces a model of five "sheaths" which, moving progressively inward, concludes with a sheath consisting of bliss (ānandamaya).[8]

BLISS IN THE TAITTIRĪYA UPANIṢAD

Taittirīya II. 5 states that the self consisting of bliss[9] is other than and superior to the self consisting of consciousness (vijñānamaya). It has the form of a person (puruṣa), with joy (priya) as head, pleasure (moda, pramoda) as sides, bliss as self (i.e. body), and brahman as basis.

As one might expect, Śaṅkara will not accept such an anthropomorphic, "saguṇa" conception of the self. He explains that the self consisting of bliss is here discussed in the context of "effect" (kārya) selves, and the -maya suffix means "modification' (vikāra). So, this self in the form of a person is a modification of bliss, as a person's form is a modification of food (annamaya). The true self has no "head" or "limbs", or any limitations. Thus, the true self is bliss, and one consisting of bliss is a modification or effect of it.[10]

Śaṅkara continues that the mind, as it becomes purer (through renunciation and knowledge), becomes increasingly detached and serene (prasanna). Containing more bliss, the mind expands and bestows bliss, a portion of which all beings live on.[11] With hundredfold increasing degrees of bliss, one eventually reaches the complete cessation of desire — thus bliss overcomes desire.

Śaṅkara concludes that knowing the highest brahman is the real aim in describing the five sheaths. Brahman is within the sheaths, and they possess the self through it. Thus, even the "sheath" consisting of bliss is part of brahman, which alone is the non-dual abode of duality imagined by ignorance.[12]

Commenting on Taittirīya II. 7, Śaṅkara explains the connection between obtaining delight (rasa) and becoming blissful.[13] Although wise brahmans are desireless and do not pursue blisses by external (i.e. lower, transient) means, they are still seen to be full of bliss, as if having obtained an external delight (rasa). Śaṅkara seems here to be suggesting "rasa" is a "feeling", particularly a pleasurable feeling. If so, he is saying desireless brāhmaṇs experience the most delightful "feeling" of all – brahman. This "brahman rasa" is therefore the cause of bliss. Here as elsewhere, Śaṅkara wants to establish brahman as the source of all, including bliss, and to characterize desirelessness as the highest bliss.

Śaṅkara says that Taittirīya II. 8 is largely an inquiry (mīmāṁsā) into the forms of bliss — for humans, gandharvas, the pitṛs, and various gods. Each later, higher bliss is one hundredfold the former. Śaṅkara starts his commentary with a question: is the bliss (primarily) under discussion merely a worldly (laukika) bliss arising from the conjunction of subject and object, or is it "essential" (svābhāvika), i.e. inherently brahman?

Śaṅkara begins by asserting that the highest worldly bliss helps one to understand the bliss "which turns away objects" (i.e. brahman bliss). Worldly bliss is a measure of brahman bliss; the degree of worldly bliss one experiences varies with the power of ignorance, action, and connection with objects. The desireless wise experience hundredfold increases in lower blisses until brahman bliss is attained. Even when the subject-object division (the realm of worldly blisses), made by ignorance, ceases, the "essential" non-dual bliss still remains.

Thus, while dualistic worldly bliss is lower, it is a measure of, and points to, the inherent non-dual bliss of brahman. Following scripture, Śaṅkara here stresses continuity within degrees of bliss. There *are* important distinctions, however. Even a rich, happy, and world-ruling king has only a human bliss;[14] the bliss of a gandharva, who has a subtle body and senses, with the power of invisibility, is one hundred times more than human bliss. The gandharvas, since less obstructed (pratighāta) than humans, have serene minds (citta-prasāda), thus manifest happiness.

Śaṅkara then returns to his emphasis on desirelessness as the highest bliss. He says that learnedness in the Veda (śrotriya) and sinlessness (avṛjina) exist among all students of the wise, but the extent of affliction by desire (kāmahata) varies. The less one is afflicted by desire, the happier one is, and complete freedom from desire is the means to the very highest bliss. Thus, when utterly unafflicted by desire, one learned in the Veda attains brahman bliss.

Śaṅkara closes with an analogy: in the everyday world, brahman bliss is separated into parts (mātra) like drops in an ocean. When the parts become one, one attains the highest, naturally non-dual, bliss, in which there is no bliss/bliss-enjoyer separation. So the bliss primarily under discussion here is the highest bliss, by nature non-dual (thus, ātman/brahman), and not the worldly bliss born of subject/object conjunction.[15]

Śaṅkara mentions bliss one more time in the Taittirīya (III. 6), where the Upaniṣad states that Bhṛgu knew brahman as bliss, after knowing it as food, vital breath, etc. Bhṛgu, says Śaṅkara, also saw the pure self within beings by tapas (asceticism), and gradually entered into that self until he reached the highest bliss in brahman. Śaṅkara concludes that tapas (unmentioned in the Upaniṣad) provides entry to the highest bliss by which one becomes and resides in brahman.

Two points about Śaṅkara's interpretation are worth making here. First, Śaṅkara consistently emphasizes that bliss comes from renunciation and desirelessness, not from indulging human desires. The highest bliss is opposed to ever-changing worldly desires, which lie in the realm of duality. Second, even when bliss is clearly the Upaniṣad's focal point, Śaṅkara focuses on brahman. If the Upaniṣad praises bliss highly, brahman, the ultimate reality, must be the real subject. For these reasons, it is small wonder that brahman bliss is superior to conventional worldly "blisses".

BLISS IN THE BṚHADĀRAṆYAKA UPANIṢAD

Bliss is discussed at some length twice in Śaṅkara's Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BāU) commentary; Śaṅkara here continues his "brahman-centric" reading. BāU III. 9. 28. 7 states that brahman is knowledge (vijñāna) and bliss. Śaṅkara explores the equation of knowledge and bliss; both are said to be calm, serene, and always satisfying (nitya-tṛpta). A distinction is then again made between worldly bliss, or happiness (sukha),[16] and the bliss of brahman. While happiness (i.e. worldly bliss) is certainly knowable (saṁvedya), it is not clear from śruti whether or not brahman bliss is knowable. How can one "know" the highest brahman bliss?

Śaṅkara's response to this question is that there is no knowing (vijñāna) without a body and its sense-organs, and liberation (i.e. attaining brahman bliss) is complete separation from the body. Liberation thus has no "knowing" of a dualistic kind, for no body/sense collocation remains which allows one to know brahman (and its blissful nature) as an other. Realizing brahman is like throwing a handful of water into a water tank; after either is accomplished, all separateness disappears. Śaṅkara concludes that the notion of a liberated being possessing the (everyday) knowledge "I am bliss" contradicts the oneness of brahman and all scriptural teaching.

From another perspective, however, brahman never *doesn't* know it is bliss, for bliss is its nature. If brahman's knowing (itself as) bliss were interrupted, the self would then have another object (than itself), and would be non-eternal. For advaitins, of course, the flaw of mutability (vikriyā) of the self is unacceptable. Therefore, Śaṅkara writes, the highest knowledge and bliss are aspects of brahman's essential nature, and are not conventionally knowable. All distinctions of happiness and sorrow are delusive superimpositions arising from contact with adventitious adjuncts like the body and senses. Śaṅkara concludes that all scriptural passages concerning ānanda should be understood like the second Bṛhadāraṇyaka passage mentioning bliss, BāU IV. 3. 32 ("this is the highest bliss").

BāU IV. 3 discusses various states of consciousness, particularly deep, dreamless sleep. Desireless and objectless sleep is considered a foretaste of non-dual brahman. Verses 32—3 glorify sleep as the highest world, goal, and bliss. IV. 3. 32 states that beings live on a measure of this bliss, and verse 33, like Taittirīya II. 8, describes various forms of bliss.

In fact, Śaṅkara makes many of the same points here that he made in Taittirīya II. 8. He differentiates the highest (i.e. brahman) bliss from transient blisses linked with objects and senses. When another is seen and known, that is only a small, mortal happiness (sukha).[17] Beings are separated from the higher bliss by ignorance, and are imagined thereby as other than brahman. Still, although ignorant, beings live by the connection of objects and senses with a measure of this bliss.[18]

After IV. 3. 33, Śaṅkara continues to elucidate the hierarchy of blisses. As stated above, all beings, from Brahmā to humans, live on a measure of bliss. The highest bliss, while ultimately one, is known by parts (measures), which emerge from it. The apparently dualistic bliss and bliss-enjoyer are really non-different.

The highest non-dual bliss is attained by starting from human bliss, and multiplying gradually by hundreds of blisses. Even heavenly blisses are a mere drop in the ocean when compared to the highest bliss. At the limit of hundredfold increases, all counting divisions (gaṇḍa bheda) cease, and the highest bliss is realized when no other who thinks or sees remains. Śaṅkara again states that the one learned in the Veda is the experiencer of this blissful unity.

In his final comments here, he also reiterates that the path to the highest bliss must pass through desirelessness. The hundredfold increases in bliss arise specifically from the absence of desire. Actions which are sinless and show Vedic learning, while central in lower stages (of renunciation), are not means to attain the highest bliss. For this, one must attain the highest degree of desireless renunciation (which presupposes sinlessness and Vedic learning). Śaṅkara concludes with a Mahābhārata quotation that human and divine happiness are not 1/16 the pleasure of the cessation of happiness.

So, once again in the BāU commentary we see Śaṅkara emphasize that the highest bliss is non-dual brahman, attained by desirelessness. Other, "knowable" blisses are within a hierarchy, which is still part of the dualistic world of desire.

BLISS IN THE BRAHMASŪTRA

We turn finally to Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra (BS) I. 1. 12—19 commentary, where a number of issues discussed above (particularly in Taittirīya II) are clarified. The primary concern here is the relationship between bliss (ānanda) and the one who consists of bliss (ānandamaya).[19] We find Śaṅkara in the curious position of arguing that the one who consists of bliss first is, then isn't, non-dual brahman. His arguments illustrate the tension between fidelity to scripture and his desire to establish brahman as one without a second.

BS I. 1. 12 asserts that the one consisting of bliss (is the self) due to repetition. Śaṅkara then asks the following question: is the Taittirīya ānandamaya self the highest brahman, or something other than brahman, like the one consisting of food (annamaya)? The prima facie answer is that ānandamaya is the transmigrating (saṁsārī) lower self, since it has limbs (avayava), and, since it is embodied, it has joy and sorrow.

Śaṅkara disputes this interpretation, arguing that the one consisting of bliss *is* the highest self (or brahman), since the latter alone is referred to repeatedly. While this explanation contradicts Śaṅkara's view of brahman almost everywhere else, there is an important purpose in arguing for it here — it allows the dull better to comprehend brahman. He writes that while the one consisting of bliss is called lower (like annamaya), it still is the innermost of all (lower) selves. The Taittirīya actually intends to instruct about the higher self, yet follows the ordinary understanding (loka-buddhi), easy for the dull (mūḍha) to comprehend. This "easy" teaching leads the dull progressively inward from dualistic non-selves to the innermost (i.e. ānandamaya) self.

The objector is still not satisfied. He points out that the higher self shouldn't have "joy as a head". Śaṅkara responds that this phrase does not describe the self's essence (svabhāva), but only its innermost adventitious condition. Describing the one consisting of bliss as embodied is part of the teaching of successive sheaths (from annamaya inwards). Ultimately, there is no embodiedness of the higher self (as there is of the lower, transmigrating self).

NOTES

[1] For a well-researched study of the historical development of bliss through the Upaniṣads, one should refer to G. Gispert-Sauch (1977). One might say I am, in part, responding to his call for further study of "the great acharyas of the Vedānta tradition" concerning bliss (p. 229—30).

Betty Heimann's work on bliss in the Upaniṣads (Heimann [1930]) is also useful, and influenced Gispert-Sauch. She points out that the early Upaniṣads describe bliss as a positive feeling (pleasure and happiness) in heaven versus another world with the mere absence of pain. Later, however, there is an emphasis on the psychological experience of bliss and bliss as the unchanging unity of consciousness (sleep/prājña).

Perhaps the most interesting distinction she makes is three senses in which bliss is used in the Upaniṣads: being (sein) bliss, bestowing (spenden) bliss, and experiencing (empfinden) bliss. When impersonal brahman is emphasized, the first is meant; the latter are too dualistic (concerned with a donor and experiencer), and bliss is seen as a thing versus a mode of being.

[2] I also spent some time going over references to bliss in Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī* (PD), particularly chapter XI. While Vidyāraṇya makes a number of interesting points, he does not break much new ground or give an extended, systematic analysis of bliss. Still, his thoughts are of sufficient interest to include here when relevant to Śaṅkara's interpretation.

For example, Vidyāraṇya discusses being-consciousness-bliss (saccidānanda) in Pañcadaśī XIII (62—3, 92—3, 102—5), where it is contrasted with name and form (nāmarūpa). Brahman is saccidānanda, the world and beings are name and form. The former is undifferentiated, beyond name and form differences. In fact, name and form are known by knowing saccidānanda, as reflected objects are only known through a mirror. Thus, non-dual bliss (brahman) is obtained by knowing the falsity of the world (name and form).

Concerning bliss specifically, Vidyāraṇya generally describes bliss as brahman, and brahman bliss is happiness, deep sleep, detachment, the highest peace, oneness, the highest self, and so on. In few places are these equations elaborated.

[3] William Indich (1980) has written on the following points; see p. 104ff.

[4] As Gispert-Sauch point out, the Upaniṣads emphasize the brahman-like nature of sleep more than does Śaṅkara. For more on sleep in advaita, refer to Fort (1980).

[5] Advaitins assert there is a fourth "state" beyond sleep, called turīya, which perpetually "knows" brahman bliss. It is most extensively discussed in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (MāU) and Gauḍapāda's kārikās. For more on this topic, see my forthcoming book, *The Self and Its States* (Delhi: Motilal Banasidass).

[6] Vidyāraṇya says sleep is brahman bliss, and quotes śrutis (Bṛhadāraṇyaka II. 1, IV. 3, MāU 5) suggesting sleep's blissfulness, such as the sleeper knows nothing within or without as when one embraces one's wife. Sleep's blissfulness is attested in experience and by reasoning (yukti) as well (concerning the above, see PD XI. 46—53, 67—8, 76, 88—90). In everyday experience, the modifications (vṛtti) of the intellect (dhī, buddhi) reflect joy and bliss when turned toward the self just before sleep; the vṛtti, arising from consciousness reflecting ignorance, merges with its reflection in sleep (XI. 44, 64—5, 86—7).

A description of the relationship between consciousness states, mental modifications, and different types of bliss is Vidyāraṇya's most interesting contribution. There are, of course, no mental modifications (dhī-vṛtti) in never-changing brahman bliss (XIII. 73—4, and elsewhere). However, a vāsanā (impression) of brahman bliss present in sleep continues only briefly upon waking, since then, an enjoyer (sukhī), impelled by desire, thinks of many sorrows and gradually forgets brahman bliss (XI. 74—5).

Brahman bliss, mental impression, and the latter's reflection (i.e. an object) are all together in waking, but in reality self-luminous brahman bliss gives birth to vāsanā- and object-blisses (XI. 87—9). The latter two blisses have mental modifications, unlike brahman bliss, and are for the action-oriented "mediocre-minded" (manda-prajña).

When thinking "I am", the self's naturally detached bliss state is covered by the ahaṁkāra ("I-maker"), so only an impression of bliss is present. Still, one experiencing such an impression will pursue the highest bliss beyond it (XI. 95—6, 121). Vidyāraṇya later adds that the wise one's (tattva-vid) intellect goes back and forth from nija (brahman) bliss and worldly joys (object bliss); he enjoys both like one sitting half-immersed in the Gaṅgā, cool and hot (from the sun) simultaneously (XI. 126—9).

One sees here the rudiments of a hierarchical "states of bliss" theory: the highest, non-dual brahman bliss, reached in sleep; vāsanā bliss, a temporary impression of bliss still tied to the 'I'; and object (everyday) bliss, for the dull, a mere reflection of the highest bliss.

[7] Śaṅkara discusses sexual enjoyment most extensively in Chāndogya Upaniṣad VII. 25. 2, where the self's pleasure (rati), amorous play (krīḍa), union (mithuna), and bliss (ānanda) are mentioned. The self's pleasure arises when the wise man enjoys knowing and reflecting. The self's amorous play is external, merely bodily pleasure, seen in the world among women (!). Union is happiness born of coupling from which the wise are free. The bliss of the ignorant causes speech, but the wise man's bliss is free from external things caused by body-born enjoyments.

Vidyāraṇya makes some interesting distinctions concerning happiness and pleasure in PD XII. 21—2. He says self-joy (prīti) is a mental modification enjoying pure happiness (sukha), not desire (rāga) for wife, worship (śraddha) for sacrifice, devotion (bhakti) for god or guru, or wish (icchā) for an unobtained thing. There is some joy in object happiness but this is variable and the self is invariable, beyond joy (XII. 25).

[8] The other sheaths are annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya, and vijñānamaya: food, breath, mind, and intellect. It should be noted that the Taittirīya never uses the word "sheath" (kośa), and Śaṅkara uses it only rarely. He prefers "selves", ātman.

[9] I translate the -maya suffix throughout as "consisting of". A graceful translation for "ānandamaya" is not easy, partly due to some conceptual unclarity. How does one "consist of" or "possess" bliss?

[10] He then turns to the nature of happiness (sukha), which is pervaded by bliss. Enjoyed objects (sukha-viṣaya) are manifested in particular mental impressions (antaḥkaraṇa vṛttis), i.e. adventitious appearances (like a son or a friend), which arise from good karma. This happiness is only momentary, however, for the karma causing particular vṛttis is impermanent.

[11] This is a reference to Bṛhadāraṇyaka IV. 3. 32—3, which will be discussed shortly.

[12] He continues praising brahman in II. 6, and says that the ānandamaya self is within the self consisting of consciousness, which is within the self consisting of life-breath (prāṇa), which lies within the self consisting of food. Following Taittirīya II. 8, Śaṅkara again lists the progressively more internal selves, and adds that their source is

the unseen, fearless, and abodeless self. This higher self enters and abides in all sheaths, indicating that there are truly no sheaths. Put another way, the sheaths, merely imagined by ignorance, are ultimately assimilated into one self, which is identical with blissful, fearless brahman.

[13] Ānandī or sukhī. This is one of many places where Śaṅkara uses bliss and happiness interchangably. See footnote 16.

[14] In Pañcadaśī XIV. 21ff., Vidyāraṇya puts it this way: both such a king and a brahman knower possess bliss — one by obtaining all, the other by desirelessness. The bliss of the fearless and desireless brahman knower is better, however, since the king fears the loss of the objects he desires, and still wishes for a gandharva bliss.

[15] Śaṅkara reiterates the above themes when he states, following Taittirīya II. 9, that words, which are names of conditioned objects used to point to non-dual brahman, turn back from the self's non-dual bliss without obtaining it. The highest brahman bliss is naturally and eternally beyond the subject/object conjunction (and thus beyond the realm of words). This highest bliss is possessed by the sinless, desireless learned, who are free from all wishes and fear.

[16] Śaṅkara equates ānanda/bliss and sukha/happiness in a number of places. They share various qualities, particularly freedom from effort and sorrow. Explicit equations are made in the commentaries on BāU I. 5. 9, II. 1. 19, IV. 3. 10, Muṇḍaka II. 2. 7, and Praśna II. 10.

The lack of distinction between ānanda and sukha reappears in later advaita. Vidyāraṇya says bliss leads to sukha (PD XI. 1), sukha is non-dual (XI. 23), and brahman is bliss, self-luminous sukha (XI. 61). Dharmarāja, in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣa*, writes that there are two kinds of sukha: sa- and nir-atiśaya (surpassing). (Merely) abundant (sātiśaya) sukha is a particular manifestation of a bliss fragment (ānandaleśa) made by a mental modification arising from contact with an object; unsurpassed (niratiśaya) sukha is brahman itself (IX. 3—5).

[17] Śaṅkara calls this happiness bhūman (abundance), following ChU III. 33. This equation is again made in Brahmasūtra I. 3. 9.

[18] Bliss here seems to give life and sentience. Vidyāraṇya, in PD XV. 1—2, says object bliss takes form as a measure of brahman bliss, and beings subsist on a measure of it.

[19] Vidyāraṇya mentions ānandamaya in PD XI (90, 212, 226): it is the lord (īśvara), experienced in sleep, and conditioned by māyā (versus unconditioned brahman). Ānandamaya is contrasted with vijñānamaya which is the jīva, experienced in waking, and conditioned by the intellect.

[20] BS I. 1. 14—17 add secondary arguments for ānandamaya being the highest self and brahman. Brahman is the cause of bliss and ānandamaya is not the lower transmigrating self (jīva).

[21] Śaṅkara repeats this point when commenting on MāU 5, which discusses deep sleep. He glosses ānandamaya (consisting of bliss) as ānandaprāya (mostly bliss), since in sleep, bliss is not uninterrupted (as brahman is). Śaṅkara explains the text's ānandabhuk (enjoying bliss) as an effortless (nirāyāsa) state, which, when continually experienced by the self, is described in scripture as the highest bliss (BāU IV. 3. 32).

[22] This also suggests that ānandamaya implies modification rather than abundance (pracurya), as Śaṅkara (and Bādarāyaṇa) argues earlier (p. 50).

[23] Points made here are echoed in BS III. 3. 11—12. All characteristics (dharma) of brahman (like bliss) should be understood to be always part of brahman, since

brahman is everywhere undifferentiated (abheda). Attributes like joy as head etc. are not present everywhere; they exist on the level of differentiation. Such attributes therefore pertain to the sheaths (kośas), not brahman. Śaṅkara concludes that the sheath attributes are only means for mental concentration (cittāvatāra) on the highest brahman.

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Dept. of Religious Studies,
Texas Christian University,
Fort Worth, TX 76129, U.S.A.

BS I. 1. 13 examines whether "consisting of bliss" means a modification (vikāra) or abundance (pracurya) of bliss. Śaṅkara, following the sūtra, indicates it is the latter: as annamaya means "having an abundance of food", ānandamaya means "having an abundance of bliss". Taittirīya II. 8, he adds, indicates extreme abundance, for at the end of hundredfold increases of bliss, it says that the unsurpassable (niratiśaya) brahman bliss is attained.[20]

The BS I. 1. 19 commentary further elaborates on the Taittirīya conception of ānandamaya, still holding it to be the highest self. Seeing the slightest (alpa) difference in the self consisting of bliss causes the fear of transmigratory existence (saṁsāra). When one, consisting of bliss, abides in undifferentiated unity (tādātmya) — like the self, and unlike the jīva or pradhāna — fear ceases.

At this point in the commentary, Śaṅkara suddenly begins to argue that the one consisting of bliss is *not* the highest brahman. This line of argument is far more consistent with his views elsewhere. His major concern now seems to be making clear that even if "consisting of bliss" implies duality, brahman's non-duality (ever his primary commitment) remains certain.

The particular passage at issue is Taittirīya II. 5, where bliss is called a trunk (of the body) and brahman a tail (puccha). How can non-dual brahman be limited to a "tail"? Śaṅkara points out that this passage makes known the nature of the sheaths (including ānandamaya), not the nature of brahman. Brahman is certainly not merely a limb (avayava) of anything.

According to this interpretation, the real teaching is that brahman bliss is the repository, or one "nest" (ekanīḍa), of worldly (laukika) blisses. Again we see the differentiation of lower, worldly blisses and the pure bliss of brahman. If ānandamaya were brahman, then a conditioned (saviśeṣa), "limbed" brahman would be accepted; however, scripture clearly teaches that only unconditioned (nirviśeṣa) brahman is brahman bliss itself.

Further, responding to sūtra 13, on ānandamaya possessing an abundance (pracura) of bliss, Śaṅkara points out that "mere" abundance implies the presence of at least a little sorrow (duḥkha) in ānandamaya, since the notion of abundance depends on its opposite (a lack of bliss, i.e. sorrow). Brahman can never lack bliss, however.

Finally, ānandamaya cannot indicate brahman because each person has differences in their limbs, such as joy as head, etc., implying that ānandamaya selves could be different — and we know from scripture that brahman is not differentiated.

Śaṅkara then says, concerning sūtra 12, that ānandamaya is not repeated as much as synonyms for bliss itself are reiterated. If the one consisting of bliss was definitely brahman, then ānanda and ānandamaya would be identical (since bliss is brahman). Ānandamaya is not unconditioned brahman, however, for, as we have seen, it is conditioned by joy as head etc. Thus, although bliss is brahman, the one consisting of bliss is not synonymous with either bliss or brahman.[21] The aforementioned Taittirīya passage (II. 5) does not suggest ānandamaya is brahman, since the context there is the succession of "modification selves" (vikārātman), of which the one consisting of bliss is the innermost.[22]

Śaṅkara concludes this (re)interpretation by stating that brahman is self-dependent (svapradhāna), not a limb of ānandamaya. The one consisting of bliss may have limbs, but brahman doesn't. Brahman is the cause of all modifications, including ānandamaya. Since brahman causes its own modifications, it cannot be a mere limb in any primary sense.[23]

To sum up, Śaṅkara views the highest bliss as brahman, and brahman is the real focus when such bliss is discussed. Ānandamaya, the one consisting of bliss, is an innermost "sheath" of the self, possesses abundant bliss, and leads the dull toward understanding the highest bliss. However, it remains dualistic (limbed or saviśeṣa), referring to sheaths and not brahman itself. If ānandamaya were brahman, brahman would be conditioned ("limbed"), and Śaṅkara consistently rejects even the slightest difference in ātman/brahman. Brahman is in reality the source of modifications like limbs.

Further, while degrees of bliss apparently exist, ultimately the highest bliss is one, and not conventionally knowable. The blisses we know are worldly ones, tied to senses and objects. The path to the highest bliss begins with sinlessness and Vedic learning, but full attainment depends on renunciation and freedom from lower, human desires. Thus, as lamented earlier, in everyday understanding, it is no pleasure to attain bliss.

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REVIEW

Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 438.

Since I have already written two relatively general reviews of this important book (*Review of Metaphysics* and *Times Literary Supplement*, October 10, 1986) in which I have said what the book is about, what its general standpoint is and what its main contributions are, I intend this review to be about the more technical philosophical issues raised in the book. Since these issues are many and varied, I will satisfy myself by reviewing only those that seem to me to be both important and interesting.

First, Professor Matilal has some very interesting things to say about the general features of Indian *philosophical* thinking, of Nyāya in particular. I will single out some of these for comments. Next, I will make some remarks on some of Matilal's views about Indian *logic and epistemology*. Finally, I will take up some interpretive theses, suggested in this book regarding the Nyāya system in particular.

I

The first important thing that Matilal says about the Indian philosophical tradition is that, presumably while something like academic philosophy was developing, there came to be two distinct types of theories which may be called the sceptical theories and the *Pramāṇa* theories. The *pramāṇa* theories set out to defeat the sceptical challenges regarding the very possibility of knowledge. Subsequently, the *pramāṇa* theories developed, I would think, not alone by way of responding to more and more sophisticated sceptical arguments, but also by way of criticising each other's views about the nature, definition and number of *pramāṇas*. Buddhist thinking, in both ways, i.e., by virtue of its sceptical component as well as by virtue

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of its sophisticated *pramāṇa*-theoretical component-spurred Hindu philosophical thinking to greater and greater sophistication. Philosophy in the strict sense came to be distinguished from religious and soteriological literature, and gradually even the spiritual (*ādhyātmika*) systems incorporated some *pramāṇa* theory or other. A sign of the strength of the Nyāya is to be seen in the fact that most Indian philosophers tacitly agreed about its value (within limits, though). It is not unlike a contemporary intellectual phenomenon: some form of mathematical formalism, with its logic and modes of argumentation, is being courted by all disciplines, not merely the natural sciences. In the Indian tradition, NavyaNyāya logical formalism came to be used by authors on Advaita Vedanta, Mimamsa, Hindu law, literary theory, medicine — to name only a few. This gave to intellectual life a cohesion, a common sense of rigor and a common argumentative style. Thus some components of Nyāya figured as determinants of Indian thinking as a whole. Understanding Nyāya, therefore, is a large step towards understanding the Indian concept of theoretical rationality in general.

What is the *pramāṇa* theory about? Matilal emphasizes the various meanings of '*pramāṇa*': proof, evidence, justification; also means (in the sense of method) of true cognition as well as the (specific) cause of true cognition. The theory is a theory of what cognitive claims are justified, of what the acceptable evidences are in support of cognitive claims, of the methods of arriving at true cognition. It is also a fragment of a (philosophical) psychology which tells us of the specific causal processes whose end product is what Matilal aptly calls a 'truth-hitting' cognitive event. In the context of contemporary philosophy, Matilal highlights (e.g., on p. 35) two aspects of this theory: it is both a *causal* and a *logico-epistemological* theory. The fact that the Indian thinkers did not see any opposition between these two aspects is significant, and should be taken into account by anyone wanting to understand the Indian concept of rationality. I will return to this point briefly later in this review. This (causal) aspect of the *pramāṇa* theory together with the primacy accorded, in all versions, to perception amongst all *pramāṇas* brings out an empiricistic strain in all Indian thinking. Matilal draws attention to this feature on various occasions: once when discussing the role of *a priori* reasoning in Indian philosophy (pp. 77—80); again when talking about the absence of a clear thesis of conceptualism as "a distinct doctrine between realism and nominalism" (p. 44), and also while discussing if Indian philosophy knows of any *a priori* knowledge (31—33). Matilal's own view seems to be that in spite of its empiricism, Indian philosophy did operate with some *a priori* principles even if these principles were not overtly recognized as *a priori*. These are principles such as the causal principle or the logical truths which were seen to be universally accepted, *sarvatantrasiddhānta* (p. 77). Even if the *pramāṇa* theory says nothing about *a priori* knowledge, the latter remains, according to Matilal, as a "background notion" (p. 31). At an overt level, non-empirical (and so *a priori*) knowledge is recognized in the case of *dharma* (through the scriptures). Or, recall Bhartṛhari's view that the undifferentiated sentence-meaning is grasped by *pratibhā*, in a flash of intuition as it were. Matilal also contends that the reason *tarka* is not recognized by Nyāya as a *pramāṇa* is that it is an *a priori* reasoning; in a *tarka* we do not use empirical evidence (p. 79).

The questions that the foregoing summary raises can only be stated here, but not answered. Any question about the role of the *a priori* in Indian thought has to suffer from the ambiguity of the words '*a priori*'. '*A priori*' may mean (i) any non-empirical knowledge, (ii) universal and necessary principles, (iii) the ultimate presuppositions (among which some under (ii) may belong) of empirical knowledge, (iv) logical truths which would be a subset under (ii), and (v) such cognitions as originate from within the nature of human reason. Bhartṛhari's *pratibhā*-knowledge or the (scriptural) knowledge of *dharma* would most probably come under (i) — their claim to be non-empirical would have to be made compatible with the fact that any linguistic cognition requires sensory cognition of the sounds uttered. Under (ii), one may want to include the causal principle or such a principle as that a conclusion is in need of evidence, but then one needs to ask, wherein does their alleged *a priority* consist? Does it consist in the fact that they *are* universally recognized, or does it consist in the fact that denying them would lead to sceptical consequences (either cognitive or practical or both)? Regarding (iv), one needs to ask, whether the Indian philosophers had a concept of *logical* truth; if they did, what precise concept it was? The only concept that, strictly speaking, plays the role of the *a priori* in sense (iii), at least in some systems of Indian philosophy, is the concept of *avidyā*. Any answer to the question, whether the concept of *a priori* in sense (v) is to be countenanced, is made difficult by the fact that the concept of 'reason' itself is suspect within the context of Indian philosophy.

Another question that is of central importance in the present context concerns the status of the *pramāṇa* theory. If the *pramāṇa* theory is meant to validate our first order claims to know, how is this theory itself to be validated? By those very *pramāṇas* themselves? *In general*, for the Indian philosophers, philosophical cognition was regarded as continuous with scientific and other empirical cognitions; it too was derived from and justified by one or more of the *pramāṇas*, and so the need for reflecting on the nature of the philosophical theory of *pramāṇa* was never formulated. If, however, this need is genuine, we may have at hand another concept of *a priori* relativised to each of the systems — as though each *darśana* has its own *a priori* foundation.

II

The second set of theses espoused by Matilal in this book, and to which I wish now to draw attention, concern the nature of Indian logic and epistemology, the Nyāya in particular. Since 'logic' and 'epistemology' are words from the western tradition, their rough translations, in the Indian philosophical language, would have to be thus: in a broad sense, *pramāṇaśastra* being the theory of justification of cognitive claims is both logic and epistemology. In a stricter sense, the theory of *anumāna* alone is logic (construing the latter as theory of inference). In any case, Matilal's book is one on epistemology, and logic comes in only as a part of epistemology — as it should be in the Indian context.

To begin with, it is important to note that Indian logic and epistemology are concerned with cognitive episodes or events, rather than with propositions: this is a position that is common to Nyāya and Buddhism, may even be acceptable to all the schools of Indian philosophy. (The only other conception of knowledge to be found in that tradition, as Matilal recognizes, is the dispositional concept of *samskāra* (p. 132). These cognitive episodes are "unrepeatable particulars", not themselves processes but rather end products of a process. (Matilal cautions us against confusing this as a Cartesian dualism or even as an interactionism. What we have is, in his view, compatible with "a milder form of behaviorism" (p. 407) and is "simple causation amongst similar sorts of events" (p. 129). He even wonders if the Nyāya position is not very much like Davidson's "anomalous monism" (p. 411). I doubt all this, but it is important that we see where it is not Cartesian.) Now there are two ways of construing the cognitive episode. One may construe it as an act or as an event. Matilal prefers the latter construal, my preference is for the former. He finds the 'act' language metaphorical and misleading (p. 112) and hopes that the embarrassing questions about the peculiar ontological status of the intentional object can be avoided by avoiding the language of acts (115). However, he does recognize that the act-object model is compatible with the Nyāya view (p. 115). One reason, it seems, why he considers the act-language misleading is, that 'act' or 'action' suggests the (Nyāya) category of *karma* which implies some motion in space. This, however, is not, in the least, intended by 'act' in the Brentano tradition, which defines 'act' simply by its intentionality. If the (Nyāya) cognitive event is *saviṣayaka* and even the yogacara cognition has still an *ālambana*, it is intentional. The idea of an intentional object, with its peculiar ontological status, does raise a serious problem especially in the case of illusions. The Nyāya position here, as emphasized by Matilal, is that the intentional object *is* a material object (in the cause of outer perception), and so for each object's being an intentional object a causal explanation is, in principle, possible (p. 408). An external material object, by being the (intentional) object of a cognitive event (or act), also functions as the 'qualifier' of the latter. This is a remarkable view. Guido Küng (Küng, 1984) defends some such view, with the difference that on his view, in the case of illusion, the intentional object (the "inmanent object" as he calls it) is not an ordinary transcendent object (whereas in the case of perception, it is identical with a transcendent object) but rather a Meinongian object. For the Nyāya, even in the case of illusion the identity holds good. But of course if in *all* cases, the intentional object is identical with a real transcendent object — the idea of an 'intentional object' becomes innocent, even trivial. I think its only justification in that case would be a distinction in roles: the same material object, *qua* "qualifier" of a cognition, is the intentional object of that cognition. Matilal adds (p. 408) however that the object in the case of illusion is intentional because it is not present where it is being imputed (though it is nevertheless identical with a material object.) This reason can be reduced to the difference of roles that I have suggested.

However interesting the idea of cognitive episodes may be in epistemology, it threatens to vitiate Indian logic — esp. theory of inference — with psychologism. I have elsewhere tried to show how the Indian, esp. Nyāya theory of inference succeeds in avoiding "psychologism". Matilal's solution proceeds on the same lines as mine. Distinguish between a cognitive event and its "structural content", the latter being shareable by numerically distinct cognitive events; then lay down conditions of identity (for purposes of logical discourse) amongst cognitive events, finally formulate your rules of inference quantifying over cognizers, appropriate types of cognitive events while keeping fixed the required order of succession. In this way, the logical and the causal would seem to coincide. Add to it the peculiar Nyāya theory of *hetvābhāsa* or 'seeming *hetu*': the consequence, in Matilal's words, is that we can never infer fallaciously, though we can *think* wrongly. While I agree with this and the diagnosis of an underlying assumption of "rationality as an ineliminable factor of the mind" (126), I still have to ask, how is this '*thinking* wrongly' to be characterized within the Nyāya discourse?

III

Matilal not only expounds the Nyāya realistic theory of perception and confronts it with the Buddhist's phenomenalism on the one hand and Bhartṛhari's 'linguistic' and holistic theory on the other. He also, along the way, suggests some important revisions of the Nyāya theory, as also some new applications of the Nyāya techniques. I will point out some of both.

Krönecker said of numbers that while God made the natural numbers, we made the rest. The Nyāya ontology, Matilal suggests, may be represented as having an inner circle consisting of real particulars (particular substances, property-particulars and action-particulars), real universals (= natural kinds) and a single real relation i.e., inherence (*samavāya*). This core is, as it were, a God's-eye view of the universe. However knowing these entities, formulating our cognitions in language and communicating our cognitions to others — all these *generate* a set of entities which Nyāya, more explicitly Navya-Nyāya, recognizes but which should be relegated to the outer circle of that ontology. These *epistemic* entities (*jñanīyapadārtha*) presuppose the entities belonging to the inner circle, though the latter entities do not need the former. To this outer circle belong properties which are not real universals, bogus, i.e., subjectively instituted connectors, abstract relational objectivities such as qualifier-hood (*prakāratā*), qualificand-hood (*viśeṣyatā*), limitor-hood (*avachhedakatā*). All these are required for analysis of our cognitions, some of them are entailed by linguistic expressions of cognitions, many but not all of them can, by further analysis, be reduced to entities belonging to the inner core. Thus, to this outer circle belong the *upādhis* (which Matilal calls bogus and also nominal universals, which leaves one to wonder, if all *upādhis* are nominal in the strict sense, i.e., language-generated) and the so-called self-linking connectors (*svarûpasambandha*). Matilal would want to deny that properties such as 'pot-ness' (ghatatva) are real universals, for a pot is an artifact and so pot-ness could not be a natural kind.

Matilal's inner circle (of Nyāya ontology) is less austere, to be sure, than that of another recent author (Mukhopadyay, 1984) who recognizes the fundamental categorial status only of '*dravya*', '*guna*' and '*karma*', and relegates even the '*sāmānya*', '*abhāva*' and '*samavāya*' to the status of concepts or categories of understanding, so to the outer circle. I have elsewhere commented upon this ingenuous distinction between categories and concepts. Some of the difficulties raised there would have arisen in Matilal's distinction as well, but for the fact that Matilal does not, as Mukhopadhyaya explicitly does, look upon the list of *concepts* as changeable and revisable.

Mukhopadhyaya uses his distinction between category and concept to separate the unchanging core of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics from the *aniyatapadārthavāda* of the latter day Naiyāyikas. One would want to know from Matilal how he stands in relation to this issue. If the outer circle contains concepts that arise from cognition and its articulation, are these concepts subject to revision, or would he recognize an unchanging core of concepts even within these?

But from the point of view of classical Navya-Nyāya a further question is unavoidable. The distinction between being and cognition, between ontological categories and concepts of understanding (*buddhi*) is, in the long run, untenable, for cognition or *buddhi* itself is an ontological concept — so that entities, such as the abstract entities, that figure in the analysis of a cognition cannot be denied an ontological status of some sort or other. There cannot be strictly speaking, within the Nyāya theory, any merely linguistic or nominal entity.

Matilal also applies the Nyāya technique for throwing light on some contemporary philosophical problems. Of these, I will, in this review, draw attention only to one. The notorious Gettier examples are cases that provide counter-examples for the 'justified true belief' definition of knowledge. These are cases where a person is justified in having a belief that *p*, and *p* is true, and yet one does not want to say that he knows that *p*. More often than not, in these cases, one mistakenly believes a premise to be true, so that he uses that (false but taken-to-be-true) premise as evidence for a true proposition *p*. Matilal traces the recalcitrant nature of the Gettier cases to not distinguishing between knowing and knowing that one knows (pp. 138—140). The solution that he suggests is based on separating truth and knowledgehood (*pramātva*). Truth is the agreement of the content (of the cognition) with reality. *Pramātva* is present when not only the content is true but is taken to be true on true ground and/or is caused by the right *pramāṇa*. Matilal describes the case by saying that the person, in Gettier cases, knows but does not know that he knows. This is possible for Nyāya to say, because the Nyāya detaches the first-order knowledge from the second-order knowledge and the *pramātva* of the first-order knowledge from knowledge of that *pramātva*.

However, will this solution do? There is an equivocation in 'knowledge' (correspondingly in 'know'): it may mean *niścayajñāna* or it may mean *pramā*. In Gettier-type cases, the person has *niścayajñāna*, but does he have *pramā*? '*Pramā*' is defined as the knowledge of *X* as *F* when *X* is in fact *F*. In this sense he has *pramā*. Matilal therefore holds that he knows. If the person does not know that he has *pramā*, i.e., if he does not know *pramātva*, that is *not* because his first-order cognition (which, by hypothesis, is a *pramā*) does not possess *pramātva*, nor because it is derived from false premises (for, apprehension of *pramātva* has nothing to do with how that first-order cognition came about), but can only be because he has not *as yet* experienced *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*. If the *pravṛtti* does become successful, then he would correctly determine that he *had* a *pramā*. But this is counter-intuitive. So we have to take back the earlier assumption that he had a *pramā*, i.e., his first-order cognition was a *pramā-jñāna*. What then to do with Gangeśa's simple definition?

I think the right way to go about would be, not to apply that simple definition, but to so modify it as to be able to exclude the Gettier cases. (If this strategy does not work, then add the *causal* concept of *pramāṇa*.) Gangeśa has shown us the way to do this.

Let us take the false premise to be *p*. Based on this false premise, one comes to believe that *q*. Let us assume '*q*' (as a content of that cognition) satisfies the definition of *pramā*. But we want to say that in such cases one does not have a *pramājñāna* that *q*. Let us capture the total cognitive state as '*p . . . q*', this total state contains a false *component*. Let us stipulate that a complex cognitive state is *pramā* if and only if all its components are. This would rule out the Gettier case from being a *pramājñāna*.

I still have not touched upon the discussion of perception in the exciting dialogue between the Nyāya and Buddhism as narrated in this book. But for that I will wait for another occasion. This only shows how rich in content the book is. I must add, it is finely written and is a pleasure to read. No one working on the Indian epistemologies can afford not to take this important book into consideration. It succeeds in raising discussions of some well known issues to a new level, and that is not a small achievement. There are a few misprints: on p. 272, line 16 from bottom, 'snythetic' should be 'synthetic'; on p. 309, line 3 from bottom 'Vendantins' should be 'Vedantins'. On p. 415, line 23, 'it' should be replaced by 'them'.

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cp. My review of P. K. Mukhopadhyay, *Indian Realism*, in this journal.

Department of Philosophy
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A.

J. N. MOHANTY

U. A. VINAY KUMAR

EXISTENCE OF SELF AND ADHYĀSA IN ADVAITA

Adhyāsa is one of the most fundamental concepts in *Advaita Vedānta*. In this paper we propose to bring out some of the major problems involved in understanding the concept of *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* as it is used in different contexts has a wide range of meanings. However, we would restrict ourselves to the 'individual aspect' of *adhyāsa*.

We have divided this paper into three sections. The first section deals with the nature of Self as is conceived by Śaṁkara, and the argument for Its existence. The second section deals with the analogy that is forwarded by the *Advaita* to facilitate a better understanding of *adhyāsa*. The third section deals with the *adhyāsa* in its 'individual aspect' and the problems involved in understanding it.

I

'What is Self' is not at all an absurd question for the Indian Philosophers including the *Cārvākas*. Different schools of Indian Philosophy have tried to answer the question in various ways. We do not here concern ourselves with either the reasons for the non-absurdity of the above question, or with the various views of self as propounded by different schools of Indian Philosophy. However, we can equate 'self' with body or mind or bodily states or mental states, or all of them or any combination of them. Any such equation must be supported by reasoning. And the meaning of such equation should be made explicit. Hence the term 'self' need not necessarily mean an abstract entity like 'soul'. We usually get repelled by a discussion on 'self' not because we do not wish to know what is self but because we have certain preconceived notions of self like 'self is an abstract entity which can never be known', where we somehow equate 'knowledge' with what is gained through sense-perception alone, etc.

Śaṁkara in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras*, has refuted many views of self. For Śaṁkara Self is *Brahman*. Śaṁkara seems to

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forward two definitions of *Brahman* which are designed to serve different purposes.[1] The definition of *Brahman per accidens* —

> That (is Brahman) from which (are derived) the birth etc. of this (universe)[2]

The definition of *Brahman per essentiam* —

> Truth, Knowledge and Infinite[3]

At this stage, the Self in the sense of *Brahman* as defined above eludes us. For we seem to have no knowledge of *Brahman* in the above sense. Precisely at this point Śaṁkara introduces the concept 'I' and goes on to refer to 'I' as 'Self'. This then logically means that 'I' is *Brahman*. But then, do we know our Self or 'I' to be *Brahman*? The answer seems to be a firm 'no'. Śaṁkara, however, claims that our lack of the knowledge of 'I' as *Brahman* is due to avidyā. Accordingly we go on to identify our Self with what is 'not-Self'. But a basic question is that 'Does Self exist?'

Śaṁkara says —

> Brahman does exist as a well-known entity . . . the existence of Brahman is well-known from the fact of Its being the Self of all; for everyone feels that his Self exists, and he never feels 'I do not exist'. Had there been no general recognition of the existence of the Self, everyone would have felt, 'I do not exist'.[4]

The above quotation from Śaṁkara makes it amply clear that there is a general recognition of the existence of Self. As Śaṁkara does not use 'I do exist' to prove the general recognition of the existence of Self, we should understand that the 'general recognition of the existence of Self' need not follow from 'I do exist' alone. Rather we should understand that the 'general recognition of the existence of Self', broadly speaking, follows from *all* propositions. However, in a slightly restricted way we can understand the 'general recognition of the existence of Self' as following from those propositions which contain 'I', like 'I am . . .'. In a still more restricted way we can have the proposition 'I do exist' itself. Since it is logically impossible to assert 'I do not exist' without contradiction, the 'general recognition of the existence of Self' can be taken to be proved even by the proposition 'I do not exist'. 'I do not exist' may be taken to mean some kind of mental agony etc. But we are not concerned here with the psychological meaning of it. Apart from this meaning one cannot, logically, deny the existence of 'I' by saying 'I do not exist'. Since Self has been referred to by 'I', to speak of 'he', 'she' etc. as denoting Self, at this stage, is not only not necessary, but irrelevant. Śaṁkara adds —

> Any idea of the possibility of denying the existence of the Self is illogical, just because it is the Self. The Self is not an adventitious effect of any cause, it being self-established. For the Self of anyone does not require to be revealed to anyone with the help of any other means. For such means of knowledge as perception etc., that are taken up for proving the existence of other things that remain unknown, belong to this very Self. . . . The Self being the basis of all . . . empirical dealings as the use of the means of knowledge, stands there as a postulate even prior to the use of those means. And it is not possible to deny such a Self; for it is adventitious things alone that can be repudiated, but not so one's own nature. The Self constitutes the very nature of the man who would deny it. The heat of fire cannot be denied by the fire itself.[5]

However, R. W. Perrett seems to contend, in his article 'Self-Refutation in Indian Philosophy', that the 'general recognition of the existence of Self' is not established by the impossibility to assert 'I do not exist' coherently, for 'I do not exist' is only 'operationally self-refuting'; and that 'I do not exist' 'might nevertheless be true'.

Perrett says —

> . . . *operational* self-refutation . . . occurs with propositions that cannot be coherently asserted because any assertion of them would be falsifying. For example, the proposition 'I do not exist'. The proposition itself is not self-refuting, but trying to assert it is. Moreover *any* assertion of it is self-refuting . . . Śaṁkara seems to claim that the denial of the self is *operationally* self-refuting in the sense that one cannot coherently assert 'I do not exist' . . . the argument is presumably not so much a 'proof' of the existence of the self as a claim that the self cannot be disproved or refuted. But then it seems that the denial of the existence of the self is only supposed to be *operationally* self-refuting. That is, it is only the *assertion* of this claim that is self-refuting. Even if this be conceded . . . the claim might nevertheless be true. Compare 'All our assertions are false'; this may be true, but no one can coherently assert that it is so.[6]

We should not fail to note certain crucial phrases in Perrett's claim. For example; 'proposition itself', 'assertion', 'claim' etc. First of all, what does he mean by a 'proposition itself'? Secondly, he seems to make a distinction between 'assertion' and 'claim', which is however not clear. Thirdly, he does not seem to claim that 'I do not exist' is true, rather he seems to point out the 'possibility' of 'I do not exist' being true.

Now, for the moment let us suppose that 'assertion' means an 'uttered' proposition which has a truth claim. Non-assertion of 'I do not exist' then does not mean the utterance of 'I do exist'. But one may utter 'I do exist'. Thus whether or not everyone *actually* utters 'I do exist' is not known. If the 'general recognition of the existence of Self' is to be established by asserting (in the sense of uttering) 'I do exist', then everyone (dead ones and future ones too) must go on chanting 'I do exist'. This is plainly absurd. And silence is not a philosophical position.

We must take the expression 'general recognition of the existence of the Self' in quite a broad sense (as we have said already). The proposition 'I do not exist' is impossible, just because everyone has some kind of notion of one's own self. To deny such a notion of one's own Self, he himself must exist prior to the denial. Then logically, the denial becomes impossible.

The impossibility to assert 'I do not exist' coherently, is a proof for the impossibility to disprove the existence of Self. Now, 'does everyone have a notion of 'I'?' Obviously, everyone must have the notion of 'I'. This follows precisely from the impossibility to disprove the existence of Self. The specific nature of such notions of 'I' of different persons may vary. The possibility of this difference in specific nature of the notions of 'I' of different persons may vary. The possibility of this difference in specific nature of the notions of 'I' of different persons is what is hinted at by the phrase 'general recognition of the existence of Self'. However, a person who enters a discussion on Self is bound to accept the existence of Self, though he may later choose to differ as to the distinctive nature of Self.

Perrett seems to confuse the intended meaning of an assertion, and the specific meaning of the individual proposition that conveys the intended meaning. If the meaning that is to be conveyed is known, and even if the proposition that conveys it involves an apparent falsification of the intended meaning, then the proposition that conveys the intended meaning is *not* self-refuting. This follows just because the intended meaning and the meaning understood are different.

If the meaning that is to be conveyed includes the specific meaning of the individual proposition that conveys the intended meaning, which is apparently falsifying, then the proposition that conveys the 'intended' meaning is self-refuting. Such a self-refuting conveying act is logically impossible. The question of conveying such meaning does not arise at all. And if a proposition is Self-refuting in all conceivable operations then such a proposition is simply contradictory; this means that such a proposition is false. If so, then to speak of its possible truth is absurd. Thus we should distinguish between the apparently self-refuting propositions and the really self-refuting propositions on the ground of their meanings.

Now, in a speaker-hearer context, the claimant of the truth of 'I do not exist' (in the sense of apparently self-refuting proposition), must explicate the meaning of 'I do not exist'. Only when an explication is forwarded may the opponent try to attack the position of the claimant. To do so is to shift the problem to a different level. Secondly, the apparently self-refuting proposition may have a metaphorical meaning. However, we do not discuss them here.

'I am dumb' is a proposition which can be asserted in speech only when one is really not dumb. If a person asserts 'I am dumb' in writing, it does not guarantee the truth of 'I am dumb'. This means that there are certain propositions which are self-refuting (or false, contradictory) in certain types of acts only. But 'I do not exist' is a proposition which is not assertible in *any* manner. Thus the so called 'operationally self-refuting propositions' of Perrett are either apparently self-refuting ones, which means that we must search for the intended meaning, or they are simply contradictory, hence false.[7]

We have seen that 'self' has been referred to by 'I'. And that there is a general recognition of the existence of 'I'. If this 'general recognition' is to mean the knowledge of 'I', the 'Self', then a further analysis is not necessary. But the general recognition of the existence of 'I' only means that people do know the existence of 'I', but not that 'I' is known to be as-it-is. The lack of the proper knowledge of 'I' is known from the existence of conflict between various views of Self.

> there is a conflict about Its distinctive nature . . . there are . . . opposite views . . . If one accepts any one of these (opposing) views without examination, one is liable to be deflected from emancipation and come to grief.[8]

Now, we have a kind of notion of our own 'Self' in the form of 'I'. But this notion is not correct since it does not reflect the actual-I. But the question is why our notion of 'I' does not reflect the actual-I, i.e., the I-as-it-is? And what is that 'I'-as-it-is? To know this we must at once understand the basic distinction that is made between the 'subject' and the 'object'.

> . . . the object and the subject . . . are fit to be the contents of the concepts 'you' and 'we' (respectively), and are by nature . . . contradictory . . . Nevertheless, owing to an absence of discrimination between these . . . which are absolutely disparate, there continues a natural human behaviour based on self-identification in the form of 'I am this' or 'this is mine'[9]

An 'object' has been said to be 'fit' to be the 'content' of the concept 'you'. The concept 'you' is designed to serve the purpose of conveying the meaning that the concepts 'we' and 'you' are absolutely distinct. Just as the concept 'you' gives us the idea of a *distinct* person, the concept 'we' gives us the idea of *immediacy*. The idea of immediacy can be brought out more clearly by the concept 'I' itself. What I mean by 'I' is that there is an *immediate awareness of my own being*. The concept 'I' is a *self-complete expression*. There is no *expectancy* involved in it. And since there is no expectancy involved in 'I', it becomes logical to deny its association with either the *expectancy-raising-words* or *expectancy-fulfilling-words* or both.

If 'I' is a self-complete-expression, and if there is the knowledge of its self-completeness then no association of 'I' with other words or concepts could proceed. But how do we 'prove' the self-completeness of 'I'. And what is the cause of the association of 'I' with other words/concepts? Śaṁkara says that the lack of the knowledge of the self-completeness of the expression 'I' is caused by *ignorance*.

> This behaviour (based on self-identification in the form of 'I am this . . .') has for its material cause an unreal nescience and man resorts to it by mixing up reality with unreality as a result of super-imposing the things themselves or their attributes on each other.[10]

Thus the *total act* of associating 'I' with 'am' etc., and with 'body' etc., is due to a fundamental ignorance, *avidyā*. And the act is called as *adhyāsa*.

II

> (Superimposition) is an awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a different . . . basis as a result of some past experience . . . the appearance of one thing as something else. And in accord with this, we find in common experience that the nacre appears as silver, and a single moon appears as two.[11]

We identify 'I' as what it is not. Hence Vācaspati Miśra says —

> . . . we attribute to real what is different from it.[12]

To facilitate a better understanding, the analogy of the perception of shell as silver is forwarded.

It is true that often we perceive a piece of shell as a piece of silver. So when we perceive a piece of shell as silver, conceptually what we do is that we associate the idea of 'silver' with something that is given to us in our awareness. And an identification results. Identification, in the sense of association, necessarily involves at least two entities or more, whose concepts are given to us in our mind. Thus the *adhyāsa* is an 'association' that is done at the mental level alone.

Now, since *adhyāsa* involves at least two concepts, we can ask, 'what are the two concepts that are involved in shell-silver *adhyāsa*?'

The two concepts that are involved in shell-silver *adhyāsa* cannot be 'shell' and 'silver'. For nobody has the cognition 'shell *is* silver' nor does anyone say 'I apprehend shell as silver'. 'Silver' belongs to t_1, which is a distinct moment of time, prior to the moment of time t_2 when we have 'shell'. What belong to two distinct points of time, logically, cannot be identified or associated with each other. Now one may be tempted to say that there are not two concepts involved here; rather there is only one concept at t_1 i.e., 'silver'. But if this were true then there would be no reason why we should perceive 'shell' in the same point at t_2. Thus we are forced to accept a substratum. Let us call this substratum as 'x'. Hence, at t_1 we had two concepts 'x' and silver. And the cognition at t_1, is 'x is silver'.

It is true to say that this cognition is nothing but a perceptual error; and the error is due to insufficient light and so forth. But one should not be hasty to claim that Śaṁkara's analogy is trivial. One should wait to pause a little, when one realizes that 'shell-silver illusion' is only an analogy to illustrate his point. 'x is silver' at t_1, is a piece of knowledge that one has at t_1. This knowledge is in the form of a *judgement*. A judgement is one which is *apparently* a complete expression containing a self-complete expression, one or more expectancy-raising-word(s), and word or words that fulfill the expectancy. Thus interrogations, exclamations, hypothetical situations etc. do not constitute judgements, consequently there is no *adhyāsa* in them. Interrogations belong to a special class of expectancy-raising-words; and exclamations represent expectancy fulfilled but not in the expected way. The details of this, we do not wish to discuss here.

We have already identified the two concepts involved in the cognition 'x is silver'; they are 'x' and 'silver'. Now, one can ask 'do we apprehend 'x' and 'silver'?' The cognition 'x is silver' refers to a perceptual situation. For all practical purposes we have the perception of 'silver' alone. But since we are presuming that at t_2 we perceive 'shell' instead of 'silver', the 'silver' perceived at t_1, must be a wrong association. Thus the association of 'silver' with the substratum 'x' takes place. But then, do we perceive the substratum 'x'? If we 'perceive' 'x' and 'silver', then we can ask a further question — 'do we apprehend them simultaneously or successively?' If we say we apprehend them simultaneously then both 'x' and 'silver' are identical. And to talk of 'two concepts' makes no sense. If 'x' and 'silver' are qualitatively the same, then there must be at least one thing that differentiates them. If so, then their apprehension cannot be simultaneous. And if the apprehension of 'x' and 'silver' is successive then there cannot be *adhyāsa*, for successive cognitions are not associable in the sense of identification.

The reply is that both 'x' and 'silver' are apprehended either simultaneously or successively. It is true that there is at least one characteristic which is not common to both 'x' and 'silver'. If 'x' and 'silver' are said to be perceived simultaneously, then it means that this particular differentiating characteristic is not recognized. This holds good even if the apprehension of 'x' and 'silver' can be said to be successive. Hence a 'false identity' persists. And the said differentiating characteristic is what is responsible for the gross difference between 'x' and 'silver'. And this characteristic is really apprehended but not recognized.

In a perceptual situation an awareness of a substratum is first evoked. This awareness creates an expectancy that longs to be fulfilled. And this is fulfilled by characterizing the substratum. The process in which the characterization takes place is called *savikalpaka* whereas the bare consciousness is called *nirvikalpaka*.

III

It is quite intelligible that one should mistake shell for silver. Because it is sensorily perceived and also that it is a common-place experience. But —

> How . . . can there be . . . super-imposition of any object . . . on the (inmost) self that is opposed to the non-self and is never an object (of the senses and mind)?[13]

In other words, if self is not apprehended through sense-organs, then how can we associate it with something which might be given to us through sense-organs? To this Śaṁkara says —

> The Self is not absolutely beyond apprehension, because It is apprehended as the content of the concept 'I'; and because the Self, opposed to the non-Self is well known in the world as an immediately perceived (i.e., self-revealing) entity. Nor is there any rule that something has to be super-imposed on something else that is directly perceived through the senses; for boys superimpose the ideas of surface (i.e., concavity) and dirt on space (i.e., sky) that is not an object of sense-perception.[14]

Now we should conclude that what is not apprehended through sense-organs or mind can be a thing on which some other thing might be superimposed. But this does not mean that what is not apprehended at all can be a thing on which a superimposition can be made. For, what is not apprehended at all in the three times is absolute non-existence.

> Absolute non-existence of *alika* is defined in Vedānta as something which is incapable of being experienced as existent in all times whether past present or future.[15]

And —

> . . . the apprehension of the word 'hare's horn' is a *Vikalpa* which is different from knowledge because it is neither objective nor immediate. The apprehension of such cases of pure fiction is different from knowledge whether it be of the real or of the illusion. What constitutes difference is the absence of any substance or substratum to which the cognition may refer.[16]

However, we should note a distinction between what is apprehended and what is apprehensible. There are innumerable things which are apprehensible but need not necessarily be apprehended at any given moment of time. But in the case of Self, there is no time when we can say we have no apprehension of Self. However, for *adhyāsa* to take place, at least two things must be apprehended.

As regards the distinction between *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*, Datta says —

> According to the Vedāntins knowledge is *savikalpaka* if it consists of the predication of one content to another in a substantive-adjective way. But knowledge in which such a relation is absent is *nirvikalpaka*. . . . (the Vedāntins) hold that a *nirvikalpaka* perception should not necessarily be confined to the prejudgement stage.[17]

Now, even though there may be *nirvikalpaka jñāna* involved in some judgements like 'This is that Devadatta', the *nirvikalpakatva* of the perception of the substratum '*x*' is indisputable, because there is no predication of one content to another in a substantive-adjective way.

So is the case with the immediate apprehension of 'I'. If so then how are we to distinguish between the apprehension of 'I' and that of '*x*'. For both seem to be *nirvikalpaka*. Yet there must be a distinction between them. For '*x*' is an external substratum (as in '*x* is silver') which can never be identified with 'I'. To the substratum '*x*' we attribute certain things like 'silver'. It is not as if the substratum '*x*' gains its 'externality' by the attributes like 'silver' etc.

Secondly, there are so many words that we associate with 'I', like 'have a pen' in 'I have a pen' etc., and these associations do not give us the sense of identification. If we accept 'I have a pen' etc. as not *adhyāsa*, then in the ultimate analysis there would be more than one entity which is real. The form 'I have' seems to be implicit in 'this is mine'.[19] We have the following quotation from Śaṁkara —

> . . . the superimposition of the object, referable through the concept 'you', and its attributes on the subject that is conscious by nature and is referable through concept 'we' (should be impossible), and contrariwise the superimposition of the subject and its attributes on the object should be impossible.[20]

While this shows the possibility of superimposition of subject on the object and contrariwise, it raises a fresh difficulty: whether the subject or the object is apprehended first? Or are they being apprehended simultaneously?

In continuation with the same difficulty, but in a slightly different context of the apprehension of 'I' itself we have the following questions.

Does one apprehend 'I'? Or does one apprehend the Self as the content of the concept 'I'? Or yet, does one apprehend 'Self' as opposed to 'non-Self'? Or again is 'I' an 'immediately perceived entity'?

Ānandagiri seems to hold that the apprehension of 'I' is never objectifiable. Padmapāda says —

> Objectivity implies outwardness or externality, with the fitness to be referred as the 'this'. Contrary to this, the subject is revealed as 'not-this', characterized by inwardness.[21]

We must discover within ourselves, what exactly do we mean by 'immediate perception of I'. The statement 'I do not have an immediate awareness of I' must be understood as 'not being explicitly aware of the immediate perception of I'. Hence Vācaspati Miśra says —

> Not that consciousness is not apprehended but that it is not realized.[22]

The meaning is that, without an 'immediate perception of I' no propositional knowledge in the form of *savikalpaka jñāna* can follow. Yet due to the importance we attach to the propositional knowledge, we happen to be 'unaware' of the factor that is singly responsible for the propositional knowledge. Thus, though we happen to be unaware of the 'immediate perception of I', in reality we are not unaware of it. Hence, all thoughts of 'I' lead us to some kind of 'objectified' knowledge of It — in the form of 'I am this' or 'I am not this'.

And due to this very 'inevitability' of objectification of 'I', one goes on to associate the really self-complete expression 'I' with expectancy-raising-words etc.

We have seen that the cause of the association in the sense of identity of 'I', a self-complete expression, with other words is a *false Nescience*. But the present analysis reveals that even the so called self-complete expression — 'I' — itself does seem to contain an element of 'association' within itself. This can be made more clear by the following analysis.

In view of the fact that 'immediate perception of I' was not forthcoming, we had agreed to seek within ourselves what we mean by 'I'; and this led us to some kind of objectified knowledge of 'I' in the form of 'I am this' or 'I am not this'. Let us call these two forms positive and negative apprehensions respectively.

Now let us suppose that a person means by 'I', a 'well-built body'. In a context which is different than the one in which he thinks 'I' to be 'well-built body', let us say, we have 'I am *x*'. If 'I' is 'well-built body', then on substitution for 'I' of 'well-built body' in 'I am *x*', we get 'well-built body *am x*'. This follows, if 'I' is said to be 'objectified' as 'I am well-built body'.

But we have said that the very 'objectification' of 'I' is due to an element of 'association' in it. If it is true then it follows that the very idea of 'I' is an 'association'. Hence *false Nescience* fails to explain this 'association'. Because, even in this 'association' we ought to have the same questions that confronted us earlier, that 'do we have the 'immediate perception of I'?' etc. So is the problem with negative apprehension of 'I'.

Moreover, a person desirous of *describing adhyāsa* must give some account of the 'immediate perception of I'. Then, what would be the status of the statement — 'I is an immediately perceived entity'? Should not one say 'I *am* an immediately perceived entity'? If one can say 'I is an . . .', then what hinders one from saying 'I is not an immediately apprehended entity'?

Finally, we do not see 'body' etc. being sublated either by something analogous to the sublation of 'silver' by 'shell', or 'body' being sublated by the 'Brahman' Itself. And why should the association of 'I' with other words be a mistake (*adhyāsa*) if the sublation is not forthcoming even with an intellectual understanding of the 'immediate perception of I'?

NOTES

[1] "Brahman is known in two aspects — one as possessed of the limiting adjunct constituted by the diversities of the universe which is a modification of name and

form, and the other devoid of conditioning factors and opposed to the earlier." BSBS. I. i. 12 (1977): 13.

// Dvirūpam hi brahmāvagamyate, nāmarūpavikārabhedopādhiviśiṣṭam, tadviparītam ca sarvopādhivivarjitam //

BSSB. I. i. 12 (1980): 116.

[2] BSBS. I. i. 2 (1977): 13.

// Janmādyasya yataḥ //

BSSB. I. i. 2 (1980): 46.

[3] 'That the supreme Brahman is eternal consciousness by Its very nature is mentioned in such Vedic texts as . . . 'Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite' (Tai. II. i. 1)' BSBS. II. iii. 18 (1977): 476.

// Brahmaṇascaitanyasvarūpatvamāmnātam . . . 'Satyam, Jñānam, Anantam Brahma' // (Tai. II. i. 1)

BSSB. II. iii. 18 (1980): 529.

[4] BSBS. I. i. 1 (1977): 11—12

// Astitāvadbrahma . . . / Sarvasyātmatvācca Brahmāstitvaprasiddniḥ / Sarvo hyātmāstitvam pratyeti, na nāhamasmīti / Yadi hi nātmāstitvaprasiddhiḥ pratīyat //

BSSB. I. i. 1 (1980): 42—43.

[5] BSBS. II. iii. 7 (1977): 455.

// Ātmatvaccātmano nirākaraṇasaṅkānupapattiḥ, na hyātmāgantukaḥ kasyacitsvayamsiddhatvāt, na hyātmātmanaḥ pramāṇamapekṣya siddhyati / Tasya hi pratyakṣādīni pramāṇānyaprasiddhaprameyasiddhaya upādhīyante / . . . Ātmā tu pramāṇādi vyavahāraśrayatvātprageva pramāṇādi vyavahārat siddhyati / Na cedṛśasya nirākaraṇam sambhavati / Āgantukam hi vastu nirākriyate na svarupam / ya eva nirākartā tadeva tasya svarupam / Na hyagnerauṣṇyamagninā nirākriyate //

BSSB. II. iii. 7 (1980): 508—509.

[6] See Perrett (1984): 240—246.

[7] See Pañcadasī, II. 25 (1975): 40—41 for a fuller exposition of the implications that the 'non-existence' carries with it.

[8] BSBS. I. i. 1 (1977): 12.

// Tadviśeṣam prati vipratipatteḥ / . . . Tatrā Vicārya yatkiñcitpratipadyamāno niḥśreyasātpratihanyenānartham ceyat //

BSSB. I. i. 1 (1980): 44—45.

[9] BSBS. (1977): 1

// Yuṣmadasmadpratyayagocarayorviṣayaviṣayiṇo . . . viruddhasvabhāvayoritaretarabhāvānupapattau / . . . Tatāpyanyonyātmakatāmanyonyadharmāmścādhyāsyetaretarāvivekena, atyantaviviktayordharmadharmiṇormithyājñānanimittaḥ satyanṛte mithunīkṛtya, ahamidam mamedamiti naisargikoyam lokavyavaharaḥ //

BSSB. (1980): 4—10.

[10] BSBS. (1977): 1

// Āhā- koyamadhyāso nāmeti //

BSSB. (1980): 10.

[11] BSBS. (1977): 2

// Smṛti rūpa paratra pūrva dṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ . . . śuktikā hi rajatavadavabhāsateḥ ekascandraḥ sadvitīyavaditi //

BSSB. (1980): 10–16.

[12] Bhāmatī in BSSB. on I. i. 1, BSSB. (1980): 11.

// Mithyāpratyayascāropaviṣayāropaṇīyamithunamantareṇa na bhavatīti pūrvadṛṣṭagrahaṇenānṛtamāropaṇīyamupasthāpayati //

[13] BSBS. (1977): 3.

// Katham . . . pratyagātmanyaviṣayedhyāso viṣayataddharmāṇām //

BSSB. (1980): 16–17.

[14] BSBS. (1977): 3.

// Na tāvadayamekāntenāviṣayaḥ, asmatpratyayatvāt, aparokṣatvācca pratyagātmaprasiddheḥ / Na cāyamasti niyamaḥ purovasthita eva viṣaye viṣayāntaramadhyasitavyamiti / Apratyakṣepi hyākāśe bālāstalamalinatadyadhyasyanti //

BSSB. (1980): 18–19.

[15] See Narain, K. (1964): 25.

[16] See Narain, K. (1964): 151.

[17] Datta, D. M. (1972): 98.

[18] See Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra (1942): 26–28, I. 59, 60, 61, for details of *Nirvikalpaka.*

[19] See reference No. 9.

[20] BSBS. (1977): 1

// Ityatosmatpratyayagocare visayiṇi cidātmake yuṣmatpratyayagocarasya viṣayasya taddharmāṇām cādhyāsaḥ, tadviparyayeṇa viṣayiṇastaddharmāṇām ca viṣayedhyāso mithyeti bhavitum yuktam //

BSSB. (1980): 6–9.

[21] See Devaraja (1972): 170. fn. 12.

// Parāgbhāvenedantasamullekhyo hi viṣayo nāma bhavati tadvaiparityena pratyagrūpeṇanidam prakāśo viṣayī //

[22] Bhāmatī in BSSB. on I. i. 1. BSSB. (1980): 18.

// Gṛhītā eva tu kalpitena bhedena na vivecitā ityagṛhītā ivābhānti //

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Dept. of Humanities and Social Sciences
I.I.T. Kanpur 208016
India.

JOSÉ IGNACIO CABEZÓN

THE PRASAṄGIKAS' VIEWS ON LOGIC: TIBETAN DGE LUGS PA EXEGESIS ON THE QUESTION OF SVATANTRAS[1]

One of the most important and most complex topics in the Mādhyamika curriculum of the great monastic universities of Tibet dealt with the Prasaṅgika critique of the *svatantra* form of reasoning, a type of syllogism which the Prasaṅgika school considered to be incompatible with the tenets of the Mādhyamika but which was adhered to by another branch of that same school that eventually came to be called by that very name, the Svatantrikas. Following the Indian exegesis based on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (III, 2),[2] the Tibetan analysis focuses the discussion on the nature of the subjects of syllogisms and of the *pramāṇas*, the valid forms of knowledge, that perceived them. Specifically it had to do with whether the subjects of the syllogisms used by Mādhyamika appeared in the same way to the Mādhyamika proponents of the syllogisms as they did to those realists to whom the syllogisms were directed (*chos can mthun snang*). The remarks that follow are based on the Tibetan dGe lugs pa exegesis on this subject, in many ways the most extensive and detailed treatment of these questions in the corpus of Buddhist literature.

We will come back to the specific question of the *svatantra* presently but first it is worth mentioning that the issue has tremendous implications to a consideration of the Mādhyamika's views on ontology, epistemology and logic. Before proceeding to our main subject, therefore, it is appropriate to turn our attention to the context in which this discussion takes place. In the *sTong thun chen mo* of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang we find that the subject is introduced by first considering whether or not the Prasaṅgikas have any philosophical positions of their own. mKhas grub rje presents the position of an opponent as follows:

> The Prasaṅgika Mādhyamika have no position of their own, no beliefs and nothing at all that they accept. Were they to have such beliefs then they would also have to accept such things as the syllogisms (*gtan tshigs*) which prove the beliefs of their own system, logical examples and so forth. Were *that* so, they would essentially become Svatantrikas.[3]

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The opponent here is claiming that the Prasaṅgikas hold no philosophical positions[4] and that if they did they would essentially become Svatantrikas because they would have to rely on the use of syllogistic reasoning to establish these positions, the implication being that in the Mādhyamika school only Svatantrikas use syllogisms.[5] The opponent here is operating under the faulty assumption that all syllogisms are *svatantras*. He then reasons as follows: if all syllogisms are *svatantras* and Prasaṅgikas reject the latter, they must also reject the former, in other words they must also reject syllogistic reasoning and logic *in general*. Syllogisms are the instruments that prove or establish the tenets of any system. If Prasaṅgikas repudiate syllogistic reasoning they could have no beliefs of their own since they could have no tools with which to establish these beliefs. Hence, concludes the opponent, the Prasaṅgikas have no system of tenets, no beliefs. The opponent further claims that whatever logical constructs a Prasaṅgika may employ and whatever views they may seem to set forth:

> . . . are carried out for the sake of confronting others, without it being a reflection of the Prasaṅgika's own system.[6]

Given the dGe lugs pa penchant for logical methodology, an outcome of the fact that much of their work is directed at creating a synthesis of the traditions of the Mādhyamikas and Prasaṅgikas, it is scarcely surprising that mKhas grub rje finds this viewpoint anathema to his enterprise. What is most interesting, however, is that he considers the source of the error to lie in erroneous ontological presuppositions, in the fact that the opponent advocates the infamous *yod min med min gyi lta ba*, an interpretation of the Mādhyamika in which emptiness is considered a middle ground between existence and non-existence. Of course for mKhas grub rje, who is a staunch advocate of the principle of the excluded middle, there is no middle ground between existence and non-existence. If the existence of something is repudiated it is a tacit affirmation of its non-existence and vice versa. For mKhas grub rje the idea that things are neither existent nor non-existent is at best nonsensical and at worst nihilistic. He says in this regard:

> Those who make such claims (that the Prasaṅgikas repudiate reasoning and have no

> tenets of their own) have, as I have mentioned before, misapprehended the extent of what is to be refuted. Hence they think that the reasoning of the Prasaṅgika Mādhyamikas is refuting all phenomena. Once they have refuted everything, seeing that all of their arguments can be used to refute what they themselves believe, they discard the notion that all of those absurdities urged on others are applicable to themselves. But when such absurdities *are* urged on them, being totally unaware of how to avert such arguments (when turned against them), their one last hope is to say "We accept nothing."[7]

What mKhas grub rje is saying is that the logical skepticism of this opponent (his view that the Prasaṅgikas accept nothing and repudiate syllogistic logic) is a corrolary of his ontological nihilism (his view that the Prasaṅgika critique is a critique of the existence of all phenomena). Put in another way, mKhas grub rje is saying that this brand of logical skepticism is the last refuge of the ontological nihilist, who, realizing that his own faulty arguments will soon be turned against him, attempts to immunize himself from logical fault by declaring himself to have no position, appending the disclaimer that any logic he *has* used was employed only in confrontation with his challenger and not because he himself ascribed to the validity of reasoning (syllogistic or otherwise).

What I find fascinating about mKhas grub rje's analysis (and I ought to mention that this is a theme that we find repeated throughout the *sTong thun chen mo*) is his connection of ontological, logical, epistemological and soteriological forms of skepticism or nihilism. For mKhas grub rje the *yod min med min* view, which he characterizes as "refuting all phenomena", i.e., as ontological nihilism, the view that the Prasaṅgikas repudiate syllogistic reasoning — a form of logical skepticism, the view that they repudiate the notion of *pramāṇa* — a form of epistemological skepticism, and the view that in meditation the mind is to be emptied of all thought, the infamous Hva shan view and a form of soteriological nihilism,[8] according to mKhas grub rje, are just different sides of the same coin (or more appropriately the same four-sided pyramid). Each of these positions he sees as not only being tied to each other historically but as being corrollaries of each other in the logical sphere as well. All of this by way of contextualization; let us return to our main topic, the discussion of the *svatantra*.

We saw that mKhas grub rje's first opponent held the position that all syllogisms were *svatantric* in nature and that since Prasaṅgikas repudiate the latter they must also repudiate syllogistic reasoning and logic in general. Another opponent is characterized as follows:

> Even Prasaṅgikas accept *svatantra* syllogistic reasoning (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*) because they accept tri-modal syllogistic reasoning (*tshul gsum pa'i rtags*) which proves a specific quality (*khyad par kyi chos*) of a certain subject (*chos can*) that is established by the *pramāṇas* of both the proponent (of the syllogism) and the opponent (to whom it is posited).[9]

This second opponent shares one presupposition with the first, namely that all syllogisms are *svatantra* forms of syllogisms, but realizing that it would be absurd to deny the Prasaṅgikas' use of logic, he maintains instead that since Prasaṅgikas accept syllogistic reasoning they must also accept *svatantras*.

Both views, of course, are, in the opinion of the dGe lugs pa exegetes, faulty, the source of their fault lying in their common presupposition that all syllogisms are *svatantric* in nature. mKhas grub rje's belief is that Prasaṅgikas accept tri-modal syllogistic reasoning (*tshul gsum pa'i rtags*) but not of the *svatantra* variety. What then characterizes a syllogism as being a *svatantra*? mKhas grub rje states:

> . . . when positing a *svatantra* position or logical reason it is not enough that both the proponent and the opponent establish, by means of a *pramāṇa*, the subject of the inquiry (*shes 'dod chos can*) which is the basis upon which a predicate is posited. Instead, it is absolutely necessary that (the subject) be established compatibly (*mthun snang du*).[10]

But what does it mean to be "established compatibly"? To put it simply it means this. Prasaṅgikas have a different notion of entities than do Realists. When they posit a syllogism to a Realist they understand that the subject of the syllogism (and indeed all of its parts, including the tri-modal relations) are not subjects that exist inherently. Despite this fact Prasaṅgikas believe that entities appear to the consciousness of every sentient being (*pramāṇas* or otherwise) to exist as if they *were* real and independent. Hence they realize that the *pramāṇa* which perceives the subject of a syllogism is erroneous (*'khrul pa*). This is of course not the case with the Realists, for whom:

> . . . all *pramāṇas* are believed to be valid in regard to subjects that exist by virtue of their own characteristic. In their system all *pramāṇas* are forms of consciousness that are non-erroneous in regard to their objects; it is believed that if the subject of a syllogism is established by a *pramāṇa*, then that very subject must be an object which is found (*rnyed don*) by the *pramāṇa*.[11]

Therefore, according to mKhas grub rje, a *svatantra* is a syllogism in which the subject is "established compatibly" in the system of both the proponent and opponent where both parties consider it to be the object perceived by a *pramāṇa* that is non-erroneous in regard to the ontological status of the object. In other words, it is a syllogism in which both parties consider the subject to be a real independent entity that is verified as such by a non-erroneous *pramāṇa*. Since this is inconsistent with the Prasaṅgika view that (a) no such entity exists and that (b) any consciousness to which an entity appears in this way must be erroneous, *svatantra* forms of syllogistic reasoning are unacceptable to this school.

This does not mean, however, that Prasaṅgikas repudiate syllogistic reasoning in general. Instead they employ a form of syllogism known as "inference based on what is renowned to another" (*gzhan la grags pa'i rjes dpag*)[12] which mKhas grub rje defines as:

> ... a syllogistic reason in which the subject, though not perceived by *pramāṇa* in a way that is compatible to both the proponent and opponent, is nonetheless perceived by a *pramāṇa* in the system of the proponent and by a *pramāṇa* in the system of the opponent and which is posited (by the proponent) while "feigning the acceptance" (*'khris nas*) of what the opponent believes in his/her system as regards the perception of the subject by a *pramāṇa*.[13]

That is to say that in an "inference based on what is renowned to another" the Prasaṅgika proponent will feign acceptance of the opponent's notion of the nature of the subject and of the *pramāṇa* which perceives it, all the time realizing that his/her own notion is completely different, i.e., incompatible, with the opponent's. But despite the incompatibility of the way in which the subject exists and in the way in which the *pramāṇa* which perceives it functions, an "inference based on what is renowned to another" is nonetheless a valid tri-modal syllogism. In this way, mKhas grub rje demonstrates that not all syllogistic reasoning is *svatantric* in nature, that there does in fact exist a form of such reasoning that is compatible with Prasaṅgika Mādhyamika tenets and therefore that the latter do not repudiate logic in general.

Whether or not mKhas grub rje's analysis is truly representative of the Indian Mādhyamika tradition to which he claims to be heir is a question that this paper does not seek to answer. What is far more interesting to me is *the fact that* mKhas grub rje (and his teacher

Tsong kha pa) interpret the repudiation of the *svatantra* as they do. Throughout, they view their efforts as an attempt to set straight the score concerning the Prasaṅgika's views on logic, which, as we have seen, is part of a more general campaign, that of upholding the validity of rationality (the possibility of valid knowledge), language (its ability to describe reality) and logical principles (such as that of the excluded middle). Whether or not the dGe lugs pas succeed in their endeavor is also a question that has yet to be answered. That it is a stance to be reckoned with in any treatment of the Mādhyamikas' views on logic is an indisputable fact.

NOTES

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[1] An earlier version of their paper was presented at a panel entitled 'Nāgārjuna and His Successors: Perspectives on "Middleism"' at the 15th annual conference on South Asia at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Thanks must go to Professor Roger Jackson of Fairfield University, the discussant, and especially to Professor Geshe Sopa of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the organizer of the panel, who made the opportunity for a very lively exchange of ideas possible.

[2] Peking edition of the *bsTan 'gyur* [Tokyo: Tibetan Tripitika Research Institute, 1957] (hereafter cited as P), *dBu ma tsa*, folio 4a; this is of course commented on by Buddhapālita, *ibid.* folio 197b, by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā*, L. de la Vallée Poussin edition [Bibliotheca Buddhica IV], pp. 34 passim. sDe dge edition [Tokyo: Faculty of Letters of the University of Tokyo, 1978] *dBu ma 'a*, folio 11a. The general discussion of the issue in the *Prasannapadā* however begins earlier (Sanskrit p. 29, Tibetan folio 9a) with a discussion of the compatibility of the subject of a syllogism based on the renowned example of the "impermanence of sound". There is however another extensive discussion on the meaning of *svatantra* reasoning in the *Prasannapadā* in its extensive commentary to the first verse of the *Kārikās* (Sanskrit p. 14, Tibetan folio 5b). This is the renowned passage in which Candrakīrti refutes Bhāvaviveka's attack of Buddhapālita's methodology. It is commented upon extensively in the *sTong thun chen mo* of mKhas grub rje (see note 3) on pp. 340–358.

[3] mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang, *sTong thun chen mo* in *Mādhyamika Text Series* Vol. 1, [New Delhi: Lha mkhar yongs 'dzin, 1972], p. 294 (all page numbers refer to the Arabic enumeration of the folios of the text).

[4] Nor are such opponents a thing of the past. This is, for example, the stance taken by Mervyn Sprung in his 'Nietzsche and Nāgārjuna: The Origins and Issue of Skepticism' [*Revelation in Indian Thought*, edited by H. Coward and K. Sivaraman (California: Dharma, 1977):

> *Buddhi*, the ratiocinative faculty, is as subject to the kleśas as character and motives (*saṁskāras*) are. The Mādhyamikas' attack on all theories, all ways of looking at things, all perspectives, as the key to removing the kleśas, follows from this. (p. 165)

And also:

> ... Mādhyamika sets out, as is well known, to undermine not only all philosophies and all ideologies but every last category and concept constituting the everyday world on which the philosophies and ideologies are founded. (p. 165)

Nor is Mr. Sprung alone; for a detailed discussion of this view in the Western academic literature see 'Dzong kha pa and Modern Interpreters II: Negating Too Much', Chapter Five of E. S. Napper's *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* [University of Virginia: Ph.D. Dissertation, 1985], pp. 159—193. See also my *A Buddhist Philosophy of Language and Its Culmination in Tibetan Mādhyamika Thought* [University of Wisconsin: Ph.D. Dissertation, 1987].

[5] This also seems to be the view of D. S. Ruegg in his 'The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuṣkoti and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism' [*Journal of Indian Philosophy* **5** (1977), pp. 8—9] and also throughout his 'On Thesis and Assertion in the Mādhyamika/dBu ma' [in E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, editors, *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Philosophy* (Vienna: Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, 1983)] (see especially pp. 224—225 and 234—236).

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 295.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

[8] To what extent these views were, individually or collectively, held by historical personages is an extremely difficult question to answer and one which is, in any case, beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to D. S. Ruegg's *The Literature of the Mādhyamika School of Philosophy in India* [Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1981] and to the 'Introduction' of R. A. F. Thurman's *Essence of True Eloquence* [Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984]. See also Paul Williams' 'rMa bya pa byang chub brtson'grus on Madhyamaka Method' [*Journal of Indian Philosophy* **13** (1985), pp. 205—225].

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 313.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 316—317. He then goes on to state that not only must the subject of the syllogism be established in this way but that indeed so must all of the other parts of the syllogism including the tri-modal criteria.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 317—318.

[12] *Paraprasiddha* or *Parasiddha* (*anumāna*) — see, for example, the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin [Bibliotheca Buddhica IV], pp. 34—35 and 272.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 318.

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Trinity College
Department of Religion
Hartford, Connecticut, U.S.A.

NANDITA BANDYOPADHYAY

THE CONCEPT OF CONTRADICTION IN INDIAN LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

I

The concept of contradiction in Indian philosophy raises some interesting logical and epistemological problems, which, though not left unnoticed by Indian philosophers, have not received adequate emphasis from modern interpreters. The English term 'contradiction', in the wider sense of incompatibility, finds its approximate Sanskrit equivalent in *virodha*.[1] The term *virodha*, however, as it is understood by Udayana in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, carries the sense of absolute opposition, which involves the operation of the Law of Excluded Middle. This sense of *virodha* is brought out by Udayana in the following well-known verse:

parasparavirodhe hi na prakārāntarasthitiḥ /
naikatāpi viruddhānām uktimātravirodhataḥ //
(Nk 3/8)

[In the case of mutual contradiction there is no third alternative. There is also no identity of the contradictories, for the contradiction is apparent on the very face of assertions.]

The two contradictories '*A* is *B*' and '*A* is not-*B*' present such a contradiction. Without factually ascertaining which one is true and which false we can at once logically intuit that one is true and the other false and that both cannot be true or both false, because *B* and not-*B* together exhaust the whole universe of discourse leaving no third alternative.[2] To sense this contradiction we need not even go for the concrete value of *B*. The same thing is apparent if we even give a value of *B*, say 'cow', wherewith we get the two propositions, '*A* is cow' and '*A* is not-cow'. There is no doubt that the question of truth or falsity ultimately bears a factual reference. Yet our immediate frame of reference does not necessarily include any ascertainment as to which one of the propositions corresponds to fact and which does not.

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It is in this sense that we can call it a logical contradiction. Such a contradiction obtains between two such propositions in which an affirmative predicate and its direct negation are predicated of the same subject. Here the two contradictory predicates are in essence identical with their mutual negation (*parasparābhāvarūpatva* — Vardhamāna's Prakāśa on Nk 3/8). Cow is the same as the negation of not-cow and not-cow as the negation of cow. In this way the two predicates are mutually repelling so that cancellation of the affirmative amounts to the assertion of its negative and cancellation of the negative to the assertion of the affirmative; and so there is no possibility of any third alternative:

> bhāvābhāvayoḥ parasparapratikṣepatvalakṣaṇasvarūpatvād bhavaniṣedho'bhāvavidhiḥ syāt, tanniṣedhaśca bhāvavidhiḥ, tena tābhyām anyaḥ prakāraḥ sambhavati na kasyāpi
> Varadarāja's Bodhanī on Nk 3/8

Now let us take a pair of opposites without the operation of Excluded Middle, e.g. '*A* is a cow' and '*A* is a horse'. It is true that here the factual reference is not so much suppressed as in the previous case, for we know from fact that 'cow' and 'horse' cannot be predicated of the same subject. If we say '*A* is *B*' and '*A* is *C*', without providing the values of *B* and *C*, it is not at all possible to sense any *virodha*, since *B* may stand for 'intelligent' and *C* for 'diligent' without giving any scope for opposition. It is only when *B* and *C* stand for cow and horse or any such pair of mutually exclusive predicates that we can immediately sense the opposition. This is not, however, a case with the propositions '*A* is *B*' and '*A* is not-*B*' wherein we need not wait for substituting concrete factual values in order to intuit the logical contradiction. From this standpoint we may say that the two contrary propositions '*A* is a cow' and '*A* is a horse' provide a case for 'factual opposition'. It is factual in the sense that if one is a fact, the other is not, but not in the sense that both are *facts* such that one *fact factually* eliminates the other. For a purely factual opposition we shall turn to Dharmakīrti later on.

Yet there is an important consideration which transfers this opposition between the two contraries from the realm of facts to the realm of logic. The moment we are presented with such a pair of propositions, even without probing into the concrete factual position as to which one is true or which false, we may at once grasp the logical position that one may be true and the other false, or both may be false, leaving unimpaired the possibility of a third alternative, say, '*A* is a camel'; but we know at the same time that both cannot be true. In this sense this sort of *virodha*, unattended by the Law of Excluded Middle, may also be legitimately called a logical opposition.

The first type of *virodha* is technically called *parasparavirahavyāpakatva* (pervasion of mutual negation by two predicates). This means that the two predicates, *B* and not-*B*, are so related that we can deduce the following from their relation: — Whatever is a negation of not-*B* is *B* and whatever is a negation of *B* is not-*B*. It brings out both mutual exclusion and Excluded Middle.

The second type of *virodha* is technically called *parasparavirahavyāpyatva* (pervasibility of the predicates by their mutual negation). Here we get mutual exclusion without Excluded Middle. In the pair of opposites '*A* is a cow' and '*A* is a horse', the two predicates are so related that we can say: — Whatever is a cow is a negation of 'horse' and whatever is a horse is a negation of 'cow'. We are not entitled to turn this into the converse order such that whatever is a negation of 'horse' is a cow and whatever is a negation of 'cow' is a horse, for there being no Excluded Middle, *A* may be neither a cow, nor a horse, but a camel. In the first type of *virodha*, however, the converse order is equally tenable, for we may legitimately say: — Whatever is *B* is negation of not-*B* and whatever is not-*B* is negation of *B*. Thus it is a case of *samavyāpti* (converse pervasion) having both *parasparavirahavyāpakatā* and *parasparavirahavyāpyatā*. On the contrary, the second type of *virodha* is a case of *viṣamavyāpti* (non-converse pervasion), for it has only *parasparavirahvyāpyatā*, and not *parasparavirahavyāpakatā*. The first type is also a case of *parasparaviraharūpatā*. *Parasparavirahavyāpakatā* and *parasparaviraharūpatā* are but two aspects of the same contradiction.

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his defence of the Advaita position subscribing to an indefinable relative existence (*anirvacanīyasattā*) of the material universe, proposes that absolute existence and absolute non-existence are not caught in such an absolute contradiction as to negate an intermediate position of relative existence. In the conventional Advaita view *virodha* between existence and non-existence is of the type of *parasparavirahavyāpyatva* which excludes the Law of Excluded Middle, as for example, in the case of cowness and horseness the negation of both of which is found in a third alternative, camel —

nāpi vyāghātaḥ . . . . . .
gotvāśvatvayoḥ parasparavirahavyāpyatve'pi
tadabhāvayoruṣṭrādāvekatra sahopalambhāt,

(As pp. 51–55)

Obviously, here Madhusūdana restricts the term *vyāghāta* to absolute contradiction which brooks no middle alternative.

Thus, of existence and non-existence, both cannot be affirmed, but both can be denied, if the relation between the two is conceived as one of *parasparavirahavyāpyatā*. Hence a third alternative as an indefinable something is not prevented by such a *virodha*. Such is the phenomenal world:

sattvāsattvayoḥ parasparavirahavyāpyatve'pi
tadabhāvayorekatra prapañce sambhavān na vyāhatiḥ

— Siddhi Comm. on *ibid*. p. 52.

Sometimes the term *vyāghāta* is used to mean paradoxical self-contradiction. Udayana uses this term in order to show the impossibility of universal doubt about causality. Universal doubt is contradicted by doubt itself. It is not possible to doubt that there is no causality at all, for in that case no reason could be assigned to the doubt. One must advance arguments to prove that causality is a doubtful category and doubt must be based on these arguments. The universal proposition of a thorough-going agnostic is as follows:

All statements of causality are doubtful.

Now this universal statement is itself a statement of causality, being the pronounced effect of the arguments advanced by the agnostic. Hence as a consequence to the very logic of agnosticism the statement of universal doubt should itself be subject to doubt. If the agnostic denies this logical consequence he has to admit that the law of causation operates at least in relation to universal doubt, thus negating universal doubt itself. If the agnostic accepts this logical consequence the result is the same. If it is averred that universal doubt has no arguments to fall back upon and as such it is an uncaused phenomenon, the agnostic would turn out to be an incorrigible eccentric unfit for any communication. When somebody says, "All will turn out to be false", the question pertinently crops up — whether this very statement is comprehended under 'All' or not. In the former case the statement about universal falsity will itself prove to be false. In the latter case the statement itself becomes a point of violation of universal falsity. This is called *svakriyāvyāghāta* by Udayana:[3]

> śaṅkāyā vyāghātāvadhitvāt tadeva hyāśaṅkyeta yasminnāśaṅkyamāne svakriyāvyāghātādayo doṣā nāvatarantīti lokamaryādā /
> na hi hetuphalabhāvo na bhaviṣyatīti śaṅkitumapi śakyate,
> tathā sati śaṅkaiva na syāt, sarvaṁ mithyā bhaviṣyatītyādivat
>
> Nk under *III*/7 pp. 345—347.

II

Both these types of *virodha*, namely, *parasparavirahavyāpakatā* and *parasparavirahavyāpyatā* are compressed by Dharmakīrti into a single type called *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā* which literally means 'having the property of standing in mutual exclusion' (Nb. pp. 203—207). Dharmakīrti himself illustrates this type of *virodha* as one between *bhāva* and *abhāva* (affirmation and negation). Dharmottara, also includes within this category the type of opposition without Excluded Middle such as obtaining between blue and yellow. Between affirmation and negation which exclude any intermediary the contradiction is sensed immediately and directly. But the opposition between blue and yellow which permits an intermediary springs from mutual difference, i.e., blue is different from yellow and yellow from blue. There is no doubt that there is mutual difference also in the case of blue and not-blue. But the logical intuition of this contradiction does not depend on the notion of mutual difference between blue and not-blue, for here directly we get the negation of blue. In the case of mutual exclusion without Excluded Middle Dharmottara virtually states *parasparavirahavyāpyatā* in a different language, when he observes that opposition between blue and yellow is invariably related to their mutual difference, i.e. blue is not-yellow and yellow is not-blue. Thus Dharmottara very finely brings out the difference of a *virodha* between an affirmation and a negation from a *virodha* between two affirmations. The former he calls *bhāvābhāvayorvirodhaḥ* and the latter *vastunorvirodhaḥ*

> tathā ca bhāvābhāvayoḥ sākṣād virodhaḥ, vastunostu anyonyābhāvāvyabhicāritvād virodhaḥ — *ibid.* p. 204.

What is logically more significant in this context is Dharmottara's observation that the *virodha* based on mutual exclusion (including both the varieties) is the contradiction of identity (*ekātmatvavirodha*), which underlies the relation between the law of identity and the law of contradiction. An object is identical with itself and not with what is not itself. It is the essential or logical opposition (*lākṣaṇikavirodha*) as distinguished from factual opposition. Between '*A* is blue' and '*A* is not-blue' one must be true and the other false. But the false proposition does not correspond to a false fact, since there is no *false fact* in the world. If *A* is truly blue, the false proposition '*A* is not-blue' has no direct fact to fall upon, for the fact is absorbed by the true proposition. Thus a false proposition, given its falsity, can imply its negation which is true, but cannot *correspond* to its negation. So the contradiction between a false proposition and a true proposition does not stand upon a contradiction between two corresponding facts, but between a fact and a non-fact or an intellectually imposed imagined fact. So the contradiction is logical, but not factual. In a certain sense, however, non-factuality is more pronounced in opposition between blue and yellow, when both are false. In this case the *virodha*, if any, obtains between two non-facts. But it is doubtful whether we should call it a *virodha* at all, because when both are false one does not negate the other, but both are negated by a middle alternative, e.g., '*A* is white'. Between blue and yellow the *virodha* then obtains only in the sense that both cannot be true. Obviously Dharmottara does not take into consideration the aspect of non-excluded middle which provides that both may be false. Hence there is sufficient force in Madhusūdana's argument that the non-excluded middle makes *parasparavirahavyāpyatā* non-determinant of *vyāghāta* or absolute contradiction — (*tasya vyāghātāprayojakatvāt* — As. p. 52).

Purely factual (rather physical) contradiction is considered first by Dharmakīrti in his classification of *virodha*. We get this *virodha* when one fact is replaced by an opposed fact, e.g., cold-sensation is eliminated by hot sensation, or darkness by light. Dharmakīrti's definition of physical contradiction runs as follows:

avikalakāraṇasya bhavato'nyabhāve'bhāvād virodhagatiḥ

Nb. p. 198.

[When an existing fact having unimpaired causal conditions ceases to exist with the emergence of another fact, there is cognition of 'contradiction'[4]]

It is purely factual contradiction, for here we really get two facts one replacing the other, at the same place. For example, a chain of cold sense-data is replaced or eliminated by a chain of hot sense-data. A preceding chain of similar events is broken by a succeeding dissimilar chain of similar events. The breach is caused by a breach in the causal factors of the preceding chain of events. But we remember that Dharmottara has used the expression '*vastunorvirodhaḥ*' in the case of opposition between blue and yellow. By this loose expression of Dharmottara one should not be misled into thinking that the *virodha* between blue and yellow is also a *factual* one. Dharmottara has used that expression in order to bring out the difference between the *virodha* between blue and not-blue and the *virodha* between blue and yellow. When A is blue in fact 'A is yellow' is not a fact at all. So one is true and the other false. Hence there is no opposition between two facts. (We ignore the case where both may be false). Here it is a question of logical truth value. But the contradiction between cold sensa and hot sensa, as defined by Dharmakīrti, is a contradiction between two dissimilar series of really happening events, such that one series is eliminated by another succeeding series. Since both the series are composed of really happening events, this is a purely factual contradiction having no logical problem of truth value. It is turned into a logical contradiction when we get two propositions 'A is hot' and 'A is cold' with reference to the same time and place.

Now factual contradiction is called *sahānavasthāna* or the contradiction of conterminousness (i.e. conterminousness of opposed phenomena is contradicted) in contradistinction to *ekātmatvavirodha* or the contradiction of identity (i.e. identity of opposed terms is contradicted). In deference to the Buddhist theory of momentariness Dharmottara has got to introduce many fine sophistications into his painstaking interpretation of physical contradiction. We have no time or space to go into those details. Only one thing is to be noted in this context. Contradiction of mutual exclusion is all-comprehensive. It is so because, apart from the question of factual elimination, we may logically say that hot is not-cold and cold is not-hot, or light is not-darkness and darkness is not-light. This logical *virodha* is present wherever identity is denied. Factual contradiction, however, is limited to a few instances:

> tato bhinnavyāpārau virodhau / ekena virodhena śītoṣṇasparśayorekatvaṁ vāryate, anyena sahāvasthānam . . . sakale vastunyavastuni ca parasparaparihāravirodhaḥ / vastunyeva katipaye sahānavasthānavirodhaḥ /
>
> Dharmottara's Comm. on Nb. p. 207.

III

Gadādhara seems to throw a new light from a new angle on the distinction between factual opposition and logical opposition. In his commentary on Gaṅgeśa's Savyabhicāraprakaraṇa Raghunātha uses the term '*svarūpato virodhaḥ*' to mean logical contradiction. Literally '*svarūpato virodhaḥ*' means essential contradiction. Gadādhara defines '*svarūpato virodhaḥ*' as —

> parasparābhāvavyāpyatvāviśeṣitayoḥ parasparajñānapratibandhakībhūtajñānaviṣayatvam
>
> Gādādharī on Sp. pp. 149–150.

[Essential contradiction is being the object-content of such a knowledge as is related to another knowledge in a relation of mutual preventiveness, in such a way that the two contradictory objects are not (necessarily) qualified by (the knowledge of) their being pervaded by mutual negation.]

The purport of this definition may be understood by contrasting the *virodha* between fire and water with the *virodha* between fire and not-fire. Fire and water are caught in factual opposition in the sense that they cannot belong to the same locus (*sahānavasthāna* or *ekādhikaraṇāvṛttitva* which is the same as *parasparābhāvavyāpyatva*, i.e. pervasion by mutual negation). But this factual opposition does not rise to the level of mutual cognitive preventiveness until and unless one knows that they are pervaded by mutual negation. This is evident from Gadādhara's own explanation:

> tasya vāstavaviruddhaviṣayakasyāpi jñānasya virodhāviṣayakasyāpratibandhakatvāt
> *ibid.* p. 149.

It is not *logically* necessary that one who knows fire and water also knows that these do not co-exist in the same locus. So the knowledge of fire does not necessarily prevent the knowledge of water in the same locus and vice versa. But mutual prevention necessarily emerges only when fire and water are known as being pervaded by their mutual negation. In this sense there is no logical or essential contradiction between fire and water or between the knowledge of fire and the knowledge of water.

But the contradiction between fire and not-fire presents a different case. Here the contradiction floats on the very face of the terms so much so that it at once passes into our logical intuition. This is underlined in Udayana's expression — '*uktimātravirodhataḥ*'. The knowledge of fire at once prevents the knowledge of not-fire. There is no doubt about the absence of not-fire in the same locus with fire. Grasping of contradiction between fire and not-fire and their mutual cognitive prevention does not depend on any such necessary qualificatory knowledge that fire and not-fire are pervaded by their mutual negation, though this pervasion by mutual negation undoubtedly prevails in fact.[5]

In our English translation of Gadādhara's definition of *svarūpato virodhaḥ* we have deliberately inserted the word 'necessarily' (in brackets) as an adverb to the word 'qualified' (*aviśeṣita* = not-qualified). Otherwise the expression may be misleading, for one may be misled to think that logical contradiction in the sense of reciprocal cognitive prevention must not be accompanied by the knowledge of pervasion by mutual negation. It is certainly not the case. What Gadādhara wanted to suggest is that the knowledge of pervasion by reciprocal negation is not a necessary condition for ascertaining the contradiction between fire and not-fire and their mutual cognitive preventiveness though such a pervasion is definitely there. In this respect essential or logical *virodha* differs from factual *virodha* (e.g.

between fire and water) which cannot be grasped without being attended by the knowledge of pervasion by mutual negation.

By factual contradiction we mean contradiction both on the physical and mental plane. We have dealt with a type of physical contradiction with reference to Dharmakīrti who shows that a series of cold sense-data is physically replaced by a series of hot sense-data. This is a case of physical elimination. It is quite possible that physical elimination goes along with physical prevention. A fire is put out by a jet of water. Here water not only eliminates the existing fire, but also prevents the emergence of a new fire as long as the combustible materials are kept sufficiently wet by water. The same aspects of elimination and prevention occur on the mental plane also. A man takes fright by taking a wind-tossed piece of rope for a wriggling snake in darkness. The corrective judgment, 'It is a rope' not only eliminates the wrong judgment, but also prevents the re-emergence of the wrong judgment as long as the corrective judgment is there in respect of the same object at the same place.[6]

Contradiction in the sense of elimination (*nivartana*) or prevention (*pratirodha* or *pratibandha*) should be better called *bādha*. Bādha means an obstruction which prevents or eliminates something on the basis of opposition. In this sense there may be *virodha* without *bādha*, but no *bādha* without *virodha*. We may be presented with two propositions, '*A* is a snake' and '*A* is a rope', or '*A* is a snake' and '*A* is not-snake', without knowing what the fact is. Nevertheless, we sense the contradiction all right. This contradiction is transformed into *bādha* only when we know the fact. If the object is rope or not a snake, and we come to know it as such, this correct knowledge eliminates or prevents (*bādhate*) the erroneous knowledge, '*A* is a snake'. This elimination is undoubtedly based on a basic opposition between the eliminator and the eliminated. This may be accepted as a matter of commonsense logic.

IV

But there is an uncommon outlook upon this whole matter of contradiction which has appeared so simple so long. The extreme Buddhist idealist Prajñākaragupta and the extreme Advaitins like Ānandabodha and Prakāśānanda question this very concept of *bādha* and *virodha*. Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, the most formidable agnostic, is their powerful ally at least in this respect.

. According to the conventional Advaita view an object of illusion is not an absolute nothing, but an indefinable something midway between absolute existence and absolute non-existence. Such an appearance is called *anirvacanīyakhyāti*. The Naiyāyikas agree that an absolute 'non-existent' cannot have an empirical appearance. Yet an object of illusion need not be conceived as an indefinable 'existent'. It seems more rational to them to accept the position that in the case of a nacre-silver illusion the identity of nacre is suppressed for some reason, and silver, really existing somewhere else, is somehow dragged by memory and tagged to the given object so that nacre appears as silver which is really not there. This is the theory of *anyathākhyāti*. The absence of any silver there is confirmed by the subsequent contradictory corrective negative judgment that it is not silver. It is here that Ānandabodha challenges the very concept of contradiction (as a real property of reality itself). 'It is a silver' and 'It is not silver' are two totally different cognitions presenting two different objects. So where is the scope of contradiction?

Ko'yaṁ virodho vittī cedubhayamāvedayataḥ

Nm. p. 90.

That means that there is contradiction in such an impossible cognitive judgment as 'It is silver and not-silver (or nacre)' in which two contradictory predicates are absurdly sought to be predicated of a single subject in a single proposition. Such a proposition is plainly unentertainable. But there is no contradiction in an object projecting two different appearances in two different cognitions, difference between which is caused by difference in causal factors. Moreover, contradiction cuts both ways. So why do you not say that illusory silver contradicts not-silver and accept the existence of silver in the supposedly wrong judgment? The subsequent negative judgment is not necessarily stronger than the preceding one. It is not impossible for a wrong affirmative judgment to follow a right negative judgment. Should we then be permitted to say that affirmation corrects the negation? You may expect this subsequent affirmation to be undone by a further subsequent emergence of the same negation. But leaving apart the question of infinite regress, how is it possible for a person to decide in a situation where he dies just after making the wrong affirmation without having any chance of entertaining any further negation?

> virodhe'pi bhāva eva kinnāśrayaṇīyaḥ? abhāvāvabhāsāvirodhāt, prābalyāt parācaḥ pratyayasyeti cen maivam, bhāvāvabhāsasyāpi parāco darśanāt, astyevāsmādapyavabhāsaḥ parācīna iti cen na, asañjātabādhānāmapi nidhanopalambhāt
>
> Nm. p. 91.

Eliminative contradiction may be called epistemic or logico-epistemic contradiction in the sense that wrong knowledge is said to be eliminated by right knowledge. It is logico-epistemic in contrast to the inherent logical contradiction which does not make it possible to entertain any such absurd proposition as 'It is silver and not-silver (or nacre)'. But in logico-epistemic contradiction it is quite possible for the same person to entertain two consecutive propositions such as 'It is silver' and 'It is not silver (or it is nacre)', both relating to the same substantive (*viśeṣya* or *uddeśya*, i.e. subject). Factual contradiction, where one fact is eliminated by another, is also ultimately an epistemic contradiction, for what is a fact or not is finally decided on the cognitive plane of appearance.

Ānandabodha attacks the problem of cognitive elimination from another angle also. Every knowledge is valiant (*śura*) only in respect of its own object (*śvagocaraśūra*). It has grip only over that which appears in itself and so it has nothing to do with the object of another knowledge.

In that case one knowledge cannot remove the object of another knowledge.[7] So it is a howler to say that the false object of the false knowledge (and for that the knowledge itself) is liquidated by the right knowledge. The false object is also an object and is very much there. Then how is the object false and the knowledge invalid? Ānandabodha answers — well, that is why the false silver is an indefinable and indeterminable existence outside the range of absolute nothing and absolute something. So falsity means indeterminability or indefinability and false knowledge is that which has for its object such an indefinable 'existent'. But if the false object is not removed why does it not continue even after the right knowledge? Here Ānandabodha replies like a traditional Advaitist of the Vivaraṇa School: Right knowledge does not directly eliminate false knowledge and its object, but it removes the positive *avidyā* which screens the right object and projects the false one. *Avidyā* is the material cause of the false object. The material cause being removed, its material effect ceases to exist and the knowledge also ceases with the cessation of its object. Thus in the final analysis, *bādha* is not the elimination of wrong knowledge and its object, but their spontaneous cessation through the removal of positive nescience, the material cause:

tasmāt savilāsāvidyānivṛttireva bādha ityācāryāḥ

Nm p. 125 (see also Nm pp. 120—125)

Prakāśānanda, the author of the Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, proposes a slight modification in Ānandabodha's conception of *bādha*. After the false knowledge 'It is silver' we have the right knowledge 'It is nacre'. This right knowledge is called *vidyā* which is affirmative in character. It is *adhikaraṇatattvasākṣātkāra*, i.e. the direct right knowledge of nacre as nacre (which is the substratum of false silver projected upon it). Elimination of *avidyā* begins at this stage by removing its screening power (*āvaraṇaśakti*). But the power of projection (*vikṣepaśakti*) of false silver is finally removed by the right knowledge in the negative form, 'It is not silver'. Thus *bādha* proper is this negative right knowledge coming after the affirmative right knowledge:

sākṣātkṛte tvadhiṣṭhāne samanantaraniścitiḥ /
adhyasyamānaṁ nāstīti bādha ityucyate budhaiḥ //

— Vsm p. 219, (See also pp. 227—228).

Here also it is to be seen that the correct propositional judgment does not directly negate the wrong one, but it eliminates the positive ignorance which is considered to be the material cause of the false judgment and its object, and thereby paves the way for their spontaneous cessation. It is obvious that this Advaitist treatment of contradiction is heavily coloured by its metaphysical consideration. We need not digress here into all the complications which may be introduced into the Advaita concept of final emancipation by such a concept of contradiction. Of course, neither Ānandabodha nor Prakāśānanda need be unduly perturbed over this, because according to them nobody has attained liberation as yet. Liberation can only be the simultaneous liberation of all individuals without exception, for all individuals are one and the same. So long as there is an empirical world for a single individual none can be said to have attained emancipation.

Śrīharṣa, the poet-philosopher who is perhaps the most formidable destructive opponent of realism, attacks the problem of contradiction (*virodha*) from a novel standpoint. Contradiction is supposed to bear the sense of incompatibility. Incompatibility means *sahānavasthānaniyama*, i.e., the law of not staying together. Śrīharṣa here examines *bhāvābhāvayorvirodhaḥ* or absolute contradiction. The law then means that an affirmative predicate and its negation cannot be predicated of the same subject in relation to the same time and place. So by contradiction we should mean the negation of the togetherness of *B* and not-*B* (i.e., both cannot be true). This negation of togetherness has been expressed as — *tadubhayāvasthānasāhityasya niṣedhaḥ*. But according to the realists, negation being a reality requires a negatum (*pratiyogin*) which must not be completely unestablished, but must exist at some time at least.[8] A completely unestablished negatum (*aprasiddhapratiyogin*) is a fiction and as such it cannot be an object of negation (*aprasiddhapratiyogikābhāvaḥ asiddhaḥ*). Now the togetherness of two contradictories is never and nowhere established in the world. Hence it follows that the negation of togetherness also remains unestablished. This means that contradiction itself cannot be established as a point of reality. It is to be noted that the realists themselves often quote in their support the following observation of Maṇḍanamiśra in his Brahmasiddhi:

labdharūpe kvacit kiñcit tādṛgeva niṣidhyate /
vidhānamantareṇāto na niṣedhasya sambhavaḥ //

Bsd p. 44.

[Only that something can be negated which has achieved an existence somewhere at some time. So there cannot be any negation without a pre-established affirmation.]

The matter is made worse if the realist suggests that *sahānavasthāna* be defined as *tadubhayāvasthānaniṣedhasāhitya*. The latter expression comes to mean togetherness of the negations of both *B* and not-*B*, which means 'neither *B* nor not-*B*' i.e. both can be false. In absolute contradiction such an assumption leads to an absurd consequence. Negation of *B* is the same as not-*B* and negation of not-*B* is equivalent to *B*. Thus 'neither *B* nor not-*B*' would turn out to be the same as 'both *B* and not-*B*' (i.e. both are true), which being just the opposite of *sahānavasthāna*, is plainly absurd. —

bhāvābhāvayoḥ ko virodhaḥ? sahānavasthānamiti cen na . . . taddhi tadubhayasāhityaniṣedho vā, tadubhayāvasthānaniṣedhasāhityaṁ vā syāt? ādye'prasiddhapratiyogikatvam, tadubhayasāhityasya kvacidapyapramiteḥ . . . dvitīye tadubhayāvasthānasāhityasvīkāra eva syāt, tadubhayaniṣedhayostadubhayatayaivāṅgīkārāt —

On Khnd pp. 1263—1265.

Vidyāsāgarī commentary very clearly and succinctly brings out the implication of the second objection —

bhāvāvasthānaniṣedhasyābhāvatvād abhāvāvasthānaniṣedhasya ca bhāvatvān niṣedhasāhitye bhāvābhāvasāhityaṁ syāt, tacca na bhavatītyarthaḥ —

On Khnd p. 1264.

Prajñākaragupta's elaborate treatment of contradiction is a deduction from a more radical idealistic metaphysics. It is also partly deduced from the Buddhist theory of *svalakṣaṇa* which, if consistently pursued, cannot but lead to the demolition of relation as a reality. The reals are nothing but self-complete discrete particulars of the moment having nothing to do with one another. Complete mutual exclusion is only another name for total isolation. Something complete in its unmitigated seclusion cannot tolerate any relation, whether it is confirmation or contradiction. So Prajñākara poses the question: — How can there be any relation of negational contradiction between two reals standing in mutual exclusion? (parasparaparihāreṇāvasthitayoḥ kathaṁ bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ? Pvb. p. 365) If still there is a contradiction somehow, both should have been negated and reduced to nothing. There is no rational way to decide that our wakeful experience negates our dream experience and that the converse is not true. So it is fundamentally meaningless to say that the dream experience is false while the wakeful experience true. Thus there is nothing called contradiction in the world of reals whether on the cognitive plane or on the external plane. That shows that uncontradictedness cannot enter into the definition of cognitive validity. Indeed the whole question of validity and invalidity is a matter of intellectual abstraction projected with deference to a pragmatic but unreal world. Prajñākara has very elaborately shown why and how one cognition can negate neither another cognition nor the object of another cognition. Prajñākara is an illustrious predecessor of Ānandabodha. So it is not unlikely that the Advaitist has drawn inspiration from a radical Buddhist idealist. According to both, the phenomenal manifold is only a tentative existence waiting to be eliminated by a final realisation. Now all logic and epistemology, indeed all philosophy, all talks of contradiction and negation, affirmation and confirmation, can exist only as long as the phenomenal world shows up its tentative existence. They are gone for good with the world going out. So the question does not arise if the negation of the world is real or not. It is, however, a metaphysical or mystical resolution of a logical question which defies any logical solution.

But even within the domain of logic and epistemology Prajñākara's challenge is formidable. Our experience never grasps contradiction itself as an object. There was a snake-percept and there is now a rope-percept. Now I say "It is not a snake". But this is only an interpretation of the rope-percept as *contrasted* with the snake-percept which seems to be drawn by memory in order to figure as the negatum of negation. My second perceptual experience is of the shape 'This is a piece of rope' and not of the shape, 'This is a piece of rope which is not snake, and which negates the snake of the preceding experience.' The whole subordinate clause is only an intellectual interpretative construction imposed on the rope-percept. So contradiction is not a reality even of a tentative world. Hence neither contradiction nor confirmation is a matter of experience:

> rūpādayo hi svarūpasaṁvedanaparā eva, na tadviṣayaḥ pratyayaḥ paratra pramāṇam – Pvb. p. 5.

We may legitimately add '*apramāṇam* vā.' (For Prajñākara's treatment of contradiction see Pvb. pp. 4–5 and pp. 359–387).

Extreme idealistic logic, which is as good as liquidation of logic itself, finds a good support from the destructive genius of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, the agnostic par excellence. The avowed aim of Jayaiāsi is to show that nothing can be finally decided as to what is right and what is wrong, that all systems of logic and philosophy are based on questionable propositions. All human behaviour whether intellectual or practical is based on presuppositions which stand only as long as no critical thought is given to them. He begins with a thorough examination of the Nyāya theory of perception and ends with the demolition of the authority of scripture. He questions the assumption that the mark of validity is uncontradictedness. Neither the object, nor the knowledge, nor both are subject to contradiction. Nothing contradicts, nothing is contradicted. His reason is compressed into a compact expression — *svaviṣayaparyavasāyinyo buddhayaḥ* (Tps. p. 15). This is a fine anticipation of Ānandabodha's remark *svagocaraśūraṇi jñānāni*. There are two competing propositions in the context of mirage, 'This is water' and 'This is not water'. Affirmation and negation independently figure in two independent judgments. It is agreed that what is or what is not is finally decided by what appears in cognition. It is an absurd situation that I do not know the contradictor and the contradicted, yet I know the contradiction. So knowledge is the final court of appeal to decide what is and what is not. In that case if the negative knowledge establishes the negation, the affirmative knowledge equally establishes the affirmation. Every knowledge exhausts itself with gripping its own object. It can take the shape only of its own object and not of the object of another knowledge. So an object of one knowledge cannot negate the object of another knowledge, nor a knowledge of one object can negate the knowledge of another object. An object being what it is can affirm only itself. It cannot affirm or negate another object. The so-called false water is as much an object of one knowledge as the cluster of solar rays falling on the desert sands is of another knowledge. There is thus no question of removing an object from its knowledge. Nor can the knowledge itself be removed from the time and place of its happening. In a series of psychic events every knowledge is fixed to its point of history. In the series one event is followed by another. So if it is said that one knowledge is contradicted by another you should say that every knowledge is contradicted by every other knowledge. A cognitive event is an evanescent point in a psychic series. This evanescence cannot be called contradiction.

tad yadi svarūpavyāvṛttirūpā bādhā tada sarvambādhitaṁ syāt, vijñānasya vijñānāntareṇa nivartyamānatvāt

Tps. p. 16.

It reminds one of Prajñākara's remark — if something has happened what can make it unhappen? (*Yadi jāto'sau bhāvaḥ kena tasyābhāvaḥ kriyate*? — Pvb. p. 374.) Thus contradiction (and so verification) is the casualty of idealistic logic.

Demolition of contradiction may be reasonably claimed to be equivalent to liquidation of logic. Truth-value is the cornerstone of logic. Rejection of contradiction means uprooting of this cornerstone. To show that there is nothing called contradiction and no way to define contradiction is the same as to show that there is no way to decide between right or wrong, truth and falsity. Hallucination and normal perception have equal claim to truth or falsity, because nothing can be contradicted or verified by anything else. It is no consolation to learn that the idealists reject contradiction and verification only from their basic metaphysical standpoint, not from the practical standpoint of normal human behaviour. In practical behaviour the child and the philosopher are alike (*sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau*) — thus speaks Bhartṛhari. But the question remains — what about the truth value of the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the idealists? What is the guarantee that man will one day realise the Brahman or *Nirvāṇa*, that the world of sufferings shall be negated for good? The only possible answer is — unquestioned faith in Scripture. But if logic is gone the question stands — why should we have this faith?

NOTES

[1] The Sanskrit term '*virodha*' covers the two types of opposition, namely, contradiction and contrariety as they are defined and differentiated in Western logic. But there is some difficulty in accepting *virodha* as an equivalent of what is generally called opposition in traditional Western logic. The relation between *A* and *I* propositions or between *E* and *O* propositions such that "if *p* is true *q* is true, if *p* is false *q* is undetermined", which is sometimes called sub-alternation or super-implication, is not recognised as a case of *virodha* in Indian logic. Similarly the subcontrary relation between *I* and *O* can hardly be called *virodha* at all. The sense of *virodha* is restricted to such a relation between *p* and *q* that both cannot be true. This relation of incompatibility obviously does not obtain between *A* and *I*, *E* and *O* and *I* and *O*.

So the term 'opposition' cannot be made an equivalent of *virodha* without heavily curtailing the conventionally accepted meaning of the former.

What is common between contradiction and contrariety is that p and q cannot both be true at the same time and place. The difference is measured by the logical position that in contradiction both p and q can neither be simultaneously true nor be false, while in contrariety, though both cannot be true, both can be false. Now the question is: – when both cannot be true whether we are entitled to say that p contradicts q and q contradicts p even in the case of contrariety such that 'A is a cow' and 'A is a horse'. If we restrict the term 'contradiction' strictly to its technical logical sense obviously we should not use the verb-form 'contradicts' in such a case, because both can be false. We may perhaps reasonably use the expressions, 'excludes' 'eliminates', 'negates', 'cancels' or 'invalidates' in the case of contrary relation between p and q if the expression 'contradicts' is found logically objectionable – for if one is true the other is bound to be false.

But a real difficulty arises when both the propositions are false. If A is neither a cow, nor a horse, but a camel, it is senseless to say that 'A is a cow' as a false statement cancels (or excludes etc.) another false statement 'A is a horse', for both are invalidated by the third statement 'A is a camel' which is true. Yet the position remains intact on the logical plane that if p is true, then q is false and if q is true then p is false. 'If-then', as a logical property of propositional relation, is not nullified by the fact that both are false. In other words, though in fact A is neither a cow, nor a horse, yet the feeling persists – had it been a cow, it could not have been a horse; had it been a horse, it could not have been a cow. Thus the case of contrariety involves a logical complexity which is absent in the case of contradiction. *Virodha* in the sense of contrariety is expressed as *parasparavirahavyāpyatva* in Indian logic. Considering the fact that two contrary propositions may be equally false and as such one does not necessarily cancel the other, Madhusūdana correctly observes that *virodha* as *parasparavirahavyāpyatva* is not a determinant of *vyāghāta* which means absolute contradiction. Contrariety also involves an element of contradiction in the sense that p and q both cannot be true, but what is absent here is the other element of contradiction, namely, one must be true. From all that we have said it may not be unreasonable for us to suggest a distinction between absolute contradiction and relative contradiction. Contradiction in the sense of 'p and q both cannot be true and both cannot be false' may be called absolute contradiction; while contradiction in the sense of 'both cannot be true, but both can be false' may be called *relative* contradiction which is traditionally recognised as contrariety. The former kind of *virodha* is properly called *vyāghāta* which is expressed as *parasparavirahavyāpakatva*. The latter is expressed as *parasparavirahavyāpyatva*. The term 'incompatibility' may be used as an expression covering both the cases of contradiction, absolute and relative (or contradiction and contrariety). If this suggestion is accepted and 'contradiction' may be used in the wider sense of incompatibility, it may not be wrong to use 'contradiction' as an English equivalent of the Sanskrit term *virodha*.

[2] That the two extremes of an absolute contradiction exhaust between them the whole universe of discourse is hinted at by Gaṅgeśa in the *Tarka* section of Tattvacintāmaṇi and clearly stated by Mathurānātha in his commentary thereon.

dhūmo yadi vahnyasamavahitājanyatve sati vahnisamavahitājanyaḥ syānnotpannaḥ syāt
Gaṅgeśa Tp. p. 3.

[If smoke were not produced either out of something unassociated with fire, or out of something associated with fire it would not have been produced at all.]

Mathurānātha states: — In this world there are two types of produced objects — an object created out of something unassociated with fire and an object created out of something associated with fire. If smoke were produced out of neither of these two, it would not have been produced at all.

janyaṁ hi jagati vastudvayaṁ vahnyasamavahitajanyaṁ tatsamavahitajanyaṁ ca tatrāyaṁ ced ubhayajanya eva na syāt tadā janya eva na syāditi bhāvaḥ.

Māthurī on Tp. pp. 2–3.

[3] Varadarāja's commentary in this context is very lucid and penetrating. Varadarāja interprets Udayana's expression *Vyāghātavadhirāśaṅkā* (Nk. III/7) in two ways — from a practical standpoint and a logical standpoint. If a person is sincerely in doubt about causality he is to be assured by his own practical behaviour. Whether water quenches thirst or not can be easily decided by sipping it twice or thrice. Such a resolution of doubt is a matter of practice. If somebody still professes doubt he should not take water to slake thirst or food to assuage hunger. His profession being belied by practice, there is reason to suppose that his doubt is not sincere. (Gaṅgeśa has shown this in Tarkaprakaraṇa). Varadarāja now proceeds to show that there is a possibility of philosophical or theoretical doubt which cannot be resolved by practice. One may go on taking water and food for quenching thirst and hunger as a matter of practical behaviour and yet may honestly take the theoretical position that boundless space and endless time being beyond the range of experience, there is every reason to question the truth of a universal causal relation. The relation between profession and practice does not solve this pertinent theoretical problem which, however, requires a theoretical reply. It is this theoretical reply which is attempted by Udayana in his observation — na hi hetuphalabhāvo na bhaviṣyati. etc.

ayamāśayaḥ — kimiyamāśaṅkā arthakriyārthino laukikasya, hetuphalabhāvaṁ jighāṁsataḥ parīkṣakasya vā, . . . yad vā sarvaṁ vyabhicariṣyatītivat sarvaṁ mithyā bhaviṣyatītyapi śaṅkāyā anutthānam, tasyāpi sarvāntarbhāvena mithyātvena vyāghātāt

Bodhanī on Nk III/7 pp. 342–347.

Also compare Vardhamāna:

śaṅkāpi hetumatī na vā, ādye hetuṁ vinā na syādeva, dvitīye deśādiniyamahetorabhāvāt sarvāsatyatvaprasaṅgaḥ

Prakāśa on *ibid.* p. 347.

See Rucidatta on the above:

ahetukaivotpattirityabhyupagame hetuphalabhāvābhāve'pi śaṅkā syāt . . . atraiva śaṅkā nānyatreti niyamahetorabhāvāt śaṅkāyāmapi saṅkā evaṁ sarvaṁ mithyā bhaviṣyatītyapi śaṅkā syāditi sarvāsattvaprasaṅga ityarthaḥ

— Makaranda on Prakāśa p. 347.

[4] Stcherbatsky's translation which is more interpretative than literal runs as follows: "When (one fact) has duration (as long as) the sumtotal of its causes remains unimpaired and it (then) vanishes as soon as another, (the opposed) fact appears, it follows that both are incompatible or efficiently opposed".

[5] Yathā vahnijalayoḥ parasparādhikaraṇāvṛttitvena parasparaviruddhatve'pi ekadharmiṇi ekadā vahnijñānaṁ jalajñanaṁ ca bhavati na tu vahnijñānaṁ jalajñāne jalajñānaṁ ca vahnijñāne pratibandhakaṁ, yadā tu vahnyabhāvavyāpyatvena jalāvagāhijñānaṁ jalābhāvavyāpyatvena ca vahnyavagāhijñānaṁ sambhavati tadaiva vahnijñāne vahnyabhāvavyāpyatvena jalajñānaṁ jalajñāne ca jalābhāvavyāpyatvena vahnijñānaṁ pratibandhakaṁ bhavati —

Vāmācaraṇabhaṭṭācārya's comm. on Gādādharī, Sp. pp. 149—150.

[6] Gaṅgeśa's definition of *hetvābhāsa* may be interpreted as involving both elimination and prevention. All three of Gaṅgeśa's definitions of *hetvābhāsa* in general, namely,

(a) anumitikāraṇībhūtābhāvapratiyogi-yathārthajñānaviṣayatvam (Acg. p. 1580).

(b) yadviṣayakatvena liṅgajñānasyānumitivirodhitvaṁ tattvaṁ hetvābhāsastvam (*ibid.*)

(c) jñāyamānaṁ sad yadanumitipratibandhakaṁ tattvaṁ vā hetvābhāsatvam (*ibid.*)

settle down to this:

The wrong probans is that the right knowledge about which is an impediment to the wrong inference.

[7] na hi tāvat samānagocarānubhavāntareṇānubhavāntaraviṣayāpahārasambhavaḥ, dhārāvāhike'pi tatprasaṅgāt / nāpi vibhinnagocareṇa, stambhānubhavenāpi kumbhānubhavagocarāpahāraprasaṅgāt / sati virodha iti viśeṣaṇād adoṣa iti cen naivaṁ svagocaraśūrāṇāṁ bodhānāṁ virodhābhāvasyābhihitatvād vijñānaviṣayāpahāre nirālambanatāpatteḥ — Nm. p. 125.

[8] See Udayana's auto-commentary on Nk III/3: — kena ca śaśasṛṅgaṁ pratiṣiddhyate / sarvathānupalabdhasya yogyatvāsiddheḥ — p. 330.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acg.	Anumānacintāmaṇi with Dīdhiti and Gādādharī (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 2nd ed. Pandit Kīrtyānanda Jhā and Sri Satkari Sarma, 1970).
As	Advaitasiddhi of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī with Laghucandrikā of Brahmānanda and Siddhivyākhyā of Balabhadra (Nirṇay Sagar Press, Bombay, ed. Mm. Ananta Krisna Sastri, 1937).
Bsd.	Brahmasiddhi of Maṇḍanamiśra (ed. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras, 1937).
Khnd.	Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya of Śrīharṣa with Vidyāsāgarī commentary (Chowkhamba, Benares, ed. Pandit Lakshmanasastri Dravid, 1914).
Nb.	Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti with Dharmottara's commentary (Kashiprasad Jayswal Research Institute, Patna, ed. Pandit Dalsukhbhai Malvania, 1955).
Nk.	Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayana with Vardhamāna's Prakāśa and Varadarāja's Bodhanī (Chowkhamba, Benares, ed. Padmaprasadopadhyay and Dhundirajasastri, 1957).
Nm	Nyāyamakaranda of Ānandabodha (Chowkhamba, Benares, ed. Swami Balarama Udaseen, 1907).

Pvb.	Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya of Prajñākaragupta (Kashiprasad Jayswal Research Institute, Patna, ed. Rahul Sankrityayana, 1953).
Sp.	Gaṅgeśa's Savyabhicāraprakaraṇa with Dīdhiti and Gādādharī (edited with an explanatory commentary by Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Master Kheladilal and Sons Benares, 1940).
Tp.	Gaṅgeśa's Tarkaprakaraṇa with Māthurī (Chowkhamba, Benares, ed. Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, 1944).
Tps.	Tattvopaplavasiṁha of Jayarāśibhaṭṭa, (Oriental Institute, Baroda, ed. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and R. C. Parikh, 1940).
Vsm.	Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī of Prakāśānanda (ed. Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, Calcutta, 1935).

Jadavpur University
Calcutta-32, India

A. M. GHOSE

AN ANALYSIS OF MANU ON MAN AND SOCIETY

I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper I have first sought to identify what I call the 'givens' of Manu-Smṛti by which I mean the fundamental assumptions. The 'givens', I must add, have been, in a way, identified by Manu; when, however, they have not been identified by him, we should identify them on our own. Once the 'givens' are identified I will proceed to examine what I call the 'key concepts', scattered all over the work. The 'key concepts' are not exactly derived from antiquity; they are largely a product of thought which developed under the aegis of Brahminical domination at a later stage. The two lists, one of the 'givens' and the other of 'key concepts' may, occasionally, have overlapping connotations. The words and concepts included in the two lists, on closer examination, will be found polysemic; one faces here considerable difficulty in eliciting the proper senses of these words. An excursus into etymology is not necessarily helpful because these words have, in course of their long and eventful usages, acquired unusual overtones. In brief, the etymological, the traditional and the scholarly meanings, as distinguished from the popular meanings of these words do not stand aligned. The best course left for us is to accept the obscurity as a fact; if the text becomes a little less perspicacious on that account, we ought to concede the point.

The 'givens', as I have listed them here, could possibly be questioned. Once the 'givens' and the 'key concepts' are identified, one may proceed to the derivations.

We examine those concepts which are not there in the text. Many of these concepts have been surreptitiously introduced by the commentators who belonged to a different age. These concepts, originally absent in the Smṛti, are often of great significance in later Hindu thinking. But it is good to remember that the incorporation of those terms by the later commentators tend to distort the tenor of the Smṛti.

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When we go through the Smṛti today we seek, consciously or unconsciously, to comprehend it with the mentality shaped by modern education, notions and ideals. It is almost impossible to study these Smṛtis with the windows so completely closed that no breath of modern social, political, legal and economic ideas is allowed to enter. It has been suggested that we ought to raise the questions Manu raised if we want to understand the work. I doubt if it is possible to raise those questions. I think we can raise only those questions which are meaningful to us.

II. THE 'GIVENS' IN MANU

1. *The Doctrine of Sṛṣṭi* (*Creation*)

I am not interested in comparing Manu's account of creation with the lore of creation figuring in other legends of antiquity. To my mind Manu's views on creation are relevant because, according to him, the natures of things, in the broadest sense, too are *created*. (I.18, 25). 'Creation' ordains the future course of the objects created. (I.29). The social order itself is a creation. Manu is not one of those who think that the social order came into existence as a result of decision or convention. "The Lord created a king for the protection of the *whole* creation." (VII.3) (Italics added). 'Daṇḍa' (punishment) too was created by the Lord (VII.14). Sṛṣṭi assumes the importance it has in Manu's scheme because 'creation' alone invests 'necessity' on the nature of things and their interrelationships. If 'convention' or 'decision' were to explain things and their interrelationships, then we would land ourselves in 'relativism' which Manu sought to avoid scrupulously.

The first question pertains to the origin of the four varṇas and emergence of the various mixed *jātis* (I.2) on account of man's perversity. In a significant sense man's corporate life is the central issue. The notions of 'Brahmā' (I.9), 'Nārāyaṇa' (I.10), 'Puruṣa' (I.10), 'Virāṭa Puruṣa' (I.33) and 'Prabhu' (I.34) need to be examined carefully to find out if and when Manu offers the notion of a personal God. The chapter on creation has several interesting and shrewd observations. Most of these observations are not clear to us today on account of their mythological overtones and metaphorical use of words. The similarity with the views of the Sāṅkhya system is striking. Regarding the origin of the Vedas the word used is '*dohana*' (I.23) and not *sṛṣṭi*. The chapter not only contains the views regarding the origin of the four varṇas but also their respective duties. The position of the Brahmin is unfailingly extolled and the importance of 'ācāra' is widely acknowledged (I.108). 'Ācāraḥ paramo dharmaḥ' (I.108) has given rise to several interpretations; we shall examine a few of them in the sequel.

One of the ślokas (I.29) says that the qualities assigned to the different creatures in the beginning clung to them spontaneously. If this is true then the scope of growth, change and improvement, particularly in the human sphere, would be impossible. If, in other words, creation determines the nature of things, then moral growth and progress would not be possible. From the verses which deal with 'fall' it appears that in Manu's scheme changes do take place but only genetically.

2. *The Doctrine of 'Varṇa'*

The concept of varṇa figures in the second śloka and is repeated at I.31 and X.4, 5. There is no fifth varṇa (X.4). The duties of the four varṇa are enumerated at I.88—91. What appears to be implicit in these enumerations is that any deviation in the performance of the stipulated duties is perversity, except perhaps in time of emergency. So far as Manu-Smṛti is concerned, varṇas and their interrelationships are simply taken for granted. One can only disturb the scheme and bring about confusion if one tampers with it.

The major portion of the discussions on varṇas, in so far as Manu-Smṛti is concerned, is devoted to the Brahmins. The discussions centre round the normal duties of the four varṇas, the kind of education and training they should receive, regulations governing their marriages and prescriptions regarding their dresses and even names. On closer examination of the concept of 'Brāhmaṇa', ('Brahmin' is the Anglicized word for member of Hindu priestly caste) one comes across at least three different views. In the first place, a Brāhmaṇa is one who performs the duties expected of a Brāhmaṇa and these duties have been spelt out at different places (I.88 and X.75). It is surely interesting to find a verse (II.87) where a Brāhmaṇa is identified only on the strength of his muttering prayers; the stress on performance or non-performance of rites becomes unimportant. There are verses (VIII.339; XI.11—21) which say that a Brāhmaṇa is entitled to take wood for sacrificial fire and grass for feeding his own cow and that these acts would not be deemed as theft! The sacrificer could, if necessary, take forcibly a couple of articles needed for his sacrificial rites from the house of a Śūdra (XI.11f).

In the second place, 'Brāhmaṇa' appears as a normative concept (I.97; II.160, 161 and XI.35), i.e., a Brāhmaṇa is one who abides by certain moral virtues. Of all the varṇas, among the Brāhmaṇas alone there is a gradation (I.97). A similar gradation has not been made among members belonging to other varṇas (III.134 where Manu talks of four kinds of *dvijas*, i.e. twice-born).

Lastly, a Brāhmaṇa is one who is born of Brāhmaṇa parents (I.99; IX.317; X.5 and XI.85.). The last view, however, is flatly contradicted at one place (XII.114).

There are Brāhmaṇas who may be so by birth, but they are not necessarily respectable because of their un-Brahmanical professions (III.152, 153). There is a verse which suggests that a Brāhmaṇa should be learned and wise in the sense that he is well-versed in the scriptures and that he should fear praise and homages (II.155, 162). Another verse goes on to say that a Brāhmaṇa is pure by nature, 'like fire and water' (X.103). Elsewhere it is said that a Brāhmaṇa in no case must get capital punishment (VIII.380). One is tempted to ask: in what sense are the Kṣatriyas born of the Brāhmaṇas? (IX.320)

A Kṣatriya's functions are enumerated at I.89. The protection of his subjects figures as the most important function (VII.3, 144; VIII.305, 306). Fame, glory and reputation are virtues which a king should care for, above all (VIII.344). Interestingly, these virtues are not associated with any one other than a Kṣatriya and certainly not with a Brāhmaṇa. One is not quite clear about what happens to a Kṣatriya who is not a king! Nor does the Smṛti say anything about the relationship between the potentates of a feudal order.

The duties of a Vaiśya are enumerated at I.90. Some of these duties are reiterated and explained at IX.326—333. The function of a Śūdra is to serve the three upper varṇa (I.91 and IX.334).

The notion of mixed varṇas (*samkara varṇa*) has been examined by several commentators. About two things Manu is quite clear. First, there are only four varṇas (X.4). Secondly, "in all varṇas those children which are begotten in the direct order on wedded wives,[1] equal in their caste and married as virgins, are to be regarded as belonging to the same caste as their fathers." (X.5).

Mixed castes, therefore, are results of 'marriages' of partners belonging to different varṇas. Commentators in explaining V.89 have held that 'samkara' are "children born of mothers of a higher caste and fathers of a lower caste." But if what Manu says at X.5 and 6 is true then children born of parents belonging to different varṇas are to be treated as 'mixed'. One commentator goes on to declare that the son of a Brāhmaṇa mother older in age to the father of the child, even when they are legally married, will not be treated as Brāhmaṇa. Mixed castes are the results of adulterous relationships (X.24). Mixed castes also arise when fathers neglect their prescribed varṇa duties. (X.24).

'Varṇa' determined by birth, is a necessary condition for what could be called a certain 'style of life.' But a person's varṇa is not wholly (i.e., sufficiently) determined by his birth; it depends on a few additional, if not adventitious, factors. It depends on 'upanayana' or initiation (II.36f; 169—71). It is, moreover, determined by the person's occupation; his 'ācāra' (conduct), proper performance of his marriage, and in the case of a Brāhmaṇa, at least, on the acquisition of certain moral qualities along with his learning of the Vedas.

The lowly position of the Śūdra is traceable to his origin from a jaghanya (base) limb like the Lord's feet (VIII.270). In fact, Manu's view that some parts of the body (even of the Lord!) are purer than others (I.92 and V.132) is unintelligible.

At one place (VIII.22) it is said that a kingdom where the Śūdras are numerous or a kingdom populated by atheists soon perishes. It is difficult to understand how Śūdra must not out-number the twice-born in a social set-up recommended by Manu. Some commentators (e.g. Bhāruci) have explained the verse to mean that Śūdras should not decide legal issues or that they should not hold high offices.

The significant point is that men belonging to the different varṇas must perform their stipulated duties properly and ungrudgingly (IV.14). A person belonging to a particular varṇa is not expected to perform the duties of another belonging to a different varṇa except in times of distress. But here too there are constraints. Non-performance or mal-performance lead to 'fall', a topic which will be discussed in another section.

There is a verse which recommends close cooperation between the two varṇas, the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya (IX.323). This verse, incidentally, is found in two other important works, Gautamīya and Vaśiṣṭha Dharmasāstras. The exact import of the idea, I am afraid, has not been worked out by the commentators. What, for example, are the areas where cooperation could and ought to be sought? How could we possibly deny the need of cooperation between all the varṇas, including the Vaiśyas and the Śūdras? In an ideal set-up, I am sure, there should be cooperation between members of all the varṇas. And in that sense all the varṇas are perhaps equally important. Here perhaps there is an Indian version of 'social contract' in a rudimentary form.

3. *The Concept of 'Āśrama'*

The notion of āśrama, let me add here on the authority of Kane,[2] is not found in the 'Brāhmaṇas' or in the 'Samhitās'. The āśrama is discussed at III.77, 78 and VI.87—90. We have seen that the four different varṇas have their respective functions; likewise there are certain functions associated with the four āśramas or stages of life through which men belonging to the three upper varṇas are expected to pass through.

Manu-Smṛti talks about three births (II.147 and 169). The first takes place when the child comes out of its mother's womb; the second when "Upanayana" takes place and the third when he receives 'yajñadīkṣā'. "Upanayana" has its own importance because this ceremony confers the right to perform the Vedic rites. The physical birth (II.147) is seen as a *natural* occurrence compared to the second, i.e., the result of 'upanayana'. The parents along with the preceptor have been compared to glorious fire (II.231). With 'upanayana' begins the hard and austere life of a 'dvija' (twice-born) in general and of a brāhmaṇa in particular. The duties of such a young man are described at length in the later half of chapter II. But one does not get a clear picture of the length of the stage called 'Brahmacarya'. At one place it is said that if he so wishes, a disciplined Brahmacārī can lead his whole life in this austere fashion (II.243); elsewhere (IV.257; 35 and 36) it is said that a Brahmacārin, on the completion of the period, and then alone, could hope for *moksa*. The life that is extolled is that of a householder (III.77). If and when the first wife dies, a householder is advised to get married once again and resume the life of a householder (V.168 and 169). What, however, has been said at VI.35 and 36 is thus denied at V.159. At VI.35 and 36 it is said that he who seeks liberation without having paid his debts (to the great sages, to the manes and to the gods) sinks downwards. One is supposed to direct his mind to the attainment of liberation *after* one has studied the Vedas and begetting sons. But at V.159 it is said that thousands of Brāhmaṇas, chaste from their youth, have gone to heaven without continuing their race! Moreover, it is not clear if the passage through the different stages (āśramas) confers any completeness on the growth and development of the twice-borns or it is obligatory only socially.

Manu, it appears, is aware of the distinction drawn between a "good citizen" and a "good man". The manner in which Manu extols the life of a householder (III.77 and 78) is hardly compatible with the virtues acquired by a life-long Brahmacārin (II.248 and 249). So far as this particular issue is concerned, the question of varṇa is irrelevant. I am inclined to believe that the life of contemplation remains unreconciled with the life of action in the scheme Manu offers. Manu's stress on repaying the three debts (VI.35) and the daily performance of the five yajnas (III.69; IV.21, and V.16) shows that he was primarily interested in the life of a householder or a life of action which contributes towards the growth of family. Who, in any case, is to decide when a person is entitled to give up his mundane belongings, rights and obligations?[3] If he is a member of the society then he cannot possibly recommend this course of life in an arbitrary fashion. Manu, it appears, has not taken into account the possibility of charlatans accepting the life of mendicants. How do we prevent the emergence of a class of escapists? The life and obligations of a mendicant, as Manu describes them (VI.42—59), seem to be extremely hard, and, in any case, *sannyāsa* (renunciation of the world) is recommended for those who are the purest among 'dvijas' (V.108). However, Manu is never tired of reminding that the Vedas continue to be the source of all wisdom even for the mendicant (VI.84). And it is not clear whether Manu would recommend a Vānaprasthin to offer sacrifices and keep the sacred fire or that he should give them up (see VI.4—5; 9—12; 25 and 43). Incidentally commentators have offered different views on the propriety of 'suicide' while commenting on VI.31.

4. *The Concept of "Dharma"*

Here is one of the most important concepts. It is a word with a bewilderingly wide variety of connotations in Manu-Smṛti itself. In the first place Dharma refers to the functions or duties of the different varṇas. This has been discussed earlier. 'Varṇadharma' not only refers to professions but also to social functions.

In the second place dharma is identified with karma which in turn is determined by varṇa. We find Manu describing the dharma, more or less as co-terminous with karma, of a Vaiṣya (IX.325 and 333) and of a Śūdra (IX.334f).

Third, dharma is related to sex in that men and women have their respective duties (V.146f; IX.1f).

Fourth, dharma has something to do with the āśramas (IV.1f; VI.1—32; 88—89).

Fifth, dharma has close relation with yuga which itself has several meanings. 'Yuga' is used in the sense of aeons, four in number (I.85). Yuga also refers to the period co-terminous with the reign of a monarch (IX.301). What, therefore, is dharma in one yuga may not be so in another.

Sixth, dharma refers to the duties of a monarch; a whole chapter has been devoted to the topic (Ch. VII).

Seventh, dharma is 'natural' (I.30).

Eighth, dharma refers to certain moral qualities (VI.92) like patience, temperance, purity etc.

Ninth, dharma is said to be supreme; in this sense dharma alone is the individual's 'dearest object' (VIII.17).

Tenth, dharma is equated with ācāra (custom) (I.108).

Eleventh, dharma is what the learned Brāhmaṇas lay down or prescribe (XII.108—110).

Twelfth, dharma has its source in the Vedas (II.70).

Finally, dharma is also determined by the individual's role (VIII.335).

'Guṇa dharma' and 'naimittika dharma' are phrases used by Kulluka, a 15th century commentator. 'Deśa dharma', 'jāti dharma' and 'pāsaṇḍa dharma' are phrases found in I.118 and 'janapada dharma' at VIII.41.

The verse which says that dharma is 'four-footed' (I.81) has given rise to various explanations. (1) The four feet represent the four principal priests at the sacrifice; (2) they represent the four varṇas; (3) they represent the four chief means of gaining dharma, viz. tapasyā (austerity), jñāna (knowledge), yajña (sacrifices) and dāna (charity); (4) they represent the four kinds of speech mentioned in the Ṛg Veda, I.164—45.

It is obviously difficult to ascertain if dharma has, what I would like to call, a 'master meaning'. The temptation to identify one meaning and give it a prominent position, though great, should be avoided.

5. *The Supremacy of the Vedas*

The Vedas are supreme in almost every respect (II.13, 14 and 166; VI.84; XII.94). The Vedas contain the truth regarding the nature of things; the prescriptions contained in the Vedas are wholly inviolable. The Vedas are 'aprameya', i.e., the validity of the truths contained in the Vedas is not ascertainable by the limited human mind (XII.94). The Brāhmaṇas alone are authorized to teach the Vedas (X.1) while the Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas are allowed to learn the Vedas. The Śūdra has no access to the Vedas. The word 'śāstra' is used fairly frequently. The word has at least three meanings. In one sense it means what is today called 'science' or systematised and organised body of knowledge; in a second sense it refers to a treatise or exposition of the principles of a recognised discipline, and, finally, it is used in the sense of scriptural 'injunctions'. Incidentally, the Vedas are accepted as the final authority by all the systems of philosophy except Buddhism, Jainism and the Carvaka thinkers. But here too there are differences among the orthodox schools; some consider rituals to be more important while other systems think the later part of the Vedas, dealing with wisdom and contemplation, to be more important. It is indeed difficult to say which part of the Vedas would be considered important by Manu.

6. *The Doctrine of Rebirth*

This is another doctrine which is widely accepted by the traditional systems. It is closely associated with the doctrine of karma. An individual's subsequent births are determined by the kind of actions he performs; these actions are performed by his mind, speech and body (XII.5, 6 and 7). There are a few philosophical observations pertaining to the nature of self and its relationship to the body; these observations are not clear. Manu, like most other thinkers, accepts and reiterates the widely held view that the soul is born again and again. Unfortunately, however, 'rebirth' is used metaphorically in at least two places (II.147 and 169). There are observations regarding a Brāhmaṇa losing his caste if he performs unBrahminical acts like discontinuing the study of the Vedas or taking to trade in certain commodities (II.168 and X.92). On the other hand, it has also been said that an Ārya who performs the acts of a non-Ārya does not loose his caste (X.73). In chapters XI and XII there are detailed descriptions of the lowly births which accrue to individuals who perform lowly acts. The language is often abusive. Some of the points relevant to the understanding of the notion of rebirth will be discussed in connection with the notion of 'mobility'.

7. *Man by Nature is 'Goal-Seeking'*

This is mentioned specifically in II.2, 3 and 4; Manu's generalization appears to be based on empirical observations (II.4). The notion of 'saṃkalpa' is found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VII.4.1 and 2 and 5.1). Here is an attempt at combining two diverse human characteristics, one belonging to the realm of facts and the other belonging to the realm of values. The *fact* is that man is a creature who desires. But he *ought* to transcend desires. I doubt if Manu has been successful in combining the 'is' and the 'ought'. Let us not forget that Manu does not invoke the notion of 'grace' (*prasāda*).

Manu's way of thinking, it appears, is that if man by nature is 'goal-seeking' then there should be rules to guide this seeking. But whence do we get the rules? According to Manu there are a few acknowledged sources. They are the Vedas, the injunctions approved by learned and scholarly Brāhmaṇas who have critically reflected upon the Vedas and enshrined in the Smṛtis, manners and customs of wise men, and finally, one's own conscientious and mature reflections (II.6). Scholars have raised several searching questions. Are these sources arranged in any order? Is the order descending or ascending? What happens when there are conflicting views? To my mind, according to Manu, the Vedas remain the highest court of appeal.

8. *The Notion of Hierarchy*

There are quite a few verses where Manu refers to the superiority or seniority of certain varṇas over other varṇas; certain professions are considered more respectable and certain virtues are considered relatively basic. The notion of a hierarchical order runs all through the Smṛti.

In so far as the supremacy of varṇas and professions are concerned we should refer to X.144f. In II.92 Manu refers to the supremacy of mind over the senses. This strain of thought could be traced back to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 6.7; elsewhere (IX.18) he refers to the supremacy of man over woman; he talks of the supremacy of the preceptor over the disciple in II.192, 194 and 198. The question of 'equality' hardly figures in Manu-Smṛti. In fact, in Manu's world the notion of horizontality is almost wholly absent; varṇas, āśramas, even puruṣārthas are conceived hierarchically. As I have mentioned earlier, Manu thinks that the 'varṇa' hierarchy should reveal itself in the names of men and women belonging to the different varṇas, in their attires and in the manner they greet! The concept of hierarchy is one of those things which has attracted the attention of a large variety of thinkers. At the heart of the notion of hierarchy there is the tacit acknowledgement of the notion of 'power'. The 'power' I am referring to either operates in a norm-governed framework or in a framework devoid of norms, i.e., where brute force alone counts. In either case power lends authority to some and deprives the majority of it. The result is a hierarchy leading necessarily to some form of inequality. This inequality, when legitimatized, is viewed as morally correct or even edifying. But some philosophers questioned this notion of hierarchical order, legitimate or otherwise, because according to them it is morally degrading. In this country we find the earliest attempts in that direction in Buddhistic and Jain thought. How far they too imbibed this notion of hierarchy is, however, a different story. The notion of hierarchy, moreover, is viewed differently according to two different conceptions regarding the nature and essence of man. When man is conceived primarily as a knower or as a rational being, he is not expected to choose, order and arrange things and situations since all of them, as objects of knowledge, are equally important or unimportant. When, however, he conceives himself primarily as an agent or as a desiring being, he is bound to choose, order and arrange things and situations, himself, his own feelings, passions, needs, requirements and his relationships with others. Then the notion of hierarchy emerges.

9. *The Notion of Monarchy*

A monarch is father to his subjects (VII.80). A kingdom is viewed as an enlarged family. The kṣatriya's function, as seen earlier, is to look after his subjects (I.89; VII.143 and 144; X.80). But what does it mean? In Manu's scheme it means that the distinction between the four varṇas should be scrupulously preserved (VII.35). The whole of chapter VIII is devoted to 'politics', consisting of discussions on administration, justice, punishments, etc. which need not be recounted here.

A kṣatriya cannot, rather should not, earn his livelihood by performing the duties of a Brahmin (X.95). But a Brahmin can, if necessary, earn his livelihood by performing the functions of a kṣatriya or even that of a Vaiśya (X.81 and 82). Does a Brahmin still retain his caste?

There are two questions whose answers cannot be gleaned from Manu-Smṛti. First, what happens to a kṣatriya when he is not a monarch? Secondly, what precisely is the relation between a small and a more powerful monarch? The observations in II.73 are not sufficiently illuminating.

Manu is of the view that ministers should preferably be Brahmins (VII.58 and 59). At two places it has been said that a Brahmin is not expected to serve a king, i.e., a Kṣatriya. Those who serve get wages; while Brahmins could get 'gifts.' A clear distinction between 'wages' and 'gifts' is not made. The notion of the participation of the people in political affairs and in administration is nowhere mentioned. The subjects have no voice in the manner they are ruled over. Manu is not interested in an explicit discussion of concepts like authority, legitimacy and power. The monarch draws his authority and power from several sources. Above all he should be a kṣatriya with moral virtues (VII.27, 44—52). Secondly, he should be well-versed in the śāstras, i.e., in the Vedas and disciplines like economics, politics, logic and metaphysics. Finally, he should seek the assistance of a group of (seven or eight) ministers equally well-versed in the śāstras. Men having experience in fighting wars, courageous, and efficient in running the affairs of the states should be chosen as ministers. Or else the monarch runs the risk of losing everything (VII.28). It is difficult to see how without a modicum of 'contract' the monarch and the people can come close to each other. But this seems to have escaped Manu's notice.

The king's court, if one could say so, described in VII.27—34, is surely different from the 'parisads' of the learned Brahmins described in XII.111ff. In the assembly of the learned Brahmins the mendicant or the sannyāsin, i.e., one who has renounced the world, is not included as a member (XII.112). But why? The question remains unanswered. Manu suggests that the king's court and the assembly of learned Brahmins should function in close cooperation (IX.323). In what way are the two institutions different?

10. *The Five Cardinal Virtues*

The five cardinal virtues for all the members of the four varṇas are non-violence, truth, non-possession, purity and control of the sense organs (X.63). It has been argued that here is a conception of man which cuts across the barrier of varṇas. Perhaps there is some strength in the argument. Unfortunately, the values have not been discussed at length. One wonders why 'dāna' (charity) does not figure in the list.

11. *The Concept of Mobility, 'Gati' and 'Fall'*

The concept of 'gati' is fairly complex; it has been discussed in different contexts. In one sense (II.168) it means a downward movement of a member belonging to a particular varṇa when he performs actions not sanctioned by the śāstras. In another sense (VI.61) it refers to what happens to a man when he goes to another world, after his death, on account of evil deeds. In a third sense, close to the second sense just mentioned, *gati* is determined by a person's deeds – physical, mental and those belonging to speech (XII.3 and 40). But Manu does not explain how a Brahmin, or even a Kṣatriya for that matter, having such exalted births could at all commit crimes which would cause 'fall.' How do they become victims of greed and lust? The notion of 'freedom of will' is not to be found in the Smṛti. There is, again, an 'upward movement' on account of marriages of successive generations in higher varṇas (X.64). One could perhaps explain this 'upward movement' as an improvement of the stock. There is, however, another kind of 'upward movement' which takes place after death, in the next life, on account of performing good deeds and acquisition of noble values (IX.335).

The 'downward movement' (in one's lifetime) takes place on account of the performance of prohibited actions (II.168 and 169; X.92; XI.98 and 176). And, of course, there is the 'downward movement', in the next life, on account of evil deeds.

Closely connected with the notion of 'gati' we must refer to the notions of 'jātyutkarṣa' and 'jātyapakarṣa' (X.42 and 44). Here too there is a downward movement on account of prohibited marriages. But the 'fall' accrued to the offspring (X.41). One is tempted to ask: how do we account for the 'fall' of the offspring? 'Fall' could mean (genetic) degeneration without moral overtones. But there is a moral 'fall' on account of non-performance of the stipulated functions (X.43 and 44); in Manu's scheme a Śūdra cannot commit any sin which would cause a 'fall' (X.126).

12. *The Concept of Karma*

Like dharma, karma too is a concept which is widely used in the Indian philosophical discourses. The term has been left untranslated on account of diverse meanings attached to it by Manu.

In the first place, karma means nothing more than a 'quality' or 'function' with which things are naturally endowed (I.29 and 30).

In the second place, karma like dharma, is relative to varṇa (I.88f; IV.3; VIII.410; IX.326f; X.74f).

In the third place, karma is equated with 'tapasyā' (penance); it involves effort (XI.125f).

In the fourth place, karma is said to have three sources — the mind, the body and speech (XII.6, 7 and 8).

In the fifth place, karma is said to be the cause of happiness as well as unhappiness (VI.79).

In the sixth place, karma of certain kinds lead to 'nihsreyasa' or liberation (IV.14 and XII.82) while elsewhere ātmajnāna (knowledge of self) is said to lead to moksa (XII.92). In the first place it is not clear if *niḥśreyasa* and *mokṣa* refer to one and the same thing; secondly, the view that karma leads to *niḥśreyasa* would not be acceptable to the Vedānta, a system of philosophy to which Manu is said to be close. This leads me to think that the relationship between the path of action and the path of knowledge is not discussed by Manu.

In the seventh place, karma is related to *jāti* and the *jāti* of a person could be known from the manner in which he acts. Perhaps there is a circularity here.

In the eighth place the notion of karma acquires a complex character when Manu introduces the twin notions of pravṛtti and nivṛtti (XII.88). *Pravṛtti* is said to lead to abhyūdaya, a concept found in the Mīmāṃsā, while nivṛtti leads to *niḥśreyasa*. The distinction between *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*, like the distinction between *mokṣa* and *niḥśreyasa*, has not been discussed by Manu. 'Svarga' (Heavenly bliss) mentioned in IV.246, is gained by one who is persevering, gentle, patient; one who practices non-injury and controls his sense organs. In VI.96 Manu is saying that one who cares for the highest state should even cease to care for Svarga. Svarga, therefore, cannot be the highest goal in the sense that there is nothing beyond it.

The question that strikes one is: has Manu drawn a distinction between duties which are legal and those which are moral? The assumption behind this distinction is that legal duties pertain to a person *qua* social being, i.e., as a member of an economic-political-social order while the moral duties pertain to a person *per se*, independent of what Kant calls 'practical anthropology.' There are suggestions that Manu was aware of this distinction but he never faces the issues squarely. Manu is never found suggesting that karma causes 'bondage', a strain of thought having a fairly ancient origin. There are a few slokas where the importance of karma has been lowered (XII.84 and 85), but karma is never viewed as a source of bondage.

III. THE KEY CONCEPTS

i. *The Concept of Ācāra*

While examining the several meanings of *dharma* I referred to I.108–110 where the concept of ācāra figures prominently. The ślokas have given rise to several interpretations even in our times because the notion of 'custom' figures so prominently in ancient Roman legal thought. Some have distinguished dharma from ācāra on the ground that dharma has a transcendental source while ācāra is human, a matter of convention. Others have held that dharma and ācāra are identical. I believe that dharma needs to be distinguished from ācāra because in an important sense dharma cannot always be traced back to ācāra or custom.

The concept of ācāra occupies a position midway between what I have called the 'given' and the 'key concept'. If one were to accept wholly what is said in I.107 and 108, ācāra would be treated as a 'given'. But the possibility of departure from 'ācāra' is acknowledged in the next verse (I.109) and another distinction is drawn between 'sadācāra' and 'ācāra' in II.18 and 155. One gets the impression that the performance of 'ācāra' is a matter of human will and effort. In that case 'ācāra' is a code (I.107) and as code it is 'given'. But ācāra as due and conscientious performance of this 'code' (having a transcendental source), being a matter of human will and effort, is a key concept.

The notion of 'sadācāra' has geographical overtones (II.17). But Manu explains 'sadācāra' elsewhere in a different manner (IV.155f). 'Ācāra' too has several meanings.

'Ācāra', or rather 'Sadācāra', is what the disciplined Brahmins recommend (II.b) and it is rooted in the recommendations of the Vedas. Ācāra, secondly, is said to be the foundation of 'tapasyā' (I.110). And 'tapasyā' is used, at least once, as a synonym of the proper functioning of the duties alotted to the respective varṇas (XI.236).

The conflict between 'dharma' and 'ācāra' is evident at several places. 'Dharma' says one thing about a 'twice-born' marrying a Śūdra woman (II.15, 16, 17 and 18) while 'custom' may say something else (IX.153). Similarly, 'dharma' says one thing about eating meat (V.55) but custom something else (II.227 and IV.250). About 'niyoga', 'dharma' has one thing to say (IX.66) but 'custom' may permit it (IX.59). About the remarriage of *widows* 'dharma' has one view (IX.157), but custom suggests something else (IX.190).

ii. *The Concepts of 'Śauca' and 'Śuddhi'*

The twin concepts of 'śauca' and 'aśauca' (purity and impurity) are associated with birth and death and the rules governing their observation are fairly complex. The concept of 'aśauca' is discussed at length in chapter V. Purity and impurity are not exactly concepts of 'hygiene' although they could be explained in that way in many contexts. Persons who wish to remain pure should not touch those who are impure, nor should they touch their belongings. When a death occurs, persons related to the dead person become impure, no matter where they are and the period of 'impurity' varies from varṇa to varṇa. A disciple has to observe 'aśauca' for a certain period when his preceptor dies (V.80). Utensils and instruments, pots and pans become 'impure' on certain occasions; the manner in which they should be washed to restore purity is discussed at length depending on the materials out of which they are made. Droppings and urine of the cow are used to restore purity. The details of the ablution of the various limbs of the human body are found in chapter V; one would find many orthodox Brahmins even today observing these rules scrupulously. One thing which appears rather strange is that the mouth of a woman is always seen as pure (V.130). Elsewhere Manu says that orifices of the human body below the navel are impure (V.132). Here is a strange notion of 'impurity'.

There is a verse which enumerates the different purifiers in a summary fashion. They are knowledge (of the highest principle), austerities, fire, holy food, water, earth, control of the sense organs, smearing cowdung, the wind, the sacred rites, the sun and the time

(V.105). The next verse emphasises that a person is pure if he earns wealth with clean hands and not he who purifies himself with earth and water. The verse V.109 identifies the various parts of the person and their respective purifiers. The body is cleansed by water, the mind (or the internal organ) by truthfulness, the soul by learning and austerities and the intellect by knowledge. This verse shows the importance which Manu attaches to knowledge and honesty.

iii. *The Notion of Daṇḍa*

'Daṇḍa' is another untranslatable term having three or four different senses. Ordinarily it refers to a rod made out of the twigs of certain trees: the rods are to be used by the Brahmacārin; the wood used will have to be different depending on the varṇa to which the Brahmacārin belongs (II.45).

Secondly, 'daṇḍa' stands for punishment. The metaphor 'daṇḍa' must have had its origin in the ancient practice of hitting the wrong-doer with a rod (by a person authorised to inflict punishment) (VII.18).

Thirdly, it is used in the sense of law (VII.14; IX.263).

Finally, it is used in the sense of restraint or discipline (XII.10). A man who has controlled the movement of his limbs, his mind and his speech is called a 'tridaṇḍi'. There is a verse (VIII.263) where 'daṇḍa' is used in the sense of punishment as well as a symbol of law, i.e., *rod.*

The notion of 'reward' hardly figures in Manu-Smṛti. Maybe Manu thought that a duty done properly and conscientiously is its own reward!

iv. *The Notions of 'Vinaya' and Moderation*

Vinaya is often equated with moderation which is already a virtue in matters of eating (II.57). Moderation is often equated with a stoical indifference towards praise and blame (II.161 and 162). Those who are affluent are recommended not to show off their wealth, particularly when Brāhmaṇa are invited to a feast (III.125). Invitation to pious Brāhmaṇa to feasts was considered to be a part of religious performances.

A monarch was expected to learn modesty and discipline, from the wise and elderly Brāhmaṇa scholars (VII.39). Control over greed, lust and anger was always considered a virtue (VII.49). The control of the senses with the help of one's reason is invariably emphasised. (II.96, 98, 99 and 100). What could be called 'good manners', like not producing unnecessary noise by clapping and shouting even when one is excited, are strongly recommended (IV.64). At one place Manu recommends that a beast of burden like a horse should never be excessively whipped (IV.68).

But the concept of 'moderation', it appears, is forgotten when Manu describes certain rigorous expiatory penances. An attitude of detachment towards persons and situations is recommended at several places (IV.12; VI.57 and 60). The moral autonomy of the individual has been considered to be one of the greatest values (IV.159). The notions of 'ātmatuṣṭi' or 'ātmaprasāda' figures at least at three places (II.12; IV.161 and XII.37) giving the impression that Manu is an egoist. Perhaps Manu thought that a slavish imitation of the social manners is morally reprehensible. One must, in other words, live according to one's mature convictions.

Manu, strangely, appears to be unusually harsh in so far as behaviour towards one's enemy is concerned. (III.144 and IV.133; also see VII.102).

v. *The Concept of 'Dāna'* (*Charity*)

There are a number of verses on the importance of 'dāna' as a value (IV.227f). But the benefits of charity as they are listed in the verses are not necessarily praiseworthy. The idea of making gifts for its own sake does not emerge anywhere. On the other hand gifts are to be offered so that one accumulates 'dharma' (IV.238) as if 'dharma' were a material object. What, however, is objected to is the announcement regarding gifts (IV.236). Gifts, however, are to be offered to 'proper' persons (III.180). The gift of the Vedic wisdom is considered to be the most valuable gift (IV.233). 'Dāna' should have figured as a 'cardinal virtue' since it is one of those virtues which men belonging to all the varṇas practise.

vi. *The Concept of Sin* (*Pāpa*)

The notion is intimately associated with the notion of 'prāyaścitta' or expiation. The three kinds of sin which call for prāyaścitta are

(a) the non-performance of acts recommended by the scriptures.
(b) the performance of unworthy acts and
(c) acts flowing from attachment to sensual pleasures (XI.44).

Manu also draws a distinction between wrong acts done intentionally and those which are done unintentionally (XI.46).

The concept of sin is also associated with the notion of 'rebirth' in the sense that the nature of sin committed in previous births determines the kinds of blemishes from which a person suffers in this life or in the lives to come. One who has committed a sin must perform prāyaścitta (XI.47). Some of the sins which were perhaps widely found in his times have been enumerated at length (XI.49—52).[4] The classification of these acts with a view to building a theory is not easy. The nature and seriousness of sins, as Manu deals with them, depend on several factors. Sin, in the first place, depends on the nature of the act performed; secondly, it depends on the age, health and the sex of the wrong-doer (VIII.312). Thirdly, it depends on the 'varṇa' to which the wrong-doer belongs. In recommending punishments to be inflicted on a man who has committed adultery, the court should take into account if the woman involved was guarded or unguarded. Fourthly, the seriousness of the crime depends on the 'āśrama' to which the wrong-doer belongs (see VIII.360 and XI.121). There are several theories which seek to explain and discover the principle behind the recommendation of punishments. Some have suggested that the principle is 'pollution' while others have suggested that it is the privileges enjoyed by the different varṇas.

The term 'puṇya' figures only once (XI.39). In the sense in which it is used it has not acquired a moral overtone. It means 'lucky'. But in the Upanisads, the term acquired an ethical overtone in the sense that 'pāpa' and 'puṇya' are believed to determine one's future birth (see Brh. Up.iii.2.13; IV.3.15; IV.4.22 and Taitt Up.ii.9). Virtuous acts, in some sense, could be performed according to Manu only by those who were able to pay the requisite fees to the priests. One expects Manu to have raised the question: what is ethically worse, inflicting a wrong decision on others or suffering a wrong decision inflicted by others? It is difficult to see why this question was never raised.

vii. *The Concept of Prāyaścitta*

As mentioned earlier, this notion mentioned in XI.44 has an important place in Manu's scheme. The nature of prāyaścitta depends on the 'varṇa' of the performer, on the magnitude the crimes committed and so on. Manu also makes a distinction between acts which are criminal and those which are tortious. The details of the crime committed to demand 'prāyaścitta' have been enumerated and classified in XI.55f. The expiatory acts include penances of several kinds, ritual ablutions and bestowing gifts.

viii. *The Concepts of 'Anutāpa' and 'Santāpa'*

Manu is not wholly unaware of the 'inner man'. The notion of 'anutāpa' (repentance) figures in XI.228, where Manu has already described the various kinds of expiatory acts. A sinful act, if confessed, is washed off. Austerity and reflection too are recommended as means of washing off sins. A sinful act causes 'heaviness' and to regain 'lightness' one must continue to perform expiatory acts (XI.234). It is in this connection that the term 'tapasyā' is used; 'tapasyā' here appears to be the same as 'varṇa' duties (XI.236). It is difficult to make out what the term means when it is used in the context of worms, insects, serpents, birds and animals (XI.241). Among other duties, the duty of acquiring wisdom (jñāna) is considered foremost in washing off sins (XI.247) and a little later wisdom is identified with the knowledge enshrined in the Vedas (XI.263).

Manu, as observed earlier, does not draw a distinction between what is morally right and what is legally right and correspondingly between what is 'legally punishable' and 'morally blameworthy'. Will 'puṇya', then, mean nothing more than performing 'varṇa-determined' duties meticulously?

ix. *The Concept of 'Yajña'*

A householder, according to Manu, possesses as it were five slaughter-houses. They are the hearth, the grindstone, the broomstick, the pestle and mortar and the water pitcher (III.68). In order to expiate the sins committed by the householder, on account of using these objects, he should *daily* perform five 'Sacrifices'. One who performs these 'yajñas' is not tainted by the sins in the five places of slaughter (III.69—71). Manu goes on to describe the sacrifices in the subsequent ślokas.

'Yajñas' are to be performed by all those who are twice-born (I.88—90). Many thinkers, ancient as well as modern, have used the word 'yajña' in a metaphorical sense. I doubt if 'yajña' could have any metaphorical overtones for Manu as it is used in XI.38—40. It is clearly stated there that a man of modest means should not offer 'Śrauta' sacrifices.

IV. INCONSISTENCIES AND INCONGRUITIES

Some of the inconsistencies are conceptual in nature while others cannot be logically related and yet others are morally unattractive.

In I.8 it has been observed that *water* was the *first* thing to be created. A little later (I.20) it is said to be the *fourth* in order of creation preceded by sound, touch and form and yet elsewhere water is said to be deformed heat (tejas) (I.78).

There are verses (III.77 and 78 and VI.89) where the life of a householder has been glorified and the stage of the householder is said to be the noblest. But there are verses where renunciation has been eulogised (II.13 & 95). The important question is: how and when is renunciation to be performed? Must one perform the duties of a Brahmacarin and those of a householder before one renounces the world? There are some verses which appear to respond to this question affirmatively (IV.257 and VI.37). It is said that one who chooses the path of 'Mokṣa' without repaying the 'debts' is going in the wrong direction. On the other hand there are verses which recommend a life of perpetual celibacy (II.248 and 249). Does it mean that according to Manu there are two kinds of men with different inclinations and aptitudes?[5]

Manu's observations on the position of women too are inconsistent. There are more *ślokas* where 'women' have been seen as lowly and despicable creatures. Here too there are descriptions as well as prescriptions. The verses where Manu is describing the lowly position of women are II.213, 214 and 215; IX.2, 3, 14 and 18. At one place it is said that a woman should not be present in the meeting where the monarch is discussing with his ministers (VII.149). A woman is never to be accepted as a witness (VII.77).

There are quite a few verses where an elevated position is accorded to women (III.56). Mother is adored (II.145). Almost in the next verse it is said that offspring are the results of parents' lust (III.147). The implication is that a person is 'born' in the true sense only when he becomes a 'dvija'. Marriage is seen as indissoluble (IX.101), but is never seen as monogamous. A woman's having sex with a man belonging to lower caste is seen as a turpitude while her having sex with one belonging to a higher caste is seen leniently (VIII.365). Manu does not recommend that a girl should be married off at any cost. He even recommends spinsterhood if a proper bridegroom is not available (IX.89). Manu goes so far as to suggest that a girl can find a husband for herself, if necessary (IX.91). But this is *prima facie* incompatible with what he has said earlier (IX.2 and 3).

In so far as the duties and character of a king are concerned Manu's approach is somewhat Machivallian (VII.105f; 195). False statements, made by a witness in certain situations are justified (VII.103f and 112).

Manu's observations on 'svarga', 'mokṣa' and a few other terms are not at all clear. 'Svarga' is attained by one who practises certain virtues (IV.246). Elsewhere (VI.96) 'Svarga' is valued poorly compared to what is called 'paramamgatim', the highest goal. It is not easy to ascertain if 'svarga' and 'mokṣa' are one and the same or different in Manu's view. Attainment of 'mokṣa' traditionally means freedom from the cycle of birth and death; 'svarga' does not confer this liberation. 'Mokṣa' is valued by the Vedāntins and those who choose the path of knowledge while 'svarga' by the followers of the Mīmāṃsā. It is not clear if Manu recommends the views of the Mīmāṃsā thinkers or the views of the Vedantic thinkers. Apparently, Manu was not acquainted with the tradition of 'bhakti'.

Manu's excursuses into metaphysics are least illuminating. The notion of 'bhūtātman' (the self consisting of the elements) as distinct from 'Kṣetrajña' (the knower of the field) is found in XII.12. Incidentally 'bhūtāman' refers to the individual soul in V.109. In explaining the meaning of ātman in XII.85 most commentators have distinguished it from 'Kṣetrajña'. (One which impels the self to action[6] is called

'Kṣetrajña' while the one who acts is called 'bhūtātman'.) 'Body' is treated as a prisoner and in a couple of verses it is described in a rather lurid manner (VI.76 and 77). Earlier, however, it is said that one should not inflict pain on one's body (II.100) as, perhaps, was encouraged in certain schools of the Yoga systems. One should be able to control his sense organs with the help of one's mind and reason.

Over and above 'deha' (body) and 'Kṣetrajña' there is the 'jīva' (XII.13) 'Jīva' is another word used widely in the philosophical literature with a wide variety of meaning. It is not clear in which sense Manu uses it. The notion of 'Śarīra', moreover is not entirely clear because on the death of a person another 'śarīra' is born (XII.16). The word 'ātman' found in XII.24 is said to possess three qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas, translated by some as goodness, activity and darkness. Some of the observations made are rather trite. What, however, is needed is to work out in greater detail, from the scattered observations, the interrelationship between 'body' and 'soul', to put the terms most broadly. In that case it may be possible for us to reconstruct Manu's view about the human nature of 'person'. Taken as they are, they give rise to a large variety of interpretations; in fact, a number of ślokas in chapter XII (12 to 19) have been commented upon in very different ways by the ancient commentators.[7]

Knowledge or jñāna at one place is said to be of three kinds (II.117), secular, Vedic and spiritual. But what exactly is meant by the knowledge of worldly affairs? In the Indian tradition a good many branches of knowledge are in some way related to 'mokṣa'. How do we, anyway, draw the lines between these three kinds of knowledge? Is, for example, knowledge of worldly affairs a preparation for the vedic learning or is it a hindrance? In what way is the Vedic learning a preparation for spiritual knowledge? Can one hope to acquire spiritual knowledge without acquiring the knowledge enshrined in the Vedas? It is difficult to come across any reference to the famous dichotomy between 'jñāna' and 'karma' in the Manu-Smṛti. The 'upaniṣads' and Rahasya' (a synonym of the Upanisadic knowledge) is found at several places in Manu-Smṛti (II.140 and 145; VI.29 and XI.263) and Manu surely was referring to what has come down to us as the major upaniṣads. If this is true then Manu should have been acquainted with controversy found in the Muṇḍaka upaniṣad (1.2, 1.2, 7—13). Strangely, there is no reference to 'parā' and 'aparā' vidyā; in fact one rarely comes across the notion of 'vidyā' so commonly found in the upaniṣads.[8]

We do not come across a sustained discussion on education although some of the terms associated with teaching and education have been expounded here and there (see II.109—16). The terms 'guru' and 'ācārya' are defined in II.140 and 142. The stress seems to be on rituals (II.69f). The teacher and the taught are never seen as partners in their common quest of knowledge. On the other hand the 'guru' is more like a master and the disciple is often seen as a chattel. It is true that 'guru' on his part should be kind and gentle towards the disciple (II.159). The sentiment expressed in the Kṛṣna Yajur Vedīya Śāntivacanam (see Taitt. Up.20.1) is not found in Manu-Smṛti.

Some verses stress the fact that certain things are hard to achieve single-handed. This is particularly true on the part of a monarch. Hence Manu suggests that a monarch should be assisted by a group of (seven or eight) ministers; these ministers should have had their ancestors in the service of the monarch's family (VII.54f).

Manu talks of the solitariness of man (IV.240). In this verse the singleness is descriptive but in VI.80 and 81 the loneliness is prescribed as a means to salvation. The notion of the 'inner man' figures but vaguely.

Manu perhaps belongs to an age when eating meat had begun to be looked down upon as undesirable. Eating meat is seen as 'natural' (V.56) but it is recommended that one should abstain from it. The eating of meat meant for ritual sacrifices is approved but to consume meat on sundry occasions is disapproved (V.31). It would, however, be difficult to judge Manu as a strict vegetarian (V.28, 29, 30). There are ślokas which commend 'ahiṃsā' (V.490, 50 and 51).

The legal and moral overtones of 'virtue' (puṇya) and vice (pāpa) are not clearly shown. 'Puṇya' could mean the avoidance of sinful acts. The positive aspect of 'puṇya' is seldom emphasised. The concepts of 'bhakti', 'prema', 'ānanda', 'Kṛpā', 'Prasāda', which were to figure so prominently in the secular as well as religious literatures later, do not figure at all. The view that these concepts were introduced at a later period largely on account of our contacts with other religious traditions does not seem to be entirely acceptable. Some of these notions are found in Pāṇini's Sūtras (IV.3.95) and in Śvetāśvatara up. 6.23. The notion of 'ānanda' is there in the Upaniṣads. From what Manu says in IX.96 it appears that in his view men and women were created only for the maintenance of race; 'sex' is the least desirable aim of marriage. The dichotomy between 'kāma' and 'prema' which figures so frequently in the bhakti literature of the medieval times is unknown. 'Friendship' too is a concept conspicuous by its absence. The verses where it is mentioned at all (VII.206—208) deal with friendship as an expediency on the part of a monarch.

In a work of this kind one expects references to poetry, music, drama, painting and similar arts. But they are seldom taken into account. Those who are associated with these arts are not treated as 'respectable' persons. The temper, on the whole, is highly puritanical.[9]

Penury, poverty, destitution or misery on account of old age, again, are nowhere taken into account. There is at least one verse (XI.40) which prescribes that those who are poor should not perform certain ritual sacrifices.

Manu does not seem to be interested in children, their games, their education and physical and mental exercises. The years they spend with their parents before they go to 'gurus' āśrama, it appears, go unnoticed by Manu.

I would like to mention some of the concepts introduced by the commentators which are not there in the text. While commenting on VII.76 one commentator[10] mentions that the king should build a temple (*devālaya*) in the precincts of his spacious palace. The same commentator refers to 'Iśvara' while commenting on XII.31. Neither 'devālaya' nor 'Iśvara' are there in the texts. Commenting on 'things of enjoyment' which a monarch should offer to Brāhmaṇas (VII.79) Nārāyaṇa, a 12th century commentator, includes 'wives' among gifts! Commenting upon III.50 one commentator thinks that an ascetic who has lost all his children could approach his wife during two nights in each month. This view, however, has been criticised by another commentator. One verse (III.78) has given rise to a controversy regarding the properiety of ascetics becoming teachers of the Vedic wisdom. Some think that householders alone are to be the teachers of the Vedas.

V. CONCLUSION

In concluding the question that naturally comes to my mind is: Is Manu relevant today? Or, in other words, what is living and what is dead in Manu? I think we are obliged to respond to this question firstly because it is a fact that being Indians we have a moral duty to articulate this strand of tradition conceptually, as far as that is possible. In the second place, Manu's views form a part of that huge spectrum of human history called antiquity which one simply cannot disown. Such an act of severing is neither possible nor advisable. A cursory comparison of the Smṛti with other similar works found in the tradition of antiquity — Chinese, Greek, Roman, Jewish and Islamic — will convince anyone that the work deserves to be studied with care and patience. The study would be rewarding purely as an academic exercise. Some of the issues raised in the work, if sifted properly, may be found pertinent to one who cares to go into the roots of things, legal, economic, political, the ideas and ideals that got buried under different sets of ideas, or that on account of changed educational policies the newer generations were no more required to get acquainted with the contents of this work. The fact that the work was neglected or forgotten may not justify the view, held by many, that it deserves to be forgotten and ignored.

The study is not only academically rewarding; it is equally interesting to one who is deeply concerned with the issues imbedded in contemporary social, political and legal problems.

There have been several attempts at ordering the basic problems of politics and the notion of 'order' itself had several approaches. To my mind, in a significant manner, the notion of equality is fundamental. I confess that as a concept it is not clear but the lack of clarity comes to the surface only on closer examination. Yet notions like equality before law, or equal regard to all and equal freedom of speech have figured in ancient European political thought. Likewise, the notion of hierarchy is equally ancient. Some thought that 'social justice' should mean the preservation of hierarchy while others thought that it should mean the demolition of hierarchy. Those who favoured a hierarchical society or stratification must accord equality at least to the members belonging to a particular stratum or class and those who favour a classless society must bestow more privileges on those who cooperate with them and less on those who go against them. The tension is in a way insurmountable.

Manu's philosophy of man and society must be viewed in the context of this tension between equality and hierarchy, equality of some sort among the members of a particular varṇa on the one hand, and hierarchy among the *varṇas*, on the other. Man, in Manu's scheme, is a term devoid of either sense or reference. We come across men belonging to different geographical regions and men endowed with certain inborn qualities. They are the 'brute facts' to begin with. These men and women, to acquire characteristically "human qualities", must pass through certain well-defined stages or 'āśramas'. We therefore do not meet a 'man' unless we are thinking of an animal having a certain form, shape and size. Such an animal would not be considered a 'human being'. To seek to define man as though he is an object of nature having nothing to do with race or stock, sex or age, or education, custom, tradition or *milieu*, according to Manu, is to define a non-existent creature. The notion of "natural, inalienable and sacred rights", a phrase popularised by the Declaration of Rights in 1789, would thus be vacuous. Manu says that "a man who is not a '*dvija*' has no rights, duties or obligation. . . ." (II.146, 147 and 169).

But Manu does not explain why a *Brāhmaṇa* should be treated as a Brāhmaṇa as soon as he is born (I.99; XI.85) or a Kṣatriya does not deserve to be treated as an ordinary mortal even when he is a mere boy (VII.8), nor why, Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas having such exalted descent (Brāhmaṇa from the mouth and Kṣatriya from the arms of Brahmā) and who acquire *dvijahood* in time, should at all have a fall. Whence come greed lust and selfishness, laziness and forgetfulness, causes which lead to their fall? The source of 'kāma' and 'saṃkalpa' (II.2 and 3) remain *unexplained*. In Manu's scheme there is no discontinuity between man and lower animals. A man's station in life and 'destiny' are determined by a host of factors like his varṇa, sex, place of birth, āśrama and finally his actions or karma. Could some of these factors be treated as adventitious and some others as essential? We do not come across a satisfactory answer. If we could find an answer, we might work out the 'minimum content' of 'manhood' in that case.

Why must the different 'varṇas', with their divisions and subdivisions, live together? The contract to live together is imbedded in the wider and broader notion of 'dharma'. They need to live together because 'dharma' which is revealed, ordains such an order, because the rights and obligations will remain unscathed if they live together and guide their lives, individual as well as social, according to 'dharma'. The notion of 'dharma' with all its opacity holds the key to the understanding of Manu's scheme.

NOTES

[1] The concept of 'marriage' is discussed at III.5—44. Manu recommends the marriage of partners belonging to one and the same varṇa (III.12 and 43).

[2] The History of the Dharmasastras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 418.

[3] See Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* VI.5 and *Politics* Book III, Ch. IV.

[4] Also see XII.3—7.

[5] There are verses where 'Samkalpa' is seen to be an important constituent in the structure of human mind (II.2 and 3). But the highest good consists in the acquisition of knowledge (V.105). The nature of this knowledge, however, has not been worked out. The verses where the loneliness of man is emphasised are IV.240 and VI.49.

[6] In chapter XII.4, Manu refers to three kinds of actions: three kinds of mental actions, four kinds of speech actions and three kinds of 'bodily' actions.

[7] Strangely, the notion of 'purusa' is absent. The term 'purusa' is found in the Upaniṣads as well as in the Saṁkhya literature. The word 'purusa' is found in a few verses (44, 45) in Ch. XII but the word is not used in a philosophical sense. Also see I.10.

[8] Muṇḍaka Up.I.1.4 and 5; Chāndogya up. ch. VII.

[9] Cf. II.178, a student must avoid dancing etc.; VIII.65 and 102, a Brāhmaṇa who is an actor is to be treated as a Śūdra and not fit to be witness; III.155; an actor is not to be invited to a religious rite; VII.47, a monarch should avoid, among other things, dance & music.

Abhinavagupta holds that Nātyaśāstra (36.74—75) promises the same reward for those who listen to or study the Nātyaveda or who perform a drama according to its rules as for one who studies the Vedas or performs sacrifices or makes gifts (see P. V. Kane: History of Sanskrit Poetics p. 23).

This goes to show that the antiquity had diverse traditions even among the cognoscenti.

[10] Kulluka (15th century).

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Department of Philosophy
University of Rajasthan
Jaipur, India – 302004.

FRANCIS X. CLOONEY

DEVATĀDHIKARAṆA: A THEOLOGICAL DEBATE IN THE MĪMĀṂSĀ-VEDĀNTA TRADITION

The similarities and differences in doctrine between the Uttara (Vedānta) Mīmāṃsā and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā systems have been studied primarily with regard to metaphysical and epistemological issues, and particularly as these are highlighted in loci such as the introductory *adhikaraṇas* of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*. But rarely have the points of continuity and divergence been traced through the entirety of the text of the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*, in the variety of less "philosophical" contexts in which connections are revealed, and there has thus far been no comprehensive assessment of the presupposed, shared discourse which makes possible disagreement between these two closely related schools. Nor have scholars described fully the larger context — theoretical and also pertaining to developing popular Hindu religiosity — in which the sometimes seemingly esoteric arguments were urgent.

I hope to contribute to this larger understanding of the Pūrva-Uttara Mīmāṃsā relationship by an extended analysis of a single example, in light of which two premises will be defended: a. there are properly theological issues — having to do with gods (*devatā*) and God (*īśvara*) — at stake in the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta and intra-Vedānta debate; b. these debates afford us an insight into the shifting religious context in which Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta developed.

I will focus on the theological issue of the nature and function of the gods (*devatā*) in relation to "religious action," ritual and meditation.[1] In the Mīmāṃsā, two *adhikaraṇas* deserve attention: *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* (henceforth *PMS*) 6.1.4—5, where the *Bhāṣya* of Śabara[2] raises the question of the competence (*adhikāra*) of gods to perform sacrifices, and 9.1.6—10, where the notion that sacrifices are performed to propitiate deities is rejected. In the Vedānta, likewise, two *adhikaraṇas* will be considered: *Uttara Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* [henceforth *UMS*] 1.3.26—33, where the competence of the gods to meditate is defended, and 3.2.38—41, where the notion that the results of

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sacrifice/knowledge[3] are the products of the action itself is rejected. The general question at issue in all these contexts is whether the validity and efficacy of a religious activity — sacrifice or meditation — is intrinsic to it such that it brings about its own result, or whether it depends on some external referent who rewards the good effort made. This issue in turn rests on a decision about the nature of possible external referents — whether one is thinking of localized, limited *devatā*, or an unlimited and uninfluenced *brahman*, or an interested and gracious supreme *īśvara*.

Treatment of these issues illuminates the internal working of the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta and helps locate them within their contexts, notwithstanding the following qualification to be noted from the start: neither the Mīmāṃsā nor the Vedānta schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja ultimately concede much importance to these deities, and it would be an exaggeration to read the discussions noted here as *the* central ones. As Biardeau has noted,[4] in Mīmāṃsā *devatā* are not necessarily anything more than names in Vedic texts; we shall see why below. Advaita rejects this view, but predictably consigns them to the *vyāvahārika* level of reality and strips them of any meaningful role; the Viśiṣṭādvaita concedes their reality but sees them as parts of the body of Viṣṇu, possessed of an efficacy entirely dependent on Viṣṇu. Nevertheless, this "theology" in its three transformations leads us into a consideration of more central issues, such as the differing dynamics of ritual and meditation.

In the main sections of this essay I will set forth in turn some key elements of the Mīmāṃsā, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita discussions of the gods in relation to religious action, arguing that there are three distinct values at work:

1. The Mīmāṃsā defends the intrinsic intelligibility of the sacrificial system, and this entails an undercutting of the importance of the gods;
2. The Advaita rethinks the meaning of knowledge and the implications of knowing, so as to reinstate the gods as participants in meditation (as all conscious beings must be), themselves on the path to knowledge, and yet without any control over the efficacy of religious action;

3. The Viśiṣṭādvaita places ritual and meditation in the context of devotion and a temple-oriented model of religious activity, denying intrinsic value to both action and knowledge.

1. THE INTRINSIC INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE SACRIFICIAL SYSTEM AND THE DIMINUTION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GODS

In *PMS* 6.1, Śabara's discussion of competence (*adhikāra*)[5] begins with the posing (6.1.4) and subsequent narrowing (in the rest of the *pāda*) of the general claim that anyone who notices, understands and desires the results of sacrifice is by nature competent to perform the sacrifices which lead to those results, since one undertakes any action because of a desire for the results: "Inasmuch as an act is [performed] for the purpose of obtaining results, all [beings] should be entitled to perform the acts prescribed in the scriptures" (*phalārthatvāt karmaṇaḥ śāstraṃ sarvādhikāraṃ syāt*). The rest of the first *pāda* focuses on the extent to which women and *śūdras* and upper caste men disabled in various ways might be judged competent or not for the role of sacrificial performer. The fact of motivation is ultimately seen to be a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite. Not all those who desire results have the other necessary qualifications which will permit them to seek the results. Women and *śūdras* both have severe limits imposed on their competence, on the narrowly defined textual grounds.[6]

In 6.1.4–5, Śabara offers some initial clarifications which define the boundaries of the discussion, by asking whether animals, gods and *ṛṣis* are competent; for one might suppose that since all living beings desire happiness rather than the opposite, there would be no reason to exclude these living beings. But he concludes that they cannot meet all the requirements which establish the nature and possibility of right performance, and hence are not among potential sacrificers:[7]

> Nor are animals and others able to carry out the details of the sacrifice in their entirety; hence for these beings the sacrifice cannot be a means of securing happiness; how can an act that one cannot do be a means of happiness for him? The deities also are not entitled to perform sacrifices, because apart from themselves there are no other deities [to whom they could offer the sacrifice], and there can be no offering to

one's own self; in fact, such an act would not be an offering at all. Nor are sages [*ṛṣis*] entitled to perform sacrifices, because they have no sages . . . [6.1.5][8]

na caite śaknuvanti tiryagādayaḥ kṛtsnaṃ karmābhinirvartayitum tasmād eṣāṃ na sukhasyābhyupāyaḥ karmeti kathaṃ yo na śakyate kartum so 'bhyupāyaḥ syād iti na devānāṃ devāntarābhāvāt na hyātmānam uddiśya tyāgaḥ sambhavati tyāga evāsau na syāt na ṛṣīṇām ārṣeyābhāvāt

The gods are excluded on the single technicality that being gods they have no gods to whom they could make offerings; there are no texts which assign gods for the gods, and it would make no sense for them to make offerings to themselves. The point of their disqualification, however, seems more attuned to what follows in the *pāda*: the limited disqualification of women, and barring of *śūdras*, on technical grounds.

The second major text about the gods is *PMS* 9.1.4–10. At issue is the general question of *prayojana*, namely, that which (on the theoretical level and in terms of the analysis of motivations) holds a sacrifice together as a purposeful whole. Jaimini poses the *siddhānta* first, that the sacrificial action itself [*yajñakarma*] is the motivation [*prayojana*] for each entire sacrifice: "The sacrificial action is the primary element, since it is this which is brought about by the injunctive force; preparation of its materials is motivated by it, since such is done for the action's sake" (my translation; *yajñakarma pradhānaṃ tad hi codanābhūtaṃ tasya dravyeṣu saṃskāras tatprayuktas tadarthatvāt*) The sacrifice coheres around its central sacrificial action, and every detail is meaningful insofar as it contributes in some way to that central action of sacrifice (into fire).

The primary competing position is an obvious one, for one might suppose that the deity, mentioned in the course of the sacrifice in the dative case (the fourth *kāraka*) and hence as the explicit intended recipient of the offering, is the real motivating factor, since all is performed for his sake. The situation appears analogous to what happens when a guest visits and a meal is prepared to please and honor this guest; it is certainly clear that the meal is not for its own sake (9.1.6).

Śabara counters this alternative with arguments which, as Mādhavācārya perceptively points out in *Jaimininyāyamālāvistara* [on 9.1.6–10], divide into questions pertaining to the interpretation of texts (*śabda*) and those which refer to "realities" (*vastu*) outside the text.

The first argument focuses on the interpretation of statements such as "The person desirous of heaven should sacrifice (to such and such a deity)," and Śabara shows that the mentioned deity is only a subordinate factor in the statement:

> . . . but the deity is spoken of only as a subordinate factor; the substance and the deity are both accomplished entities; while what is denoted by the root "to sacrifice" is something that has to be accomplished; and whenever an accomplished entity and a thing to be accomplished are spoken of together, the former is mentioned only for the purposes of the latter. From this it follows that the deity cannot be regarded as the prompter of details. (9.1.9).[9]
>
> kiṃ tu guṇatve devatāśrutiḥ dravyadevatāṃ hi bhūtaṃ bhāvayitavyo yajatyarthaḥ bhūtabhavyasamuccāraṇe ca bhūtaṃ bhavyāyopadiśyate tasmān na devatā prayojikā

If one hears an injunction such as "Let him who desires sons offer as sacrifice a rice-cake to Indra," it is inadmissible to glean from this the view that the sacrifice is "for the sake of Indra," even if a narrow exegesis of the text might seem to support this view. Rather, since "Indra" and "rice cake" and the "son-desiring person" already exist, with or without a sacrifice, and are merely brought together so that "to sacrifice" might occur, it is only reasonable that they all be seen as subordinate to that action — regardless of what people might commonly think.

The argument "from reality" also relates to texts, those which make statements about the gods as embodied, powerful and rich lords, etc.: e.g., "Indra, Maghavan, this illimitable earth and heaven you hold in your fist" (9.1.6), and "Being satisfied, Indra satisfies him with cattle and offspring." (9.1.7)[10] The goal is to show that such texts neither give nor intend to give the information that the gods possess the physical bodies (*vigraha*)[11] and the material possessions which would make their participation in sacrificial transactions meaningful or even possible.

Because deities have bodies, the opponent argues, they are able to receive and enjoy the materials offered to them in the fire; they will also have domain over physical goods and thereby be able to compensate those who have gone to the trouble of offering the materials. In rebuttal Śabara argues, first, that there are no positive proofs of divine corporeality; the adduced texts in this regard are merely representative of popular traditions, and are better, more simply, interpreted metaphorically. Thus, when a text says, "Indra, I take hold of your right hand," there is no evidence at all that this is or ever has been physically possible; so it is better to interpret it as meaning "dependence":

> Thus it is by being treated as an intelligent being that the deity [Indra] is involved by means of a word with the vocative ending; and having been indicated by means of the invoking word, the deity is told, "we have taken hold of your hand," which only means, "we are dependent upon you." This only serves the purpose of reminding us that "we should proceed to perform the rites [in honor of this particular deity] Indra." (9.1.9)
>
> cetanavad ivopacaryamāṇaḥ sambuddhiśabdenāmantryate tathā sambodhanaśabdena nirdeśa ucyate gṛhītavanto vayaṃ tava hastaṃ tvadāśrayā vayam ityartha asmābhir indrakarma kartavyam ityetad anena smāryate

Moreover, there is no evidence at all that the deities participate physically in the sacrifices addressed to them. Śabara adds, in a point to which the Vedāntins respond at very great length in *UMS* 1.3.28 (in developing their theory of language), that the fact of divine bodies would mean that the Veda would include references to beings with bodies which by definition come into existence and cease to exist, and thus the Veda itself would have to be an "historical" text.

Mādhavācārya, commenting on 9.1.6—10, summarizes this second part of the argument as follows:

> Nor are the gods givers of the results due to a real capacity to do so, for the *mantras* and *arthavādas* which describe their five attributes — having bodies, etc.[12] — do not have that [i.e., establishment of divine capacity] as their intent. Otherwise we would have to conclude that the gods mentioned in *mantras* such as "Hail to the *vanaspatis*, hail to the *mūlas*" would have bodies, and this would contradict perception [for no one thinks of these as "real" deities.] Therefore [there is no evidence in such texts that] the gods do function like kings who give rewards.
>
> nāpi vastusāmarthyād devasya phalapradatvaṃ vigrahādipañcakapratipādakayor mantrārthavādayoḥ svārthe tātparyābhāvāt anyathā vanaspatibhyaḥ svāhā mūlebyaḥ svāhā ityādimantreṣvapi devatvaṃ vigrahādipañcakayuktaṃ kalpyeta tac ca pratyakṣaviruddhaṃ tato na rājādivatphalapradatvam

To use different terms, one might say that the argument is about whether sacrifice is propitiation (*ārādhanā, pūjā*) — be it for its own sake or for the sake of a reward from the propitiated deity. The objector appeals to this meaning of the root *yaji*: Sacrifice is worship of the deity [*yāgo nāma devatāpūjā*], so obviously sacrifice is subordinate to the deity who is the principal motivation of what happens. This in turn is an appeal to the obvious fact that in Vedic and later Hindu times people attempt to win the favor of powerful deities, by the performance of sacrifices.[13]

The Mīmāṃsakas reject this interpretation with its appeal to popular conceptions, probably because they are reluctant to have the system of sacrifice, the constituent core of *dharma*, depend too heavily on the mythic figures of the gods — lest legitimate criticism/demythologization of these gods lead in turn to a denigration of the ritual action itself. Other systems, such as various Buddhist and Jaina schools, downplay and mock the gods and the concomitant "I give so that you give" religion; a system dependent on such vulnerable gods and the material satisfaction of desires would indeed be a "frail raft." By valorizing the sacrifice with reference to its core action alone — i.e., stating that the performance of sacrifices brings into actuality possibilities described in authoritative texts which transcend our limited perspectives and goals — the Mīmāṃsakas avoid the dangers inherent in an appeal to an external referent; unless the sacrifice is self-valorizing, it remains forever dependent on shifting values external to itself.[14]

To state the Mīmāṃsā view positively: deities do not need to be corporeal in order to function in the sacrifice in a fashion compatible with the tradition and the old formula, *dravyaṃ devatām uddeśya tyajyate*:[15] when the deity has been invoked, the material is relinquished, offered up. According to the ritual rubrics, a deity must be named in the dative (fourth *kāraka*), in order that it be known to which deity the material is being offered. The naming is a strictly linguistic requirement, ensuring the intelligibility of the sacrifice through what is said, relating the things talked about. What lies behind the divine name is not a relevant issue; such a name may be interpreted according to any of a variety of linguistic rules, with or without the postulation of a divine existence (spiritual and/or material) external to the sacrifice, as long as the verbal structure can be explained without detriment. The possibilities of extra-verbal reality do not bind the interpretation, except for the restriction that whatever is hypothesized should not contradict what is known by other means of knowledge. Indeed, Śabara concedes in 10.4.23 that it ultimately does not matter if the deities exist apart from the Veda, their "linguistic reality": "'In that case (says the *pūrvapakṣin*) it is the word [the name] alone that constitutes the deity.' We (the *siddhāntin*) need not refute this [idea], because if expressed it does not militate against our view" (*nanvevaṃ śabda eva devatā prāpnoti naitad asmābhiḥ parihartavyaṃ na hīdam ucyamānam asmatpakṣaṃ bādhate*). Finally, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, it is a category mistake to involve gods in the receiving and rewarding of materials, wrongly shifting them from the verbal to the material side of the sacrifice; they are "part of the *mantra*," not part of the *kriyā*."

In sum, the Mīmāṃsā subordination of the gods is merely one aspect of their elevation of the sacrifice to the status of the unquestionable, intrinsically worthwhile goal. The Mīmāṃsakas deprive the gods of competence to sacrifice and of any real role in the rites performed, but these are simply implications of their main position. As we shall now see, the Vedāntins partially restore the role and reality of the gods, for equally indirect purposes, because their attention has shifted away from the sacrifice.

2. DIVINE FORMS AND THE FORM OF INTELLIGIBILITY IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA[16]

When the Vedāntins assert the competence of the gods for meditation and the existence of their bodies (*vigraha*; 1.3.26—33), this reversal of the Mīmāṃsā position is indicative not of renewed interest in the gods per se, but instead of a shift to a new set of values which in turn require a new strategy of defense. They concede to the gods corporeal reality and individual personalities partially out of respect for certain upaniṣadic texts, but mainly because *knowing* and the kind of requirements set in place by a goal of knowing — as opposed to sacrificial performance — cannot exclude those whose nature makes them capable of knowing; the ability to know is intrinsic.[17] Let us now examine the Advaita position.

UMS 1.3.25—38 correspond with the *adhikāra* discussion taken up in the 6th *Adhyāya* of Jaimini. It is first (in 25) determined that humans are the appropriate performers of meditation, those intended by the relevant texts. There follow discussions of whether gods (26–33) and *śūdras* (34–38) are eligible. At the beginning of the section Śaṅkara offers the criteria by which one can determine who is competent for meditation:

> For the *śāstra*, although propounded without distinction [i.e., although not itself specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its precepts], does in reality entitle men only [and not animals]; for men are firstly, *capable* of complying with the precepts of the *śāstra*]; are secondly, *desirous* [of the results of actions enjoined by the *śāstra*]; are, thirdly, *not excluded by prohibitions*; and are, fourthly, *subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on*. This has been explained in the [*PMS*] section on competence [*adhikāra*]. (1.3.25; emphasis mine)
>
> śāstraṃ hyaviśeṣapravṛttam api manuṣyān evādhikaroti śaktatvād arthitvād aparyudastatvād upanayanādiśāstrāc ceti varṇitam etad adhikāralakṣaṇe

The four factors basically describe the ability and right to perform the action of meditation: capability — the ability to know, act, anticipate the future; desire for a result (ultimately, release) — which constitutes the motivation to act purposefully; non-exclusion — not being explicitly barred by any text (as *śūdras* are); subject to prescriptions regarding the *upanayana* and other aspects of required Vedic training. Śaṅkara's position regarding the gods is that whatever the appropriateness of their exclusion from sacrificial performance, knowledge is something altogether different, and the restrictions are not relevant.

In 1.3.26 he defends the competence of the gods by reference to these four points: the gods are desirous of release, just as men are; capable, because possessed of bodies (*vigrahavattva*); not prohibited as *śūdras* are, because there are no texts to this effect; and finally, not subject to the requirements for initiation, etc., since *upanayana* initiates Vedic study, and "to the gods the Veda is manifest of itself [without study]" *teṣāṃ ca svayaṃpratibhātavedatvāt*]. Moreover, since meditation does not require that the gods be in relation to gods other than themselves, they cannot be barred for the specific reason they had been barred from sacrificing in *PMS* 6.1.5.

The ensuing *śūdras* defend various aspects of the proposition that the gods are competent to meditate. The question of divine embodiment (*vigrahavattva*) is raised in 27, with the assertion that this does not cause problems for sacrificial performance, as some charge

(3.1.27), for there are ways to explain how gods, though embodied, can still be present to multiple sacrifices occurring simultaneously in various locations.[18] Since it is the species (*ākṛti*) of each god which is mentioned in the beginningless and eternal Veda, and not any particular individual deity, the possible temporariness of this or that divine body does not mean that the Veda is really recording finite, transient figures (28—30).[19] That the gods might be excluded from performing certain meditations which do have gods as objects need not exclude them from all meditations, since even competent human performers may be barred from one or another sacrifice; thus, only kings are allowed to perform the *rājasūya*, and all other competent performers are excluded — without losing their general competence. Moreover, if texts seem to attribute to gods the distinct personal individuality which is necessary if a sacrificer is to conceive of them and be able to address them, there is no reason to doubt that these texts are indeed capable of communicating this information (31—33).

In thus granting competence for meditation to the gods, the Vedāntins reverse the Mīmāṃsā tendency to diminish these gods to the point of merely verbal status; in attributing to them bodies they directly contradict the Mīmāṃsā viewpoint.

There are several reasons why Advaita Vedānta bothers to make these distinctions regarding the status of the gods. One was already mentioned above, that meditation is different from ritual performance, and some of the strictures related to the latter are simply irrelevant to the former. On this point Śaṅkara can take advantage of his strenuous efforts at the beginning of his *Bhāṣya* to show that the rules to which knowledge is subject are not reducible to those governing action; the problems pertaining to material sacrifices in some kind of material relationship to embodied gods are simply not analogous to the conditions pertaining to meditation.

In 26 Śaṅkara gives a second reason, explaining in particular why gods should have material bodies:

> The fact that they desire, etc. justifies their competence. The gods can have this desire for release because they see the impermanence of their powers which are subject to change. Similarly, they can be capable, because we know from *mantras*, *arthavādas*, *itihāsas*, *purāṇas* and ordinary experience that they have bodies, etc. (my translation)

> sambhavati hi teṣām apyarthitvādyadhikārakāraṇaṃ tatrārthitvaṃ tāvan mokṣaviṣayaṃ devādīnām api sambhavati vikāraviṣayavibhūtyanityatvālocanādinimittam tathā sāmarthyam api teṣāṃ sambhavati mantrārthavādetihāsapurāṇalokebhyo vigrahavattvādyavagamāt

Vācaspati elaborates:

> The objection is that the gods who participate in the enjoyment of various kinds of pleasures will not desire knowledge of *brahman* because they will have no distaste [*vairāgya*] . . . For distaste is due to an experience of a surfeit of decay, notwithstanding enjoyment of heaven, etc. . . . If they lacked bodies it would not be reasonable to think that they would have the authoritative knowledge which arises from contact with the objects of the senses; and so they would not be competent because they would lack ability, due to lack of knowledge.

> syād etat devādīnāṃ vividhavicitrānandabhogabhāgināṃ vairāgyābhāvān nārthitvaṃ brahmavidyāyāṃ . . . kṣayātiśayayogasya svargādyupabhoge 'pi bhāvād asti vairāgyam . . . devādīnāṃ vigrahādyabhāvenendriyārthasaṃnikarṣajātāḥ pramāṇādivṛtter anupapatter avidvattayā sāmarthyābhāvena nādhikāraḥ

Intelligent action is motivated and informed action,[20] and as action, meditation too must be motivated. But its motivation is a desire not for transient material things, but for what is immaterial, something better than the finite, decaying world in which humans live. This urgent perception that this-worldly experiences are transient has to be based on the experience of decay, and for this experience one must have a body. Only embodied beings know the dissatisfaction that leads to the taking up of meditational practice. Therefore, if the deities are to be sufficiently motivated to meditate, they must be embodied beings; and since there are texts which support the notion that they do meditate and no good reason to the contrary, we must assume that they are embodied.[21]

The third reason I wish to point out is less clearly developed but still very significant. In 1.3.33 Śaṅkara says that the gods must have true proper forms (*svarūpa*) in order to be related to in sacrifice and meditation; unless the gods have proper forms the sacrificer will not be able to think of them, and hence will be unable to proceed with the sacrifice:

> The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other gods,

presuppose certain characteristic shapes [*svarūpa*] of Indra, etc., because without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if this or that divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it.

api ca vidhibhir evendrādidaivatyāni havīṃṣi codayadbhir apekṣitam indrādīnāṃ svarūpaṃ na hi svarūparahitā indrādayaścetasyāropayituṃ śakyante na ca cetasyanārūḍhāyai tasyai tasyai devatāyai haviḥ pradātuṃ śakyate

If we recall that *vigrahavattva* is a principle of individuation and not merely the fact of corporeality, we can appreciate more clearly the point here. In the Vedānta estimation of the logic of ritual, one can enter into a "personal" relationship with the god to whom the offering is made only if that god has some individuating, material features. Otherwise that deity would be either an abstraction or nothing but the undifferentiated reality of *brahman* — either possibility ending the possibility of purposeful ritual action. This leads Śaṅkara to reject what we saw above to be Śabara's view (*PMS* 10.4.23) that the gods may be merely verbal; Śaṅkara says that "their real proper form cannot be merely verbal, since the real and the verbal are distinct" (my translation; *na ca śabdamātram arthasvarūpaṃ sambhavati śabdārthayor bhedāt.*) Words cannot constitute the reality of that to which they refer, since in that case they would lack a referent.[22]

Vācaspati emphasizes the necessity of individual, conscious deities, if sacrifice is to make sense:

Similarly, it is proven from *mantras, arthavādas*, etc. that gods do have bodies, and so it is further concluded that sacrifice, which consists of making *pūjā* in honor of the god just as in honor of one's guru, etc., is fruitful by the graciousness of the god, etc. For [this graciousness] would make no sense with respect to an unconscious being who does not attend to the *pūjā*. (1.3.33)

tad evaṃ mantrārthavādādisiddhe devatāvigrahādau gurvādipūjāvad devatāpūjātmako yāgo devatāprasādādidvāreṇa saphalo 'vakalpate acetanasya pūjām apratipadyamānasya tadanupapatteḥ

The gods must be not mere names but definite "persons," one might say, to make worship of them purposeful. That a god has a *vigraha* — a material form — is necessary for the plausibility of the whole scheme of sacrifice; and by this rationale they are also competent to meditate.

To summarize where we stand thus far regarding the difference in the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta positions: The Mīmāṃsā insistence on the intrinsic value of sacrifice led to a devaluation of the gods and a rejection of the idea that they are external referents for meaning; therefore, their "reality" is denied, and they are limited to a purely verbal role in the sacrifices. When Vedānta considers meditation, however, it must first of all defend the universal nature and intelligibility of knowing; this is an issue in which an exclusion of the gods, not their inclusion, would compromise Vedānta values. But because meditation is motivated activity, the gods must be instigated to it by the frailty of their bodies; so too, a relationship with deities in sacrifice is possible only if they are individualized and hence possessed of bodies.

The second major aspect of the Vedānta treatment of the gods has to do not with who performs religious action, but with how its results come about. The basic Mīmāṃsā position has already been explained; when the gods are denied centrality and corporeality, they are also denied the ability to give the results desired by the sacrificer. These results come from the action itself via, in Śabara's terminology, the resultant *apūrva* which links the perished sacrifice and still-future results.[23]

The question of how the results of meditation come about arises in *UMS* 3, which focuses on the prerequisites and implications of the intelligibility of meditation: the path after death (3.1), the meditating self and the Lord who is meditated on (3.2), the texts for meditation (3.3), and a description of the performer of meditation, before and after it (3.4). 3.2.38—41 takes up the question of the resultant *phala*, in relation to action and *brahman*.

The first *sūtra* (38) in this *adhikaraṇa* states (tersely as usual), "the result arises from this, because this is the plausible explanation" (*phalam ata upapatteḥ*). The immediate referent can only be *brahman*, which had been under discussion since 3.2.11. Śaṅkara interprets this as a rejection of the Mīmāṃsā view that through the *apūrva* the sacrifice itself effects the desired result. Śaṅkara says that it is more plausible to suggest that results come from *brahman* himself:

> The ruler of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsistence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of effecting all those modes of requital which are in accordance with

> the merit of the agents; actions, on the other hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of bringing about results at some future time, since nothing can spring from nothing. (3.2.38)

> sa hi sarvādhyakṣaḥ sṛṣṭisthitisaṃhārān vicitrān vidadhad deśakālaviśeṣābhijñatvāt karmiṇāṃ phalaṃ sampādayatītyupapadyate karmaṇas tvanukṣanavināśinaḥ kālāntarabhāvi phalaṃ bhavatītyanupapannam abhāvād bhāvānutpatteḥ

In 40 Jaimini is cited as holding the contrary position, that *dharma* is the source of the result, and Śaṅkara explains this as a reference to the *apūrva* doctrine (which is more properly Śabara's position). In presenting the Mīmāṃsā position he adds the interesting claim that if an intelligent Lord were supposed to be the rewarder and punisher of actions, this would attribute too many results to one cause, and leave unsolved the problem of evil. In 41 Śaṅkara appeals to a text from the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* (3.8) and the following text from the *Bhagavad Gītā* (7.21) to reassert that the Lord alone can be the cause:

> Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me.

> yo yo yāṃ yāṃ tanuṃ bhaktaḥ śraddhayārcitum icchati tasya tasyācalāṃ śraddhāṃ tām eva vidadhāmyaham sa tayā śraddhayā yuktas tasyārādhanām īhate labhate ca tataḥ kāmān mayaiva vihitān hitān

Vācaspati explains the analogy of the god and an earthly ruler in an argument worthy, I think, of somewhat lengthy citation:

> A worldly lord is propitiated by acts of devotion born of great faith, consisting of praise in the form of gifts, service, prostrations, salutations and praise; pleased, he gives rewards to the one thus suitably propitiating him; conversely, when opposed, he gives the undesirable to the person opposing him with offenses. And this is well known.
>
> It is contrary to what we observe to say that the mere ritual action or the *apūrva*, unconscious and not based on some consciousness, gives the result. Just as it is concluded that [any] perished action cannot give [a later] result, because this is opposed to what we observe, so too in this case: it contradicts what we observe to say that sacrifice which consists in honoring the god brings about the reward apart from pleasing the god. For propitiation of the king does not lead to the reward except by pleasing the king. Hence, for the sake of consistency with what we see, we say that the god is pleased by the sacrifices [and renders them fruitful.] (3.2.41)[24]

> laukikaś ceśvaro dānaparicaraṇapraṇāmāñjalikaraṇastutimayībhir atiśraddhāgarbhābhir

> bhaktibhir ārādhitaḥ prasannaḥ svānurūpam ārādhakāya phalaṃ prayacchati virodhitaś cāpakriyābhir virodhakāyāhitam ityapi suprasiddham tad iha kevalaṃ karma vāpūrvam vā cetanānadhiṣṭhitam acetanaṃ phalaṃ prasūta iti dṛṣṭaviruddham yathā vinaṣṭaṃ karma na phalaṃ prasūta iti kalpyate dṛṣṭavirodhād evam ihāpīti tathā devapūjātmako yāgo devatāṃ na prasādayan phalaṃ prasūta ityapi dṛṣṭaviruddhaṃ na hi rājapūjātmakam ārādhanāṃ rājānam aprasādya phalāya kalpate tasmād dṛṣṭānuguṇyāya yāgādibhir api devatāprasattir utpādyate

The flavor of this language is clearly that of *pūjā*, the worship of a god in the temple, the god as a great king able to reciprocate and offer rewards in return. We can hardly avoid the conclusion that the Vedāntins are appealing to "local" experience, the religious practice common in their time and place, to support the notion that such action was not a self-contained reality. It was obviously meant to please a god: now not the Vedic, pre-Mīmāṃsā deities, but the new popular deities of Hinduism.

The *Gītā* quotation cited above makes it clear that these gods stand for a more potent figure, who alone is the source of efficacy — in Śaṅkara's view, *brahman*, even if people are not aware of this. In a strikingly odd turn of events (which is not made less so by Śaṅkara's initial remark [to which we shall return immediately] that all this applies only to the "ordinary" [*vyāvahārika*] realm), the Advaitins thus end up defending *brahman* as the guarantor of temple worship. *Brahman* alone is the source of action's intelligibility. As we shall now see, Rāmānuja carries this further than Śaṅkara was willing to admit.

3. THE SUBORDINATION OF RITUAL AND KNOWLEDGE TO DEVOTION IN RĀMĀNUJA'S VEDĀNTA

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja agree that the gods are eligible to meditate, that the gods have bodies, and that *apūrva* is not the source of the efficacy of religious action, but there are still points of controversy among the Vedāntins themselves on the topic of the gods and religious action. Śaṅkara introduced his comment on 3.2.38–41 with a distinction that allowed him to handle the passage as he wishes:

> Now this other character of the same *brahman* is described, insofar as it is connected with the everyday state of affairs in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of his rule. (3.2.38; my translation)

tasyaiva brahmaṇo vyāvahārikyām īśitriśitavyavibhāgāvasthāyām ayam anyaḥ svabhāvo varṇyate

Since *brahman* is really (on the *pāramārthika* level) devoid of attributes and since reality is non-dual, *brahman* can hardly be thought to be involved in awarding the fruits of actions; hence, this discussion of the fruits of actions pertains only insofar as the everyday (*vyāvahārika*) world is concerned. Moreover, Śaṅkara presumes that the only *phala* in question is *karmaphala*; as he states emphatically in 3.4.26 and elsewhere, *mokṣa* cannot be the result of action, and "action" includes meditation as well as prescribed Vedic rites. Thus he does not consider the possibility that the result of meditation — *mokṣa* — is under consideration here.

But his interpretation is not convincing. As we have already seen, the discussion in 3.2.38—41 comes in the midst of an overall consideration of meditation, and it is most probable that meditation's result is the issue here.[25] The most plausible view to take is that Bādarāyaṇa means that the desired release from *saṃsāra* is the *phala* of meditation, and asks in 3.2.38—41 how this highest *phala* comes about — from the meditation itself, or as a "reward" from *brahman*?

Rāmānuja, as might be expected, has no problem with seeing the *phala* of meditation as the result being considered in 3.2.38—41. In his theocentric view no results of any sort are independent, and the Lord alone gives rewards of any sort. Meditation is nothing but propitiation of the Lord, and *mokṣa* is not attained through meditation per se or through any other means independent of the Lord. He states in commenting on the first *sūtra* of this section:

> Being about to investigate the nature of meditation, the *sūtrakāra* now declares that the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e., release, which consists in attaining to the highest person, from that highest person only; and that analogously the rewards of all works prescribed by the Veda — whether to be enjoyed in this world or the next — come from the highest person only. For it is only he — the all-knowing, all-powerful, the mighty one — who being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings and the like, as well as by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and release which consists in attaining to a nature like his own. (3.2.37).[26]

ataḥparam upāsanaṃ vivakṣan upāsīnānām parasmād evāsmāt puruṣāt tatpraptirūpam apavargākhyaṃ phalaṃ samprati brūte tulyanyāyatayā śāstrīyam aihikāmuṣmikam api phalam ata eva parasmāt puruṣād bhavati sa eva hi sarvajñaḥ sarvaśaktir mahodāro yāgadānahomādibhir upāsanena ca ārādhitaḥ aihikāmuṣmikabhogajātaṃ svasvarūpāvāptirūpam apavargaṃ ca dātum iṣṭe

Pleased by meditation, the Lord rewards it with release, just as he rewards lesser religious actions with lesser gifts. Earlier in the *Bhāṣya*,[27] Rāmānuja equated meditation (*upāsanā*) with *bhakti*, and that equation functions nicely here: to meditate is to approach the Lord with devotion — to please the Lord by *ārādhanā*, *pūjā* — and the Lord responds graciously with the reward of release.

We have seen earlier that it is the Prābhākara school which most forcefully disputes the idea that sacrifice is a means to a higher goal, really propitiation (*ārādhanā*) of a deity. This explains why Rāmānuja in turn, in the *Śrībhāṣya* (1.1.1; 148ff. in Thibaut's translation) and the *Vedārthasaṃgraha* (nos. 116—126 in van Buitenen's edition), singles out the Prābhākara positions for his most vehement attack. In the *Śrībhaṣya* text, after a lengthy criticism of the Prābhākara view of language and the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, he concludes:

> From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which is expressed by the imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root — as known from grammar — is to be effected by the effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of the roots, viz. the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and the other divinities [to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered], and that through the highest person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accomplished, we shall show later on [at 3.2.37]. (Skt. 993—4; tr. 155)

ato vidhivākyeṣvapi dhātvarthasya kartṛvyāpārasādhyatāmātraṃ śabdānuśāsanasiddham eva liṇāder vācyam ityadhyavasīyate dhātvarthasya ca yāgāder agnyādidevatāntaryāmiparamapuruṣasamārādhanārūpatā samārādhitāt paramapuruṣāt phalasiddheś ceti phalam ata upapatter ityatra pratipādayiṣyate

Following Śaṅkara's lead, Rāmānuja suggests that the deities are "reconstituted" here, but now with Viṣṇu/*brahman*, and not just *brahman* on a *vyāvahārika* level, as their inner ruler (*antaryāmin*).[28] The older idea about the gods — that they are propitiated by sacrifices and reward them — is formally maintained, contrary to the Mīmāṃsā viewpoint, since Rāmānuja has no interest in defending the independent efficacy of the sacrifice; but he preserves the old "theology" only with a new meaning focused on Viṣṇu as the one true *īśvara*.[29]

In light of this exceptionless view of ritual action as propitiation, it comes as no surprise that Rāmānuja concludes that all religious action, both ritual and meditation, achieves its results only because it pleases the Lord who is freely gracious in return. Meditation is a propitiatory action; it is efficacious (as Śaṅkara insisted), but only in the way other kinds of religious action are. The explanation of the *adhikaraṇa* probably goes beyond what Bādarayaṇa was willing to say; he does not explicitly identify *brahman* with the Lord of popular devotion, even if he "installs" *brahman* in the position of that Lord. Nevertheless, Rāmānuja's interpretation, encompassing both ritual and meditation, seems to come closer to the view of the *sūtrakāra*.

In conclusion, we can see that throughout the Mīmāṃsā-Vedānta debate on this issue the interplay of the dynamics of action and knowledge, modelled in various ways and to various degrees on one another, is maintained. The Mīmāṃsā defense of sacrifice's intrinsic value provided the model by which Śaṅkara could defend meditation's intrinsic value. Yet it is a fitting parallel that Śaṅkara's further refusal to allow sacrifice its intrinsic value — by denying the *apūrva* and reintroducing an external rewarder of action — sets up the situation for Rāmānuja's refusal to allow knowledge itself to have intrinsic value.

Schematically, the progression looks like this:

1. Pre-Mīmāṃsā sacrificial theory: extrinsic value for sacrifice; the gods as rewarders of sacrifices;
2. Mīmāṃsā sacrificial theory: intrinsic value for sacrifice; gods deprived of their role;
3. Advaita Vedānta: extrinsic value for sacrifice, *brahman* as rewarder of sacrifices; but intrinsic value for meditation which remains intrinsically efficacious;
4. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta: extrinsic value for both sacrifice and meditation, their rewards coming from Viṣṇu.

The same series of shifts may be vividly traced as a series of positions on whether the gods have bodies. In Mīmāṃsā, they are denied bodies, largely because without bodies they will not be able to have any extra-verbal reality or efficacious role. Advaita restores their bodies to them, in part because of a lack of interest in the Mīmāṃsā's sacrificial concern and complicated exegesis of the relevant texts, but primarily so that the gods will be seen as beings who experience decay and are motivated to meditate. Viśiṣṭādvaita, concerned to include all material reality in Viṣṇu alone, subsumes these bodies under the one body of Viṣṇu.

As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, the issue of the gods and their relation to religious action is not the central issue for either Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta. Nevertheless the exposition offered here points up the larger issues involved in that debate, and the way in which the very rich and complex interaction of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta continues to unfold throughout the entirety of their traditions; Śaṅkara's declaration of independence from Mīmāṃsā does not by any means signal an end to the relationship.

Attention to the theological debate described here should also heighten our awareness of the wider, more popular religious context in which even the most apparently rarefied Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta arguments took place. Discussions of *apūrva*, analyses of how injunctions oblige, definitions of divine bodies, etc. take place within the context of a gradual shift from Vedic to Hindu ritualism, from altar to temple. The shift from Prabhākara's to Rāmānuja's position indicates the extent of the change in religiosity, the eventual subordination of the old Vedic orthodoxy to the new orthodoxy of the temples. Śaṅkara's "interim" position is then highlighted as an (ultimately unsuccessful) effort to come to terms with the shifting values without conceding the entire religious ground to the new temple-oriented religion.

NOTES

[1] Throughout I will use "religious action" as a shorthand term referring to both ritual activity and meditation since, as will be seen, the Vedānta treats meditation as an "act of knowledge."

[2] The two *sūtras* of Jaimini do not explicitly prompt this discussion, which while not at odds with Jaimini's set of questions, does introduce the kind of issue related to the supernatural he rarely shows interest in. It is important to discern when Śabara (and other commentators, of course) develop points indicated by the words of a *sūtra*, and when they introduce more extraneous discussions.

[3] As we shall see, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja disagree as to whether ritual action alone, or ritual action and meditation, are at issue here.

[4] Biardeau, *Théorie de la Connaissance* 87—88. Biardeau does not note, here at least, *PMS* 10.4.23, where Śabara concedes that the deities may have only verbal reality. In my view she draws too broad a conclusion by saying that they do not really exist for the Mīmāṃsakas, who are not interested in holding this position, and do not. Their insistence on the primacy of the sacrifice does not necessarily deprive the deities of reality.

[5] *adhikāra* involves both the capacity of a person to do something, and the permission granted from outside that he or she do it. It is thus more than either "license" or "ability."

[6] The Mīmāṃsakas avoid the suggestion of moral or personal deficiency in either group; their more or less limited exclusion is due to textual evidence, not some natural deficiency inherent in them.

[7] As Mādhavācārya summarizes succinctly the distinction being made: awareness that future happiness is involved, offering to deities and having ancestral *ṛṣis*, are three sacrificial components, not secondary characteristics of the sacrificers; hence they are not optional.

[8] For translations of Śabara I have made use of the Jha translation wherever possible, occasionally with slight stylistic adaptations. For Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja I have used Thibaut's translations. All other translations are my own. For the Sanskrit texts I have used the standard editions referred to. For the sake of easier use of other editions, references are not to page numbers, but to *sūtras*.

[9] The Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools agree that the deities are subordinate, if the cited *svargakāmo yajeta* is properly understood. The Bhāṭṭas, along with Śabara, see sacrifice itself as a means to heaven in the statement, while the Prābhākarins see heaven as a means — incentive — contributing to the accomplishment of the sacrifice. The basic positions are spelled out at 2.1.5, in the discussion on *apūrva*, and in 6.1.1—3, the *svargādhikaraṇa*.

[10] Both texts are cited by Śabara, and are given here as translated by Jha.

[11] *vigraha* indicates individuality — some graspable, intelligible particularity differentiable from an abstract species — rather than mere materiality; as we shall see regarding the Vedānta position, divine *vigrahavattva* is essential if we are to be able to imagine a god properly. But since the particularization is achieved through matter, references to "having bodies" or "being corporeal" are appropriate.

[12] Five attributes related to the deities: having bodies, accepting the oblation, eating it, being satisfied, being gracious.

[13] To anticipate the third stage of our analysis, much later Rāmānuja argues against the Prābhākara school by asserting that the point of religious action — ritual and meditation — is to please (*ārādhanā*) the Lord, who grants results appropriate to the action.

[14] Analogously, Prabhākara also downplays the anthropocentric interpretation of the sacrifice, resisting the view that rites are performed in order to get earthly pleasures and finally heaven. Such a view is open to the charge of selfishness, and also is liable to doubt when the earthly desires do not appear on schedule. Prabhākara insists that rewards are offered simply to persuade people to become performers, instruments of the sacrifice's completion.

The Prābhākara school's view on the gods is well summarized in Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, in the second part of the *Vākyārthamātṛkā*; the additional comments of the editor, A. Subrahmanya Sastri, are succinct and very helpful (pp. 436–39). For the Prābhākara defense of *niyoga* and subordination of the human perspective, see pages 443–5 of the same section.

[15] Cited by Śabara at *PMS* 4.2.27.

[16] I restrict myself here to Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* with the few cited references to Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmatī*. Since most of what follows refers to the Advaita Vedānta, I will refer to that school as "the Vedānta" except when it is necessary to make a distinction from the positions of Bādarāyaṇa or Rāmānuja.

[17] Although, of course, the Vedāntins do immediately afterwards (1.3.34–38) exclude one set of knowing persons, the *śūdras*, on the extrinsic grounds of their lack of access to initiation [*upanayana*], one particular way in which texts might be learned.

[18] I am not aware of a Mīmāṃsā text which raises this precise objection; since in Mīmāṃsā a deity was not thought to be primary in relation to the sacrifice in which it was named, this was not likely to be a major problem or topic of debate among them.

[19] This *sūtra* occasions a lengthy exposition of the Vedānta theory of language, aimed primarily at defining precisely how the apparently finite realities are referred to in the eternal, beginningless Veda.

[20] In commenting on 3.2.38, Vācaspati makes a more general claim about the priority of the conscious: "Whatever is without consciousness acts only as based on something with consciousness" (*yad yad acetanaṃ tat tat sarvaṃ cetanādhiṣṭhitaṃ pravartate.*)

[21] As Vācaspati explains at the beginning of 26, meanings one gleans from *mantras* can be held to be true except in cases where those meanings would contradict what is known by other means of knowledge.

[22] According to Vācaspati, the "extra-verbal" reality of the gods is what is known from *itihāsa* and *purāṇa*.

[23] The *apūrva* doctrine was itself a topic of debate within Mīmāṃsā and between Mīmāṃsā and other schools. Prabhākara and Śālikanātha retain the term *apūrva* and do not argue against Śabara's idea; but appealing back to Jaimini himself, they restructure the analysis in such a way that the question of how exactly results come from sacrifices need not arise. Their preferred term is *niyoga*. For a discussion of the debate over *apūrva*, see Chapter 7 of Clooney; see also Halbfass, and Biardeau, pp. 91–3.

[24] Vācaspati continues with the qualification that the supernatural Lord is not swayed by attraction and hatred as an earthly king is, but merely rewards deeds as is fit. He also ventures to suggest a way in which the *apūrva* theory can be made compatible with the *siddhānta* here, on the analogy of how subsidiary *apūrvas* contribute to the main *apūrva*, or honor paid to the king's councillors pleases the king.

[25] The alternative, advaitin view is that the passage simply continues the description of *brahman* which occurs from 3.2.11–37, adding the attribute that *brahman* rewards ritual action.

[26] Rāmānuja's numbering of these *sūtras* differs due to a different division of a *sūtra* earlier in the *pāda*.

[27] In the *laghusiddhānta* in 1.1.1: *evaṃrūpā dhruvānusmṛtir eva bhaktiśabdenābhidhīyate upāsanaparyāyatvād bhaktiśabdasya*. (Skt. 86–7; p. 16 in Thibaut's tr.)

[28] The significance of Rāmānuja's doctrine of Viṣṇu's body (*śarīra*) in relation to this whole discussion is a topic worthy of extended treatment. For the basic idea, see Carman, pp. 124–33.

[29] Much as Vācaspati had explained at 1.3.33 that the Mīmāṃsā view of *apūrva* and the bodilessness of the gods could be combined with the Vedānta idea of the rewarding of sacrifices by the gods.

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Francis X. Clooney, S. J.
Theology Department
Boston College, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

REVIEW

Paul Hacker: *Grundlagen indischer Dichtung und indischen Denkens.* Aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Klaus Rüping. Wien 1985. (Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, vol. XII.) Commission agents: E. J. Brill, Leiden — Gerold & Co., Vienna — Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. 148 pp.

Paul Hacker died in 1979. This book contains his last lecture (or course of lectures?), held in the summer of 1978. It has been published — as the editor, Klaus Rüping, points out in his preface — because it represents in a way the sum of many years' research by Hacker.

The book is divided into two parts: 'Grundlagen der indischen Dichtung' ('Principles of Indian poetry'; pp. 13—38), and 'Grundlagen des indischen Denkens' ('Principles of Indian thought'; pp. 39—141). This review will first reproduce some salient remarks from the first part of the book. It will then review the second part in more detail. In the first part Hacker emphasizes that the boundaries between individual disciplines in cultures which are as far apart as those of Europe and of India, do not always coincide (p. 37); that an account of Indian philosophy in accordance with the European idea of philosophy should also mention Indian aesthetics, and within aesthetics the psychological elements (p. 36); and that much of what we call psychology is in India included in poetics and aesthetics (p. 37).

The second and longest part of the book ('Grundlagen des indischen Denkens') consists of three sections. The first of these ('Was meinen wir, wenn wir das Wort "Philosophie" auf Leistungen des indischen Geistes anwenden?'; pp. 39—62) again adresses the question of the difference between certain concepts in India and in Europe. The term 'philosophy' overlaps with a number of Sanskrit terms — Hacker discusses *ānvīkṣikī, vidyā, śāstra, dharmaśāstra, darśana* — but is equivalent to none of them.[1] The lack of a Sanskrit

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correlate of 'philosophy' should not however mislead us into thinking that India had no philosophy. Sanskrit has no general term for 'religion' either, yet India had and has religions. Moreover, Sanskrit words such as *dharma* have no exact equivalent in Western languages either.

After this introductory discussion Hacker comes in the following Sections 2 and 3 to his main concern, *viz*., to find schemes of thought that characterize Indian thought ("für das indische Denken bezeichnende Denkschemata", p. 64). Section 2 ('Grundbegriffe des indischen Denkens in den älteren Upaniṣaden'; pp. 62—105) gives for this purpose a classification of the contents of the Upaniṣads (p. 65 f.), which is extensively discussed and exemplified. In the course of this discussion a number of schemes of thought make their appearance, which are subsequently listed and enlarged upon in Section 3 ('Die Denkschemata'; pp. 105—141). They are (see p. 139):

1. Anthropological-cosmological parallelism.
2. Substantialism.
3. Opposition of 'subtle' and 'coarse'.
4. Opposition of latency and manifestation.
5. Tendency to identify potency and matter.
6. Enumeration.
7. Gradualism.
    a. Inclusivism.
8. Paradoxes.

What are schemes of thought ('Denkschemata')? The book under review is not very explicit about this. Another lecture, called "Inklusivismus", held in 1977 and also published posthumously (in 1983), provides some elucidation. It states (p. 11): "Es gibt in einem Kulturkreis gewisse Verhaltensweisen des Geistes, Denkformen, Denkschemata, die diesem Kulturkreis eigentümlich sind und deren Eigentümlichkeit sich eben dadurch bekundet, dass sie in diesem Kulturkreis zu finden und nachzuweisen sind, anderswo aber nicht." Is this description valid for the schemes of thought in the present book?

The stipulation that Hacker's schemes of thought are not found outside India has been criticized by W. Halbfass and A. Wezler (both

1983) for the case of 'inclusivism'. In the book under review this stipulation is not mentioned, nor does it appear to be presupposed. On the contrary, while dealing with the eighth scheme of thought — that of metaphysical or mystical paradoxes — Hacker makes a comparison with Christian mysticism (p. 135), which suggests that the same or a closely similar scheme of thought existed in the West. And something similar to scheme no. 5 is found in Medieval European thought (pp. 128—29).

Are these schemes of thought common to all Indians, or at least common to all Indian philosophers? Hacker rejects this idea. They rather characterize Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the different forms of 'Vedāntism', which together constitute the 'conservative systems' (p. 105). Hacker emphasizes the contrast which exists between these schemes of thought and the ways of thinking in the schools of Buddhism. Also the Vaiśeṣika system and its derivatives are different (p. 106). But the fact that monistic Vedānta most radically elaborated some of these schemes of thought makes it the most Indian of Indian philosophies ("die indischste der indischen Philosophien"; p. 132). The schemes of thought are apparently looked upon as typically Indian in some sense, even though they are not universally Indian.

Another question related to the schemes of thought is whether the Indians really thought that way or merely found these schemes in the traditional belief systems which they followed. These two alternatives must be strictly kept apart. By way of comparison we may consider that certain Christians believe that bread and wine are the flesh and blood of Christ, without adhering to the general scheme of thought which an outsider might be tempted to see here, *viz.*, that an object is identified with the symbol that represents it. An Indian philosopher, similarly, might accept a 'scheme of thought' because it is part of the tradition, without using that 'scheme of thought' where he thinks independently.

If the question here raised can be answered at all, then it can only be answered by distinguishing between an author's own thoughts and his traditional beliefs. 'Schemes of thought' found in traditional beliefs only say something about the way of thinking of those who created these beliefs, not about their followers. Hacker does not attempt to make these distinctions. On the contrary, he concentrates on what he calls the 'conservative systems', precisely because they preserve the ways of thinking which are attested already in the oldest surviving literature (". . . insofern, als sie viel von den Denkweisen bewahren und weiterentwickeln, die schon in der ältesten erhalten gebliebenen Literatur nachweisbar sind"; p. 105—06). Such an approach could be accused of lacking historical sense.

Ironically, Hacker says a great deal about historical sense ('historisches Bewusstsein'; p. 47). He contrasts it with traditionalism, for which the past is present in the traditions. Historical sense, on the other hand, means that the past is studied as past. This is not however the historical sense which is relevant here. What is at stake here is the awareness that every thinker, and every thought, must be understood in his or its historical situation. Such an understanding may be obtained by studying the history of Indian thought (in as far as this is possible), and by avoiding studying a thinker apart from his historical context. Hacker does not seem to be aware of this. On p. 61 he makes the statement that it is our habit to ask for history in the study of Indian philosophy,[2] as if the history of Indian philosophy is studied to satisfy our *habits*, instead of our need to *understand*.

Hacker justifies his non-historical approach by pointing at (i) the fact that Indian philosophy for a long time remained the same without noticeable developments, and (ii) our lack of knowledge regarding the historical developments (pp. 61—62). Both these points can be appreciated, but they can be no justification for not considering whose schemes of thought are being studied.

Turning now to some of the schemes themselves, it seems obvious that the first one ('anthropological-cosmological parallelism') is neither universally nor typically Indian. Hacker himself admits (p. 107) that as a living category of thought it is restricted to the oldest times. Probably its most important manifestation in the classical philosophical systems, however, is not mentioned by him. This is the Sāṃkhya scheme of evolution, which cannot clearly be assigned to either the cosmological or to the anthropological realm, but belongs to both.[3]

Of perhaps more general interest is scheme no. 2, 'substantialism'. 'Substance' is what has existence that is independent in itself ("welches eine Existenz hat, die unabhängig in sich selbst steht"; p. 109).

'Substantialism' means that there is a predominance of the category 'substance' in thought ("Vorherrschaft der Substanz-Kategorie im Denken"; p. 109). An example is *karman*, which is conceived of as a substance, sometimes in the form of subtle matter. The *guṇas* of Sāṃkhya – which are qualities and at the same time constituents of original matter – are another example.

Hacker's 'substantialism' seems a valid and valuable way of characterizing much of Indian thought. It is not however clear why Buddhism and Vaiśeṣika are excluded. Buddhism is called 'radikal anti-substanzialistisch' (p. 123), and Vaiśeṣika 'nicht ausgesprochen substanzialistisch' (p. 114). Yet the most influential school of Hīnayāna Buddhism in India, *viz.* Sarvāstivāda, accepted as one of its elements of existence (*dharma*) the so-called *avijñapti*, which was classified as *rūpa*, i.e., as 'matter' (see Lamotte, 1936: 156 f.). This *avijñapti* is the Buddhist equivalent of the materialized *karman* in Jainism which Hacker describes as the most radical form of substantialism (p. 110). Other elements of the Sarvāstivādins, such as the four *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* – *viz.*, *jāti, sthiti, jarā, anityatā* – as separate entities, are the most radical expressions of substantialistic thinking one could imagine, which have no parallel even in Jainism. Hacker might object that 'substance' is stable and implies ongoing existence;[4] most Buddhists, on the other hand, emphasize the momentary nature of what there is. But this objection carries no conviction. It is of course possible to add qualifications to the meaning of 'substance' until this term can only be applied to one's chosen philosophy or philosophies, but this runs counter to the aim of the book to find the principles of Indian thought. Buddhism, and in particular its dharma theory, shares characteristics with the other philosophies of India, and there is no reason to narrow down one's understanding of substance to the point that Buddhism is excluded.

Turning to Vaiśeṣika, this system distinguishes between six, or seven, categories, of which substance (*dravya*) is but one, *viz.*, the first one. But does this mean that Vaiśeṣika is not substantialistic? The different categories of Vaiśeṣika are believed to have separate existence, to be separate 'things'. Does this not entitle them to be considered substances in Hacker's sense? Hacker says no, but his description of what a substance is does not make clear why. It is true that, say, qualities do not occur where there is no substance (in the Vaiśeṣika sense). But can the Sāṃkhya *guṇas* exist without *prakṛti*? The matter appears to be more complicated than is clear from Hacker's treatment of it.

The third scheme is the opposition between 'subtle' and 'coarse'. This opposition came to be used, in the conservative systems, to differentiate the mental from the physical. Once the difference between spirit ('Geist') and matter had been clearly understood, Hacker thinks, the opposition between 'subtle' and 'coarse' became more or less superfluous. The fact that it was yet preserved made it possible in Sāṃkhya and Vedānta to assign mental processes to the realm of subtle matter, and to understand the spirit as purely transcendental (p. 124).

There may be truth in this, but I think that the emphasis is wrongly put. The spirit in Sāṃkhya and Vedānta did not become transcendental because mental processes were taken care of by subtle matter, but rather the other way round. I have argued elsewhere (1986: 51 f.) that the idea of a transcendental soul, not involved in any physical or mental activity, takes a central position in Sāṃkhya, Vedānta, and its historical precursors. Such being the case, mental processes had to be located elsewhere, and this was and remained a good reason to distinguish between subtle and coarse matter.

The opposition between latency and manifestation — Hacker's fourth scheme of thought — finds primarily expression in the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*. Again no Buddhists are mentioned in connection with this scheme of thought, but one may wonder whether the central doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins — that past, present and future all exist — does not belong here. These Buddhists hold that the own character (*lakṣaṇa, svabhāva*) of an element of existence (*dharma*) is constant; it manifests itself, it 'becomes present', on account of causes and conditions.[5]

Hacker does not confine himself to discussing the above schemes of thought. In passing he touches on many questions, and makes many observations which often are of a rather general nature. Some of these are hard to understand, while others are of a dubious nature.

One of the things repeatedly emphasized is that in India everything, including science and philosophy, must have a purpose: "Was zweckfrei ist, ist zwecklos, und was zwecklos ist, ist sinnlos" (pp. 14, 46). It is also obvious, according to Hacker, that this need for a purpose has hampered the progress of research in science and philosophy in India. In Europe, on the other hand, the situation was quite different. Aristotle already stated that knowledge is for its own sake, and this idea of knowledge has been taken over by the West.[6]

These are high claims, which Hacker himself has to assuage to a considerable extent. Aristotle's view of knowledge for its own sake, we learn on p. 44, has a religious or quasi-religious meaning, for the spiritual faculty called *noûs* is involved in knowledge, and this *noûs* is something divine in man. In other words, knowledge has the *purpose* of activating the highest in man (p. 45). Moreover, Thomas Aquinas, in the European Middle Ages, recognized knowledge for its own sake as a high, or the highest, purpose in life for life on earth (p. 49). In India, furthermore, many aspects of the philosophical systems — *viz.*, the speculations in the realm of natural philosophy — seem to have been the result of free investigation (p. 50). Hacker has some doubts regarding this last point; he considers it more probable that these early speculations too served some purpose, right from the beginning.

Hacker's view — whether he invented it with or without a purpose — has to be rejected. The suggestion that Western science and philosophy made progress owing to the fact that they had 'no purpose', is not bolstered by any evidence. And the fact that Indian philosophers paid lip-service to some purpose or purposes cannot be held responsible for the presumed lack of progress in India. Many developments in Indian thought — think, e.g., of the logical refinements of Navya-Nyāya — had no connection whatsoever with the purposes which they were theoretically meant to serve. And the idea that all important Western scientists and philosophers worked without purpose — including that of furthering their own career — is wishful thinking.

At the beginning of the discussion of the principles of Indian thought, Hacker makes some interesting remarks on the points of similarity between certain thoughts in India and in the West (p. 39 f.). The view that they are the result of Western influence on India is, I think rightly, rejected. Rather, the Indians have thought out their philosophical questions independently of the West, the reason being that these questions are of general human interest. Hacker goes further and concludes that this tells us something about human nature. Comparison of Indian and European achievements might lead to new knowledge of what Hacker calls an anthropological nature ('anthropologischer Natur'). On p. 55 he repeats the 'methodological principle' that first the characteristics of each culture must be studied. Initially everything will seem to be radically different; but then 'bridges across the abyss' appear, and one notices that human nature has expressed itself in words here in this and there in that way ("dass es die menschliche Natur ist, die sich hier auf diese und dort auf jene Weise im Wort ausgedrückt hat"; p. 55).

It is not easy to understand what exactly Hacker had in mind, but he returns to this question while discussing the concept of *prāṇa* in the Upaniṣads (p. 71 f., esp. pp. 73—74). The history of this concept, Hacker states, has a significance for our understanding of man in general; it has anthropological relevance. Words that originally mean breath, later soul, are also found in other cultures. Hacker mentions Latin *spiritus*, Greek *pneûma*, and Hebrew *rūach*. The Upaniṣads are special in that they allow us to follow the development from the old to the new meaning.

Hacker does not further specify what knowledge of man in general is to be derived from this. In a way he has already undermined his position on the preceding pages 72 and 73. There he argues that the origin of the speculations on breath is rather easy to explain. No man or animal can live without breath. Breath came to be considered life itself, and the word *prāṇa* acquired a meaning which we might translate as 'soul'. But if this development is so easy to explain, what does it tells us about man in general? Hacker does not provide an answer.

Another of his lectures may help us. It was delivered not long before the lecture on which the book under review is based, viz., in 1976. In that lecture ("Cit and Noûs, or the concept of spirit in Vedāntism and in Neoplatonism", Kleine Schriften pp. 320—337) Hacker points to the similarities which exist, besides differences, between 'Vedāntism' and Neoplatonism. These similarities cannot be explained by historical influences. Towards the end of this lecture, after announcing a conclusion, Hacker makes the following statement: "If theistic metaphysics is to survive, if the doctrine of God is not to degenerate into an ideology ancillary to anthropology, it is indispensible that we should uphold this heritage of Platonism and Neoplatonism" (p. 17/336). In the final paragraph of that same article Hacker concludes that in several respects "the study of Vedāntism and Neoplatonism . . . seems to be of great relevance in our time, provided we recognize the value of great tradition in general and of metaphysics in particular". Note that here Hacker distances himself from 'anthropology' and rather speaks in favour of the preservation of traditional metaphysics. If we can be guided by this, we are led to the conclusion that Hacker's 'new knowledge of an anthropological nature' is really old metaphysical knowledge which is supposed to contain some truth – presumably on account of the fact that it occurs in more than one culture. Hacker only rarely admits his concern with the truth of the metaphysical doctrines he discusses. On p. 111 he states that the substantialistic scheme of thought (see above), when applied in Vedānta to the absolute, probably contains truth ("sehr wohl eine Wahrheit in sich enthält"). This statement concerns the Vedānta view that *sat, cit,* and *ānanda* are no attributes of the absolute, but describe, each of them, the absolute as a whole. On p. 107, moreover, it is stated in parentheses that the anthropological-cosmological parallelism — which is Hacker's first scheme of thought — may be based, in the epistemological realm, on a partial truth; this is not further explained, "da ich hier kein spezifisches Philosophiekolleg halte".

A concrete comparison between similar ideas in India and in Europe is again made on p. 59, but here human nature is not invoked. It concerns the similarity between the categories of Vaiśeṣika and those of Aristotle. This time the similarity 'can easily be explained' by the fact that the philosophy which is immanent in the Indo-European languages finds here conceptual expression ("diese Kategorienähnlichkeit im Vaiśeṣika und bei Aristoteles erklärt sich einfach daraus, dass die den indogermanischen Sprachen immanente Philosophie sich hier begrifflich auslegt").

The basic idea here expressed is not new. We find it already in Faddegon's account of the Vaiśeṣika system (1918: 109).[7] But Hacker goes beyond his predecessor in speaking about a philosophy which is *immanent* in the Indo-European languages. What does this mean? On p. 112 Hacker returns to the same issue, now stating that the three categories substance, quality and action are preformed in the grammatical structure of the Indo-European languages ("Schliesslich sind die drei Kategorien der Substanz, der Eigenschaft und des Handelns schon präformiert in der grammatischen Struktur der indogermanischen Sprachen"). On the next page he adds his impression that a certain ontology lies preformed in the Dravidian languages ("dass eine gewisse Philosophie des Seins insbesondere im Dravidischen ursprünglich präformiert vorliegt"). He explains this by stating his view that one system of languages has more correctly recognized one side of reality, another language family another side of it ("dass das eine Sprachsystem eine Seite der Wirklichkeit genauer erkannt hat, eine andere Sprachfamilie eine andere Seite genauer erkannt hat"). Does this imply that, according to Hacker, the first three categories of Vaiśeṣika are in some way in agreement with reality? The question is neither asked not answered. Hacker does however express his amazement that the other systems of Indian philosophy have not accepted these categories.

On pp. 122 f. we learn more about the relationship between language and philosophy. Not only are philosophies 'preformed' in certain languages; new philosophies can also change the structure of a language. The substantialistic scheme of thought, Hacker tends to think, finds expression in the nominal style which came to characterize philosophical Sanskrit more and more as time went by. He admits of course that the same style is also used by schools of thought that were not substantialistic (at least in his opinion), but the predominance of substantialistic thinking must be held responsible for this.

It seems clear that much of what is said by Hacker in this book will not be generally accepted. This may concern the schemes of thought, but even more the many, often completely unsubstantiated claims and hints scattered throughout the book; only some of these could be referred to in this review. But whether or not we agree with all of Hacker's opinions, it remains laudable that he made at least an effort to look beyond the boundaries of Indology. He drew attention to the fact that Indological studies may contribute to larger issues, such as the understanding of man, which not many Indologists seem to be aware of. Even if Hacker did not always draw conclusions which are acceptable to most of us, it may be worthwhile to follow his example in trying to see the relevance of our own discipline for other realms.

NOTES

[1] Also Halbfass (1981: 296 ff.) deals with this problem.

[2] P. 61: "... wir sind gewohnt, bei einer Untersuchung der indischen Philosophie zunächst nach der Geschichte zu fragen."

[3] Perhaps the most recent attempt to solve this 'problem' is by Rodney J. Parrott, recently in this journal.

[4] P. 129: "Denn die Substanz ist die statischste aller Kategorien. Sie bedeutet bleibendes Sein."

[5] See La Vallée Poussin, 1937: 131—32.

[6] A discussion of this presumed difference between India and Europe, which does not however mention Hacker, is given in Halbfass, 1981: 303 f., 180 f.

[7] Note that Faddegon bases the categories of Vaiśeṣika and Aristotle "on the properties of the human language" in general, not on Indo-European.

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Section Des Langues Orientales
Université de Lausanne
Bfsh 2
CH-1015 Lausanne
Switzerland

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

RICHARD P. HAYES

ON THE REINTERPRETATION OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S *SVABHĀVAHETU*

Ernst Steinkellner (1974: 118) correctly pointed out that the significance of the term "*svabhāva*" in the works of Dharmakīrti "has more or less puzzled scholars ever since the first text of Dharmakīrti was read." In that same article Steinkellner performed the long overdue service of showing the fundamental inadequacies of Stcherbatsky's predominately neo-Kantian interpretation of Dharmakīrti's system of epistemology. It has come to be my impression that the difficulty that Stcherbatsky and other modern interpreters of Dharmakīrti have experienced in reaching an understanding of key terms is but a continuation of the difficulty that Dharmakīrti's own commentators had in explicating the tortuous writings of this highly complex thinker. Since Dharmakīrti's use of the expression "*svabhāva*" provides a good example of an area in which his thinking seems to have been fluctuating during his career and therefore to have caused problems for his later commentators, I intend to focus on that one term in order to examine how it is used in various of Dharmakīrti's works.

First, I shall try to demonstrate that the word "*svabhāva*" has a uniform interpretation in all its occurrences in the logical portions of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Then I shall examine parallel passages in other of Dharmakīrti's works to show how the term "*svabhāva*" has a different interpretation from that found in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Let us begin, then, by examining two verses in the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*. The first verse to be examined is *kārikā* two, which reads:

kāryaṁ svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe
hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvo'pi bhāvamātrānurodhini

It is Dharmakīrti's contention that there are exactly two types of evidence (*hetu*) that can be used to confirm the presence of a suspected property (*sādhyadharma*) in a given locus (*pakṣa*). In the *kārikā* under discussion he defines these two types of evidence. In the

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first instance an effect is said to serve as evidence of that which caused it: "kāryam . . . kāraṇe hetuḥ." But it is a well-known axiom of Buddhist metaphysics that when one speaks of objects in the roles of causes and effects, one is speaking of such ordinary phenomena as fires and clouds of smoke, which are examples of the type of objects that present themselves in naive cognition (*saṃvṛtisajjñāna*). The Buddhist claim is that at a more reflective and analytical — and therefore a more accurate — level of cognition, an ordinary object such as fire must be seen as merely the collocation of several properties such as existence, substantiality and firehood — properties that belong to all fires — plus various individuating properties that belong only to some but not to all fires. In the final analysis of *paramārthasatya*, properties are regarded as being superimposed by the mind upon particular objects of sensation. Thus it is strictly speaking inaccurate to speak of such properties as existence, substantiality and firehood as belonging to fire. Rather, according to the *cittamātra* nominalism of Dharmakīrti, the intellect (*citta*) superimposes these properties upon a sensation. But this nicety is an encumbrance to our understanding of the main logical point, which is that there are some "properties" that all fires have, and other "properties" that some but not all fires have.

Given this understanding of things, the question naturally arises whether each one of the set of properties that together constitute what we perceive as an object in the role of an effect serves as evidence of each one of the properties that together constitute what we perceive as an object in the role of a cause. Can, for example, the property of being made up of earth atoms, which is one of the many properties of smoke, serve in itself as evidence for the property of being a fire, which is one of the many properties of the object that we take to be the cause of smoke? The answer is clearly negative; we cannot legitimately infer the presence of the property of being a fire from the observed presence of earth atoms, for if we could, then the following would be a sound inference: "There is a fire on the mountain, because there is a pot on the mountain. Wherever there is earth, there is fire."

Nor, conversely, can the observation of the property of being smoke in itself serve as evidence for a property that belongs only to some but not to all fires. One cannot, for example, legitimately infer from the mere fact of observed smoke that the fire causing it is fueled by dry straw. And so, in order to make it clear that only the properties that belong exclusively to the class of objects to which the effect belongs can serve as evidence for all the properties that belong to every member of the class of objects to which the cause belongs, Dharmakīrti qualifies the word "*kāryam*" in his definition with the phrase "*svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi*." The entire statement "*kāryaṁ svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe hetuḥ*" now means this: "an effect is evidence for exactly the number of *svabhāvas* in the cause in virtue of which the effect is restricted to the cause."

Now before we are in a position to determine what interpretation to give to the term "*svabhāva*" in this context, we must ask in general just what those properties are in virtue of which the effect is restricted to the cause. To say that A is restricted to B is to say that A does not occur without B. And so what we are asking here is: what are the properties in a cause without which the effect could not occur? And the answer is obviously: just those properties that always (or necessarily) occur in the cause. A wisp of smoke cannot arise, for example, from objects that lack existence and combustion, and so these are necessarily properties of the cause of smoke. But a wisp of smoke can arise from an existent combustive thing that is not fueled by straw, and so being fueled by straw is an unnecessary property of the cause of smoke. Thus the simple observation that Dharmakīrti is making is that an effect confirms all and only those features of the cause without which the effect could not occur and hence without which the cause could not actually be a cause. And so it would appear that in the context of this discussion, the term "*svabhāva*" must mean something very much like the English expression "essential property," that is, a property that a thing must have in order to be the type of thing that it is. Indeed, "essential property" or "wesentliche Beschaffenheit" is the translation that Steinkellner has proposed (1974: 124, n. 24). He also mentions in a note (1974: 123, n. 20) that he believes the term "*svabhāva*" has not undergone any semantic shifts in the works that Dharmakīrti wrote after the *Pramāṇavārttika*. As mentioned above, my purpose in this paper is to present evidence that indicates to me that the term "*svabhāva*" did undergo a rather important shift in Dharmakīrti's usage. Steinkellner (1974: 129) does say that in Dharmakīrti "we have basically two kinds of *svabhāvahetuḥ*: The pure generic property and the particular properties, where certain exclusions are referred to, which qualify these properties." It is my contention that there is but one notion of *svabhāvahetu* in *Pramāṇavārttika*, another in *Nyāyabindu*, and an incorrect assumption on the part of later commentators that the term has not undergone a semantic shift. Even if my contention can be proved to be false, however, I shall hope to be able to show that the state of affairs that Steinkellner describes, whereby the key term "*svabhāva*" means either the "pure generic property" or "particular properties that qualify these properties," would be a state of confusedness that in a system of logic based upon the relative extensions of class-defining properties would be intolerable. Rather than have to assume that Dharmakīrti was so hopelessly confused himself, I should prefer to assume, until it can be proved otherwise, that Dharmakīrti changed his usage of the term in such a way as to leave his later interpreters confused. This would mean only that one would have to be cautious in transporting ideas from one Dharmakīrtian text to another, but one could expect consistency within any given text.

Before going on to discuss other instances of Dharmakīrti's use of "*svabhāva*," it is important to spell out exactly what the implications are of understanding it here as an essential property. To say that an essential property of a thing is a property that the thing has necessarily and not just accidentally is to say that all instances of the thing in question will have the property in question. For example, to say that heat is an essential property of fire is to say that all fires have heat and that an object lacking heat would not in fact be a fire. And conversely, to say that the colour blue is a nonessential property of fire is to say that some fires are not blue. To state this same principle in the terminology of Dharmakīrtian logic, an essential property of an object of type x is any property that pervades (is a *vyāpaka* of) the class-defining property X, that is, the property in virtue of which the object is of type x. For example, an essential property of fire is any property that pervades firehood, that is, the property of being a fire. An object, then, naturally has a plurality of *svabhāvas*. It is, incidentally, in the nature of the pervasion relation that every property pervades itself. Since the property of being a fire pervades the property of being a fire, it qualifies as one of the essential properties of fire. In fact, it is the essential property of narrowest extension among all the essential properties of fire. It can be said in general that a *jāti*, that is, a property that determines a natural class, is the essential property of narrowest extension among all the essential properties that the objects of a given class have. Firehood, then, is the property that every fire has and that only fires have.

Now to return to the matter at hand, if we construe *svabhāva* as an essential property, we are committed to saying that the *svabhāva* is a *vyāpaka* or pervasive property. And if we say that a *svabhāva* is a *vyāpaka*, we can only say that the role played by a *svabhāva* in inference is that of the property to be confirmed, the *sādhyadharma*, and not that of the confirming property or *hetu*. And from this it would follow that the expression "*svabhāvahetu*" should be analyzed as a *saptami tatpuruṣa* compound: "*svabhāve hetur iti svabhāvahetuḥ*."

Bearing the above observation in mind, let us now examine the second line of the verse under discussion:

hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvo'pi bhāvamātrānurodhini

If we read this statement in what appears to be the most straightforward way and pay heed only to what Dharmakīrti himself says in this passage, we arrive at an interpretation something like the following: "An entity is evidence for an essential property that is causally dependent upon only [the entity's] existence (*bhāvamātrānurodhini*)." Note that in this interpretation the *svabhāva* is the property to be confirmed, and the *bhāva* is perhaps a property that determines a subclass of the class determined by the *svabhāva*. In other words, the *svabhāva* pervades the *bhāva* and is thus the *sādhyadharma* for which the *bhāva* property is the evidence (*hetu*). And this is just what we should expect, because of our understanding of how the word "*svabhāva*" is used in the first line of this same verse and also because in this second line the word "*svabhāve*" appears in the locative case, which in the conventions of stating arguments in Sanskrit is the case used to mark the *sādhyadharma* for which a given *hetu* stands as evidence. The account I have just given, however, is rather surprisingly not the one given by Dharmakīrti's commentators.

Before looking at these commentators, however, let us look at what Dharmakīrti himself says in his own commentary to the verse under discussion. He explains the relationship called "*tādātmya*" that underlies the fact of being an essential property in these words: "*tādātmyaṁ hy arthasya tanmātrānurodhiny eva nānyāyatte.*" I translate: "For a thing has the same nature as that alone which is causally dependent upon that thing; it does not have the same nature as that which is dependent upon something other than the thing itself." To give an illustration of the import of this statement using the stock example, the property of being a tree (*vṛkṣatva*) is an essential property of a given śiṁśapā tree. That this is so is a reflection of the fact that the śiṁśapā has the nature of being a tree, because the fact of being a tree is associated with the śiṁśapā throughout its existence. Moreover, speaking ontologically, the existence of this particular instance of treehood depends upon no causal factors other than those that produced the particular śiṁśapā at hand. The treehood of any individual śiṁśapā is therefore not only temporally coextensive with the individual śiṁśapā, but it also has precisely the same causal factors as the individual śiṁśapā. Seen in this way, Dharmakīrti's discussion of *tādātmya* confirms the observation that a *svabhāva* such as treehood is invariably present with the individual whose essential property it is. The *svabhāva*, therefore, is a *vyāpaka* and hence functions as a *sādhyadharma* rather than as a *hetu.*

There is yet one other important passage in Dharmakīrti to look at before we examine the interpretations of his commentators. That is the seventh verse of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter. It reads:

hetunā yaḥ samagreṇa kāryotpādo'numīyate
arthāntarānapekṣatvāt sa svabhāvo'nuvarṇitaḥ

The arising of an effect that is inferred through the complete cause is called a *svabhāva*, because it has no requirement of any further causal factor.

The issue here is the relatively unusual inference in which we infer an effect from a cause. Normally, of course, it is legitimate to infer from an effect to any one of the causal factors that are necessary for the effect to arise. An effect used as evidence for a necessary condition is a *kāryahetu.* But what sort of evidence are we to call it when the sufficient conditions of a given effect are used as evidence for the arising of the effect? Dharmakīrti in answering this question argues that if the totality of necessary causal factors is present, then that totality itself is a sufficient condition for the arising of the effect. That is, the totality of necessary conditions requires nothing further to produce its effect, and so the arising of the effect is a certainty and can therefore be inferred from the observation of that totality. It will be recalled that in the earlier discussion of the *svabhāva* it was said that a *sādhya* is a *svabhāva* if its existence depends on no other factor than the existence of the *hetu*. And so, on the grounds that the *sādhya*, namely, the arising of the effect, requires no causal factors other than the existence of the *hetu*, namely, the totality of necessary conditions, Dharmakīrti calls the arising of an effect in this case a virtual *svabhāva* (*svabhāvabhūta*). In other words, it is something that functions in every important respect like a *svabhāva* without strictly speaking being one. In the words of Dharmakīrti's own commentary to the verse:

> tatra hi kevalam samagrāt kāraṇāt kāryotpattisaṁbhavo
> 'numīyate samagrāṇāṁ kāryotpādanayogyatānumānāt.
> yogyatā ca sāmagrīmātrānubandhinīti svabhāvabhūtaivánumīyate.
> (Dharmakīrti, 1960 ed., p. 6)
>
> For in that case one infers only the possibility of the arising of the effect from the complete cause, because one infers the capacity of all the causal factors to produce an effect. And this capacity belongs only to the collection as a whole, so one infers this capacity which is virtually an essential property.

What is important for our discussion here is that once again it is the virtual *svabhāva* that is in the role of the *sādhya* and must therefore pervade the evidence used to confirm it. The use of the term "*svabhāva*" here, then, is perfectly consistent with our interpretation of its use in the second *kārikā* of this chapter.

Let us now return to that discussion of *svabhāvahetu* in the second *kārikā* and see how the commentators Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin treat it. Both Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin offer the following analysis of the statement "*hetuḥ svabhāve bhāvaḥ.*" We are, say these commentators, to understand that the word "*bhāvaḥ*" in Dharmakīrti's verse really means *svabhāva*, while the word "*svabhāve*" is to be understood as "*sādhye.*" Making the substitutions indicated by these commentators, Dharmakīrti's statement now reads "*hetuḥ sādhye svabhāvaḥ.*" This is, on the face of it, a radical reinterpretation of the original *kārikā*! For in Dharmakīrti's verse the *svabhāva* is the property to be confirmed and therefore the property that *pervades* the confirming property. But on the interpretations of Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin, the *svabhāva* is the confirming property and therefore the property that is *pervaded by* the property to be confirmed.

Furthermore, it will be recalled that Dharmakīrti had specified that the fact of needing no further causal factors was the state of affairs that made a property qualify as a *svabhāva*. For Dharmakīrti, the fact of being a tree is one of the *svabhāvas* of a given śiṁśapā tree, because once the śiṁśapā exists there are no additional causal factors required to make the property of being a tree arise. But in Manorathanandin's account, the fact of being a śiṁśapā is a *svabhāva* that serves as evidence for the existence of the property of being a tree, and this indicated property requires no further causal factors than those needed to make the *svabhāva* itself arise. In Manorathanandin's words: "*yasya sattāmātreṇa yo dharmo' vaśyam bhavati na hetvantaram apekṣate, tasmin sādhye svabhāvākhyo hetuḥ.* (The so-called *svabhāva* is evidence for that property to be confirmed that necessarily occurs owing to the presence of the confirming property and requires no causal factors outside those of the confirming property itself.)" To repeat, the fact of needing no additional causal factors is for Manorathanandin and Karṇakagomin the defining attribute not of a *svabhāva* itself but rather of any property that the *svabhāva* indicates. This represents a significant departure from the most straightforward interpretation of what Dharmakīrti himself said in the *Pramāṇavārttika.*

The question that now confronts us is why would two interpreters as generally reliable as Manorathanandin and Karṇakagomin apparently misconstrue a passage as important as this one in which the key concept of *svabhāvahetu* is defined? On what authority did they reverse the role of the *svabhāva* from the part of a *sādhyadharma* to that of a *sādhanadharma*, from that of a pervasive to that of a pervaded property? Why did they construe the compound "*svabhāvahetu*" as a karmadhāraya rather than as a locative tatpuruṣa?

The answer to these questions is not difficult to find. These commentators followed the lead of Dharmakīrti himself, for he himself in his other epistemological works, the *Nyāyabindu* and the *Hetubindu*, offers an interpretation of *svabhāvahetu* that is quite different from the interpretations offered in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

In the *Nyāyabindu*, for example, Dharmakīrti discusses the *svabhāvahetu* as follows: "*svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ. yathā vṛkṣo'yam śiṁśapātvād iti.*" As we shall see below, there are two interpretations of this statement, but it is at least clear that the *svabhāva* is something that functions as evidence for a property to be confirmed. And since the *svabhāva* is the confirming property, it must be a pervaded property, that is, a property pervaded by the property whose presence in the same individual is confirmed through it. What this means is that the word "*svabhāva*" as it is used in this passage can less satisfactorily be construed as an essential property than was the case in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. What a *svabhāva* is in the *Nyāyabindu* is related to what Diṅnāga had called a "*bheda*." Diṅnāga's *bheda* was a subclass of a larger class. Thus the term "*svabhāva*" is best understood relatively insofar as a given property is a *svabhāva* only relative to a property that pervades it. Thus, while "*svabhāva*" in the *Pramāṇavārttika* might be translated as "essential property," in the *Nyāyabindu* and *Hetubindu* it might better be translated as "individuating property" or "particularity." At one extreme, a *svabhāva* in these two latter texts may simply be the unique features that give an individual object its individuality, its difference from all other objects. Indeed, in the discussions of *svabhāvānupalabdhi* in the *Nyāyabindu*, the *svabhāva* is best understood simply as the identifying characteristics of a macroscopic object that, when not observed in a particular location, enable us to conclude that the object is not present in that location.

Now, as was mentioned above, there still remains a discrepancy between Dharmottara and Vinītadeva on how to construe the word "*mātra*" in the phrase that qualifies "*sādhyadharme*" in the *Nyāyabindu* discussion. Dharmottara first explains that "*mātra*" is to be construed in its restrictive sense: "*svasya ātmanaḥ sattā. saiva kevalā svasattāmātram.*" And then he goes on to give an account very similar to the one that Dharmakīrti himself gave of the parallel phrase in *Pramānavārttika* and that Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin followed in their commentaries on that work. Dharmottara says:

> yo hetur ātmanaḥ sattām apekṣya vidyamāno bhavati,
> na tu hetusattayā vyatiriktaṁ kaṁcid dhetum apekṣate
> sa svasattāmātrabhāvi sādhyaḥ. tasmin sādhye yo
> hetuḥ sa svabhāvaḥ tasya sādhyasya nānyaḥ.
> (Dharmakīrti, 1955 ed., p. 106)

> A property to be confirmed that arises owing to nothing but the presence of the evidence itself is a property the occurrence of which requires the existence of the evidence itself but which does not require any causal factor aside from the presence of the evidence. That which is evidence for such a property to be confirmed is a *svabhāva* of that property to be confirmed; nothing else qualifies as a *svabhāva*.

Vinītadeva, on the other hand, seems to depart from this interpretation of "*svasattāmātrabhāvini*" as indicating causal dependence and treats "*mātra*" instead as a term that indicates class containment. Explaining the stock inference using a *svabhāvahetu*, he says:

> yathā vṛkṣaḥ ayaṁ śiṁśapātvād iti. atra vṛkṣasya
> śiṁśapāmātreṇa saṁbandhaḥ. tasmāt tena sādhyate.
> (Dharmakīrti, 1971 ed., p. 20)

> For example, "This is a tree, owing to its being a śiṁśapā." In this case, tree is connected with every śiṁśapā. Because of that connection it is confirmed by that śiṁśapā.

Notice that we would be led into a falsehood if we took "*mātra*" in the sense of exclusion in this context. For then we should have "tree is connected only with śiṁśapā," which would entail the false consequence that oaks and elms and so forth are not trees because they are not śiṁśapās. To avoid this absurdity, Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya translated the passage in question as follows:

> As for example: this is a tree, because it is of the nature of śiṁśapā. Here the tree is related to *every* form of śiṁśapā and hence the existence of the tree is deduced from it, i.e. from the nature of being a śiṁśapā. (Dharmakīrti, 1979 ed., p. 133. Emphasis added.)

Despite the fact that Gangopadhyaya translates Vinītadeva's use of "*mātra*" as "every," he unaccountably takes "*mātra*" as "only" in his translation of the very passage from *Nyāyabindu* to which Vinītadeva's passage is an explanation. Gangopadhyaya translates Dharmakīrti's sūtra thus:

> Identity is the reason in relation to an inferable property which exists in its own [i.e. of the reason] existence *only*. (Dharmakīrti, 1971 ed., p. 133. Emphasis added.)

In this translation of the sūtra, Gangopadhyaya evidently stayed close to Stcherbatsky's translation, which read:

> Own existence [= identity] is a reason for a deduced property which exists in its own [the reason's] existence *only*. (Stcherbatsky, 1930, p. 65, n. 4. Emphasis added. The so-called philosophical translation of *Nyāyabindu* 2.16 reads in Stcherbatsky's text: "Identity is a reason for deducing a property when (the subject) alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction." His literal translation, which I have quoted, appears in a footnote and actually reads: "Own existence (*svabhāva*) is a reason for a deduced property (*sādhya-dharma*) which exists in its own (the reason's) existence only (read sva-sattā-mātra-bhāvini).")

Stcherbatsky's translation is misleading not only because of the unclear treatment of "*mātra*" but also because of the interpretation of "*svabhāva*" as identity. As Steinkellner (1974: 123, n. 19) has already pointed out, a *svabhāvahetu* is a property, whereas identity is a relation between properties or between classes. In addition to the objections that Steinkellner states against treating *svabhāva* as identity, it can further be pointed out that identity is not even the relevant relation between the confirming property and the property to be confirmed: Treehood is not identical to śiṁśapāhood, nor is the class of trees identical to the class of śiṁśapās. Classes are identical if, and only if, they possess exactly the same members. And properties are not identical unless their extensions are identical classes. In Dharmakīrti's system, the only connection that the relation of identity has with the issue of *svabhāvahetu* is that in the case of a *svabhāvahetu* the locus of the *hetu* is identical with the locus of the *sādhyadharma*. This feature differentiates it from the *kāryahetu* in which the locus of the *hetu* is an individual that is not identical to the individual that is the locus of the *sādhyadharma*. This identity of locus for the *sādhyadharma* and the *sādhanadharma* of the *svabhāvahetu* type is signalled by the fact that the two properties do not have distinct causes.

Taking all this into account, then, I would translate the above passage from the *Nyāyabindu* as follows:

Svabhāvaḥ svasattāmātrabhāvini sādhyadharme hetuḥ.

A particularity is evidence for a property to be confirmed that is causally dependent upon only the occurrence of the particularity itself.

To summarize, then, in all of Dharmakīrti's works, the key feature of inferences making use of *svabhāvahetus* is that the individual that is the locus of the confirming property is identical with the individual that is the locus of the property to be confirmed. This feature distinguishes *svabhāvahetu* inferences from *kāryahetu* inferences, in which the individual that is the locus of the confirming property is nonidentical with the individual that is the locus of the property to be confirmed.

From a purely logical and epistemological point of view, incidentally, the distinction between a *svabhāvahetu* and a *kāryahetu* inference is completely irrelevant. It makes no difference whatsoever in the task of inferring property A from the observation of property B whether A and B are properties of the same individual, since all that is needed in this sort of inference is a knowledge that B has been observed with A and has never been observed without A. Diṅnāga's theory of the *trirūpa hetu* had said as much as it was necessary to say to determine the soundness of an inference. Not only is Dharmakīrti's added distinction between *kāryahetu* and *svabhāvahetu* unnecessary, it might even be seen as retrograde in that it reintroduces ill-defined metaphysical concepts into a logical system that had carefully been purged of such concepts.

To return to the main issue of this paper, Dharmakīrti's account of the *svabhāvahetu* throughout the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* differs from his account in the *Nyāyabindu* and the *Hetubindu*. In the *Pramāṇavārttika* account, a *svabhāva* is any necessary property that an object belonging to a given class has, and an object of a given class therefore has a plurality of *svabhāvas*, any one of which can be confirmed to occur in any object that is the locus of a property of lesser generality than the *svabhāva* itself. But in his other works a *svabhāva* is treated by Dharmakīrti as a particularity that serves as evidence for any property of greater generality than the *svabhāva* itself. Despite this rather important discrepancy in the treatment of the *svabhāvahetu* in Dharmakīrti's works, commentators of the *Pramānavārttika* found a means of providing glosses for the key terms within the definition given in that work in such a way that the discrepancy was rendered apparently harmless. But in a logical system that depends on a recognition of the relative extensions of properties to decide which inferences are sound and which are not, no confusion on the matter of whether a property is pervasive of or pervaded by another property can be regarded as harmless. Therefore, modern scholars of Dharmakīrti could, by following the lead of Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin in their account of *svabhāvahetu*, be led rather seriously astray.[1]

NOTE

[1] An earlier version of this paper was read at the Sixth World Sanskrit Conference in Philadelphia, October 14, 1984. Professors Steinkellner and Bimal K. Matilal made a number of useful suggestions that I have tried to take into account in revising the paper. Prof. Shoryu Katsura and Dr. Brendan S. Gillon also made comments on an earlier draft that have resulted in substantial improvements. Whatever flaws remain in the presentation are a function of my stubbornness rather than a result of a lack of excellent criticism from my colleagues. Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to the National Endowment for the Humanities, which funded the research out of which this paper grew as a by-product.

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University of Toronto

CHANDIDAS BHATTACHARYA

CAN THERE BE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR GENERAL TRUTH?

As the title of the paper suggests I shall be interested, in this context, in looking into the following questions: 'In which way empirical evidence (supposing that there is such kind of evidence) alone can justify the acceptance of some general truths?' and 'Whether empirical evidence has any intrinsic evidential demerit for a general truth?' It is important to note here that by 'general truth' I do not mean 'empirical generalization', rather significantly, I intend to mean 'truth which is indispensable for describing the world with a certain sense of profundity and finality.' A general truth is sometimes called a metaphysical truth. Thus 'time has a measurable magnitude' is a general truth, while 'watches measure time' is not a general truth.

The distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence is generally accepted as valid, at least in the West, and this distinction alone can be the ground of a more widely accepted distinction between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge. The distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence is more fundamental than the distinction between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge. This can be understood from the fact that the following questions are always regarded as key questions about knowledge:

(1a) Can we actually know or truly believe some particular things on empirical evidence alone?

(2a) Can we actually know or truly believe some general things on empirical evidence alone?

(1b) Can we actually know or truly believe some particular things on non-empirical evidence alone?

(2b) Can we actually know or truly believe some general things on non-empirical evidence alone?

No philosopher can remain neutral to any of these questions, and would try his best to give an affirmative or a negative answer to each

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of these questions according to his philosophical temperament. This fact itself shows that the connection between types of knowledge and the types of evidence is too sensitive an issue to be ignored.

The problem chosen for the present paper falls under the question (2a). Supposing that the general distinction between *empirical evidence and non-empirical is significant and not just trivial*, is it possible to say that *some general truths* (if not all general truths) can be known through empirical evidence alone, without disturbing the empirical character of the evidence by (implicit) a priori elements, at the same time without landing into some sort of *dogmatism*?

I propose to discuss the problem only with reference to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view for *a very special reason*. It is only the philosophers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (and Indian philosophers in general) who have sought to establish a set of general propositions on empirical evidence, without having raised the issue whether such propositions can be *subjected to logical doubt*. Is there any intrinsic demerit in their general approach? Or can there be a point in their remaining contented with it?

I have in mind the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *categories and abstract entities*. Surely such a theory entails establishing some general truths in the sense specified above. Some general truths attempted to be established by this system on empirical evidence alone may be put as under:

(1) There are only seven kinds of knowables (*padārtha*).
(2) Non-existence is a kind of object.
(3) God is without a body, yet he is the creator of the world.
(4) Magnitude and not the plurality of objects is the cause of perception.

The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is not made in this system[1], at least, explicitly, the empirical leaning is too apparent to be ignored. It seems extraordinary how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers should talk of a fixed set of categories, or of the non-existence, or of God. For that matter how could they avoid the sceptical mode of thinking? One possibility for a rigorous empiricist would be to have resort to talk about the world with an air of profundity and finality just arbitrarily, 'hitting at random', or just 'from whims'. Even an avowed empiricist has no bar in proclaiming that 'there are only such and such things', but may provide no reason whatsoever. But can there be no *non-trivial and non-arbitrary method for an avowed empiricist* to talk about the world profoundly? I think that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philsophers did adopt a kind of non-trivial and non-arbitrary, though an empirical method of talking about the world successfully, whether or not truly. And here lies their ingenuity. Along with strong empirical bias, e.g. belief in the perceptual evidence as the primary source of knowledge, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *takes certain 'clues' or 'insights' for granted, and these 'clues' or 'insights' help them in spite of* their rigorous empirical commitment to talk significantly about the world. There are different kinds of these clues which *they always innocently made use of in their fervent attempt to establish certain general conclusions about the world*. The following clues (among others) are very much built into their mode of philosophising: '*that doubt must be positively oriented*', '*that the categories of the perceptual world apply* (*unrestrictively*)', '*that infinite regress is untenable*', '*that persimony is preferable to plurality*, '*that there are degrees of weight of evidence*'.[2]

Let me sketch abstractly the ways these clues are made use of in their actual philosophising. This would enable us to have a better grasp of the concrete illustration of their application to be discussed later. The above clues, for a clear understanding of them, are classified into two groups — A and B. In group A I desire to include the most fundamental of the clues: 'that doubt must be positively oriented' and 'that the categories of the perceptual world apply unrestrictively'. In group B I include the less fundamental ones i.e., the rest.

Whenever a philosophical statement is made it is not questioned or rejected simply because no immediate evidence is available for its acceptance. The important point is not whether there is an evidence, *but whether there is some concrete evidence against it, making room for an alternative or contrary thesis*. In other words, first of all, it is considered whether actual doubting of the original thesis is possible, such a case of actual doubting has to be grounded in certain concrete facts. It must not be merely a case of a priori doubt (Humean or Cartesian). If no actual doubting is possible against a given proposition, or if the propounder of a new thesis can meet all the grounds for doubting his thesis, then his thesis must enjoy acceptance. *The possibility of meeting the doubt itself thus can be counted as an evidence for a philosophical thesis, or as necessary and sufficient ground for accepting a philosophical* thesis. This procedure might remind us of Popper's criterion of falsifiability. But whereas the criterion of falsifiability is primarily applicable to scientific statements, this procedure of establishing a proposition through an attempt to doubt on concrete grounds is applicable to philosophical propositions as well.

Evidently this procedure is different from the 'Cartesian doubt'. Now, what is more important to note is that there are *definite ways* in which certain doubts against a proposition be raised (and an alternative proposition proposed) as well as such doubts be quashed away (and the alternative proposal be rejected). To explain. There are different ways in which doubts may arise in our mind as to the acceptability of a proposition. Some of these ways of raising doubts may be too complex and complicated, or round about, unspecific to be taken account of, others may be *simple, serious and genuine*. It is philosophically very interesting to ask whether *genuine doubts* are also of unlimited kinds, just as non-genuine or unspecific or *pathological doubts* are. If genuine doubts are unlimited, then no proposition whatsoever can ever be dreamt of being justified and accepted. I am, however, in favour of accepting that genuine doubts against any possible thesis must be *numerically limited such that an* attempt *can be made to answer those doubts. This is what is implicitly accepted by all Indian philosophers without any exception.* To give some hints as to what is meant by 'genuine doubt' I shall just point to some of the very *precise manners* in which genuine doubts are raised by Indian philosophers against a proposed thesis. (It would be very instructive in this connection to go into the Naiyāyika's analysis of doubt, vide *Nyāyasutra*, aphorism 11:1:7). It is plain to see that genuine doubts against a thesis can be raised when there are concrete facts against a thesis, e.g., the thesis that nothing is caused. Sometimes, however, there may not be any concrete fact against a thesis, but yet a doubt can be raised against it from some other considerations, for instance, by showing that the given thesis leads to *an infinite regress*, or that is is against our sense of *parsimony* (there can be an alternative proposition which is in tune with our sense of parsimony). Again, a proposition may be doubted, if an alternative proposition based on a stronger ground is available. Of the two available alternative conclusions, both of which have some (empirical) evidence for them, one may be based on a stronger ground. And an alternative proposition based on a *stronger ground* can *cause* us to doubt the other alternative proposition. In the same way, doubts against a conclusion can be met and quashed away by showing that actually no doubt can be raised against the proposed thesis, that the ways of raising a doubt are *misapplied or inappropriate.*

The first clue of the group (A) is primarily negative in character, although its use can yield certain positive result. *Simply by showing that a conclusion cannot be doubted in a concrete way, one may make a plea for its acceptance.* But the second clue of the same group 'the categories of the perceptual world apply' is primarily positive and helps us to establish certain conclusions about the universe as a whole. The significance of the clue is this. *The mode of explanation or description of the perceptual world in terms of, for instance, object* (of knowledge), *substance, relation or even causality etc. must be extended to any universe of discourse whatsoever.* To take an example, if we can say that 'God has knowledge', then we have to admit that there is something which He knows, i.e., something must figure as object of (His) knowledge, that there is a difference between God and His object of knowledge. Of course, certain variation within the parameter may be allowed, that is to say, we may be allowed to postulate different types of sub-categories, e.g., substance of different sort, relations of different kinds, than what are given to ordinary sensory organs of us, if the universe of discourse so demands. (This is not to compromise with the empirical standpoint). The frequent use of *analogical argument* in Indian Philosophy may be traced to this firm belief in the unrestricted application of these categories. This clue of the group A is made use of by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika mainly to prove the existence of different kinds of categories, e.g.; non-existence, inherence, universal. (It is to be noted once again that all of these clues are not always explicitly mentioned in establishing a conclusion, but a careful reader of the text can always delineate them from implicit use made of them by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and of course by other schools; while talking about the world, — especially in discovering the different categories[3] of the world.)

Let us now have a look at some general truths that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika entertains and examine how this system makes an attempt to establish them from an empirical stand-point. This system can be definitely characterised as empirical, yet it accepts unshakingly some general truths like:

1. There are only seven kinds of knowables.
2. Non-existence is a kind of knowledge.
3. God is without a body, yet He can be the cause of the world.

In this system of philosophy the question is raised: 'how many kinds of things are there in the world'. The answer given is 'there are only seven kinds of things'. But the question may be raised: how can an empiricist come to this conclusion about the world? Or why the number of categories be restricted to seven only? Is it not just arbitrary? The Kantian approach to the discovery of categories from an analysis of the possible forms of judgements is ruled out of court here. Moreover, there are other schools of philosophy which in fact recognized more than seven kinds of knowable. Let us see how the question is tackled by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The *Bhāṣāpariccheda* raises the questions: Why are the knowable only of seven kinds? 'Why are 'power' and 'similarity' not to be counted as additional categories? Or the question may be raised: Why the knowables cannot be less than seven? The manner in which the objections are raised and answered is instructive. *The objection is not an a priori objection, it is rather a posteriori. Doubt against the thesis is raised from certain concrete considerations*. We do actually apprehend 'similarity' and 'power' (causal efficacy) in the world. Likewise, in attempting to do away with the doubt, factual conditions are referred to. The method of dealing with the objections seems to be the following: *if actual doubting of the proposition (1) can be shown, by analysis or some other method, to be impossible, then the proposition (1) is a true one.* Now, the objector's claim is that 'similarity' and 'power' are additional knowables because 'they can be known' (A), for instance, similarity is apprehended through perception (A1), while power can be known through inference (A2). Secondly, it is argued that the two kinds of additional knowables *cannot be reduced to any of the seven classes of knowables* (A3). No argument of an a priori kind is advanced, for instance, 'in future we may be able to discover some additional categories'. *Visvanātha has no quarrel with the method of casting doubt on his proposed thesis. What he would contest is the correct application of the method of doubt. He thinks that the objector is misapplying the method of casting doubt on his proposed thesis.* He gives a different analysis whereby he tries to show that though 'similarity' is apprehended perceptually, it can be reduced to different categories. He also shows that 'power' cannot be inferred as an additional category. Therefore, the objector's doubt is unwarranted, it does not stand and the original proposition (1) can survive. The objector's argument in favour of 'similarity' is unacceptable, for 'similarity' is not a different category. 'Similarity' can be reduced to one (or more) of the seven categories and their species and sub-species. For instance, 'similarity' is taken to be the 'common properties (guṇa) of two (or more) things together with some difference among them'. 'Two things (x and y) have similarity' means 'some properties which are present is one (x) are also present in another (y), while some other properties which are present in one are absent in the other. The precise rendering of the relevant sanskrit aphorism[4] is possible in symbolic terminology:

$$(x)\,(y)\,(Sxy \equiv (\exists P_1)\,(P_2)\,((\exists P_1 x \cdot P_1 y) \cdot (P_2 x \cdot \sim P_2 y)))$$

($Sxy = x$ is similar to y, $Px = x$ has a property, Etc.)

Therefore, a sentence containing the word 'similarity' may be thought of as a 'short-hand' description' about certain relationship obtaining between two (or more) substances on the basis of presence of some identical properties in them as well as non-presence of some identical properties. Here we find a concrete use of the clue 'parsimony is preferable to plurality' which is the source of reductive analysis of all kind. For after all, 'similarity' is clearly definable in terms of already accepted categories.

So also it is shown that 'power' cannot be known as a distinct entity through inference, i.e., such an inference is unsound (may be only formally valid). It is shown that to explain certain peculiar fact, viz., that fire does not burn in the presence of certain kind of stone (Candrakāntamaṇi), but it burns only in the presence of certain other kind of stone (Sūryakāntamaṇi), or in the absence of both kinds of stone etc; we need not infer any such entity as 'power'. The objector thinks that the fact that the same fire does not burn anything in the presence of certain obstacle (in the presence of Candrakāntamaṇi), but burns when the obstacle is removed or is counteracted through some other stimulating agent (Sūryakāntamaṇi) indicate that *in the fire there must be besides fire something else*, i.e., power, which is held dormant in the presence of an obstacle, but which is free to act making it possible for the fire to burn something when the obstacle is removed somehow. But the Naiyāyika thinks that to explain the above mentioned peculiarities we need not postulate or infer an extra category called 'power'. The facts of fire's burning and its not burning can be *more simply* explained by introducing 'negative condition' over and above 'positive condition' as parts of a whole cause, i.e., by saying that a cause is a sum total of negative and positive conditions (a rather over-simplified version). Only the fire (positive condition) is not the cause of burning anything, but fire and the absence of the negative condition. Hence, in thie particular case, the fire and the absence of the jewel are the cause of burning. But since fire can burn even when the negative condition, i.e., the jewel (Candrakāntamaṇi) is present, although being counterpoised by the stimulant, i.e., Sūryakāntamaṇi, a more general explanation is called for. Thus, it is finally explained that it is the fire and the absence of the jewel determined by the absence of the stimulant that is the cause of burning.[5] Putting symbolically: $F \cdot \sim(J \cdot \sim S)$ is the cause. This sophisticated explanation can now cover all the possible cases in which fire can burn in relation to the presence or absence of the negative condition, or the stimulant, as the case may be :

1. $F \cdot J \cdot S$
2. $F \cdot \sim J \cdot S$
3. $F \cdot \sim J \cdot \sim S$ (i.e., only fire is present.)

These three cases 1, 2, 3 as mentioned by the objector are adequately explained without the help of an extra category called 'power'. There is no reference to 'power' in any of these sentences 1, 2, 3. Hence 'power' cannot be said to be known through an inference, i.e., it cannot be validly inferred as a separate category. Of course, 'non-existence' or 'abhāva' is implicitly imbued in this reductive analysis. But 'non-existence' is one of the seven categories.

Let us now see next, how it is possible for an empiricist to talk about *an abstract entity*, e.g., about non-existence. Here also the author first of all tries to dispel every concrete doubt raised against his view that non-existence can be a separate category. For the sake of avoiding repetition I shall not discuss already familiarised methodology of dispelling such doubts as is generally employed here. But I shall try to show *how the clue 'Categories of the perceptual world apply' is taken for granted in an attempt to establish that non-existence is a kind of knowable.* This clue in its most simple sense means that the model we use to explain our ordinary experience must be extended to any universe of discourse. Thus if we explain, 'how do we know a table or a chair' in terms of 'object', 'relation' (a category or species of a category) etc., then our knowledge of things of any other discourse must be similarly accounted for, even at the risk of postulating 'object', 'relation' of a different kind. Now, non-existence is *also known*. We, for instance, know that fire is non-existent in a lake, i.e., there is non-existence of fire in a lake. Such knowledge of non-existence of fire cannot be reduced to anything else, e.g., 'to a bare ground' (as suggested by the opponent). To say that non-existence is simply the existence of a bare ground (simply the lake) is to impose a restriction on the application of *some of the categories, or its species, i.e., relation, object*. For to say that non-existence is known perceptually, but non-existence is identifiable with a bare ground, is to imply that non-existence is not known, i.e., not perceived through the application of some of the categories of the perceptual world. For to be able to apply the concept of relation in the case of knowledge of non-existence, i.e., to be able to say that fire is non-existence in a lake, we need at least two entities 'the container' (the ground) and 'the content' (non-existence). If non-existence is identified with the bare ground, there would be no scope for applying the concept of 'relation' in respect to the knowledge of non-existence. So if we desire to apply the category of the perceptual world (relation etc.) unrestrictively, we have to say that non-existence, since it is known, is something more than *a bare ground*. Thus, only if we have a belief in the unrestricted application of a category or its species, we can argue that non-existence is a distinct knowable, distinct from its bare ground.[6]

Let us see next how the assumption or insight 'there is degree of weight of evidence' is made use of to talk about the world that transcends the perceptual realm. Above we have seen how the assumption 'the categories of the perceptual world apply' *helps one to talk quite meaningfully about things which are not given to sense perception as positive things are given*. But sometimes it so happens that unrestricted application of some category may lead us to certain paradoxes. What is the way out then? Thus, while the Naiyāyika attempts to prove the existence of God through the application of the concept of *causality, agent*, which can be regarded as species or sub-species of some of the categories, the Mimaṁsaka attempts to block such an application, i.e., inference about God, by pointing out that the concept of agency, causality cannot be correctly applied to 'God' who is supposed to be without a body. God cannot be an instrumental cause (Kartā) without a body, for all instrumental causes, a potter, a weaver have bodies. Thus if one insists on the unrestricted application of 'there is an instrumental cause of a composite thing', one must also insist that 'an instrumental cause must have a body'. Thus, this dilemma a non-transcendentalist has to face in some phase of his philosophising. Such a dilemma, however, is nothing new even in science and instead of creating stagnation, the attempt to overcome this dilemma can break new grounds. But what is the inner principle which can help an empiricist or a non-transcendentalist to overcome the dilemma? To get out of this *internal dilemma* the Naiyāyika has implicitly taken recourse to the clue 'there is degree of weight of evidence' as is implied in Viśvanātha's manner of refuting the opponent. According to him the opponent's argument (though not baseless) cannot be supported (being disputable) by a hypothetical reasoning or Tarka. (Aprayojakatvāt[7]). That is to say the doubt whether every instrumental cause must be embodied cannot be resolved by Tarka. But the doubt whether every effect (such as the world) presupposes a cause (instrumental cause) can be resolved by Tarka. Thus his thesis 'that God is the instrumental cause of the world' is stronger than the opponent's thesis that God cannot be the cause of the world being incorporeal. The empirical flavour of the argument is too clear. For it is not argued that 'everything has a cause' is a necessary truth, being a priori, while 'an instrumental cause is embodied' is a contingent fact, therefore, the former cancels the later. But the basis of preferring between two equally empirically based arguments is again an *empirical evidence* of a different dimension.

Some Observations:

I have so far surveyed in a limited manner the methodology adopted by a school of Indian philosophy to establish some general truths about the world. This school of Indian philosophy can be characterised as empirical from the standpoint of Western philosophy. This characterisation is correct in so far as the term 'empirical' is taken to mean nothing more than 'belief in the primacy of perceptual evidence'. The term 'empirical' cannot be ascribed to this school in the sense in which it is something ascribed to the sceptic or to the advocator of perpetual silence, Buddhist, for example. This school has endeavoured to arrive at certain philosophical conclusions. And its endeavour is something *quite intelligible, suggestive, and can even be promising to an avowed empiricist.* ***This is because of its incorporating into its general empirical frame-work certain basic guidelines which have both positive and negative bearing on its mode of philosophising***. In other words, the empirical flavour of this system is not without distinction and difference, but at the same time does not hinge on any implicit a priori element.

However, two questions immediately arise here: (1) Is this school of philosophers dogmatic in their general acceptance of the validity of empirical approach? (2) Has this school disturbed the empirical flavour of its methodology by incorporating certain 'Clues' as basic guidelines?

As regards the question (1) my observation is that faith in the validity of empirical evidence, in other words, belief in the general validity of empirical evidence, i.e., failure to come across any intrinsic demerit in it, cannot be characterised as a dogmatic approach. Following are the reasons for such an observation:—

(a) What is behind the general claim that empirical evidence is vitiated by certain intrinsic demerit? It is nothing but the idea that empirical evidence of all kinds are subject to *indefinite doubt* without leading to any contradiction, and that empirical evidence is contingent on that account. In other words, it is 'logically possible' that any conclusion derived from empirical evidence becomes false in some world. But the premise 'there is no contradiction in the idea that empirical evidence is always subject to doubt' is barren. (This would appear to be too silly an argument to a philosopher belonging to the Indian philosophical temperament to be worthy of serious consideration). It proves little or nothing. For there can be a parallel opposite premise 'there is no contradiction in the idea that some empirical evidence is not subject to any doubt'. ***There is no self-evident reason for preferring the former to the latter.***

Again clarity is called for with such concepts as 'contingent', 'logically doubtful' in terms of which alone any intrinsic demerit can be imputed to empirical evidence. But it is questionable, if a non-vacuous and non-circular definition of 'contingent', 'logically doubtful' can be proposed.

It is also of immense philosophical importance to raise the issue whether the very possibility of characterising an empirical evidence as 'logically doubtful', 'contingent' etc. has any real consequence, i.e., has any effect in undermining the validity of empirical evidence in any significant way. If this way of characterising an empirical evidence is not of much consequence, then there is no *inner significance of raising the* ***issue of an empirical evidence being logically doubtable, or being contingent etc.***

As regards the question (2) my observation is that adoption of certain general principles, as mere guidelines, or directions which are made use of only to avoid certain general errors in the application of empirical evidence, cannot be said to have disturbed the empirical character of such evidence as is employed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. These pieces of empirical evidence are not based on those general principles, *they are merely presupposed in some sense, in which an arrow mark is presupposed to show the way*. In other words, these general principles like, 'indefinite doubt cannot be carried on' etc. *do not constitute premises of an empirical evidence*. They are not constitutive principles.[8] They only help empirical evidence to proceed on undisturbed without creating any bottleneck or hindrance, making way for non-dogmatic investigation of truth.

In fact these general principles are merely *regulative rules*. They are as relevant to empirical investigation as to any *other type of investigation* including any meta-inquiry. No investigation of any kind can begin without these general principles being accepted. It is instructive to note that when rival schools of Indian philosophy oppose one another, *the opposition is not really concerning the acceptability of some general method of approach, but the point at issue is fundamentally taken to be concerning the appropriate application of it to a definite issue.*

The prime importance of these clues is, therefore, that they enable us to say something, the only alternative to the acceptance of these clues being *perpetual silence*. But even if one desires to justify '*perpetual silence*', one must 'talk' and have to adopt a general method of approach which surely has to incorporate into it ***all these clues***. These clues are *so general* in the sense that it is very difficult to think of anything which can be accepted as alternative to them. What can be an alternative to the principle 'doubts need be justified'? We must adopt these principles and general method of approach as possible axioms without raising the issue whether they are a priori or empirical, or even whether they are true or false. These principles or the general method of approach can only be justified or unjustified. *And this is determined by considering whether and to what an extent the adoption or actual use of these principles is conducive to the expansion of knowledge. If they are conducive to the progress of knowledge, in some sense or other, then they are justified, otherwise not.*

However, if this kind of evidence is to be characterised as *impure empirical evidence* simply because of its presupposing certain general methodology, *then the very distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence will break down*. The very term 'non-empirical evidence' would be a misnomer! And with this no distinction can be maintained between *empirical knowledge and non empirical knowledge*. Moreover, even an a priori evidence works only when it is associated with empirical evidence or empirical data. Empirical evidence supply data on which an a priori reasoning can function. To argue a priori that certain geometrical propositions are true, we are required to take various procedures, such as measurement, drawing of lines, formation of certain concepts about geometrical figures etc. which involve empirical demonstration. But in spite of this, a priori character of such geometrical proofs is not questioned. It can be said that such procedures as measurement etc. are merely aids to the a priori evidence and do not constitute premises or grounds of certain conclusions.

Therefore, we have either to accept that some evidence (employed to establish some general truths) can be characterised both as empirical and valid, or *obliterate the very distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidences*. But with the obliteration of the distinction between empirical evidence and non-empirical evidence, the distinction between empirical knowledge and non-empirical knowledge becomes untenable. And then we cannot raise the very key question about knowledge: Can we actually know or truly believe some general things on empirical evidence alone (see p. 2).

NOTES

[1] See Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophy*, Prentice-Hall of India (Private) Ltd; New Delhi, 1965. . . , There is a general failure on the part of Indian philosophers to distinguish such opposites as a priori and a posteriori, analytic and synthetic, formal logic and empirical reasoning. *No need seems to have been felt for any such distinctions*, p. 66. (Underlining mine. This line can be treated as 'Iṣṭasiddha').

[2] I have mainly relied on *Bhāṣāparichheda* with *Mukatāvali* by Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana, Bengali Translation and explanation by Sri Mat Pančanana Bhattāchārya-Shāstri (1947) Published by the author, Sānskrit, Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, for having a close look into Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's method of establishing general truths about the world. Further, this methodology I have treated as representative.

[3] The term 'category' can be used in two senses, not incompatible with one another: in the senses of the 'different classes of things' and 'different classes of concepts necessary to describe the world'. These two senses of 'category' have overlappings in my use of 'category'. This, however, is not something contrary to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. They have attempted to describe the world in terms of 'cause', 'thing', 'relation', and also have attempted to discover the classes of things. In the later attempt they of course have not mentioned 'cause' or 'relation' (saṁbandha) as thing (padārtha). But 'cause' or 'relation' can be easily subsumed under one or more of these 'things' or padārthas. In other words, every tool or concept made use of by them to describe the world can be accommodated as species or sub-species, or sub-sub-species of sapta *padārthas*. For example, 'relation' can be put under 'Guṇa', 'Cause' under 'substance' and 'guṇa' etc.

[4] *Nyāya-Muktāvali*. Commentary on Aphorism No. 2, p. 27. (Tatbhinnatve sati tatgatabhūyodharmavattvam).

[5] *Op. Cit.* (Uttejakabhāvaviśiṣta manyabhāvasya hetutvāt), p. 26.

[6] It is true that in disproving 'similarity' as a separate category the Naiyāyika has *employed reductive* analysis and has not just relied on *perceptual evidence*, whereas in proving a positive thesis, namely, non-existence as a separate category, he has primarily relied on perceptual evidence. But there is no scope of suspecting 'opportunism' here. The logic of the contention decides about the kind of method to be employed. Reductive analysis plays a more dominant role in a negative thesis, while perceptual evidence in a positive thesis. For instance, to prove that what looks like a snake is really a snake, not just a piece of rope, one has to give more emphasis on the perceptual data, but to make it clear that what looks like a snake is actually a piece of twisted rope with stripes, a reductive analysis is more relevant. However, it is true that these two methods cannot be used separately in determining 'what is there' or 'what is not there'. The Naiyāyika could have been accused of opportunism only if he had employed any of these methods separately to his advantage. But the Naiyāyika has merely shifted their emphasis on the particular method according to nature of the conclusion. But in both the negative and the positive thesis — in proving what is there and proving what is not there — both the methods are made use of, either in the negative or in the positive way.

[7] *Op. cit*, p. 13.

[8] The conceptual distinction between 'presupposition' and 'premise' is assumed here. See, Strawson's 'On Referring'.

* Central idea of this paper is expressed in: 'Can an empiricist talk about the world?' Published in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. IX No. 3, April (1982).

DUSHAN PAJIN

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TERM "PHILOSOPHY" IN AN ASIAN CONTEXT

The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy

For some time two distinct issues were in option; one was whether European philosophy was altogether superior in relation to Asian philosophies (in modern times, as well as in antiquity), and the other was whether the particular modes of thinking developed in Asia (including those in India and China) should under any conditions be designated as "philosophy". Some historians of philosophy were prone to give a positive answer to the first issue and some preferred a negative answer, while still others thought that the answer should actually go beyond both issues and be grounded either in an attempt to put forward a general or global review of man's modes of thinking, or in a review of such modes developed in regions under question (India, China), which in the end would prove itself as a history of philosophy giving an implicit positive answer to the second issue. That means that the answer is given after an attempt to consider philosophy in an Asian context and not in advance. It also means that the "introduction" which elaborates such a possibility is not really written at the beginning but at the end of such an endeavour (disregarding the fact that as an introduction it occupies the front pages).

Of course we can doubt that such a conclusion is really something that comes *post facto* and not as a heuristic postulate, but the second is not exclusive of the first if the investigator is not a historian for whom the historical data are valid only insofar as they prove the construct with which he started.

(1) At the outset we could question whether it is not too easy to prove the legitimacy of the term "philosophy" in an Asian context after two centuries of Asian studies, so many histories of Indian or Chinese philosophy written either by Indian, Chinese or Western historians of philosophy, and four attempts to write a general history of philosophy (Deussen, 1920; Radhakrishnan 1952–3; Jaspers,

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1966; Plott, 1963, 1979, 1980)? In a word it is, if we would be satisfied just to enumerate those books without trying to discuss their and our arguments and to consider the obvious divergencies in understanding that term in an Asian context.

We should remind ourselves that the problem of philosophy proper was considered in Europe rather recently, from Hegel onwards, in an attempt to lay the foundations of the disciplinary subject of the history of philosophy (in relation to the history of religion and myth). The Indians in the Middle Ages did not write a history of *darśanas* (in the modern sense) but reviews of the teachings which were still extant at the time of their writing (some of those teachings really had a history of over 20 centuries behind them at the time when Madhava's (1904) review was written (14th century). Nevertheless, it shared a certain trait with Hegel's history of philosophy. While Hegel wrote it as a continuous history of the spirit starting with Greek philosophers and ending in the philosophy of Hegel himself (as a crowning of the whole history of the spirit coming to know itself), Madhava, as a Vedantin, wrote his review starting with the Cārvāka (Lokāyata), which he considered as the one which is farthest from the truth, and ending with Vedanta as the teaching being in possession of the truth itself. For Hegel, the order in time (history) coincided with the order in the development of the spirit, and the succession of various philosophies was actually the succession of various embodiments of the spirit. In India, at least at the time when Madhava wrote his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, all the teachings he had to comprehend were not only the matter of history (i.e. of the "living past") but were actually living, and some of them still developing. For that reason it was not only a matter of "absence of historical sense" in an Indian context, but a matter of fact that Madhava had to relate the various teachings as a succession in truthfulness (or various depths in comprehending the truth) and not as a succession in time. Hegel could settle the succession in time as well, because the pre-Socratics preceded Socrates and Plato, who preceded Aristoteles, and so on. Their teaching ended in time, while the teaching of Lokāyata was contemporary with the early Sāṃkhya and Ājīvika, Buddhism, Jainism, and the early Vedānta (of Upanishads); all of these teachings had a nearly parallel course of development. Something that could be named a "parallel course" was peculiar to the history of ideas in the Asian context as far as we find a similar course in China (parallel development of Taoism and Confucianism). However, in the Middle East and Asia Minor we find a course more similar to European history: succession of various teachings (Zoroastrism, Greek and Hellenistic tradition, Christianity, Islam).

During some twenty centuries (from the sixth century B.C. to the fourteenth cent. A.D.) in India we find a parallel development of several teachings. The denyers (*nāstika*) of the authority of the Vedas: Ājīvika, Lokāyata, Buddhism, and Jainism; and the orthodox (the confirmers, *āstika*) teachings: early upanishadic Vedānta, early Sāṃkhya, and from the third cent. B.C. Yoga, Vaiśeshika, and Nyāya. At the same time Pāṇini opened up the general problem of language in a systematic way which had no parallel at the time in Greece. Later on interesting developments took course in the field of aesthetics, especially in the theory of drama (with Bharata, fifth cent. A.D.) and with attempts to define the aesthetic experience (*rasa*), and the meaning of language in poetry.[1] Under the guise of Śaivism, beside aesthetics, Kashmirian thinkers like Somananda, Abhinavagupta, and Kshemaraja developed refined speculations relating the aesthetic and meditative experience. Their teachings were named the Pratyabhijñā system which came to be the philosophical part of the Trika or Kashmir Śaivism (800—1100 A.D.).

Some of these teachings did after a time become organized religions with institutional forms (priests, monks) or have evolved under the guise of religions that were already established.[2] The first we find in the case of Buddhism and Jainism, the second in Vedanta and Trika, whereas other teachings do not fall in either category (Ājīvika and Lokāyata).

(2) For many European historians of philosophy the birth of philosophy as a separate and distinct cultural form was paradigmatically given in the happenings which took place in Greece during the times of the pre-Socratics (seventh to sixth B.C.) represented, as is commonly stated (e.g. Nestle, 1942; Cornford, 1952), by the progressive separation of *logos* from *mythos* and the criticism of Homeric religion. On the other hand, they either knew nothing about similar developments in China and India or neglected them with the

idea that this course in Greece was completely unique.[3] Such an attitude was also the result of several cultural circumstances. The first one was the belief (sometimes labeled as "eurocentrism") that Europe was either superior, or the sole bearer of certain cultural forms or values. Among them the idea of an independent subject free in his thinking and opinion was thought to be the sole privilege of Europe and was connected with the birth of philosophy and its separation from the collectivity and obligations of myth and religion in ancient Greece. Other arguments included statements that the Indian tradition never developed ethics independent of religion and its concepts of freedom and liberation were always unhistorical and connected with mysticism and irrational faith. This coincided with the tendency to import and mediate the Indian tradition, particularly on grounds of mysticism or religious revival, which was hoped for, either to serve as a moral healing for the West or as a source for creating a world religion of a universal type which could transcend particular confessions. Indians themselves in many instances insisted on their religiosity as something that gave them the legitimacy of equality in the cultures of the world so far as religion (or being religious) was a matter of decency. Even today some authors would point out (as if nothing has changed from the time Vivekananda came to the West) that every philosophy in India was a religion and that every religion had its philosophy. Apart from metaphorical meaning — that every philosophy in India was not only a matter of intellectual occupation, but was really a part of a life *credo* (or *credo* itself) and its teachings were pursued with "religious fervor" — this statement is blatantly untrue.

(3) In time it was seen that neither the actual happenings in Greece conformed to the classical ideal of a "neat beginning" of philosophy (with Thales or any other philosopher up to Socrates, as a beginner), nor that the Indian tradition is of such uniformity as it seemed at first glance or as it was propounded by the vedantic orthodoxy. However, the insight that between the two traditions there can be found — somewhat strikingly, when direct influence was out of the question — many similarities or analogies, either in ideas or cultural situations, came to the fore. For example, the idea that man has a permanent and independent core which serves as the basis of his personal responsibility which does not end with the death of the body, but is

transmitted to the following embodiments. The idea of repeatedly being born (for the Indians *punarbhāva*, for the Greeks *palingenesia*) was always considered by historians as something foreign to the Greek tradition, or, at least, foreign to Greek philosophers, in spite of the fact that we find it propounded by many philosophers in Greece (Pythagoreans, Empedocles, Socrates, Plato).

On the other hand, reincarnation was always considered as something native to the Indian tradition and teachings, in spite of the fact that we do not find it present from the very beginnings of the vedic period (traces of the idea are found in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, III, 44. and in a more elaborate form it is propounded in the early Upanishadic and later teachings), whereas in some of the non-orthodox teachings (*lokāyata*) it is refuted. It was always asked from where did such ideas come to Greece (the "mystic" East was under blame), but no one asked how they arrived to India. Anyway, this was a cause of doubt for the historians of Greek philosophy. Windelband, Zeller, Diels, Wilamowitz and others took the trouble of drawing a demarcation line between mysticism and science in the Pythagorean tradition or between religion and natural philosophy in the teachings of Empedocles. Windelband (1958) is explicit in excluding from his considerations those aspects of presocratic teachings and thus simply keeps them out of scope as "contradictory" to those ideas which he finds worthy of being accepted as the subject of the history of philosophy.[4] Later it was recognized that the problem cannot be dismissed in such a way. Particularly the teachings of the Pythagoreans and of Empedocles were in focus for this matter. The problem of the immortal soul (*psychē*) and its destiny had to be accounted for as either a part of *philosophia* and its history in the Greek context or something that was just borrowed from the Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries which had nothing to do with philosophy proper (as was Windelband's opinion).

Jaeger (1945, 1967) was one of those who accepted the challenge and he considered the history of (the term) *psychē* and its destiny as expounded by philosophers. He still tried to retain the dividing line by teaching about the theology of the early Greek philosophers, suggesting that the subject was treated by philosophers, but should be considered as part of their theology (that is, not philosophy *stricto* *sensu*). He calls Empedocles a "philosophical centaur" who connects mysticism and rationalism, religion and philosophy (Jaeger, 1945: vol. I, p. 295).

Kahn (1974) would later confirm that in the fragments of Empedocles' poems (*On Nature* and *Purifications*) one can find the duality of rationalism and irrationalism, philosophy and religion.

In his Gifford lectures Jaeger slightly modified this evaluation connecting Empedocles with a "new synthesizing type of philosophical personality" and spoke about the "mystical imagination of the philosopher-poet" (Jaeger, 1967, p. 132—133). Dodds argued with that, saying that Empedocles is in fact an old type of personality, "the shaman who combines the still undifferentiated functions of magican and naturalist, poet and philosopher, preacher, healer and public counsellor" (Dodds, 1956, p. 146). Dodds suggested a valuable explanation. The presence of the idea of an immortal soul and its destiny in Greek philosophy has a twofold cause: the "outer" cause is due to contact with shamanistic beliefs and practices; the "inner" was ethical, i.e. the necessity to explain unmerited suffering as the consequence of individual responsibility by sustaining the idea of the reincarnation of the soul and its previous existences. This is very important for we see that the same ethical reason stands behind the introduction of this idea in the upanishadic corpus.[5] Guthrie, referring to Burnet,[6] has given further clues for understanding the importance of this idea in Greek philosophy.

"For Pythagoreans then the purification and salvation of the soul depended not merely, as in the mystery-cults, on initiation and ritual purity, but on *philosophia*; and this word, then as now, meant using the powers of reason and observation in order to gain understanding" (Guthrie, 1962, vol. I, p. 205).

Exactly the same (with only a change in terms) could be said of the upanishadic *ātmavidyā* as the knowledge (of the identity of *ātman*) which liberates from transmigration. The early Upanishads (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya*) stress the path of knowledge (*jñāna-mārga*) which they propose as distinct and superior to the ritual path (*karma-mārga*) of Vedic religion, particularly because the second cannot bring the liberation (*kāma-cāra* or *moksha*) from transmigration and ethical causality represented by the notion of karma.

However, before going on to the Indian context we should consider the conclusions concerning the place of this idea in pre-Socratic philosophy. This is important because generally we consider the Asian context through criteria with which we start and that in turn depends upon deciding what philosophy was in Greece.

(4) We can decide that in Greece natural philosophy, epistemology and ethics (in so far as it did not include the idea of the immortal soul, its transmigration and liberation) should be considered philosophy proper. The latter we could consider as theology (together with the philosophers' speculations on god, if any), or just as a remnant from the tradition of the mysteries.[7] However, the idea of immortality and transmigration did serve to establish personal responsibility on one side, and the possibility of going beyond the wheel of transmigration (being purified by philosophical insight), on the other side. It was then an attempt to solve an ethical question from a philosophical point of view (religion gave its solution which necessitated God and ritual as a means of communion). Therefore, this idea served a legitimate philosophical purpose in a philosophical context and was not just an expression of the influence of Orphism or Eleusis. But, was this purpose irrational and therefore really something foreign to the *corpus philosophicum*? In our opinion it was not foreign to philosophy — for we should not confuse the meaning of philosophy for us, with its meaning for the pre-Socratics (or, for the same reason, for the Indians), but we can consider it as irrational (though it would be difficult to prove that it was such for most pre-Socratics). On the other hand, it is of interest to note that this idea met with more criticism in India (from the Lokāyatas) than in Greece; later it was more widely accepted in India than in Greece (the comparison is, of course, valid only up to the time of Christianity, since for Greece, as for the rest of Europe, a novel idea of singular, non-repeatable existence was then introduced). What is more important is that the idea of transmigration was actually partly inspired by natural philosophy in Greece and in India. This is usually neglected and materialistic teachings and natural philosophy are generally taken to be in opposition to the idea of an immortal, surviving soul. It is true that the Lokāyatas refuted the idea of an immortal entity (independent of the body) on the grounds of natural philosophy (the elements as the ultimate constituents of every-

thing). But, at the same time, as can be seen in the Upanishads (and we can find similar developments in Greece: *psychē* as a torn-off fragment /*apospasma*/ of *aither*, or *pneuma*) there were teachings that connected *ātman* with *prāṇa* and the whole idea of transmigration (reincarnation) was inspired by the idea of the cyclical transformation of the elements. Empedocles gives a similar account.[8] On the other hand, the idea of an imperishable self was indirectly inspired by the concept of an imperishable element, as something which goes on transforming into different things and shapes, but is imperishable by itself. It seems, therefore, legitimate to use the term philosophy[9] in an Asian context. However, one could remark that it would be more appropriate to leave aside this word of Greek origin and to use a term that originated in India or China. In that case the appropriate Sanskrit term could be *ānvīkshikī* (or *ānvīkshakī*, exploration, consideration) or *darśana* (viewpoint, teaching). But such an option would rather throw us back and would be in line with keeping apart the two traditions (Greek and Asian), whereas enough evidence has been given that in those days (700—200 B.C.) Greece, India and China actually shared the intellectual uprising which brought to the fore cultural forms with many common traits.

(5) Jaspers (1953) has outlined some traits common to these traditions in the axial age[10] and contributed to our understanding with his unorthodox exposition of these philosophies (Jaspers, 1966). Plott (1963, 1979, 1980) has undertaken the enormous task of writing a global history of philosohy from the same standpoint which he sums as follows:

> In India, China and Greece virtually the same problems were dealt with almost simultaneously: the nature of the world, soul and God; the distinction of matter and mind and/or spirit; the faculties of the soul and the pressing questions of salvation and immortality; the paradoxes; the beginnings of mathematics; the distinction of Being, Becoming, and non-Being; the importance of self-knowledge; the necessity of greater precision in discussing the nature of God or ultimate reality; and the setting up of rules of conduct. And the answers in all areas were varied. It will be found that the full range from crass empirical materialism to transcendental idealism and uncompromising monotheism was developed in all three cultures of this period. All the possibilities were opened up, necessitating the later dialectical juxtaposition in order to attempt some synthesis (Plott, 1963, p. 19).

Now, what was specific for the beginnings of philosophy in India?

(a) First, there appeared a category of free thinkers who — beyond any professional or social appointment that is, from an independent, and personal interest — formulated questions concerning man's place, the meaning of his life and endeavours in a world not governed anymore by old beliefs and gods. They could not find the answers to these questions in the framework of tradition and therefore sought them in independent reflection. The answers given cover a wide spectrum from voluntarism to fatalism, from liberation (soteriology) to the stoic enduring of an existence deprived of any transcendental support, left only with the values of hedonism and sensualism. However, it is not easy to separate these thinkers who were called *śramaṇa, parivrājaka, charaka, muni* or *samana*, from the common ascetics (*tapasvin*) or religiously inspired seers (*ṛishi*), or from saints (*sādhu*) and those educated in the vedic tradition (*pandit*), as well as shamans, conjurers or magicians (*yati-mati*) or the obscure category of predecessors (*vratya*). Sometimes the roles coincided and the philosopher occasionally claimed the powers of the shaman (in India this was the case with Mahāvīra the founder of Jainism and Gośāla the founder of the Ājīvikas and in Greece with Empedocles). But still they had some distinct traits which made them a separate group, in spite of the fact that they did not belong to the same social strata (*varṇa*). Among them we can find Brahmans (or ex-Brahmans), kings (or ex-kings), intellectuals and people from the lowest strata (outcastes). Except for the Ājīvikas and Jains, they were not ascetics (*tapasa*) who tried to gain supermundane powers. In contrast to *ṛishis* and *sādhus*, their knowledge was not supported by any tradition.

When we say that, we don't have in mind only the so called denyers (*nāstika*) of the authority of the Vedas (that is the Lokāyatas, Buddhist and Jains), but refer also to quotations from the Upanishads,[11] in which the upanishadic knowledge (*ātmavidyā* or *paravidyā*) is contrasted to the vedic knowledge received in vedic schools existing at the time.

(b) In this context, of special interest were the attitudes to the vedic religion and gods. The Greek philosophers criticized the athropomorphisized figures of Greek mythology and religion, while keeping and redefining the idea of the divine (*to theion*). In India we find a more broad spectrum of answers to these questions. All *nāstikas* are atheists in the sense that they do not postulate any new meaning of the divine or any new gods. The Ājīvikas and Lokāyatas deny not only the authority of the vedic tradition but the existence of vedic gods as well. The Buddhists and Jains do not deny the existence of gods, but consider them unimportant for the destiny of man, and for solving the ultimate question of existence, i.e. liberation from the wheel of reincarnation and karma. Some upanishadic philosophers (especially Yajñāvalkya) had a similar standpoint.[12]

(c) From the beginning of Indian philosophy we find different teachings and viewpoints which are strongly opposed to each other. Traces of their disputes can be found in early Buddhist Pali suttas and the Upanishads. Public contest in disputing took on the form of institutionalised competitions and some towns had halls for such discussions (*kutuhala-sala*). On certain occasions kings — willing to hear and meet thinkers of fame from other parts of the country — would organize contests with awards for the winners. This was also an opportunity for thinkers to meet and hear each other, since philosophical communication was mainly restricted to oral means.[13]

Men who met at these contests were not primarily distinguished by their learnings, but as being original, lucid and ready to put anything at stake for their opinions. To mention only the prominent contemporaries, such were the upanishadic thinkers Uddālaka and Yajñāvalkya; Ājīvikas like Maskarin Gośāla and Pūrana Kaśyapa; the Lokāyata Bṛihaspati; Buddha and Mahāvīra; as well as individuals, who neither belonged to any school nor founded any, like Ajita Keśakambalin and Sañjaya Belatthiputta.

(d) In relations to ethics, Ājīvikas and Lokāyatas have restricted themselves to criticizing vedic normativism and its idea of moral retribution. This was accompanied by libertinism and hedonism as their values, combined sometimes with remnants of ascetic practices. They, as well as Buddhists and Jains, also refuted the ritual social inequality (based on the *varṇa* system), but the latter also developed the idea of liberation (in Buddhism, awakening) from reincarnation and karma, giving their own answers to the problem which was so elaborately dealt with in the Upanishads. In relation to this, it is important to note that in the Upanishads and Buddhism ethical purification was not considered as a sufficient condition for liberation (awakening). The crucial point was to attain, through self-effort, the knowledge of the identity of *ātman-brahman* (according to the Upanishads); or of the basic premises of existence (according to Buddhism), such as impermanence, suffering and the insubstantiality of a permanent self.

It was postulated that the liberated or awakened one goes beyond the domain of ethical values and their dualities which actually govern the one subjected to reincarnation and karma. Elaboration of this point was an inspiration for much of the philosophizing in later Vedānta and Buddhism.

Later on Buddhism and Jainism became distinct religions and their founders were actually deified. However, this did not necessarily mean the suppression of philosophy — on the contrary, the high tide of Buddhist philosophy was yet to come.

NOTES

[1] Raniero Gnoli (1956) has given a valuable account of these developments, which was later supplemented with a study by two other authors: Masson, J. M. and Patwardhan, M. V. (1969).

[2] This issue was and will be a matter of dispute from various standpoints. Recently, Chatalian (1983) has investigated the question whether early Indian Buddhism is philosophy or religion. He gave a full review of previous opinions and considered the problem of defining philosophy (as well as religion) in general, and particularly in an Asian context.

[3] As Chatalian (1983) has remarked: "Every major scrutiny of the concept of philosophy undertaken in the West by Western philosophers has been confined to the study of Western philosophies; it has remained purblind to the existence of non-Western philosophy" (p. 175).

[4] "Besides those characterisations of the soul, which resulted from their general scientific theory, we find in tradition in the case of several of these men (Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles and the Pythagoreans) still other doctrines which are not only not connected with the former, but are even in contradiction to them. A conception of the body as prison of the soul (*soma = sema*), personal immortality, recompense after death, transmigration of souls — all these are ideas which the philosophers took from their relations to the mysteries and retained in their priestly teaching, however little they accorded with their scientific teachings. Such expressions are not treated above" (Windelband, 1958, vol. I, p. 62, f. 1).

[5] "According as one acts, according as one behaves, so does he become. The doer of good becomes good, the doer of evil becomes evil" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-up*, IV.4.5).

"Those whose conduct here has been good will quickly attain a good birth . . . . But those whose conduct here has been evil, will quickly attain an evil birth . . . (*Chāndogya-up*., V.10.7).

[6] "In Ionia philosophia meant something like 'curiosity' . . . . On the other hand, wherever we can trace the influence of Pythagoras, the word has a far deeper meaning. Philosophy is itself a 'purification' and a way of escape from the 'wheel'" (Burnet, 1930: p. 83).

[7] Even in such cases the term "mysticism" was rather seldom used to denote the teaching of Greek philosophers, while it is rather customary to use this term in its loose or strict meaning in relation to Indian teachings or thinkers.

[8] "When that passes away for them, then they pass forth into space; from space into air; from air, into rain; from rain into the earth. On reaching the earth they become food. Again they are offered in the fire of man. Thence they are born in the fire of woman. Rising up into the world they cycle round again thus" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-up*., VI.3.16).

"The might of air pursues him into the sea, the sea spews him forth on to dry land, the earth casts him into the rays of the burning sun, and sun into the eddies of air. One takes him from the other, but all alike abhor him" (Empedocles, fr. 115, trans. by Kirk and Raven, 1957). The later Upanishads distinguished the entity which is liberated (*ātman*) from the one which is subjected to transmigration (*bhutātman*). "There is indeed another, different /*ātman*/, called the elemental self, he who, affected by the bright or the dark fruits of action, enters a good or an evil womb so that his course is downward or upward and he wanders about affected by the pairs (of opposites)" (*Maitrī-up*., III.2.).

It is also interesting to note that for the upanishadic thinkers, the Pythagoreans and Empedocles, the idea of transmigration is followed by refutation of ritual sacrifice, bloodshed and meat-eating.

[9] For us it is not so important who was the first to use the word *philosophia* and *philosophos* but who used it with a certain meaning. Marcovich (1967: pp. 26–7) has shown that the word *philosophos* should not be ascribed to Heraclitus' fragment 7 in his numbering — 35 in Diels-Kranz. It seems, as Guthrie concluded, that the Pythagoreans were the first to use it in a rather specific sense — as *theoria* with the purpose of purifying the soul.

[10] "What is new about this age, in all three areas of the world, is that man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world and his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption. (. . .) All this took place in reflection. Consciousness became once more conscious of itself, thinking became its own object. Spiritual conflicts arose, accompanied by attempts to convince through the communication of thoughts, reasons and experiences. The most contradictory possibilities were essayed. (. . .) In this age were born the fundamental categories within which we still think today, and the beginnings of the world religions, by which human beings still live, were created. (. . .) For the first time philosophers appeared. Human beings dared to rely on themselves as individuals. Hermits and wandering thinkers in China, ascetics in India, philosophers in Greece and prophets in Israel all belong together, however much they may differ from each other in their beliefs, the contents of their thought and their inner dispositions. (. . .) The highest potentialities of thought and practical expression realised in individuals did not become common

property, because, the majority of men were unable to follow in their footsteps. What began as freedom of motion finally became anarchy. When the age lost its creativeness a process of dogmatic fixation and levelling-down took place in all three cultural realms" (Jaspers, 1968: pp. 2—5).

[11] There are two well known passages where this is discussed. First, the dialogue between Śvetaketu and his father in *Chāndogya-up.* (VI.1.1—7), where the Brahmanic knowledge and Vedic education is contrasted to the teaching by which "the unhearable becomes heard, the unperceivable becomes perceived, the unknowable becomes known". The second is from *Muṇḍaka-up.* (I.1.4—5) which speaks of two kinds of knowledge: the higher (*para*), being that whereby the imperishable (*akshara*) is apprehended, and the lower (*apara*), i.e. the knowledge contained in the four Vedas. Elsewhere we have discussed the full scope of upanishadic knowledge (Pajin, D., /1980/: *The Philosophy of the Upanishads /Filozofija upanišada/*, Serbo-Croat ed., Belgrade: Nolit).

[12] "So whoever worships another divinity (than his self) thinking that he is one and (*Brahman*) another, he knows not. He is like an animal to the gods. As many animals serve a man so does each man serve the gods. Even if one animal is taken away, it causes displeasure, what should one say of many (animals)? Therefore it is not pleasing to those (gods) that men should know this" (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-up.*, I.4.10.).

[13] Rather than written texts, oral tradition was considered as primary and as a more appropriate means of communicating philosophical knowledge (compare: Plato, Phaedrus, 274c—278a; *Chuang-tzu*, ch. XIII). It was considered that either it is not possible to communicate certain knowledge through writings but only through personal contact, or even when possible, that it would be harmful to do so, since writings are open to anyone, whereas this knowledge should be imparted only to the ones fit to receive it (compare: *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-up.*, VI.3.12; *Śvetāśvatara-up.*, VI.22; *Maitrī-up.*, VI.29; Plato: *Epistle VII*, 340b—345c).

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NG YU-KWAN

THE ARGUMENTS OF NĀGĀRJUNA IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN LOGIC*

INTRODUCTION

Nāgārjuna's arguments appear mainly and most clearly in his major writing, the *Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā*.[1] These arguments are closely connected with the principles of logic. Through the studies of modern scholars, this has become clearer. These studies, as far as the materials are available, include Richard H. Robinson's "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuṇa's System,"[2] "Nāgārjuna's Logic",[3] Nakamura Hajime's "The Interpretation of the Concept of Śūnyatā through Symbolic Logic" ("Kugan no kigoronrigakuteki Kaimei"),[4] Ui Hakuju's "The Logic of Śūnyatā and Formal Logic ("Ku no Ronri to Keishikironrigaku"),[5] Kajiyama Yuichi's "The Thought of Nāgārjuna" ("Ryujyu no Shiso")[6] and R. Pandeya's "The Logic of Catuṣkoṭi and Indescribability".[7] Among them, Ui and Kajiyama basically see Nāgārjuna's arguments through traditional logic, while Nakamura sees with the Algebra of Logic, and Robinson sees with both, and with the Material Implication in addition.[8] It is commonly maintained by Robinson, Nakamura and Kajiyama that Nāgārjuna's arguments by and large keep in line with logical rules. Ui, however, considers the arguments as having not a few errors.[9] We basically agree with the former. Actually what Ui considers errors are mainly a fallacy of the antecedent.[10] This, however, only occupies a minor proportion of the use of logic in the *Kārikā*.

Taking advantage of the studies of these scholars, we wish in this article to take a further step forward, to make a further examination of Nāgārjuna's arguments through modern logic, particularly symbolic logic. By symbolic logic we mean the following three logical systems: the Boole-Schroeder Algebra of Logic, the Russell-Whitehead Material Implication and the Strict Implication of Lewis.[11] Traditional logic, however, will also be consulted. What has been mentioned by these scholars will not be repeated here. We wish rather to give more

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discussion on Nāgārjuṇa's dialectics, which is of special significance to Madhyamaka philosophy. Thus our study will be a complementary one to those studies mentioned above.

Our work will be confined to the *Kārikā*. And in general, the logical forms of Nāgārjuna's arguments are categorized as laws of thought, syllogism, dilemma, and *catuṣkoṭi*, etc. Our discussion will follow this categorization, together with some other forms. Here, however, we will first examine the copula used in the *Kārikā*.

COPULA AS REPRESENTING THE RELATION BETWEEN CONCEPTS

The copula "is", or "to be", as a formal word, has special denotation in the *Kārikā*. It comes from an extremely important verse, of which the Chinese translation reads:

> I declare that whatever is relational origination is emptiness. It is also a provisional name. It is also the middle path.[12]

The corresponding Sanskrit original of this verse reads:

> *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe,*
> *sā prajñaptirupādāya pratipatsaiva madhyamā.*

And it means:

> We declare that whatever is relational origination is *śūnyatā*. It is a provisional name (i.e., thought construction) for the mutuality (of being) and, indeed, it is the middle path.[13]

There is a slight difference in reading between the Sanskrit original and the Chinese translation. The former reads that whatever is relational origination is emptiness (*śūnyatā*), this emptiness is yet a provisional name, and it is the middle path; whereas the latter reads that whatever is relational origination is emptiness, is a provisional name and is the middle path. However, the meaning does not change, both identifying relational origination, emptiness, provisional name and middle path with each other, with the copula "is". Here is the problem: in what respect are these four things identical with each other?

To make the problem simpler, let us consider the concepts "relational origination" and "emptiness" only, as the other two are of the same level. Here it is apparent that whatever is relational origination cannot be equivalent to emptiness in intension. For, as far as intension is concerned, these two concepts have their own meaning respectively. It is not easy to bring them together, not to say to identify them. Robinson thinks that in this case the property (*lakṣaṇa*) of emptiness is ascribed to the term relational origination.[14] In other words, he considers the copula "is" as representing intensionally the connection of meaning between the subject and the predicate. Robinson may be correct. However, what Nāgārjuna means must be more than this, more than to see emptiness as a property or an attribute. For Nāgārjuna, emptiness is indeed the essence of relational origination. There indeed exists between these two concepts a relation of mutual limitation and yet mutual embracing. That is, relational origination is of course emptiness. It is merely emptiness, as far as its essence is concerned. Apart from emptiness, it does not have any other essence. On the other hand, emptiness is merely the emptiness of relational origination. There is no emptiness outside this relational origination. Hence they are equal in extension. The copula "is", in this context, is to denote the identification of relational origination and emptiness in extension. If understood intensionally, then relational origination can be emptiness, it can be other properties as well; and emptiness can be the emptiness of other things as well. This, however, is not all that Nāgārjuna means.

The other two concepts, namely, provisional name and middle path, can be understood as identical with relational origination and emptiness in having the same extension.

This relation of having the same extension is in the Algebra of Logic represented as $a = b$, a, b being the extension of a certain class respectively. This relation is also indicated elsewhere in the *Kārikā*, as

> It is not that apart from life and death there is *nirvāṇa* elsewhere.[15]

Piṅgala under this verse adds, "As mentioned in the *Sūtra, nirvāṇa* is life and death, life and death is *nirvāṇa*."[16] This identification of life and death and *nirvāṇa* in extension means that *nirvāṇa* is to be attained just within the realm of life and death; and just within the realm of life and death there is the availability of *nirvāṇa*. Thus life and death and *nirvāṇa* are not separated from each other.[17] *Nirvāṇa* is not to be attained outside this empirical world of suffering, and one does not need to leave this empirical world of suffering, in order to seek for *nirvāṇa*.

In the *Kārikā* there are also such verses as:

> *Saṃsāra* (i.e., the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially different from *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa* is nothing essentially different from *saṃsāra*.[18]

And:

> The limits (i.e., realm) of *nirvāṇa* are the limits of *saṃsāra*. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever.[19]

The latter verse directly identifies the world of life and death or of relational origination with *nirvāṇa* in extension, which Inada renders as limits or realm, the original Sanskrit being *koṭiḥ*.[20]

LAWS OF THOUGHT

The laws of thought usually consist of the law of identity, the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. Nāgārjuna's arguments have less to do with the law of identity. Or we could say that in the *Kārikā* he does not conspicuously make any use of this law.[21] The other two laws are on the other hand often made reference to.

The law of contradiction is in the Algebra of Logic represented as $a \cdot \sim a = 0$, whereas in the Material and the Strict Implication as $\sim(p \cdot \sim p)$. Robinson has made a detailed examination of Nāgārjuna's use of this law.[22] He thinks that this law is necessary to most of Nāgārjuna's arguments, because he relies heavily on dichotomies.[23] Kajiyama goes even further and claims that this law is the very prop of Nāgārjuna's arguments.[24] Both of them in their writings have enumerated examples, to show how Nāgārjuna makes use of this law. We are not going to repeat these examples here. Rather, we wish to give other examples which were not touched by them.

> If by chance a bound entity is in the process of being released, then bondage and release will be simultaneous phenomena.[25]

> If it is not justifiable to assert that existence can be expressed in the concurrent process of arising and ceasing, then it should arise as well as cease within the same realm of the *skandhas*.[26]

As for the law of the excluded middle, it is in the Algebra of Logic represented as $a + \sim a = 1$, and in the Material and the Strict Implication as $p \vee \sim p$. The examples of employment of this law in the *Kārikā*, besides those enumerated by those scholars, are:

> An entity devoid of both characterization and characteristics cannnot exist.[27]

> Again, separated from self-nature and extended nature, how could existence be? For, indeed, existence establishes itself in virtue of either self-nature or extended nature.[28]

> Apart from self-existence and other existence, what could be (the nature of) a *Tathāgata*?[29]

SYLLOGISM

Syllogism consists of two types: categorical and hypothetical, the latter being Nāgārjuna's major form of inference. Kajiyama points out that Nāgārjuna is more concerned in criticizing the theories of other schools than in proposing his own theories, therefore he does not so often use categorical arguments. What he usually uses as a weapon, are hypothetical inference, dilemma and *catuṣkoṭi*.[30] Here let us first discuss categorical syllogism.

Categorical syllogism is in general of four kinds of arrrangements, or so called figures. What Nāgārjuna employs is the first kind, the formula of which is $\dfrac{\substack{M-P\\ S-M}}{S-P}$. This corresponds to $p \supset q \cdot q \supset r \cdot \supset \cdot p \supset r$ and $q \supset r \cdot p \supset q \therefore \supset \cdot p \supset r$ in the Material Implication. The typical example showing Nāgārjuna's employment of this kind of syllogism can be seen in the verse as:

> The Blessed One has said that elements with delusive nature are untrue. All mental conformations are delusive in nature. Therefore, they are untrue.[31]

Here it is apparent that delusive nature is used as a middle term M, to connect the mental conformation and the untrue, which are minor term *S* and major term *P* respectively.

And we could change the wording of this verse

> Any factor of experience which does not participate in relational origination cannot exist. Therefore, any factor of experience not in the nature of *śūnya* cannot exist.[32]

without affecting its meaning, however, into

> All factors of experience participate in relational origination. Therefore all factors of experience are in the nature of *śūnya*.[33]

By combining this wording with the first half of the verse, which is just placed before the above one in the *Kārikā*,

> We declare that whatever is relational origination is *śūnyatā*.[34]

we could thus have the formula:

> Whatever is relational origination is *śūnyatā*
> All factors of experience are relational origination
> Therefore all factors of experience are *śūnyatā*

which is indeed the first kind of categorical syllogism.

Again, the verse

> It is said that *karman* and defilements are a co-operating conditionality of differing bodies. But if *karman* and defilements are of the nature of *śūnya* (i.e., thusness or "void"), what could be said of these bodies?[35]

simply means that bodies are of *karman* and defilements, which are *śūnya*, therefore bodies are *śūnya*. This is by all means the first kind of categorical syllogism.

As regards hypothetical syllogism, there are two forms: constructive and destructive. As represented in the Material Implication, the constructive form is $\begin{array}{l} p \supset q \\ p \\ \hline \therefore q \end{array}$, whereas the destructive form $\begin{array}{l} p \supset q \\ \sim q \\ \hline \therefore \sim p \end{array}$. The latter is more common in Nāgārjuna's arguments. For instance, the verse

> Any existence which is relational is indeed neither identical to nor different from the related object. Therefore, it is neither interruption nor constancy.[36]

consists of the destructive hypothetical syllogism. This verse first presupposes such meaning as: if cause and effect have *svabhāva*, or substance, then they are bound to be absolutely identical to each other, or absolutely different from each other, for *svabhāva* is of absoluteness.[37] Then this verse says, now cause and effect are neither absolutely identical to nor absolutely different from each other, thus they cannot have *svabhāva*. The whole meaning could just be represented as $p \supset q$; $\sim q$, $\therefore \sim p$.

The verse

> If there is no primary abiding, how can there be seeing, etc.? Therefore, we should know that there is already primary abiding.[38]

is although one in which the heretics establish their own viewpoint, its form is constructive hypothetical syllogism. Its meaning is, if there is no primary abiding (eternal self), there will be no seeing, etc.; (now there are seeing, etc.) therefore we know that there is primary abiding. If p is to denote seeing, etc., q primary abiding, then the first half of the verse can be written as $\sim q \supset \sim p$, i.e., $p \supset q$, whereas the second half as (p), therefore q.

DILEMMA

Nāgārjuna is especially interested in using dilemma to elaborate his arguments. The use is based on the supposition of *svabhāva*. If one philosophizes from the standpoint of *svabhāva*, one is bound to be confronted with dilemma. Thus *svabhāva* has to be negated, should one wish to be free from dilemma.

The inference of dilemma also consists of two forms: constructive and destructive. Nāgārjuna's arguments, however, have nothing to do with the latter. As regards the former, two types can be enumerated, one being simple, the other being complicated. The simple one is written as:

$$p \supset q \text{ and } r \supset q;\ p \vee r,\ \therefore q;$$

whereas the complicated one is written as:

$$p \supset q \text{ and } r \supset s;\ p \vee r,\ \therefore q \vee s$$

It is important to note that in Nāgārjuna's arguments, the two alternatives constructing the dilemma are always opposed to each other. Or, more precisely, they exclude each other. Thus the two inferences can be written as:

Simple: $p \supset q \text{ and } {\sim}p \supset q;\ p \vee {\sim}p,\ \therefore q$
Complicated: $p \supset q \text{ and } {\sim}p \supset s;\ p \vee {\sim}p,\ \therefore q \vee s$

These two alternatives are always exhaustive as well. Therefore Nāgārjuna's inference of dilemma could be regarded as perfect.

Among these two types, the simple one is used more by Nāgārjuna. There are, however, quite a few examples of the complicated one. As far as our statistics reveals, dilemma is the most prevalent form in Nāgārjuna's arguments.

Here are enumerated the verses of dilemma inference in the *Kārikā*, which were not touched by Robinson *et al.* First are those of the simple type:[39]

> When material form exists, its cause is untenable. Moreover, even when material form does not exist, its cause is (likewise) untenable. (4:4)
>
> It is untenable that the effect will resemble the efficient cause. Again, it is untenable that the effect will not resemble the efficient cause. (4:6)
>
> In a unity (of passion and impassioned self), there is no

concomitance because a thing does not come together with another. In a diversity, on the other hand, how does such a concomitance arise? (6:4)

In truth, the cessation of an abiding entity is not possible. Also, the cessation of a non-abiding entity is not possible. (7:27)

The entity does not extinguish itself in this time. It does not extinguish itself in other time either.[40]

In truth, the cessation of a real existing entity is not possible. (7:30) The cessation of an unreal existing entity is also not possible (7:31)

The combination of identical entities or of different entities is not justifiable. (14:8)

They, as permanent entities, do not transmigrate. In fact, as impermanent entities, they also do not transmigrate. (16:1)

Why is it that *nirvāṇa* (or quiescence) is not possible with mental conformations? Also, why is it that even a sentient being is not possible of *nirvāṇa*? (16:4)[41]

There is no occurrence of being in either a ceased or an unceased entity. Again, there is no dissolution of being in either a ceased or an unceased entity. (21:7)

It is not possible that occurrence and dissolution are identical. They cannot be different either. (21:10)

If the defilements really exist in someone in virtue of self-nature, how could they be abandoned and who could abandon the self-nature? (23:24)

If the defilements do not really exist in someone in virtue of self-nature, how could they be abandoned and who is able to abandon non-realities? (23:25)

If the world has limits, how could there be another world? On the other hand, if the world has no limits, how could there be another world? (27:21)

The following are those of the complicated type:

> At nowhere and at no time can entities ever exist by originating out of themselves, from others, from both (self-other), or from the lack of causes. (1:1)[42]
>
> It is not possible that the effect is already in the causes before origination; and it is not possible that the effect is not in the causes before origination either.[43]
>
> It is not justifiable to say that the coming to pass is the same as the passing entity; nor is it justifiable to say that the passing entity is different from or alien to passage. (2:18)
>
> If origination is of the created nature, then the three characteristics (i.e., origination, duration, cessation) will prevail. But if origination is of the uncreated nature, how could it be a characteristic of the created? (7:1)
>
> A doer in a completed state cannot create a deed in a completed state. Again, a doer in an incompleted state cannot created a deed in an incompleted state. (8:1)
>
> Existence is the grasping of permanency (i.e., permanent characteristics) and non-existence the perception of disruption. (15:10)
>
> If the effect is in the assemblage of cause and relational conditions, it should be conceivable within the assemblage. However, (the fact is) it is inconceivable within an assemblage. (20:3) If the effect is not in the assemblage of cause and relational conditions, then the cause and relational conditions would be similar to non-causal and non-relational conditions. (20:4)
>
> If the cause gives to the effect a causal nature before extinguishing itself, then there will be a dual causal form of the given and the extinguished. (20:5) If, however, the cause does not give the effect a causal nature before extinguishing itself, then the effect, arising after the cause extinguishes itself, will have no cause. (20:6)

> If again, the effect and the assemblage appear together, then it would follow that the producer and the produced are contemporaneous (i.e., exist in the same moment). (20:7) Moreover, if the effect appears prior to the assemblage, then it, without cause and relational condition, will have a non-causal nature. (20:8) If the effect is taken to be the transition of a cause which had extinguished itself, then it follows that the cause would be a re-origination of an already originated cause. (20:9)[44]

CONTRADICTIONS OF THE CATUṢKOṬI

The *catuṣkoṭi*, or tetralemma, is an important form of thinking in Nāgārjuna's philosophy. It is also common in the *Kārikā*. It usually consists of four alternatives, including negations. The typical example of the *catuṣkoṭi*, which is also often mentioned by scholars, is embraced in the verse as follows:

> Everything is suchness (*tathyam*), not suchness, both suchness and not suchness, and neither suchness nor not suchness. This is the Buddha's teaching.[45]

This verse can just be written into four alternatives:

(1) Everything is suchness.
(2) Everything is not suchness.
(3) Everything is both suchness and not suchness.[46]
(4) Everything is neither suchness nor not suchness.

They being represented through the Material Implication, we have:

(1) p
(2) $\sim p$
(3) $p \cdot \sim p$
(4) $\sim p \cdot \sim \sim p$

Thus these four alternatives, as seen from the viewpoint of logic, are full of contradictions. The first one p and the second one $\sim p$ contradict each other. The third one $p \cdot \sim p$ is the combination of the first and the second and is of course contradictory. If rendered in the Algebra of Logic, it can be written as $a \cdot \sim a$, which is just zero.

This is the expression of the law of contradiction. As seen from the Algebra of Logic, let a be everything, b be suchness, the statement becomes $a \subset b$ and $a \subset \sim b$, hence we have $a = 0$. To approach in terms of extension, $a = 0$ indicates that the member of such a class does not exist at all, or, the class is empty, or null.[47] Whereas to approach in terms of intension, $a = 0$ means self-contradictory, or logically inconceivable.[48] There is nevertheless a difference between what is logically inconceivable and what does not exist at all. The former, such as "a white pen which is not white", is absolutely impossible; the latter, such as "horn of a rabbit", is still possible or conceivable, it simply does not exist empirically.

As regards the fourth alternative $\sim p \cdot \sim \sim p$, $\sim \sim p$ can be turned into p through the principle of double negation. Thus the alternative is rendered as $\sim p \cdot p$, or $p \cdot \sim p$, which is indeed the third alternative. Therefore the fourth one is also self-contradictory. Or, $\sim p \cdot \sim \sim p$ according to Augustus de Morgan's Theorem[49] can be rendered as $\sim (p \vee \sim p)$, indicating that the law of the excluded middle is false. It follows that this fourth alternative contradicts the law of the excluded middle, negating the contraposition of p and $\sim p$.[50]

DIALECTICAL IMPLICATION OF THE CATUṢKOṬI

As seen above, it is apparent that the *catuṣkoṭi* is opposed to logical rules. Its implication is rather on the dialectical. $\sim p$ implies negation, $\sim \sim p$ implies negation of negation, leading to an absolute-affirmation. This is conspicuous dialectical thinking.[51] The absolute affirmation could indeed be regarded as corresponding to the synthesis in dialectic, with a close connection with ultimate reality. We could probably apprehend the *catuṣkoṭi* as follows. The first alternative p is an affirmation, the second one $\sim p$ a negation, the third one $p \cdot \sim p$ a combination of these two, the fourth one $\sim p \cdot \sim \sim p$ the negation of the combination, leading to a transcendent sense. The first alternative corresponds to the thesis of dialectic, the second one to its antithesis, the third and fourth ones to its synthesis, with, however, a transcendent entailment, which the synthesis lacks. Reality could merely assume perfect meaning until the dimension of transcendence is reached. It is not difficult to see that there exists a process of elevation of reality in the *catuṣkoṭi* thinking. The first alternative "Everything is suchness" affirms the existence of all *dharmas*; this is being, is *saṃvṛti*, the worldly reality. The second alternative "Everything is not suchness" negates the *svabhāva* or substance of all *dharmas*; this is non-being, is *paramārtha*, or emptiness. The third alternative "Everything is both suchness and not suchness" combines the world of being and the world of emptiness together. Finally, the fourth alternative "Everything is neither suchness nor not suchness" negates and transcends the third one, indicating the state of non-attachment to both the world of being and that of emptiness. This is indeed the middle path expounded by Nāgārjuna.

There is yet one thing to which we should draw our attention. Besides the *catuṣkoṭi* in Nāgārjuna's thinking, there is the negation of the *catuṣkoṭi*, as could be seen from the following verse:

> It cannot be said that the Blessed One exists after *nirodha* (i.e., release from worldly desires). Nor can it be said that He does not exist after *nirodha*, or both, or neither.[52]

In this verse, existence, non-existence, both and neither are negated at the same time. It is somewhat unnatural that the fourth state of transcendence should be refuted. It seems that, whatever may be implied by the *catuṣkoṭi*, it is nevertheless the realm of contemplation. The negation of the *catuṣkoṭi*, however, uplifts one to the realm of non-contemplation, i.e., *nirvāṇa*. Robinson thinks that Nāgārjuna refutes every alternative of the *catuṣkoṭi* because its terms are null.[53] This could be understood in connection with his conception of language. For him, language, as the function of ideas or consciousness, is but artificial, without corresponding to reality.[54] The *catuṣkoṭi* is, after all, an expression of language, which is essentially empty. Therefore it is also empty. It has to be negated finally. This is why it is prevalent in Ch'an Buddhism that one is to be detached from the *catuṣkoṭi* and abstain from the one hundred negations (*li ssŭ-chü, chüeh pai-fei*).

Among these two forms of *catuṣkoṭi* and its negation, the former appears much less in the *Kārikā*. Besides the one in the verse given above (i.e., 18:8), there is one more in this verse:

> The Buddhas have provisionally employed the term *ātman* and instructed on the true idea of *anātman*. They have also taught that any (abstract) entity as *ātman* or *anātman* does not exist.[55]

This verse, however, lacks the third alternative.

On the other hand the negation of the *catuṣkoṭi* appears quite often in the *Kārikā*. Here are enumerated as follows the verses showing this form, which were not given by Robinson, *et al.*

> At nowhere and at no time can entities ever exist by originating out of themselves, from others, from both (self-other), or from the lack of causes.[56]

> When a factor of experience does not evolve from being, non-being, nor from both being and non-being, how can there be an effectuating cause? Thus (such) a cause is not permissible.[57]

> Indeed, an origination relative to either being or non-being cannot be justified. Nor is it possible with being and non-being (at the same time). This has been demonstrated before.[58]

> Some assert that suffering arises by virtue of being self-caused, other-caused, both self and other-caused or non-causal. Such an assertion which treats suffering as an effect is not justifiable.[59]

> (True) existence arises neither by itself nor by an other. It does not arises by both (forces). How then does it arise?[60]

> Since all factors of existence are in the nature of *śūnya*, why (assert) the finite, the infinite, both finite and infinite, and neither finite nor infinite?[61]

> Why (assert) the identity, difference, permanence, impermanence, both permanence and impermanence, or neither permanence nor impermanence?[62]

> Consequently, the (false) views that I existed in the anterior state, I did not exist, both or neither, are all impossible.[63]

FURTHER LOGICAL EMPLOYMENTS

Besides those mentioned above, there are still quite a few of Nāgārjuna's arguments which could find their parallels in modern logical formulas. The most commonly seen are those concerning the relation of dependent co-existence. In the verse:

> If now the coming to pass which is devoid of a passed entity does not take place, then, in turn, where will the passing entity be without the coming to pass?[64]

let p be the passed entity, q be the coming to pass, we can write:

$\sim p \supset \sim q,\ q \supset p$ (first half of the verse)
$\sim q \supset \sim p,\ p \supset q$ (second half of the verse)

According to the fundamental definition of the Material Implication, we can have

$$p \supset q \cdot q \supset p \cdot = \cdot p \equiv q$$

Hence the passed entity and the coming to pass are equal to each other. This means not that both have the same contents, but rather that both have the same possibility of existence, i.e., both simultaneously exist, or do not exist. This is the relation of dependent co-existence. This could by all means be understood in connection with the basic Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). That is, all entities, as phenomena, are devoid of substance, or *svabhāva*, and cannot exist independently; they can only assume their existence through dependence upon others.

Here are further verses showing this relation of dependent co-existence:[65]

> Material form (*rūpa*) separated from the efficient cause (*kāraṇa*) cannot be conceived. Moreover, separated from material form the efficient cause cannot be seen. (4:1)
>
> Where characteristics do not arise, there can be no characterization. And where characterization is not possible, characteristics will not arise. (5:4)
>
> The doer is dynamically related to the deed and the deed to the doer in order to arise. (8:12)

> How is it possible for an entity to be without its functions and the functions without their entity? (9:5)
>
> Occurrence and dissolution are not possible apart from (true) existence. On the other hand, (true) existence is not possible apart from occurrence and dissolution. (21:8)
>
> We provisionally assert that impurity cannot exist without being mutually dependent on purity and that, in turn, purity exists only as related to impurity. Therefore, purity per se is not possible. (23:10)
>
> We provisionally assert that purity cannot exist without being mutually dependent on impurity and that, in turn, impurity exists only as related to purity. Therefore, impurity per se does not exist. (23:11)

In the verse, which embraces the negation of the *catuṣkoṭi*,

> At nowhere and at no time can entities ever exist by originating out of themselves, from others, from both (self-other), or from the lack of causes.[66]

there is implied such a meaning as "neither from themselves nor from other, therefore not from both", which is quite in tune with the following formula in the Strict Implication:

$$\sim\Diamond p \sim\Diamond q \;.{=}.\; \sim\Diamond(p \vee q)$$

This compound proposition states that "p is impossible and q is impossible" is equivalent to "It is impossible that either p or q be true."[67] This mode of "neither from themselves nor from other, therefore not from both" also takes place in some other verses:

> Some assert that suffering arises by virtue of being self-caused, other-caused, both self and other-caused or non-causal. Such an assertion which treats suffering as an effect is not justifiable.[68]
>
> (True) existence arises neither by itself nor by an other. It does not arise by both (forces). How then does it arise?[69]

Moreover, as regards the relation between the void, non-void and the arising, extinguishing of an effect, there are two verses:

> An effect which is a non-void (*aśūnya*) will not arise nor extinguish itself. For, that which is a non-void will be non-arising and non-extinguishing.[70]
>
> How could an effect which is a void (*śūnya*) either arise or extinguish itself? Again it necessarily follows that that which is a void will be non-arising and non-extinguishing.[71]

The first one is much in tune with the following formula of the Strict Implication:

$$p \cdot \supset \cdot qr :=: p \supset q \cdot p \supset r$$[72]

Whereas the second one is similar to the following formula of the Two-valued Algebra: $p \supset q \cdot p \supset r : \supset : p \cdot \supset \cdot qr$[73]

Finally, let us consider this verse:

> Whatever is in correspondence with *śūnyatā*, all is in correspondence (i.e., possible). Again, whatever is not in correspondence with *śūnyatā*, all is not in correspondence.[74]

To take a glance at this verse, it seems to commit the fallacy of denying the antecedent: $p \supset q;\ \sim p,\ \therefore\ \sim q$, while p being *śūnyatā* and q all (entities). What this verse maintains is, however, that the theoretical ground which renders all entities possible is simply *śūnyatā*. The first half of it says that it is based upon *śūnyatā* that all entities can be established as they are. This should not be considered as the mere entailment relation of $p \supset q$, but should rather be taken as of the meaning that all entities would not be possible without *śūnyatā*, which is just what the second half of the verse says. That is, it should denote the entailment relation of $\sim p \supset \sim q$ as well. Thus, if X be all entities, A be *śūnyatā*, B be being in correspondence, the symbolic form of the verse should not be:

$$AX \supset BX;\ \sim AX,\ \therefore\ \sim BX$$

but instead should be

$$(AX \supset BX) \cdot (\sim AX \supset \sim BX)$$

That is, $AX \supset BX$ and $\sim AX \supset \sim BX$ are tenable simultaneously. From $\sim AX \supset \sim BX$ we deduce $BX \supset AX$. Hence we have

$$(AX \supset BX) \cdot (BX \supset AX)$$

This is nothing but $AX \equiv BX$, which means that *śūnyatā* and all entities are of the relation of dependent co-existence. As all entities are of relational origination, we can say that *śūnyatā* and relational origination are of the relation of dependent co-existence. That is, they rely upon and yet entail each other. This is indeed the fundamental pattern of Nāgārjuna's philosophy of Emptiness.

NOTES

[1] Hereafter will be cited as *Kārikā*.

[2] *Philosophy East and West*, January 1957, pp. 291—308. Hereafter as "Logical Aspects".

[3] Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*, Madison, Milwaukee, and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967, pp. 50—61. Hereafter as "Logic".

[4] *Studies of Indology and Buddhology* (*Indogaku Bukkyugaku Kenkyu*), Vol. 3, No. 1, 1954, pp. 223—231.

[5] *Selections of Ui Hakuju* (*Ui Hakuju Chyosaku Senshyu*), Vol. 5, Taito Press, 1971, pp. 16—22.

[6] *Logic of Śūnyatā* (*Ku no Ronri*), Tokyo, 1969, pp. 55—142.

[7] R. Pandeya, *Indian Studies in Philosophy*, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977, pp. 89—103.

[8] According to Robinson, the first step toward a formal analysis of Nāgārjuna's arguments was taken by the Polish Indologist Stanislaw Schayer. In his "Ueber die Methode der Nyāya-forschung", he offers a notational transcription of a stanza from the *Kārikā*. And in his "Altindische Antizipationen der Aussagenlogik", he broaches the question of rules of inference employed by early Buddhist dialecticians, and examines the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) as a feature of propositional logic ("Logical Aspects", p. 294).

[9] Robinson considers Nāgārjuna's knowledge of logic as about on the same level as Plato's. (*Ibid.*, p. 295). He thinks that it is possible to transcribe the *Kārikā* entirely, chapter by chapter, into logical notation (*Ibid.*, p. 307). Nakamura maintains that the arguments of *Śūnyatā* in the *Kārikā*, as considered individually, are fully in accordance with formal logic and even symbolic logic. (Nakamura, *op. cit.*, p. 227) Kajiyama rather thinks that the essence of Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika logic does not

conform to the purely formal principle of contradiction and the law of the excluded middle. He is convinced that Nāgārjuna's logic is of two dimensions: phenomenal and noumenal. The former apprehends phenomena, whereas the latter noumena. More emphasis should be laid on the latter, which is nothing but dialectics (Kajiyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 112–124). Ui insists that the *Kārikā* as a whole, as seen formally, does not prove its logical rules to be correct, its logic being comparatively simple. He also insists that what is made use of in the arguments of the *Kārikā* is mainly direct inference, and that indirect inference has hardly been touched. For him, among Nāgārjuna's direct inferences, speaking formally, much is completely erroneous (Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 17).

[10] The propositional form of this fallacy is: $p \supset q$; $\sim p$, $\therefore \sim q$.

[11] As regards symbolic logic, cf. C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, Dover Publications, Inc., 1932.

[12] Kumārajīva's translation, *Taisho* 30, p. 33b. The English translation is mine throughout this article.

[13] *Kārikā* 24:18; Kenneth K. Inada, *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of His Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, p. 148.

[14] "Logical Aspects", pp. 298–299. Relational origination is for Robinson dependent co-arising.

[15] *Taisho* 30, p. 21b.

[16] *Idem.*

[17] It does not mean, however, that life and death and *nirvāṇa* are not distinguished from each other.

[18] *Kārikā* 25:19; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[19] *Kārikā* 25:20; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[20] This *koṭiḥ* Kumārajīva translates as "*chi*", which, however, in Chinese has two meanings: realm and content, referring to extension and intension respectively. In-shun, though an eminent scholar monk, tends to take the latter meaning, thus failing to catch its extensional implication (In-shun, *An Exposition of the Middle Treatise* (*Chung-kuan-lun-song chiang-chi*), Taipei, 1963, p. 382).

[21] Robinson says that the law of identity is neither affirmed nor denied anywhere in the *Kārikā*, and that unity and multiplicity are however mentioned in a non-logical sense in many places ("Logic", p. 51). He also says that Nāgārjuna in these places is discussing identity as an absolute, and that he rejects this identity because the concept of identity is definable only in relation to difference (*Ibid.*, pp. 51–52).

[22] He sees that this law is invoked constantly throughout the *Kārikā*, that it is stated in general form in two places, and that application of it with narrower values for the terms are common ("Logical Aspects", p. 295).

[23] "Logic", p. 50.

[24] Kajiyama, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[25] *Kārikā* 16:8; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[26] *Kārikā* 21:20, Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[27] *Kārikā* 5:5; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[28] *Kārikā* 15:4; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

[29] *Kārikā* 22:4; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

[30] Kajiyama, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[31] *Kārikā* 13:1; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[32] *Kārikā* 24:19; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

[33] In fact Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of this verse is akin to this wording. Cf. *Taisho* 31, p. 33b.

[34] *Kārikā* 24:18; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

[35] *Kārikā* 17:27; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[36] *Kārikā* 18:10; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[37] Cf. Kajiyama, *op. cit.*, pp. 85—86.

[38] *Kārikā* 9:2; Kumārajīva's translation, *Taisho* 30, p. 13b. The Sanskrit original differs a little in wording. It reads, "How is it that seeing, etc. come to be of a presently non-existing entity? Consequently, the entity (seemingly) exists abidingly prior to its functions" (Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 77).

[39] Unless indicated individually, the verses enumerated here are all Inada's translations.

[40] Kumārajīva's translation, *Taisho* 30, p. 11c.

[41] Kumārajīva's translation of this verse reads, "It is not that mental conformations are possible of *nirvāṇa*. It is not that sentient beings are possible of *nirvāṇa* either" (*Taisho* 30, p. 21a).

[42] This verse, though mainly formulated from the *catuṣkoṭi*, embraces the inference of dilemma: entities existing either by causes (self, other, self-other) or lack of causes will be confronted with difficulty.

[43] Kumārajīva's translation, *Taisho* 30, p. 2c.

[44] These three verses describe, however, not a dilemma, but a three-fold difficulty, or trilemma.

[45] *Kārikā* 18:8; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[46] According to the Sanskrit original and Kumārajīva's translation, the subjects of all these four alternatives are the same, i.e., everything (*sarvam*). Robinson, however, takes the subject of the third alternative as something, and he represents this alternative as $ab \neq 0.\ a\bar{b} \neq 0$, regarding it as the conjunction of I and 0 forms ("Logical Aspects", p. 303; "Logic", p. 57). His understanding is by all means questionable.

[47] This is similar to $\sim p \cdot \supset \cdot p \supset q$ (a false proposition entails any proposition) in the Material Implication; (7.41; C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 86) and it is also similar to $\sim \Diamond p \cdot ⥽ \cdot p ⥽ q$ (a self-contradictory proposition entails any proposition) in the Strict Implication. (19.74; C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 174).

[48] This is like $\sim (p \circ p) ⥽ \sim p$ of the Strict Implication, which indicates that self-consistency is false, or indicates self-inconsistency (17.61; C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 159).

[49] The negative of a product is the sum of the negatives of its terms; and the negative of a sum is the product of the negatives of its terms. (C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 32).

[50] In the Strict Implication it is implied by $\sim \Diamond \sim (p \vee \sim p)$, indicating that the negation of the law of the excluded middle is not possible (18.81; C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 166).

[51] There has been, however, quite a lot of controversy among scholars, as regards the question whether the philosophy of Nāgārjuna or the Mādhyamikas is dialectical. T. R. V. Murti and F. J. Streng are second to none in giving an affirmative response to the question. (Cf. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London: George

Allen and Unwin, 1955, in which there are two chapters entited "The Structure of the Mādhyamika Dialectic" and "The Mādhyamika and some Western Dialectical Systems", and Streng, *Emptiness*, Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, in which there is a chapter called "Nāgārjuna's Dialectical Structure".) Streng even goes so far as to be convinced that in Nāgārjuna's negative dialectic the power of reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate Truth, and that the negative dialectic and the articulation of ultimate reality as "empty" are two aspects of the same structure of religious apprehension (Streng, *op. cit.*, pp. 149—150).

R. Pandeya on the other hand is sceptical about an affirmative answer to the question. He thinks that dialectic understood as the Hegelian sense is a synthesis thought-process and aims at proving a thesis, e.g., the Absolute, whereas the Mādhyamikas analyze a concept to determine whether it contains some real element and ultimately come to conclude that it has none. Thus, for Pandeya, the Mādhyamikas, instead of going upward to some synthetic unity or the Infinite, come down to the root, the *śūnya* (R. Pandeya, "The Mādhyamika Philosophy: A New Approach", *Indian Studies in Philosophy*, p. 84).

Negation of negation is double negation, which is, however, not a relative negation, but rather an absolute negation. And absolute negation is just absolute affirmation, as logically speaking, negation of negation is affirmation. (Cf. Abe Masao, "Non-being and Mu: the Metaphysical Nature of Negativity in the East and the West", *Religious Studies*, II, pp. 181—192).

[52] *Kārikā* 25:17; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[53] "Logical Aspects", p. 303.

[54] Nāgārjuna's understanding of language can be seen from his two verses:

> Where characteristics do not arise, there can be no characterization. And where characterization is not possible, characteristics will not arise (*Kārikā* 5:4; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 58).
>
> Therefore, characterization as well as characteristics cannot exist. Again, an entity devoid of both characterization and characteristics cannot exist (*Kārikā* 5:5; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 58).

Characterization is the function of language, or simply language itself; whereas characteristics is the object of language. Here we see that language and object are mutually dependent. This relation is tenable only in the realm of phenomena. In reality there is no object correspondent to language.

[55] *Kārikā* 18:6; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

[56] *Kārikā* 1:1; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

[57] *Kārikā* 1:7; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 40. This verse lacks the fourth alternative.

[58] *Kārikā* 7:20; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 68. This verse lacks the fourth alternative.

[59] *Kārikā* 12:1; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[60] *Kārikā* 21:13; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 128. This verse lacks the fourth alternative.

[61] *Kārikā* 25:22; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[62] *Kārikā* 25:23; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

[63] *Kārikā* 27:13; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

[64] *Kārikā* 2:7; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

[65] The verses enumerated here are all Inada's translations.

[66] See note 56.
[67] 19.8; C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
[68] *Kārikā* 12:1; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
[69] *Kārikā* 21:13; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
[70] *Kārikā* 20:17; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
[71] *Kārikā* 20:18; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
[72] 16.8; C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
[73] 4.23; C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
[74] *Kārikā* 24:14; Inada, *op. cit.*, p. 147. Here a note is added: The meaning conveyed here is that *śūnyatā* is the basis of all existence. Thus, without it, nothing is possible.

GEORG FEUERSTEIN

THE CONCEPT OF GOD (ĪŚVARA) IN CLASSICAL YOGA

In the *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali the concept of the "Lord" (*īśvara*) is dealt with in the following six aphorisms:

I.23: *īśvara-praṇidhānād vā*, "Or [enstasy is achieved] through devotion to the Lord."

I.24: *kleśa-karma-vipāka-āśayair aparamṛṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvaraḥ*, "The Lord is a special Self, untouched by the causes-of-affliction, action, fruition, and the deposits [in the depth-memory]."

I.25: *tatra niratiśayam sarvajña-bījam*, "In Him the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed."

I.26: *pūrveṣām api guruḥ kālena anavacchedāt*, "[The Lord was] also the Teacher of the earlier [teachers] because [He] is not interrupted by time."

I.27: *tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ*, "His symbol is the *praṇava* [i.e. the sacred syllable *oṃ*]."

II.1: *tapaḥ svādhyāya-īśvara-praṇidhānāni kriyā-yogaḥ*, "Asceticism, self-study, and devotion to the Lord [constitute] the Yoga of Action."

II.32: *śauca-saṃtoṣa-tapaḥ-svādhyāya-īśvara-praṇidhānāni niyamāḥ*, "Purity, contentment, asceticism, self-study, and devotion to the Lord are the observances."

II.45: *samādhi-siddhir īśvara-praṇidhānāt*, "Through devotion to the Lord [comes about] the attainment [or perfection?] of enstasy."

From aphorism I.23 it is clear that Patañjali regards "devotion to the Lord" (*īśvara-praṇidhāna*) as an auxiliary practice leading to the enstatic consciousness. Vyāsa in his commentary (YBh I.23) defines this act or attitude of devotion as a "special love" (*bhakti-viśeṣa*). As a result the Lord "favors" (*anugṛhṇati*) his devotee by virtue of the latter's "mere intention" (*abhidhyāna-mātra*), which Vācaspati Miśra

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(TV I.23) understands as a "desire for a future object" (*anāgata-artha-icchā*). Thus Vyāsa introduces the idea of the Lord's agency, which is in keeping with Patañjali's notion of the *īśvara* as Teacher of the teachers of yore (see YS I.26).[1]

Since the tradition of Classical Yoga is known to admit of only two transcendental categories, the "Self" (*puruṣa*) and "Nature" (*prakṛti*), the question arises how the concept of the *īśvara* is to be understood. Patañjali anticipates this question in his aphorism I.24. There he defines the Lord as a special kind of Self. His specialness lies in that He was at no time embroiled in the play of Nature, whereas the Self of any Enlightened being can be said to have, at one time, been caught up in the illusion of its bondage to the mechanisms of Nature.

More precisely, Patañjali states that the *īśvara* transcends the "causes-of-affliction" (*kleśa*),[2] "action" (*karma*) and action's "fruition" (*vipāka*), as well as the "deposits" (*āśaya*) in the depth-memory[3] which, in the ordinary individual, lead to repeated embodiment.

To make the special status of the *īśvara* quite clear Vyāsa emphasizes that those who have attained to "Transcendence" (*kaivalya*)[4] are many. These multiple "Transcenders" (*kevalin*) differ from the Lord in that they attained Transcendence by severing the "three bonds" which Vācaspati Miśra (TV I.24) explains as (a) the "natural" (*prakṛta*) bond of those who have merged into the Ground of Nature (i.e. the phenomenon of *prakṛti-laya*); (b) the "modified" (*vaikārika*) bond of the "disembodied" (*videha*) entities (such as the deities); and (c) the bond of "sacrificial offerings and so on" (*dakṣiṇā-ādi*) of those who pursue the experience of divine and non-divine matters.

By contrast, the Lord's relationship to the Condition of Transcendence pertains, as Vyāsa (YBh I.24) puts it, neither to the past nor to the future. In other words, it is eternal. Lest there should be any doubt of his meaning, Vyāsa adds: "He is always Liberated, always the Lord" (*sa tu sadā eva muktaḥ sadā eva īśvara iti*).

Vyāsa (YBh I.24) also indicates that the Lord's "eminence" (*utkarṣa*) results from His "acquisition of a perfect *sattva*" (*prakṛṣṭa-sattva-upādāna*). That is to say, since the transcendental Self, by its very nature, cannot intervene in the spatio-temporal processes of Nature, the Lord must appropriate for Himself a medium through which He can exert his influence. The highest expression of manifest

Nature, as recognized by all Sāṃkhya-Yoga traditions, is that aspect or "quality" (*guṇa*) of Nature which has from ancient times been called "*sattva*" (meaning literally "being-ness").[5] It conveys, as the name indicates, the idea of sheer existence, or presence. In combination with the qualities of "dynamism" (*rajas*) and "inertia" (*tamas*), it is thought to weave the whole web of manifestation.

As Vācaspati Miśra (TV I.24) makes clear the "perfect *sattva*" of which Vyāsa speaks is devoid of any trace of *rajas* or *tamas*. This is strikingly different from the position of the author of the *Yukti-Dīpikā*, a sixth-century commentary on Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā*. This work (YD LXXIII.25) speaks of the Lord's occasional assumption of a "glorious body" (*māhātmya-śarīra*) which consists of much *rajas*, even though his proper medium is constituted predominantly of *sattva*.[6]

As we learn from Vyāsa (YBh I.25) the Lord appropriates such a perfect *sattva* for the "gratification of beings" (*bhūta-anugraha*). We know from the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (I.23) that the *īśvara* favors the *yogin* who is intent on Him. Does he favor *only yogins* or all beings? The phrase "gratification of beings" suggests the latter. This is made evident in a passage (YBh I.25) where Vyāsa has the Lord ponder "Through instruction in morality and wisdom I shall uplift the world-bound selves, at the end of the age or at the great [cosmic] end" (*jñāna-dharma-upadeśena kalpa-pralaya-mahā-pralayeṣu saṃsāriṇaḥ puruṣān uddhariṣyāmi iti*). This resolution is a sufficient motive. The Lord, as Vyāsa affirms, is above "self-gratification" (*ātma-anugraha*). The motive is, in other words, selfless "compassion" (*karuṇā*), as is acknowledged by Vācaspati Miśra (TV I.25). He makes the point that the Lord's compassionate instruction of beings is to be distinguished from the compassionate instruction engaged by such Enlightened beings as Kapila, the legendary founder of the Sāṃkhya tradition. As Vācaspati Miśra emphasizes, Kapila's own Enlightenment was due to the "compassion" (*anukaruṇya*) of Maheśvara (= Śiva) alone.

Vācaspati Miśra also explains that being uplifted means to attain to Transcendence, but this interpretation seems too extreme, unless one were to assume that the *īśvara* Liberates all beings regardless of their spiritual condition. If Liberation were guaranteed, there would be no motivation to observe the moral law given by the Lord nor apply His wisdom to life.

The Lord's acquisition of a medium of pure *sattva* is, of course, not the result of ignorance. As Patañjali (YS I.24) states, the Lord is untouched by the causes-of-affliction of which the root-cause is "nescience" (*avidyā*). Vācaspati Miśra (TV I.24) concedes that the Lord appears to behave as if he were under the spell of nescience. He compares Him to an actor who acts out his role without becoming confused about his real identity.

Vācaspati Miśra elaborates Vyāsa's theology. Thus he argues that the Lord is not only eternal, but also responsible for the creation and dissolution of manifestation. The world is dissolved into the transcendental Ground of "Nature" (*prakṛti*) when the *īśvara* resolves to assume a perfect *sattva*. This "resolution" (*praṇidhāna*) causes an "impression" (*vāsanā*) in the Lord's "consciousness-*sattva*" (*citta-sattva*). His consciousness-*sattva*, carrying the imprint of this resolution, tends toward homogeneity with the transcendental "Foundation" (*pradhāna*) of Nature. Nevertheless, the Lord's consciousness-*sattva* assumes the condition of *sattva* and is not dissolved together with the rest of manifestation. In other words, Vācaspati Miśra proposes that the relationship between the Lord and His *sattva* is an eternal one; the Lord's "appropriation" (*upādāna*) of a perfect *sattva* is a continuous act. And it is through the medium of this *sattva*, which can retain the imprint of His resolution, that He fashions the manifest cosmos out of the transcendental Ground of Nature only to dissolve it again at (regular) intervals.

For Vācaspati Miśra (TV IV.3) the Lord necessarily has a rather delimited sphere of activity, which is confined to the removal of obstructions in the moral nature of beings so that they can mature spiritually and thus ultimately discover that "man is neither mind nor subtle body, but the Power of Consciousness which does not conjoin [with objects]" (*na ca cittaṃ vā sūkṣma-śarīraṃ vā puruṣaḥ kiṃ tu citi-śaktir apratisaṃkramā* — TV IV.10).

Vācaspati Miśra (I.24), moreover, argues that these activities of world creation and destruction as well as spiritual upliftment could not possibly be ascribed to more than one being, which would be like having an "assembly" (*pariṣad*). For the same reason he rejects the idea of different transcendental Selves assuming the role of the *īśvara* by turns.

Yet, interestingly enough, the transcendental Selves — and a multiplicity of Selves is distinctly recognized by Vyāsa[7] and Vācaspati Miśra[8] — are not without agency or influence either. Vyāsa (YBh I.45), for instance, speaks of the Self as being an "instrumental-cause" (*hetu*) in relation to the first evolute of Nature, the *liṅga-mātra* (lit. "sign-only").[9] The "causal nexus" (*anvaya*) is inherent in Nature itself so that the unfolding of manifestation follows its own laws.

Furthermore, Patañjali (YS II.18) postulates that objects — i.e. the manifest forms of Nature — exist for the sake of the worldly "experience" (*bhoga*) or the "Liberation" (*apavarga*) of the Self. However, as Vyāsa (YBh II.18) explains, experience and Liberation occur only in relation to the individualized consciousnss or *citta*, but in no way affect the Self itself. He employs the simile of an army commander who is credited with victory or blamed for defeat, whereas the actual fighting is done by his soldiers. The "seen" (*dṛśya*) — which refers to any form within the compass of manifest Nature — is noticed by the apperceiving Self. Vyāsa compares this cognitive process to that of a magnet which becomes efficient through sheer proximity.

The teleology of Nature is an important Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept. This inherent orientedness of Nature is inferred from the fact that "Nature" (*prakṛti*) is a composite and, like all composites, does not exist for its own sake.[10] This argument, which is not convincing, has its parallel in Christian scholasticism.[11] Since Nature (including the individualized consciousness) does not exist for its own sake, it can only exist for the sake of the transcendental Reality, the Self. The Sanskrit exegetes did not ask the question of whether Nature might not exist specifically for the sake of the "Lord" (*īśvara*), although they otherwise affirm His special ontological status.

The Self, again, exists for its own sake. As Vācaspati Miśra (TV II.20) states, "Everything exists for the Self, but the Self [exists] for no-one else" (*sarvaṃ puruṣāya kalpate puruṣas tu na kasmaicit*).

As Patañjali (YS II.17) notes, there is an obvious "correlation" (*saṃyoga*) between the "Seer" (*draṣṭṛ*) and the "seen" (*dṛśya*) or the whole manifest realm of Nature. According to Vyāsa (YBh II.17), this correlation is "beginningless" (*anādi*), that is, it cannot be traced back in time. However, it can clearly be terminated, as is demonstrated in the event of Liberation, and indeed, this termination is the great *opus* of Yoga. The termination of this natural correlation coincides with the perfect Transcendence of the most fundamental (or highest) mode of Nature, which is the *sattva* quality as it is present in the cognitive apparatus, the *citta*. This Transcendence consists in the reinstatement of the perfect autonomy of the Self which is not a doer, but the transcendental Witness. In the words of Vācaspati Miśra (TV II.21): "Liberation is the Experience of the distinction between the Self and the *sattva*" (*apavargaḥ sattva-puruṣa-anyatā-anubhavaḥ*). However, this explanation appears to contradict Patañjali's (YS III.49, 50) own definition of "Transcendence" (*kaivalya*), which presupposes the cessation of even this apperception of the distinction between the Self and the *sattva*.

At the moment of Liberation, the Self and the mind's *sattva* shine forth in equal purity (see YS III.55). Then the illusion of being a separate, experiencing entity or body-mind is shattered. As Vyāsa (YBh III.55) makes clear, this Liberation occurs for the "theist" (*īśvara*) as much as for the "atheist" (*anīśvara*), just as it occurs for anyone who "partakes of the knowledge born of discernment" (*viveka-ja-jñāna-bhāgin*). Vācaspati Miśra (TV III.55), however, understands these two terms differently, though his statement is somewhat obscure. He seems to hold that *īśvara* refers to that *yogin* who is endowed with the powers of wisdom and action (that is, who has supernatural faculties), as developed in the course of a full yogic program; *anīśvara*, again, appears to refer according to him to that *yogin* who achieves Liberation directly through the process of higher discrimination (as described in YS II.52).[12]

However, the more economic interpretation of these two concepts, *īśvara* and *anīśvara*, as "theist" and "atheist" respectively, is the more convincing. It ties in with the fact that Patañjali (YS I.23) did introduce the whole notion of devotion to the Lord as a matter of choice (indicated by the word *vā*, "or"). In theory, a follower of Patañjali's Yoga will be a "theist," since the doctrine of the existence of the *īśvara* is central to his philosophy. In practice, however, a follower of Pātañjala-Yoga may disregard the Lord's existence without the risk of heresy, although this does not seem a very likely course of action. After all, "devotion to the Lord" (*īśvara-praṇidhāna*) is listed among the constituents of both *kriyā-yoga* (see YS II.1) and the "observances" (*niyama*) of the section dealing with the eightfold path that has come to be so exclusively associated with Patañjali (see YS II.32).

It has often been suggested that the doctrine of the *īśvara* is an unconvincing craft upon the dualistic metaphysics espoused by Patañjali. But this is too shallow a view, which ignores the theistic (or, rather, pan-en-theistic) pre-classical heritage of Patañjali's school of thought. It also pays no attention to the experiential dimension of Yoga and its long history of encountering the numinous, which readily lends itself to a theistic interpretation of sorts.

It cannot be denied that the concept of the *īśvara*, as formulated by Patañjali and his exegetes, fits ill into his dualistic system. Yet, one should not overlook the fact that its inclusion might have met primarily psychological rather than philosophical needs or the diplomatic purpose of appeasing the authorities of mainstream Hinduism. That is to say, the concept of *īśvara* may have been felt necessary in order to account for certain yogic experiences. This explanation is not discredited by the fact that Patañjali (YS II.44) also acknowledges the possibility of making contact with one's "chosen deity" (*iṣṭa-devatā*) as a result of "self-study" (*svādhyāya*). He manifestly distinguishes between this kind of contact with a higher being and devotion to the transcendental Lord, which devotion well may lead to numinous encounters. Indeed, this possibility is indicated in Śaṅkara's fine commentary on the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (YBhV I.23) when he states that the Lord "comes face to face with him and gives him his favor" (*anugrahaṃ pratyabhimukhī-bhāvam āpāditaḥ tam*).

What possible proof is there for the existence of the *īśvara*? Patañjali (YS I.25) appears to address this issue briefly and enigmatically, giving rise to much exegetical elaboration. His aphorism "In Him the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed" has generally been interpreted as being the equivalent to the ontological proof of the existence of God proposed by such Christian theologians as St. Augustine and St. Anselm. Vyāsa (YBh I.25) expounds thus: "Supersensuous knowledge (*atīndriya-grahaṇa*), of the past, the future, or the present — singly or collectively, great or small — is the seed of omniscience. He in whom this [seed] grows unsurpassed is omniscient" (*yad idam atīta-anāgata-pratyutpanna-pratyeka-samuccaya-atīndriya-*

grahaṇam alpaṃ bahv iti sarvajña-bījam etadd hi vardhamānaṃ yatra niratiśayaṃ sa sarvajñaḥ). Lest antagonists should abuse this inferential argument to prove the supremacy of, say, the Buddha, Vyāsa adds that it has only a general thrust and therefore is not applicable to individual cases. These have to be decided on the basis of "tradition" (*āgama*), by which he undoubtedly means the "true" tradition of Yoga which reserves this supremacy for the transcendental Lord. Of course, Vijñāna Bhikṣu (YV I.25) unashamedly equates Vyāsa's "tradition" with Vedānta.

Of all the exegetes Śaṅkara (YBhV I.25) has the most prolific commentary on this particular aphorism. He speaks of the Lord not only as the supreme Knower, but also the Creator of the universe. For, he argues, only one who knows absolutely can construct such a complex and functional world. He writes for instance: "The waxing and waning of the moon is regulated by a single Knower of the time of the lunar day etc., because [there is evidence for an exact] proportioning of time, as with an 'hour-bearer' (*candramaso vṛddhi-kṣayau tithy-ādi-kāla-jñānavata ekena prayuktau, kāla-paricchedakatvāt, ghaṭikā-hara-ādi-vat*).[13]

Śaṅkara furnishes an abundance of similar examples and illustrations, some very striking, and then even refers to the testimony of the Vedānta scriptures (*viz. Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* I.1.9 and *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* VI.12). Next he invokes common experience ("the whole world", *samasta-loka*) to demonstrate the existence of a supreme Lord, saying that even women and cowherds bow their heads to the *parama-īśvara* in the form of Śiva or Nārāyāṇa. Finally he engages in a bit of sophistry when he refutes his (putative) opponent's denial of the existence of an omniscient Lord by arguing that such a denial contains its own refutation, since the words "omniscient" and "Lord" cannot be used apart from their conventional meaning. In other words, by speaking about the Lord one already affirms His existence. Words, he says, necessarily have a referent. The counter-argument that expressions such as "the son of a barren woman" have no referent is not denied by Śaṅkara, but he explains that propositions of this kind are also not generally accepted. So, in the last analysis, Śaṅkara resorts to revelation and belief.

The philosophical notion of the eternal relationship between word and objective referent, invoked by Śaṅkara, is an integral part of the metaphysics of Classical Yoga. This is borne out by Vyāsa's (YBh I.27) treatment of Patañjali's aphorism "His symbol is the *praṇava* [i.e. *oṃ*]." Vyāsa declares: "The relationship between the symbol and that-which-is-to-be-symbolized is fixed. But convention, [as determined] by the Lord reveals the meaning [of the sacred syllable *oṃ*] as fixed" (*sthito'sya vācasya vācakena saha saṃbandhaḥ, saṃketas tv īśvarasya sthitam eva artham abhinayati*). Thus, the relationship is not adventitious as, for instance, a son's name which is bestowed on him by his father. It is rather, in Vyāsa's imagery, similar to the relationship between a lamp and its light.

The syllable *oṃ*, symbolizing the Lord, is understood as a revealed sound. It is, in the words of Bhāvāgaṇeśa (YSV I.27), the Lord's "principal name" (*mukhya-nāman*). Because of the eternal relationship between the Lord and His name, the *pranava* is seen as a fit vehicle for fixing attention upon the transcendental Reality. Therefore Patañjali (YS I.28) also recommends the age-old practice of meditative recitation or *japa* of *oṃ* and "contemplation" (*bhāvana*) upon its meaning. Undoubtedly, the underlying principle here is the esoteric recognition that one becomes what one meditates upon.

Many questions remain unanswered. For instance, what precisely is the relationship between the Lord's *sattva* and the *sattva* of the individualized consciousness? If Liberation signifies the unconditional Transcendence of the *sattva* (together with all other qualities of Nature, and thus of Nature itself), then, how can the Lord be perpetually associated with a *sattva* without forsaking his Condition of Freedom?

Moreover, if the *īśvara* is eternally associated with a pure *sattva*, why does Vyāsa (YBh I.25) speak of a resolution to *acquire* a pure *sattva* on the part of the Lord?

Also, if there are many transcendental Selves, how are they related to one another and to the Lord, singly and collectively? Since the Lord is characterized as a Self, albeit a special kind of Self, and since all Selves are by definition not encapsulated by space-time, it follows that the relationship between the Lord and the other transcendental Selves must be one of coalescence, and this is appreciated by Vācaspati Miśra (TV I.41), for instance, who observes that there is a lack of distinction in "Selfhood" (*puruṣatva*). I have elsewhere even suggested that this coalescence is one of "enclosure" of the Selves by the Lord.[14] This interpretation admittedly tends toward the type of qualified nondualist metaphysics espoused by Rāmānuja, but it seems entirely unsatisfactory to consider the relationship between the *īśvara* and the multiple *puruṣas* in terms of a Leibnizian monadology, in which there is an eternal chasm between all the Selves and between the Selves and the Lord.

Furthermore, how could the desire to benefit beings arise in the Lord prior to his assumption of the *sattva*, since such a desire presupposes association with Nature? Bhoja (RM I.23) bluntly argues that one should not ask this question, because the logical problem involved is one of what we would call the chicken-and-egg variety. If we were to follow his advice, we would have to exercise silence on all other metaphysical issues as well, since they are largely of such a paradoxical nature. Vyāsa's (YBh I.24) answer is a dogmatic assertion that the association of the Lord with a pure *sattva* is beginningless.

To the question what this *sattva* might conceivably be, there is no answer, because the question has never been asked. According to Vācaspati Miśra (TV I.24) the perfect *sattva* of the Lord can neither be perceived nor inferred. It is simply revealed in the scriptures. Thus the authorities of Classical Yoga ultimately make this doctrine a matter of belief.

Why would Patañjali speak of the *īśvara* as the "Teacher" (*guru*) of earlier sages (who might possibly even belong to earlier world cycles)? Is this merely a concession to popular theistic notions, vindicating the idea of the transcendental "authorship" of the Vedas? The commentaries offer only scant information, with the notable exception of Śaṅkara (YBhV I.26) who states: "The supreme Lord, in the form as described, is 'the Teacher of the earlier' teachers who instruct in all the related means and ends for prosperity and for the *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*) [which is Liberation]. The meaning is that He creates even their knowledge and instruction, because of the arising of all knowledge from Him — just as sparks arise from a flame or salt particles from the briny ocean." (*saḥ yathā-ukta-rūpaḥ parama-īśvaraḥ pūrveṣām api guruṇām abhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-sarva-sādhana-sādhya-saṃbandha-upadeśināṃ guruḥ teṣām api jñāna-upadeśasya kartā ity* *arthaḥ, tad udbhavatvat sarva-jñānānām, yathā jvalana-lavaṇa-jaladhi-samudbhava visphuliṅga-lavaṇa-kaṇāḥ.*) The metaphor of the sparks of fire and salt particles is, to be sure, a didactic device familiar to students of the Vedānta school of thought, which is usually applied to the relationship between the "individuated self" (*jīva*) and the "transcendental Reality" (*brahman*).[15] Here, however, it designates the peculiar dependence of the knowledge in finite minds upon the perfect knowledge in the Lord's consciousness-*sattva*. The distinctly vedantic flavor of this interpretation can be thought to point both to the metaphysical leanings of the author of this commentary and to the nondualist ("epic" or "pre-classical") roots of Patañjali's Yoga.

Śaṅkara goes on to defend the doctrine of the Lord's association with a pure *sattva*. He argues that the Lord's *sattva*, though perfect, is in fact manifest and therefore determinable, while still transcending time. He further states that the knowledge that springs up in it also transcends time and is of the "nature of the essence of the *sattva*" (*sattva-svarūpa-vat*). He moreover argues that the Lord's role as original Teacher is not only revealed by the scriptures, but proved by inference relative to the fact of creation. This presumably means that the Lord's Teaching function is inferred from the fact that all knowledge must have a beginning.

Even though Śaṅkara's tight-rope apologetics is not satisfactory, it is passages like this which testify to the extraordinary intellectual acumen of the author of the *Vivaraṇa* and which lend strength to the assumption that he was indeed the great Śaṅkarācārya.

By way of conclusion, it can be said that the theology of Classical Yoga is surrounded by philosophical conundrums that have only been inadequately resolved. The Sanskrit philosophers are, however, not alone in their failure to formulate a theoretical framework that convincingly demonstrates the existence of God and satisfactorily defines his relationship to the conditional world. The same failure can be witnessed in all theologies, notably those that are grounded in a metaphysical dualism. The theoretical propositions of these theologies, East and West, have so far failed to satisfy the rational understanding of all minds. It is clear that they proceed from within a particular metaphysical commitment structure, as do those philosophies that reject not only theological solutions to the problem of the existence of

God but discard the theological enterprise itself. But this is another consideration.

NOTES

[1] One can see in this doctrine an echo of Kṛṣṇa's declaration in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (IV.1) that he has imparted the ancient "imperishable Yoga" first to Vivasvat and that (IV.7–8) he incarnates — as a teacher — whenever there is a decline of religiosity or spirituality.

[2] According to Patañjali (YS II.3) the five "causes-of-affliction" (*kleśa*) are: "nescience" (*avidyā*), "I-am-ness" (*asmitā*), "attachment" (*rāga*), "aversion" (*dveṣa*), and the "will-to-live" (*abhiniveśa*). Nescience is the source of all the others, and therefore when it is removed in Enlightenment the remaining causes-of-affliction are also obviated. Since the Lord's *sattva* is absolutely pure, that is, devoid of any trace of nescience, He also does not suffer the limitations of the other four *kleśas*.

[3] The "deposits" (*āśaya*) of the individual's action or volition are the countless "subliminal-traits" (*vāsanā*) that compose the individuated consciousness (see YS IV.8, 24). Since they extend beyond a person's present embodiment they can be considered transpersonal. Hence I speak of their matrix as a "depth-memory". See G. Feuerstein, *The Philosophy of Classical Yoga* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1980), p. 70.

[4] The word "*kaivalya*" is the gunated form of "*kevala*," and means literally "aloneness." This phrase reminds one of Plotinus' use of the Greek term "*monos*" for the soul and the Divine.

[5] The notion of the *sattva* is one of the most interesting of Indian ontology. It also belongs to its most ancient vocabulary. In its earliest conception it applied to both microcosmic (psychic) and macrocosmic referents. Subsequently the term was increasingly restricted to the psychic dimension. See e.g. J. A. B. van Buitenen, 'Studies in Sāṃkhya III,' *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 77 (1957), pp. 88ff.

[6] See J. Bronkhorst, 'God in Sāṃkhya,' *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, vol. XXVII (1983), pp. 149–164.

[7] On the plurality of the Selves, Vyāsa (YBh I.24) states unequivocally: "And the Transcenders who have indeed attained Transcendence are many" (*kaivalyaṃ prāptas tarhi santi ca bahavaḥ kevalinaḥ*).

[8] Vācaspati Miśra accepts Vyāsa's position on the plurality of the Selves, without entering into a discussion of this issue. This is also the attitude of all the other exegetes, including Vijñāna Bhikṣu (YV II.22) who, however, interprets this pluralism along vedāntic lines, affirming that there is a very real and permanent distinction between the "individual self" (*jīva-ātman*) and the "transcendental Self" (*parama-ātman*) or God.

[9] Patañjali's (YS II.19) concept of *liṅga-mātra* is identified by Vyāsa (YBh II.19) as the "great principle" (*mahā-tattva*) or "mere being-ness" (*sattā-mātra*), whose only characteristic is that it exists. It is the first evolute to emerge from the "signless" (*aliṅga*), the undifferentiated transcendental Ground of Nature. The *liṅga-mātra* is

pure differentiated existence, but without any qualities and can be compared to the Neoplatonic concept of *nous*.

[10] The teleology of Nature is clearly expressed by Patañjali (YS II.21) when he says "The essence of the 'seen' is only for the sake of that ['seer', the apperceiving Self]" (*tad-artha eva dṛśyasya ātmā*). In another aphorism (YS III.35) he speaks of the "other-purposiveness" (*para-arthatva*) of the *sattva* (as the highest form of Nature) and (YS IV.24) of the consciousness as "other-purposed" (*para-artha*). The term "purposiveness" (*arthavattva*) employed by him elsewhere (YS III.44, 47) has presumably the same meaning. For, as he explains (YS IV.32), upon Liberation the very building-blocks, the *guṇas*, of Nature have fulfilled their purpose (*kṛta-artha*) so that they are now "devoid of purpose for the Self" (*puruṣa-artha-śūnya*, YS IV.34). This concept is obviously of primary importance in Classical Yoga.

[11] This is known in Christian theological circles as the teleological argument of "design" or the evident orderliness of the universe.

[12] The word "*anīśvara*" has caused some difficulty to previous translators in connection with its appearance in several stanzas of the *Mahābhārata* (XII.238.7; 289.3; 294.40). F. Edgerton, *The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965), p. 291*n*, takes this to be a straightforward synonym for "soul."

[13] The Sanskrit phrase *ghaṭikā-hara-ādi-vat* "like an 'hour-bearer' etc." is obscure. Presumably it refers to a device by which a *ghaṭikā* (a period of forty-eight minutes) was measured. The Sanskrit edition of the *Vivaraṇa* gives the alternative reading of *ghaṭikā-ādi-vat*. T. Leggett's translation of the former variant with "as with a clock-maker" is surely erroneous. See T. Leggett, *Śaṅkara on the Yoga-Sūtra-s, Volume 1: Samādhi — The Vivaraṇa Sub-Commentary to Vyāsa-bhāṣya on the Yoga-Sūtra-s of Patañjali: Samādhi-pāda* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981).

[14] See G. Feuerstein, *The Philosophy of Classical Yoga* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1980), p. 12.

[15] See e.g. Vijñāna Bhikṣu's employment of this metaphor in his *Yoga-Vārttika* (I.26) in explaining the relationship between the *īśvara* and the individualized beings.

LEGEND AND SANSKRIT EDITIONS USED

YS = *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali, Bhāratīya Vidyā Prakāśana edition (1963);
YBh = *Yoga-Bhāṣya* of Vyāsa, *op. cit.*;
TV = *Tattva-Vaiśāradī* of Vācaspati Miśra, *op. cit.*;
YV = *Yoga-Vārttika* of Vijñāna Bhikṣu, ed. by T. S. Rukmani, *Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhikṣu*, vols. 1 and 2 (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1981 and 1983).
YBhV = *Yoga-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇa* of Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkara, Madras Government Oriental Series (1952);
RM = *Rāja-Mārtaṇḍa* of Bhoja, Kashi Sanskrit Series (repr. 1982).
YSV = *Yoga-Sūtra-Vṛtti* of Bhāvāgaṇeśa, Kashi Sanskrit Series (repr. 1982).

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FRANK J. HOFFMAN

THE PRAGMATIC EFFICACY OF *SADDHĀ*

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The goal of this paper is to trace the outlines of the concept of *saddhā* in early Buddhism with a view to showing how early Buddhism takes a *pragmatic* religious road rather than an *intellectualistic* one. An intellectualistic road would be, for example, like the one Anselm takes in constructing his ontological argument for the existence of God.[1]

The approach taken in early Buddhism, by contrast, is pragmatic in that it involves an initial openness to test things religious for oneself by personal experience, rather than trying to construct abstract philosophical proofs for religious beliefs.

This is not to say, however, that one is encouraged in early Buddhism to have faith in the sense of 'believing on insufficient evidence'. As will become clear, 'initial faith' is not this but is a listening orientation, a willingness to hear the *dhamma*.

There are, in addition to *saddhā*, other terms such as *pema* and *aveccappasāda* which are relevant to the discussion of faith in early Buddhism. Ānanda, for example, is said to have had too much *pema* ('affection') for the Buddha.[2] In other contexts, *pema* has a pro-attitude use when linked with *saddhā* in its pro-attitude use, as when referring to those who have 'enough faith, in the Tathagata, enough regard',[3] And, as Jayatilleke points out, the verb *pasīdati* ('to have faith in, appreciate') is used to refer to the Buddha, while *pasāda* in the compound *aveccappasāda* frequently refers to Buddha, *Dhamma*, and *Saṅgha*.[4] Nevertheless, in this paper the focus is on *saddhā*, a frequently recurring term usually translated as 'faith' or 'confidence' and sometimes even 'belief'.

Saddhā is rarely if ever given careful, detailed consideration by Pāli scholars, for they often accept the received view of early Buddhism as empiricism on which certain uses of *saddhā* may be ignored as

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anomalous data which do not fit the received view. The purpose of this paper is to discuss some uses of *saddhā*, usually rendered as 'confidence' or 'faith', and the importance of this concept for understanding knowledge and religious belief in the early Buddhist context.

I

In discussing *saddhā* the issues of the relation between confidence and learning the doctrine, between confidence and practical results, and the interpretation of *amūlikā saddhā* and *ākāravatī saddhā* are crucial.[5]

On the relation between confidence and learning the doctrine, consider, for example, the *Majjhima Nikāya* passage.[6]

> When I had heard that *dhamma* I gained faith in the Tathāgata

juxtaposed with another *Majjhima* passage.[7]

> If faith is born, then he approaches.

Taken in isolation the first passage might mistakenly be viewed as support for the notion that *saddhā* is only consequent to hearing the doctrine. Not only is it confidence in the *Tathāgata* (rather than specifically in the doctrine) which results, but also this quotation is balanced by others, like the second one, in which *saddhā* is prior to investigation. From an epistemological perspective, therefore, *saddhā* sometimes precedes, and is not always consequent to checking the doctrine.

It is illuminating to see *saddhā* from a pragmatic perspective, in terms of whether it follows or precedes practical realization of the path. On the one hand, considering learning elephant riding and handling the goad (which are compared to becoming a Buddhist adept) it is said:[8]

> Had he no faith he could not attain whatever is to be won by faith.

In this context *saddhā* is one of the five qualities (*pañca vasāni*) for making progress on the path, and is *prior* to achieving results. In the same vein a *Majjhima Nikāya* passage explains that the development of the *abhiñña* depends on *saddhā*.[9] In another context, however, *saddhā* comes *after* getting results based on a hearing of the doctrine.

'Be a *dīpa* (lamp, island) for yourself', the trainee is urged, and do not accept anything on report, tradition, or hearsay, but because you have known and seen it yourself.[10]

Saddhā is one of the five powers which, taken together, define the *Arahant* when they are fully developed. Having a proper degree of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and insight is having the necessary and sufficient conditions for becoming an *Arahant*.[11] But in addition to this sort of usage of *saddhā* as a faculty, for example, in the phrase 'the moral sense of faith', it also occurs in expressions like 'walking according to faith' and 'living in faith',[12]

A very different and negative usage is exemplified by the story of the wanderer, Magandiya, proud of his health, who is told by the Buddha that such pride is like being taken in by a 'confidence' man. Being proud of one's health is compared to 'confidence in the man with vision' (i.e., the trickster) who offers a greasy, grimy, coarse robe as if it were a lovely, unstained, pure, white cloth.[13] Since the word used is *saddhā*, it is clear that having *saddhā* is not always regarded as a good thing.

Elsewhere in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, however, there is a clear contrast between: 'a good man has faith' and 'a bad man is lacking in faith'.[14] *Saddhā* is here used with a pro-attitude, as in the 'five qualities' usage. There are degrees of *saddhā*, as the difference between those 'with only a little faith, with only a little regard', and those 'who have gone forth from home into homelessness without faith, who are crafty' shows.[15] The latter is contrasted with the phrase, those who have 'gone forth from home into homelessness through faith in me'.[16] When *saddhā* is used as a virtue, it is linked with moral habits involving certain attitudes, as in the case of 'young men of family who have faith and are of great enthusiasm, of great joyousness and who, having heard this, focus their minds on suchness'.[17] That moral habit is seen as an important way of developing *saddhā* as a virtue is clear in the emphasis given to family background, 'he who comes from a family that has no faith' being at an initial, although not necessarily final, disadvantage.[18] Sometimes, too, faith is used with a pro-attitude in reference to the Buddha, the doctrine, and the monastic order, and these may be mentioned singly or in combination.[19]

There is no evidence of a division among the uses of *saddhā* such that confidence in the doctrine is a primary use and the other uses are of lesser importance. For example, there are non-cognitive applications, such as 'if faith is born, then he approaches' in order to hear the doctrine. Although it would be a mistake to over-emphasize a single strand of the complex concept as more important than all others, there are some passages which suggest the overriding importance of *saddhā* in the *Tathāgata*, for example:[20]

> If he has enough faith in the Tathāgata, enough regard, then he will have these things, that is to say the faculty of faith, the faculty of energy, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of wisdom. This, monks, is called the person who is striving after faith.

If it is correct to assume that the second occurrence of *saddhā* here, as in 'the faculty of faith', refers to doctrine, then one *consequence* of sufficient faith in the *Tathāgata* is faith in the doctrine. Taken in this way, the passage depicts the former as the source or precondition of the latter. I mention this passage, not to argue for one usage of *saddhā* as primary in general, but to offset the undue weight given to *ākāravatī saddhā* (Jayatilleke: 'rational faith').[21]

Jayatilleke calls attention to a distinction presented in the *Majjhima Nikāya* between confidence based on checking some points of the doctrine by acquiring 'knowledge and vision' (which confidence is called 'rational faith' M. N. I 320), and the 'baseless faith' (*amūlikā saddhā*) which the brahmins are said to have had toward the Vedic scriptures. Although Jayatilleke indicates that there are affective, conative, and cognitive aspects of the concept of *saddhā*, in the context of his expressed interest in the cognitive aspect in order to illuminate early Buddhist theory of knowledge, a reductionistic account in terms of propositional belief emerges according to which other *aspects* (he denies that there are different *uses*) of *saddhā* telescope into the cognitive one:[22]

> (659) The object of saddhā in the Nikāyas is most frequently the Buddha. The favourite phrase is 'having heard his doctrine he acquired faith in the Tathāgata' (taṃ dhammaṃ sutvā Tathāgate saddhaṃ paṭilabhati, M. I. 179, 267, 344; M. III. 33). If saddhā means belief', 'acquiring faith in the Buddha' is equivalent to saying 'believing in the Buddha' and what is meant by believing in the Buddha is that one believes that what the Buddha says is true. As Woozley points out, 'certainly we do talk of

> believing in a person but there we mean that we believe that what he says is true.'[2] The verb pasīdati, 'to have faith in, appreciate' also has the person of the Buddha as the object (e.g. Satthari pasīdiṃ, M. I. 320) but pasāda- in the compound aveccappasāda- (*v. supra*, 655) frequently has the Buddha, his teaching (Dhamma) and his Order (Saṅgha) as the objects. 3 Here 'faith' or belief in the Dhamma means the statements that constitute the Dhamma or the teachings of the Buddha. Likewise, believing in the Saṅgha implies believing in the truth of the utterances of the Saṅgha; since these were more or less derived from the Buddha, it again ultimately implies a belief in the statements of the Buddha.

The third sentence in the quotation above, in particular, states that believing in the Buddha and believing that what the Buddha says is true are *equivalent*.[23] What Jayatilleke is doing here is giving an account of *saddhā* such that other uses are parasitical upon its cognitive use. There are two major difficulties with this attempt. First, it is mistaken to suppose (with Woozley) that believing in a person is tantamount to believing that what he says is true. For as Basil Mitchell's 'parable of the Stranger' shows, belief in a person sometimes occurs even when it is recognized that the person says some things that are false.[24] Secondly, even if the supposition of 'equivalence' just mentioned were philosophically defensible as a general account of 'belief in', it would, anyway, not be factually correct to think that in early Buddhism the cognitive aspect of *saddhā* is primary or fundamental. For *saddhā* is sometimes operative *prior* to knowing the doctrine, as in 'if faith is born, then he approaches' and 'had he no faith he could not attain whatever is to be won by faith'. Thus, there are non-cognitive elements or aspects of *saddhā* which are ignored if one treats believing in the Buddha as equivalent to believing that what the Buddha says is true.

Jan Ergardt's work, *Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism*, tends to support the view that it would be mistaken to try to reduce all strands of *saddhā* to the cognitive one. He writes:[25]

> To sum up: faith in these texts is mainly an affective and conative faculty that functions in the disciple's good decisions on the way to the goal. Its cognitive aspect is secondary and derived from the dhamma, of which the utmost knowledge is the knowledge and experience of release and nibbana. Faith is not a necessary condition for the religious process but knowledge and experience are.

But what is 'religious process' here? If it includes approaching to hear the doctrine from a teacher of *dhamma*, then the last quoted sentence above is objectionable. For *saddhā* in the sense of an initial confidence with which to approach is, indeed, a necessary condition for the religious process on this inclusion.

Faith and knowledge are not opposed to one another in early Buddhism, as Ergardt points out. He sees that 'the consequence of this confidence in the Buddha, the dhamma and the sangha is development towards knowledge and experience of release' and notices that, in contrast to 'belief', 'faith is the more dynamic term suggesting a warm, even passionate attachment and implies the urge to some kind of action as a result'.[26] Ergardt rightly pinpoints 'the dynamic quality which is part of the Buddhist healthy faculty of faith', and supports the suggestion argued for herein *viz*., that *saddhā* is viewed as pragmatically efficacious in early Buddhism.

Another reason to think that the distinction between *amūlikā saddhā* and *ākāravatī saddhā* presented by Jayatilleke as representing Hindu and Buddhist faith respectively is not as sharp as he suggested is found by examining *Majjhima Nikāya* I 478.[27] Here the Buddha says of the person who if 'freed by faith' that there is still 'something to be done through diligence'.[28] Commenting on this passage Barua observes:[29]

> In the lowest rank is placed the Saddhānusārī who develops the five faculties, essential to mukti, by way of blind faith in and through the love of the Buddha.

One should not be misled by this assertion into thinking that faith in early Buddhism is by itself sufficient for liberation. Both the text and Barua's comment on it shows that the *saddhānusārī* leave something to be done on the Buddhist path, unlike those who are 'freed both ways' (*ubhatobāgavimutta*) and those who are 'freed by intuitive wisdom' (*paññāvimutta*). But the person freed by faith does have *some* of his cankers (*āsavas*) destroyed, and has a firm faith in the *Tathāgata*.[30]

Barua sees the importance of Buddhist faith for approaching the teacher, and emphasizes that 'the Buddhist faith is essentially that of a religious student'.[31] Here faith is seen as pragmatically efficacious for progress in the *dhamma*. Another way in which *saddhā* is pragmatically efficacious in early Buddhism is seen in the life of the Buddha as interpreted by Kalupahana thus:[32]

> Upon reaching Isipatana, Buddha discovered the five old-time friends continuing with their mortification of the flesh. The five ascetics recognized Siddhārtha.
>
> "Here comes the weak-minded Siddhārtha, who gave up austerities for a life of abundance," said one of them, calling the attention of the others. "It would not be proper for us to pay any respect to a person who vacillates when faced with the rigors of spiritual exercises."
>
> Yet, as the Buddha came closer to them, they noticed the change in his physical personality. They were mystified by the peace and serenity that was reflected on his face. They realized that it was not the same Siddhārtha that they left behind in Uruvela; he was completely transformed. Yet they could not understand his spiritual achievement. In spite of their earlier decision not to pay the Buddha any respect, they could not resist the temptation to get up from their seats when Buddha reached them. One of them took his bowl and robe; another prepared a seat; a third set water for him to wash his feet.

Part of the spiritual transformation described above is that the Buddha has confidence that he can teach *dhamma*. As depicted in the *Udāna*, the experience of enlightenment in which the Buddha understands causality involves the elimination of all doubts.[33] Hence the above-mentioned 'peace and serenity' may well have characterized the Buddha after enlightenment.

If, as I maintain, *saddhā* in early Buddhism is pragmatically efficacious, then it may be asked: in what ways is it efficacious? The foregoing account enables one to distinguish three levels of the application of *saddhā*. First, *saddhā* is pragmatically efficacious in coming to hear the doctrine. This does not necessarily involve an element of intellectual assent, but does involve a willingness to approach a teacher and listen to the *dhamma*. When *saddhā* is applied at this level it can be characterized as 'initial faith'.[34] Secondly, while on the path and before enlightenment, *saddhā* is one of the five qualities necessary for making progress on the path. In particular, the development of *abhiññā* requires *saddhā*. At this level *saddhā* may be rendered 'confidence', and here confidence in the Buddha, the *Dhamma*, and the *Saṅgha* would be appropriate examples. Thirdly, *saddhā* is necessary after becoming enlightened if one is to teach the doctrine effectively as did Gotama Buddha.[35] At this level *saddhā* may be characterized as 'realized faith', and in this sense it is incompatible with doubt (*viccikicchā*).

Thus, in view of the account just given, *saddhā* is of continuing significance for the exemplary religious life in early Buddhism from beginning to end. It is not that *saddhā* is only important for the laity; nor is it irrelevant in the life of the Enlightened One himself. Indeed, as long as there is recognition of the role of religious experience in early Buddhism, without any suggestion that *saddhā* is the only important early Buddhist concept, then it would not be too much to say that *saddhā* is the alpha and the omega of the exemplary Buddhist life.

II

The nature of religious belief is a difficult and technical problem in the philosophy of religion. In this part of the paper I explore the question of whether and how philosophers of religion may learn from considering early Buddhism something of the nature of religious belief.

One of the most obvious lessons is that early Buddhism presents itself as a non-theistic religion, so that in a *descriptive* sense (of course not in all *pre*scriptive senses) of the term, 'religion' is not necessarily theistic. It is not that early Buddhists were unaware of theism: they considered the view that *Issara* is Creator God and rejected it.[36]

Faith, however, plays a significant role in early Buddhism, although not in the way it is sometimes taken in the West as insufficiently evidenced belief. At none of the three levels of the application of *saddhā* discussed in part I is *saddhā* ever tantamount to believing something on the basis of report, tradition or hearsay.[37]

Philosophers of religion are often exercised by the question of whether religious belief requires justification or not.[38] One group typically claims that religious belief neither requires, nor admits of justification. (They are sometimes called fideists, although this is not a precise designation.) Another group believes, with Hume, that a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. On this view religious belief does stand in need of justification. And, unsurprisingly, it is the philosophers of religion who are supposed to provide this justification.

Accordingly some philosophers of religion in the latter group have sought support for religious belief in arguments from miracles. Well-known difficulties with this sort of argument are summarized by prominent philosophers of religion and require no repetition here.[39] What is significant for the present line of inquiry is that the Buddha is depicted in the *Kevaḍḍha Sutta* as prohibiting his monks from performing miracles in order to gain converts.[40] Hence it is clear that the *dhamma* does not stand in need of justification by miracles according to early Buddhism.

Does it stand in need of any other sort of justification? Not by way of pure reason does the Buddhist procede, as the rejection of the methods of the *takki* ('logicians') shows. Personal meditative experience is the key to *dhamma*; neither working wonders nor pure reason apply.

Thus, if one says that there is a pragmatic tendency in early Buddhism, then this statement must not be taken to imply that the Buddha would admit any and all means of promoting the doctrine. Skill-in-means, often emphasized as a pragmatic emphasis in early Buddhism, includes neither deception nor miracle-working.

Stewart Sutherland, a contemporary philosopher of religion, writes of the Damascus road experience of St. Paul something that also applies to a pragmatic interpretation of the Buddhist road:[41]

> to understand the significance of that experience — what makes it religious — is to grasp the role which it plays in the life of the believer. The experience modifies how he sees his life, how he behaves, and so on, and in parallel fashion the way in which he sees the experience in question may alter in the light of his developing biography. The attempt to understand a particular experience in the absence of at least some access to the subsequent biography is doomed to produce a distorted picture.

According to a pragmatic criterion of *meaning* a proposition is meaningful if and only if it can make a difference. On this criterion it would, for example, be meaning*less* to say that everything in the universe doubled in size overnight since it would not make a difference to experience. The Buddhist belief that things have a causal nature would, however, be meaningful on the pragmatic principle. This is shown in the segment of a biography of the Buddha by Kalupahana quoted herein. A changed physical personality characterized by peace and serenity is the picture of the Buddha one gets just after he understands causality in the enlightenment experience.

In both the careers of Buddha and St. Paul after their most important religious experiences, a conviction which changes their lives is apparent in each case. Buddha claims an insight into things as they really are, and Paul insists that his doctrine is no mere human invention. I do not think that religious experience *necessarily* results in a change of life. For it might be impossible to tell what would have resulted if there were no religious experience, in which case one could not attribute the change specifically to the religious experience. And having a religious experience might result in a confirmation of existing behavior patterns rather than a change in them, in cases when the patterns were already close to a religious ideal. But when religious experience *does* result in a change of life, as in conversion and enlightenment experiences, and when there are religious beliefs understood in the context of such change, on the pragmatic criterion of meaning the religious beliefs are meaningful. Saying so does not require the assumption that the changes always occur only afterwards: they might begin simultaneously with the conversion or enlightenment experience itself.

The pragmatic criterion of the meaning of religious belief is not, however, a panacea for all the problems of meaning in the philosophy of religion. It has its limits, one of the most important ones being that 'making a difference' is so dependent on context that it is not possible to say categorically that a particular religious belief is meaningless. Whether a religious belief is a 'live option' for us or not (to borrow William James' term) depends on the context of our lives.[42] It seems that the most that the criterion can do is to indicate after the fact that a religious belief is meaningful in a context. It cannot sort out which religious beliefs are meaningful and which are meaningless once and for all.

However the pragmatic theory of meaning may hold up against criticism, the pragmatic tendency in early Buddhism stands and is well-documented by modern scholars.[43] I have emphasized the pragmatic tendency of early Buddhism with reference to *saddhā* as efficacious in its three applications distinguished. These correspond roughly to what Jayatilleke has called the affective, conative, and cognitive aspects of *saddhā*.[44]

Does religious belief require justification? This question was posed earlier in section II by pointing to a contrast between those who deny and those who assert that it does. Now it is time to see how light from an account of *saddhā* in early Buddhism can suggest an answer to this question that may be of interest to philosophers of religion.

When *saddhā* is used with a pro-attitude, faith and knowledge are not mutually exclusive in early Buddhism. As previously noted, Ergardt's work tends to support this conclusion. If fideism holds that faith and knowledge are mutually exclusive, then it is false as a descriptive account of religious belief. But if it is taken to mean just that religious belief does not require justification, then it is correct where initial openness to hear the doctrine is concerned. In regard to the affective aspect of *saddhā*, the question of rational justification does not arise. However, where faith on the road to enlightenment is concerned, a justification on the grounds of the pragmatic efficacy of *saddhā* in developing the *abhiññā* can be given. At this level, those who insist that faith stands in need of justification are correct. They are also correct at the third level, realized faith. Here the confidence of the Buddha is rooted in his understanding of causality, and faith is based on knowledge of *paṭiccasamuppāda*.

In summary, the problem of the relation between faith and justification may turn on making finer distinctions between the levels at which faith or confidence are applied to the religious path. On the above account the question of justification for religious belief applies at the secondary and tertiary levels, but not at the primary level. It is up to philosophers of religion who are more interested in Christianity to see whether, and if so how, this kind of solution might apply in that context. In regard to Buddhism E. Frauwallner observes:[45]

> In the teachings of the Buddhistic canons, we see again and again how the Buddha knows to work on his hearers with consummate skill and win them in favor of his doctrine. He, however, does not demonstrate the rightness of his system but he awakens the trustful confidence that the way pointed out by him is the right one.

Certainly Buddha did not set out to demonstrate *dhamma* by pure reason alone. But enough has been said here to show that Frauwallner's characterization only applies to what Jayatilleke has called the affective aspect of *saddhā*, and not to the conative and cognitive ones.

This paper raises more scholarly and philosophical questions than can be solved in its brief compass. The hope that it embodies is that interpreting across boundaries, both between Buddhism and

Pragmatism and between Buddhology and Philosophy of Religion, will be encouraged.[46]

NOTES

[1] Anselm *Proslogion* chs. II and III.
[2] See, for example, the way in which he laments the Buddha's passing away. *Dīgha Nikāya* II, 140. See also David J. and Indrani Kalupahana, *The Way of Siddhartha*, London & Boulder: Shambala, 1982, pp. 225—226.
[3] *Majjhima Nikāya* I, p. 479. I. B. Horner (trans.); *Middle Length Sayings*, London: Pali Text Society, 1970, II, p. 154.
[4] K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1963, p. 386 and p. 389.
[5] Jayatilleke, p. 393.
[6] MN III, p. 33; MLS III, p. 85.
[7] MN II, p. 176; MLS II, p. 365.
[8] MN II, p. 94; MLS II, p. 281.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Dīgha Nikāya* II, p. 100.
[11] *Saṃyutta Nikāya* V, p. 204; *Kindred Sayings* V, p. 180.
[12] T. W. Rhys Davids and Wm. Stede, *Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary*, London: Pali Text Soceity, 1972, p. 675.
[13] MN I, p. 509; MLS II, p. 189. The MLS translation has 'faith', but in this context I think that 'confidence' is preferable.
[14] MN III, p. 23 (MLS III, p. 73); MN III, p. 21 (MLS III, 71).
[15] MN I, p. 444: *pema*; MN III, p. 6 (MLS III, p. 56).
[16] MN I, p. 463; MLS II, p. 135.
[17] MN I, p. 465; MLS II, p. 138. Sung Bae Park has an argument concerning faith as a positive virtue that should be mentioned in this connection. The main premise of Park's argument to show that non-backsliding faith in early Buddhist tradition is impossible does not apply to the first of three senses of *saddhā* herein distinguished, and does not specify the sort of impossibility claimed (logical, empirical, or technical?). From the above quoted premise, plus one about the fallibility of will and intellect, it is inferred that backsliding faith is always possible in the gradual tradition. But this neither means nor logically implies that nonbacksliding faith is impossible in the gradual tradition, contrary to what Park asserts, and early Buddhists would have seen Gotama Buddha's life as an example of its possibility. See his *Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment*, Albany: SUNY Press, 1983, p. 44.
[18] MN II, p. 185; MLS II, pp. 372—373. See also Mrs. Rhys Davids (trans.), *Kindred Sayings*, London: Pali Text Society, 1979, p. 217: 'Faith is the seed . . .'.
[19] See Jayatilleke, p. 389; *cf.* Rhys Davids & Stede, p. 446. There does not seem to be enough difference in the meaning of *pasāda* and *saddhā* in these passages to worry that the former sometimes occurs. They both mean faith or confidence as applied to Buddha, Doctrine, and Order. At MN I, p. 67 *pasāda* occurs in reference to the Buddha and *dhamma* while at MN I, p. 479 *saddhā* is used to refer to the Tathagata.
[20] MN I, p. 479; MLS II, p. 154.

[21] Jayatilleke, p. 393.

[22] Jayatilleke, p. 389.

[23] The translation of *saddhā* as 'belief' here is somewhat arbitrary, and tends to predispose one to accept Jayatilleke's reductionistic account of *saddhā* as propositional belief. I have argued against this reduction in greater detail with reference to H. H. Price's distinction between 'belief "in"' and 'belief "that"' in a separate paper presented at Auburn University on Nov. 12, 1983. (See *Religious Studies* **21**, pp. 381—387.)

[24] The Stranger's behavior as a secret agent is ambiguous (and it is possible that he may have to say what is false in the course of executing his duties). Nevertheless, the resistance forces believe in him. See Basil Mitchell (ed.), *The Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 18—20.

[25] Jan T. Ergardt, *Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977, p. 145.

[26] Ergardt, p. 145.

[27] *Cf.* Jayatilleke, p. 393.

[28] MLS II, p. 153 (MN I, p. 478).

[29] B. M. Barua, 'Faith in Buddhism' in Bimala Churn Law, *Buddhistic Studies*, Calcutta: Thacker, Spink & Co., 1931, p. 346.

[30] MN I, p. 478.

[31] Barua, p. 347.

[32] Kalupahana, p. 102.

[33] *Udāna* p. 1; David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1975, p. 89.

[34] K. N. Upadyaya points out: 'even the initial faith commended in early Buddhism is meant to be critical'. He criticizes the expression 'blind faith' (quoted above from Barua), especially the idea expressed by N. Dutt that *aveccappasāda* ('faith based on understanding') marks a special distinct path to *nibbāna* for the laity. *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1971, pp. 255-261. My use of the term 'initial faith' is not meant to imply credulity, for when *saddhā* is used with a pro-attitude, as a Buddhist virtue, there is no implication of intellectual assent to what is dubious. Contrast: N. Dutt, 'The Place of Faith in Buddhism' in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol. 16, p. 640.

[35] See Kalupahana (1982), p. 102. In this connection it is also interesting to consider the *paccekabuddhas*. In contrast to the Buddha, could it be that they lack *saddhā* sufficient for teaching *dhamma*?

[36] *Dīgha Nikāya* I, pp. 17—18.

[37] Many times in the Pali Canon the Buddha is depicted as urging his disciples not to base knowledge claims on report, tradition, or hearsay.

[38] See, for example, Basil Mitchell, *The Justification of Religious Belief*, London: Macmillan, 1973, and D. Z. Phillips, *The Concept of Prayer*, London, 1965.

[39] For example, see John Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973, pp. 29—30. By contrast, William Rowe is less inclined to entirely reject the argument from miracles in his text, *Philosophy of Religion* Belmont: Wadsworth, 1978, pp. 136—137.

[40] Jayatilleke, p. 324.

[41] Stewart R. Sutherland, 'St. Paul's Damascus Experience' in *Sophia*, Australia, 1975, p. 15.

[42] William James, *The Will to Believe*, New York: Dover, 1956, pp. 2–3.

[43] David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy*, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976, pp. 160–161; K. N. Upadhyaya, *op. cit.*, pp. 290–293.

[44] Jayatilleke, p. 387.

[45] Erich Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1973, p. 124.

[46] An abstract of this paper occurs in *Proceedings of the International Research Conference on Interpreting Across Boundaries* (Honolulu, 1984), and in somewhat different form the paper constitutes part of a chapter in *Rationality and Mind in Early Buddhism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1987.

University of Montevallo
Montevallo, AL 35115
U.S.A.

कालय
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